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For the 2012 Mexican Presidential Elections, about 50 million voters went 
to polls to elect more than two thousand posts. The runner-up attributed the 
defeat to a massive vote-buying mobilisation in favour of the front-runner. 
Reports from electoral observers supported that version. Did vote buying 
modify voters choices? Although the literature has approached vote buying 
from several angles, there remain disputes and gaps in our understanding 
of the mechanisms involved and their direct implications for electoral 
outcomes. In this dissertation, I assess both, asking i) how are Mexican 
voters confronted by vote-buying strategies, ii) what mechanisms for 
targeting and buying votes do parties deploy, and iii) how strong are the 
effects on voting choices. First, I propose an extended two-stage model of 
vote-buying mobilisation to frame the analysis and to resolve conflations 
and confusions in previous research. Second, I employ a mixed-methods 
research design, analysing thousands of phone calls reporting vote-buying 
to a national hotline service, a series of semi-structured interviews with 
brokers, and a list experiment embedded in a nationally representative 
survey in Mexico. Qualitative evidence from calls and interviews confirm the 
two-stage model: that activists begin to target voters long time before polling 
days by knocking on doors, proffering rewards as an exchange for votes 
and compiling lists of electors. Near and during polling days, activists 
conduct the second mobilisation strategy to monitor voters and ensure 
compliance by distributing benefits broadly across the country. Survey 
evidence shows that 15% of those electors switching voting choices near 
polling days were contacted by activists during the Election Day, which 
suggests that further research on vote buying should be more attentive to 
the timing of the exchange. This research contributes to the literature on 
vote buying in three ways. First, it extends theoretical approaches of models 
of vote-buying mobilisation. Second, it provides qualitative evidence from 
both citizens and brokers to understand mechanisms of targeting and 
buying votes. Third, it highlights some indirect questioning strategies –
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Whereas some campaign strategies rely on policies proposals and 
ideological manifestos to win elections, others distribute rewards to 
persuade voters. Academic literature has understood such clientelistic 
strategies as vote buying, which is a one-shot, direct exchange, in which the 
participants have no particular characteristics other than that the recipient 
is a voter (Schaffer 2007, Schedler 2002a). Mexican elections have dealt 
with accusations of vote buying –amidst other types of illegal transactions– 
in exchange for political support. Contemporary literature on clientelism 
(e.g. Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Gans, Mazzuca & Nichter 2009, Nichter 
2008, Stokes 2005) suggests that vote buying requires three components, 
a party machine, brokers in the ground and electors willing to sell their vote. 
 The Mexican case is a good example of the problem in the Latin 
American region. After the Revolution, the Mexican government developed 
a national system of distribution of benefits strategically addressed to social 
groups and individuals. As a result, the dominant party (PRI) maintained the 
power with a vast political network of loyalists constituted of partisan, 
volunteers, public employees and high-level officials. The PRI and the 
government consolidated a national structure what literature on clientelism 
has called political machine (Stokes 2005, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 
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2014). Such structure contributed to stabilise the regime and mitigate 
potential signs of nonconformity. But this corporatist model also shaped 
clientelistic ties between citizens and politicians resulting in individuals 
highly familiarised with deliveries from the government. 
Gradually, electoral reforms –addressing free and fair contests– 
provided access to opposition groups, who began to influence the public 
agenda by occupying strategic political positions. The PRI, therefore, turned 
to other illegitimate methods to keep the power. Electoral fraud appeared to 
come to life. The party developed a national network of regional and local 
leaders –called by literature brokers (e.g. Larreguy, Montiel & Querubin 
2017, Stokes et al 2013, Gay 1999, Schmidt 1974). These leaders were 
able to interact with people at ground level manipulating, at different 
degrees, election procedures, voters’ choices and harass opposition 
groups. In addition, electoral officers, in line with government’s interests, 
used to assist the PRI in conducting operations as stuffing ballots, 
miscounting votes and selectively denying access to polls. The PRI then 
established and consolidated a vast network of brokers working in the 
ground. 
Finally, once Mexican voters removed the PRI from the Presidency 
after seven decades in power, the task of electoral reforms focused on 
undermining numerous fraudulent practices. Amidst other changes, new 
legislation provided electoral authorities with more legal tools to monitor 
closely campaigns, audit parties spending, control a fair access to media 
and even nullify anomalous elections. These measures have contributed 
considerably to remove fraudulent activities. However, these changes have 
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also pressured parties to conduct ground-level electioneering. Given that 
the regime had already developed a party machine, a national network of 
brokers and Mexican voters had already got used to receiving benefits from 
politicians, the presence of vote buying was a matter of time. Although there 
have been conditions for parties to perform vote-buying tactics, they have 
no incentives to do so, because other methods seemed to be enough. 
Academic literature has largely study clientelistic exchanges (e.g. 
Diaz, Estevez & Magaloni 2016, 2012, 2007, Hagene 2015, De La O 2013, 
Hilgers 2008, 2005, Diaz-Cayeros 2008, Magaloni 2006, Shefner 2001, 
Cornelius 2000). However, studies still differ about the extent of the problem 
and its direct implications on electoral outcomes. Whereas qualitative 
evidence (e.g. Schedler & Manriquez 2004) suggest that voters reject 
clientelistic distributions of benefits from politicians, statistical evidence 
(Greene 2016) indicates that a fifth of voters entered such deals, 
exchanging votes for rewards. Why do conclusions differ? To answer this 
question, I approach vote-buying in Mexico by investigating four aspects, i) 
conditions of the case relevant to the Latin American region, ii) the way 
voters cope with vote buying, iii) brokers’ mechanisms of targeting and 
buying voters, and iv) the relationships between the exposition of electors 
to vote-buying and voting choices. Although this difference of findings 
between methodologies has been addressed by literature (Gonzalez et al 
2012), fewer attempts have studied vote-buying from a mixed-methods 
perspective. This study aims to fill this gap. 
This Chapter is organised a follow, I first present the motivations of 
the research. Then, I discuss theoretical and methodological grounds of this 
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dissertation. The I describe the research design and, finally, I describe the 
dissertation plan. 
  
1.1 Dissertation Grounds: The Motivations  
 
In 2012, about 50 million Mexicans voters went to polls1 to elect more than 
two thousand posts, the President, Federal and local Congressmen, 
governors, mayors and councillors. As the previous Presidential election, 
campaigns were fraught with mutual accusations of irregularities (Cantu 
2014b) and malpractices (Alianza Civica 2006). However, in 2012, an 
unexpected margin between front-runner Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN) and 
runner-up, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) caused a series of public 
protests appealing official results.2 Supporters of AMLO filled Mexico City’s 
streets claiming a massive vote-buying mobilisation. 3  EPN eventually 
claimed the victory with 39% of votes against 33% of AMLO. The Electoral 
Federal Institute (IFE) reported official results underlining a high turnout.4 
The report also emphasised the contribution of more than half a million of 
volunteers, over 143 thousand polling stations, hundreds of thousand ballot 
boxes recounted, and millions of votes verified. 
Amidst speculations, social organisations on electoral observation 
supported the version of an illegitimate mobilisation of vote buying (Alianza 
                                                        
1 Source, Election Guide, Democracy, Assistance and Elections:  
http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/140/ (Mexico: 50,323,153). 
2 Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la  Federación (TEPJF), ‘Juicio de Inconformidad SUP-JIN-
0359-2012’, Thrusday 30 August 2012, 
http://www.te.gob.mx/Informacion_juridiccional/sesion_publica/ejecutoria/sentencias/SUP-JIN-
0359-2012.pdf (accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015). 
3 BBC News, ‘Mexico’s Lopez Obrador rejects presidential poll ruling’, Saturday 1 September 2012, 
Latin America and Caribbean News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19440654 
(accessed on Tuesday 28 May 2013). 
4  IFE, ‘La elección en numerous. Elcciones 2012, boletín de Prensa’, 
http://pac.ife.org.mx/2012/eleccion_en_numeros.html (accessed on Wednesday 29 May 2013). 
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Civica 2012).5 Electoral observers reported thousands of activists proffering 
gift tokens to voters from a national chain of shops. In addition, hundreds of 
voters also claimed to be offered cash, materials for construction, bags of 
provisions and clothing for their vote. Most of these claims, however, were 
provided by newspapers and non-academic sources. For domestic 
analysts, post-election claims must be taken carefully since electoral 
preferences could misguide the real status of the election. Citizens’ opinions 
captured after elections not only disclose the perception on the performance 
of the IFE but also disappointments. The truth is that unexpected election 
results and evidence against irregularities suggested a widespread vote-
buying mobilisation. What did it happen then? Did final legitimate strategies 
of campaigns suddenly make voters switch choices? Did vote buying indeed 
switch abruptly parties’ preferences? These are the initial questions of this 
project. 
In a previous study on voting behaviour, Moreno (2003) examines 
influential factors of Mexican voters, i.e. sociodemographic conditions, party 
identity, religion, ideological position of parties, rational choices and party 
rotation. The study addresses the explanatory power of legitimate campaign 
strategies, clientelistic tactics are not even mentioned. I argue that surveys’ 
questionnaires in Latin America omitting illegitimate campaign tactics from 
the set of answers tend to be reductionist. Evidence on the pervasiveness 
and prevalence of clientelism in the region (e.g. Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007) 
suggests that clientelistic exchanges are a political strategy to attract voters. 
                                                        
5  Alianza Civica, ‘Boletín de Prensa’, Monday 3 July 2012, 
http://www.alianzacivica.org.mx/archivos/pub/4434Informe%203%20de%20julio%202012.pdf  
(accessed Wednesday 29 May 2013).(accessed Wednesday 29 May 2013). 
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As a result, the fact of excluding such rewards as a pattern of voting choices 
is a limited approach. 
 There are several forms of distributing rewards for votes. Studies 
have employed the label of vote-buying to allude to a variety of conducts. 
This conflation can produce divergent findings. Given that publications on 
vote buying have proliferated in the literature on clientelistic ties, clientelism 
and patronage have been closely related to vote buying. Since scholars 
have used randomly these terms, in this dissertation, I assess and revisit 
the core attributes of the concepts to clarify definitions, aiming to alleviate 
potential diversions. This diversity can also affect empirical analysis 
particularly, those requiring the operationalisation of variables such as 
surveys. A fundamental distinction between clientelism, patronage and vote 
buying should help to mitigate the problem. 
Specialised literature (Schuman & Presser 1996) demonstrates that 
the wording of survey questions influences respondents’ answers. Vote 
buying is illegal and socially undesirable. Therefore, asking about the action 
in surveys might provoke attitudes of rejection; there is a risk for individuals 
to lie about admitting they have engaged in vote buying. Several efforts 
(UNDP 2006, Stokes 2005, Brusco et al 2004, Speck & Abramo 2001, 2002) 
have addressed the puzzle producing and testing questions on vote buying. 
Although these studies have contributed to our current understanding, 
experimental evidence (Gonzalez, De-Jonge & Meseguer 2017, Greene 
2016, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015, Gonzalez et al 2015, De-Jonge 2015, 
Carkoglu & Ayac 2015, Palmer-Rubin & Nichter 2014, Gonzalez et al 2012, 
Corstange 2009) has reopened the debate, challenging findings about the 
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accuracy of the measurement. A recent study (Nichter 2014) underlines 
conceptual problems of vote buying, which affect results and findings. As a 
result, I review conceptual foundations of vote buying and make two 
significant refinements to the definition: the basis of the agreement and the 
benefits dispensed. 
In addition, based on Nichter’s (2008: 20) model of targeting reward 
of electoral mobilisation, in this dissertation, I develop an alternative two-
stage model of vote-buying mobilisation. My model contributes to research 
by dividing vote buying into the stages of targeting and buying. The former 
refers to individuals exposed to multi-offers and the latter denotes voters 
engaged in a transaction. Literature has tended to analyse vote buying 
employing indistinctly the actions of offering and giving. Because parties 
compete for voters, it is likely that one single voter is exposed to multiple 
vote-buying offers. Although the exposition to several offers depicts the 
intensity of parties’ mobilisation, it omits the fact that voters might assess 
and select one offer over the others or even reject all of them. In contrast, 
the action of receiving rewards from brokers illustrates more closely that 
voters might have entered and closed a vote-buying transaction. In other 
words, the two-stage model offers an analytical framework to examine 
different aspects of vote buying. 
 
1.2 Research Design 
 
Studying vote buying is a complex task for three reasons. First, with regards 
to perpetrators, candidates and parties have no incentives to generate 
records about the strategy since its illegality but also, because judges could 
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nullify elections on the grounds of vote buying. Second, from the citizens’ 
perspective, given that vote buying is contrary to democratic values and 
principles, it is unlikely that individuals acknowledge empathy or any 
engagement in such activity despite experiences. Thirdly, in terms of 
brokers, some actions they undertake during campaigns are punishable, 
there is a vivid risk of prosecution. As a consequence, a single method could 
partially drive research questions on vote buying towards solid answers. 
Mixed-methods then offer a viable option to explore some aspects of the 
phenomenon to understand its mechanisms, identify its processes and 
uncover its hidden structures. Additionally, they provide researchers with 
the versatility to move from one side to another comfortably following the 
needs of the research. In order to overcome some of the complexity of vote 
buying, the design of this research adopts a mixed-method approach. 
 This dissertation uses a mixed-method research design applied to 
Mexico constituted of two qualitative sources and an experiment. The case 
selection responds to the following reasons. The country has a wealth of 
experience in clientelistic transactions (Fox 1994), it also has a rich history 
of politicians manipulating elections (Balinski & Gonzalez 1996), voters’ 
choices (Magaloni 2006, Cornelius 2004), and it is a traditional example of 
a political machine regime (Stokes 2005). In addition, Mexico has hosted 
numerous studies about electoral system (Nohlen 2005, Klesner 2005, 
Cornelius & Craig 1991, Molinar 1989), fraudulent elections (Magaloni 
2010, Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2004, Lehoucq 2003, Schedler 1999, 
McCann & Dominguez 1998), electoral reforms (Serra 2009, Cordova 2008, 
Becerra, Salazar & Woldenberg 2000, 1997, Barquin 1987), and corporatist 
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national structure (Chapman 2012, Grayson 1998). Most of these studies 
have played a prominent role in the study of those areas, in particular, 
elections and clientelistic politics. As a consequence, in Chapter 3, I discuss 
how Mexico provides a good opportunity to investigate vote buying as its 
similar conditions to those political systems with highly institutionalised 
parties’ machines and selective deliveries of benefits.  
The first technique I use is an unconventional qualitative examination 
(Terry & Wong 2005, Arbon et al 2006) of thousands of phone calls from 
the National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in Mexico reporting vote 
buying. In Chapter 4, I assess how Mexicans face vote-buying mobilisations 
based on the accounts of callers. I rely on information provided by non-
recruited interviewees from across Mexico reporting vote buying for more 
than thirteen years of federal and local elections. I intend to capture crucial 
and sensitive details of vote-buying but more importantly how Mexicans 
face these strategies. In addition, records of calls help me to trace dates of 
the reports associated with campaign trends to establish the timing of the 
mobilisation strategies. 
Secondly, I conduct a series of semi-structured interviews with 
brokers to understand how they devise and perform strategies. Different 
from other studies (Hegene 2015, Zarazaga 2014), I focus particularly on 
their tasks to buy votes. Brokers perform numerous duties that cover areas 
beyond elections or even politics. However, in Chapter 5, I essentially 
explore aspects as structures and networks, targeting and buying 
strategies, and mechanisms of compliance. I examine the methods political 
machines works by understanding structures between parties and brokers 
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and networks within brokers’ teams. Furthermore, I investigate mechanisms 
and timing to deploy brokers to streets targeting voters, enforce individuals’ 
voting choices. Finally, I ask brokers about their perception of the success 
of vote buying. 
Finally, I conduct an alternative version of a list-experiment called 
LISTIT embedded in a nationally representative survey to test the effects of 
the exposition of electors to vote-buying on voting choices. This individual-
level data collection is an unobtrusive technique providing respondents with 
anonymity and confidentiality to get truthful responses. Given that vote 
buying is illegal and contrary to democratic values, it is likely that individuals 
underreport their experience. LISTIT offers research a method to ask 
directly sensitive subjects. After uncovering how Mexican voters face vote-
buying mechanisms, strategies and methods employed by brokers, I 
formulate hypotheses focused on timing and personal interaction. Given 
that strategies of vote buying seem to increase near and during polling days, 
the items and wording address such element. Hypotheses aim to determine 
whether switching voting choices respond to encounter with activists near 
or during polling days. Results indicate that one in six electors who switched 
choices reported interaction with activists, which suggest that the timing of 
the electoral mobilisations is crucial to manipulate voters. 
  
1.3 Dissertation Plan 
 
Overall, this research is organised in the following way. In Chapter 2, I 
review the broad use that literature has given to vote-buying. I categorise 
studies and dimensions. Consequently –following Nichter (2014)–, I discuss 
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the terms clientelism and patronage with vote buying by analysing the core 
attributes. I explain how scholars tend to allude to vote buying when they 
are, indeed, including attributes from patronage and clientelism and vice 
versa. I then present my arguments to develop a two-stage model of vote-
buying mobilisation discussing some benefits for research. By examining 
implications of the divergent uses of vote buying on empirical findings, I 
show how results can differ as a result of the conceptual ambiguity. To 
achieve it, I use the discussion of distinct attributes between clientelism, 
patronage and vote buying. Additionally, I use my two-stage model to 
assess traditional survey designs and innovative experiments. Finally, I 
present conclusions and final considerations. 
Chapter 3 introduces the particular conditions that have driven 
Mexico to be a good case for studying vote buying. I explain how the 
transition from an authoritarian to a dominant-party regime favoured the 
context of clientelist politics. I discuss how policies implemented by the 
government on social welfare, distributing resources to individuals and 
social groups, shaped a paternalist state to guarantee political control. Such 
method, however, strengthened clientelistic ties for the success vote 
buying. In addition, emphatic electoral legislation to the government 
interests and a political operation at ground level created incentives for 
performing clientelistic transactions. I show that such distributive policies in 
combination with a national party structure and voters highly familiarised 
with deliveries from the government set an appropriate environment for vote 
buying. I also describe how the outcome of the 2000 Presidential Elections 
pressured other parties to deploy similar tactics during campaigns. I finally 
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examine how recent electoral reforms, addressing free and fair contests, in 
fact, enhanced practices of vote buying. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss how Mexican voters face vote buying. First, I 
explain why the Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes serves as a source for 
qualitative evidence from a citizen’s perspective of vote buying. I focus in 
particular on 2012 to examine trends of reports about the Presidential 
Election. Secondly, using theoretical literature about targeting, I analyse 
accounts reporting activists offering benefits as an exchange for their vote. 
Third, I examine calls reporting conditions and brokers’ strategies to 
distribute benefits and voters accepting rewards to show timing and 
circumstances in which voters engaged in vote-buying deals. In addition, I 
analyse reports about negative vote-buying and calls received on polling 
days, focusing on tactics of targeting near polling stations. It is important to 
admit that, to the best of my understanding, this is the first study presenting 
evidence about negative vote buying in Mexico. Finally, I examine 
mechanisms for ensuring voters’ compliance. 
Chapter 5 discusses parties’ mechanisms for targeting electors and 
buying votes from a broker’s point of view. Firstly, I describe how brokers’ 
structures and networks are connected, developed and shaped for vote 
buying activities. I discuss the extent and strength of these aspects and how 
the relationships between parties and brokers leverage. Secondly, I 
investigate methods and strategies for targeting electors and buying votes. 
I then explain how brokers and parties plan and implement such strategies 
for the success of vote buying. Thirdly, I describe how brokers close vote-
buying deals, discussing relationships between the distribution of rewards 
 13 
near polling days and the execution of mechanisms of compliance. Finally, 
I present the conclusions of the Chapter. 
In Chapter 6, I conduct an alternative technique of a list-experiment 
called LISTIT embedded in a nationally representative survey in Mexico. I 
discuss the design and the data collection, advantages and shortcomings 
of the technique for studying vote buying. I also present the variables of the 
study and justify the items of control. Secondly, I discuss the results by 
presenting relevant descriptive statistics and conducting regression tests. I 
finally discuss results with other studies and present some implications and 
conclusions. 
In Chapter 7, I conclude this dissertation by highlighting the main 
contributions of the research; summarising problems, methods, techniques 
and findings; discussing theoretical and methodological implications with an 





Chapter 2. A Conceptual Review of Vote Buying. 
Revisiting its Defining Attributes and Refining its 







Academic publications have used the term vote buying to refer a variety of 
conducts. Nichter (2014) argues that such diversity has the risk of 
conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970) causing divergent empirical findings. In 
academic literature, vote buying might refer to sports governing bodies 
deciding over an organiser hosting the Football World Cup (Buttler 2002), 
representatives shaping lawmaking (Saiegh 2011) governments allocating 
discretionary state resources (Wyatt 2013), legislators developing projects 
of infrastructure within their constituencies (Golden & Picci 2008), and 
parties distributing rewards to influence voters’ choices (Schedler 2002, 
Schaffer 2002). It is unlikely that empirical findings on a single term of vote 
buying apply to all these conducts. There is a need then to categorise such 
diversity and examine its conceptual foundations. In order to both locate my 
own work into the field and identify relevant previous findings, I review the 
term of vote buying and revisit its defining attributes. 
This review concentrates on the field of electors’ vote buying. 
Scholars investigating clientelist exchanges have shown a renewed interest 
in reassessing this field. Whereas traditional approaches (e.g. Stokes et al 
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2013, Kramon 2011, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Stokes 2005, Brusco, 
Nazareno & Stokes 2004) have focused on revealing parties’ strategies to 
target electors and their mechanisms to enforce compliance, a recent trend 
(e.g. Gonzalez et al 2012, De Jonge 2015, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015) provides 
new methods to estimate more accurately its incidence, re-discussing 
previous results and findings. Given that academic literature on clientelism 
has dominated the research on vote buying, scientists have developed 
several definitions, alluding to a variety of clientelistic exchanges but calling 
all of them vote buying. Clientelism itself and patronage are terms 
interacting closely with vote buying in literature. Scholars seem to employ 
randomly the three related terms when stating only about vote buying. In 
this Chapter then, I deconstruct the concepts of clientelism, patronage and 
vote buying to revisit attributes, comparing similarities and differences. This 
analysis will serve to clarify whether studies allude to clientelism or 
patronage despite naming the acts as vote buying. 
Also, literature concurs that electors’ vote buying entails strategies of 
mobilisation conducted by parties based on personal interactions with 
voters through what theory traditionally calls brokers (Larreguy, Montiel & 
Querubin 2017, Larreguy, Marshal & Querubin 2016, Holland & Palmer-
Rubin 2015, Stokes et al 2013, Gay 1999). Research has examined such 
interactions to buy votes by exploring turnout and voting shares to estimate 
the effects of mobilisation strategies on voting behaviour. Although both 
factors depict electors’ voting choices, this view is not able to describe what 
happens during the period when electors are exposed to multiple vote-
buying offers and when they make the final decision. The problematic 
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aspect is the omission of the fact that electors are able to assess and reject 
vote-buying offers before making choices or even aborting a deal. Thus, in 
this Chapter, I develop a two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation 
(targeting and buying) to offer an alternative view to solve this problem. I 
compare traditional survey designs (Stokes et al 2013, Szwarcberg 2012, 
Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004, Stokes 2005) with the growing area of 
experiments (Greene 2016, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015, De-Jonge 2015, 
Hicken et al 2015, Gonzalez et al 2014, Vicente 2014, Gonzalez et al 2012, 
Gallego & Wantchekon 2012, Kramon 2011, Vicente & Wantchekon 2009, 
Wantchekon 2003) to evaluate advances in research. In particular, I 
examine the wording of vote-buying items based on defining attributes and 
the two-stage model of mobilisation. 
This chapter is organised as follows, I first review the use of the term 
vote buying from a broader view by categorising literature and placing 
research into appropriate dimensions of study. Second, guided by Nichter’s 
(2014) study, I contrast the terms clientelism and patronage with vote buying 
by taking their attributes apart. I briefly discuss how scholars tend to allude 
to vote buying when they are actually including attributes from patronage 
and clientelism. Third, I develop the arguments of my two-stage model of 
vote-buying mobilisation strategy and discuss its benefits for empirical 
research. Fourth, I assess implications of the conceptual development of 
vote buying on empirical research based on the distinction between 
clientelism and patronage and the two-phases of mobilisation. In particular, 
I focus the analysis on traditional survey designs and innovative 
experiments. I finally present conclusions and some implications I will 
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discuss against qualitative evidence in Chapters 3 and 4 and test 
statistically in Chapter 5. 
 
2.1 Vote Buying: The Broad Scope 
 
A variety of studies have employed the term ‘vote buying’ to refer to the 
exchange of personal benefits for individual choices. A majority of these 
works agree with the negative notion of the action since it violates principles 
of fairness, equality and undermines the foundation of electoral procedures. 
Although previous efforts (Hasen 2000: 1326) have identified five targets of 
vote buying, three individuals have prevailed in literature as shareholders, 
representatives and electorate. Schaffer (2007: 1) argues that ‘instances of 
vote buying have reportedly taken place within the International Whaling 
Commission, among members of the US Congress, […] between 
shareholders of large corporations [and within] popular elections’. Other 
studies (Nichter 2014) have classified the usage of the term vote buying into 
four categories as a) clientelistic vote buying, b) legislative vote buying, c) 
non-excludable vote buying, and d) non-binding vote buying. Researchers 
have examined shareholders vote-buying from a more business angle to 
understand the ways corporate governing bodies influence members of 
organisations to arrive at certain decisions. From the political angle, 
scientists have shown interest in representatives and electorate vote-buying 
as their detrimental effects on democratic values. 
Shareholders vote-buying alludes to the bias towards business 
decisions in a corporate governance structure (Hu & Black 2006). For 
instance, when a voting system is established to reach decisions, all 
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shareholders are given with specific rights to vote, usually according to the 
size of their stocks (Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky 2008). Some of these 
members are more aware of situations in specific areas, which creates 
scenarios of incomplete information. Shareholders with bigger stocks have 
incentives to manipulate the choice of the others. The design of the voting 
system is also important to know the number of votes required to reach the 
decision. Shareholders usually offer money and business opportunities in 
exchange for support (Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky 2008). In contrast with 
the political arena, the fact of buying votes of shareholders is not fully 
illegitimate as a measure of persuasion since potential costs of the business 
decision (Clark 1978) and wealth-maximization principles (Cole 2001). 
Representatives vote-buying refers to those voting arrangements 
made in legislative arenas to reach public decisions. Such type of vote 
buying is closely related to congressional norms commonly conducted in 
American politics known as logrolling, which is legal. However, its sensitive 
aspect lies in politicians reaching private arrangement about public affairs 
(Hall & Deardorff 2006). Lobbying is still an effective method to constitute 
majorities and serve as a channel for communication between social groups 
and congressmen despite the evidence against representatives selling the 
vote (Lewis 1998, Groseclose 1996, Hall & Wayman 1990), which 
undermines the foundations of the democratic representation. There is a 
diffuse boundary between legitimate lobbying and illegal vote-buying in the 
legislative arena. Studies on this area have examined the effects of vote 
buying on the formation of majorities (Wiseman 2004, Banks 2000, 
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Groseclose & Snyder 1996), the creation of coalitions (Haefele 1970) and 
particular cases as European Parliament (Rodden 2002), for example. 
Electorate vote-buying alludes to the exchange of money and goods 
for votes. Politics implies an exchange of deliveries for support. From this 
perspective, politics is distributive by nature (e.g. public policies, national 
programmes or infrastructure), but the ways that politicians and 
governments deliver such benefits to people distinguish legitimate transfers 
from other types of exchanges. The study of electorate vote-buying has 
been mostly undertaken from clientelistic approaches. Nichter (2014), 
however, argues that literature on clientelism has employed the term “vote 
buying” referring to a variety of phenomena, which might drive research to 
a conceptual ambiguity and affect empirical results. I then review the 
literature on electorate vote-buying guided by Nichter’s (2014) study on the 
conceptualisation on vote buying. I discuss the development of the definition 
vote buying, focused on the attributes distinguishing vote buying from 
clientelism and patronage. Additionally, I develop a two-stage model of vote 
buying mobilisation, dividing the tactic of targeting from buying. Finally, 
based on surveys and experiments designs, I review the implications of 
employing distinct definitions on empirical research. 
 
2.2 The Conceptual Development of Vote Buying 
 
The conceptual development of clientelistic vote buying has been held by 
literature on clientelism. Although studies seem to agree that exchanges of 
benefits for votes illustrate an act of electorate vote-buying, there are 
particular aspects that require further revision. In fact, (Nichter 2014: 316) 
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argues that ‘studies of clientelism often report survey or fieldwork evidence 
about the relative prevalence of clientelist vote buying, but it is sometimes 
unclear what specific attributes of benefits are considered’. To assess 
differences and similarities of the attributes of vote buying, I deconstruct 
related concepts treated by literature on clientelism, placing vote buying at 
the core of the analysis. 
 
Vote Buying vs Clientelism: The Foundations of the Arrangement 
 
Literature on clientelism has predominantly framed the study of vote buying 
as examining elites and citizens’ ties. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, 
research on clientelism looked at two central factors of the dyad, its 
functional and structural aspects. First, literature has emphasised the 
instrumental-utilitarian incentive of citizens when engaging in clientelism. 
Whilst there are negative consequences for democracy that politicians 
distribute resources discretionarily, it is also a method for individuals to 
receive services, benefits and goods as an exchange of support. In some 
cases, clientelism is an easy way for deprived people to access to 
programmes of food, employment, housing, education or health as well as 
energy, water amidst other essential services. When governments allocate 
limited resources, they tend to subsidise supportive regions. Under these 
circumstances, the poorest see clientelistc exchanges as a ‘strategic 
mechanism for achieving physical and economic security’ (Hilgers 2009: 
51). 
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Secondly, research on clientelism (Gay 1998, 1999) has focused on 
the structural aspect, assuming sincere sentiments between citizens and 
elites. For these scholars, solid norms of solidarity and reciprocity (Lawson 
& Greene 2014, Foster 1961) set the social system that makes clientelism 
work. This type of face-to-face socialisation encourages people to 
participate in activities for the community –beyond politics. It forges a local 
identity by building trust and collective cohesion. There is, indeed, a genuine 
individual sense of collective well-being. These conditions create mutual 
obligations for elites and citizens, which ease the establishment of 
clientelistic deals, benefits and type of support. 
There is, however, an asymmetrical relationship in a patron-client tie. 
This notion is illustrated by Powell (1970), who describes peasants as 
powerless living violence, exploitation, and injustices at the hands of a 
powerful patron. But most importantly, despite the inequality, there is a little 
that peasants can do to change conditions. In addition, the author describes 
a clientelistic system as a relationship that involves ‘[an] interchange of 
noncomparable goods and services between actors of unequal socio-
economic status ranks [...]’ (Powell 1970: 413). This notion conceives 
clients as victims since the unequal social status as well as the inability to 
abort the deal. 
The idea of subordination continued prevailing for a few decades in 
literature. As exploring authoritarian clientelism in Mexico, Fox (1994) 
argues that ‘a wide range of political systems [...] oblige the poor to sacrifice 
their political rights if they want access to distributive programmes’ (Fox 
1994: 152). Electors, therefore, are deprived of the right of free elections as 
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they vote for the incumbent to not lose benefits from the government. Yet, 
an influential study (Auyero 1999) on clientelistic politics in Peronist 
Argentina observes that even though clientelism entails a type of 
domination, these networks are not necessarily an effective mechanism of 
electoral mobilisation. Poor people are not ‘Pavlovian agents who vote and 
support candidates in exchange for favors and services’ (Auyero 1999: 
301). This idea suggests that the poor are able to make voting choices 
despite the domination. The fact of delivering goods, benefits, services and 
favours does not straightforwardly ensure support at polls. 
Schaffer (2002) discusses the automatic connection between 
benefits and votes. Some academics assume that all materials exchanged 
within the political arena are addressed to influence electoral choices; 
however, the author argues that voting behaviour is not the only 
consequence of delivering goods. Such practice can, for instance, shape 
citizens’ expectations about governments or switch negative perceptions 
about crises. In addition, given the variety of goods dispensed and methods 
employed to deliver them, research on vote buying should look at the 
contextual meaning for both givers and recipients. It is then necessary to 
clarify whether the distribution of benefits is truly a strategy of electoral 
mobilisation for parties and what such goods and services do certainly mean 
to people. Schaffer (2002) concludes that given the wide variety of goods, 
services and practices conventionally understood by literature, the category 
of vote buying has inaccurately covered a range of dissimilar phenomena. 
 The discussion about the causal connection between rewards and 
votes stresses two different characteristics of a current distinction between 
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clientelism and vote buying. First, concerning what politicians expect from 
people, voting is one, but not the only, form of support. Second, regarding 
its academic definition, vote buying is a subclass but not a synonym of 
clientelism (Stokes 2007). Recent studies of both clientelism and vote 
buying depict well this distinction. In her ethnographic investigation in 
Mexico City, Hilgers (2009: 52) defines clientelism as, 
[A] voluntary, dyadic arrangement in which two individuals of 
unequal status, who have a long-term personal relationship that 
may include elements of friendship and affection, engage in 
diffuse reciprocal exchanges of non-comparable goods and 
services to mutual benefit. The alliance is informal but is 
governed by a set of norms based on reciprocity, integrity, 
honour, respect and obligation. The concept has been used to 
describe traditional relations between landlords and peasants or 
among villagers, links between politicians and the poor in modern 
societies and alliances among members of the middle class, 
elites, bureaucrats and politicians. 
 
 
The preceding definition entails fundamental aspects for vote buying as the 
exchange of goods and politicians; nevertheless, it does not consider key 
terms as elections, campaigns, electoral support or even votes. Such 
conditions are constitutive elements in Nichter’s (2014: 316) definition of 
clientelistic vote buying. As the author explains, 
Clientelistic vote buying is the distribution of rewards to 
individuals or small groups during elections in contingent 
exchanges for vote choices. Rewards are defined as cash goods 
(including food and drink), and services. Post-election benefits, 
employment, public programs, and transportation to the polls are 
not considered rewards. 
 
 
Such understanding of vote buying redefines three traditional attributes of a 
clientelistic relationship. First, the base of the arrangement. Whereas the 
definition of clientelism establishes the long-term relationship between the 
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two individuals as the foundation of the agreement, the definition of vote 
buying turns to the reward. Even though vote buying entails a link between 
two people, the relationship does not sustain –by itself– the transaction. 
Firstly, because a durable link is not a necessary condition for vote buying 
to succeed and, secondly because citizens engage in vote buying as a 
result of the utilitarian incentive they find in the reward. In addition, by 
focusing on rewards, the definition moves the preceding assumption of loyal 
individuals to more autonomous voters exposed to different offers, free to 
assess and take the best deal. In other words, it sees vote buying as ‘a 
contract’ Schaffer & Schedler (2007: 17). By understanding benefits as 
rewards, the definition superposes then the compensation onto affective 
sentiments in the exchange.  
The second attribute is the restriction of the delivery to election 
periods. By enclosing the distribution of benefits in electoral campaigns, the 
definition excludes other clientelistic exchanges from the concept of vote 
buying. Such observation is illustrated by a study (Spalding 1981) about the 
corporatist regime in Mexico that explains how both government and the 
dominant party managed to regularly distribute cash and services to 
selective social groups beyond elections. This strategy was designed to 
perpetuate the political control since the electoral competition was almost 
non-existent in the seventies (Magaloni 2006, Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 
2004, Weldon 1997, Dominguez & McCann 1995). Mexican politicians 
created a structure of state rewards, binding selective individuals and 
groups to such system (see Chapman 2012). They expected loyalty to the 
regime from people rather than support at polls. Although deliveries used to 
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take place within electoral periods, buying votes was not the intention. 
Therefore, clientelistic exchanges outside elections are not vote-buying. 
Thirdly, following previous ideas (e.g. Kitschelt & Wilkinsons 2007), 
Nichter (2014) adds the condition of contingent to the component of 
exchange, which entails uncertainty and opportunism to a vote-buying deal. 
By adding these features, the definition understands the exchange as a 
strategy subjected to the volatility and particular needs of each electoral 
contest. Also, successful deliveries of rewards are conditioned to electors’ 
behaviour, especially those switching voting choices. But how parties 
overcome the secrecy of the ballot6 to monitor voters’ choices at polls. 
Studies show that parties ensure voters compliance by conducting 
monitoring and enforcement activities through political machines (Gans-
Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2014, Nichter 2008, Stokes 2005). First, parties 
insert own networks into electoral authorities to violate the secrecy of the 
ballot. This strategy relates to an electoral malpractice that Birch (2011: 29) 
calls ‘the manipulation of the administrative process’. Second, during the 
Election Day, parties send brokers to the ground (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & 
Rivera 2013) who, amidst other tactics, ask bought electors to take a photo 
of the ballot paper marked (Vicente 2014) at the polling booth to prove 
voting choices. The condition of contingency to clientelistic exchanges 
arises questions about the implications of delivering rewards before or after 
polling days. Parties should perform tasks of monitoring and compliance to 
mitigate voters’ opportunistic defection (Nichter 2014) when they distribute 
                                                        
6 At the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, only two political regimes –Bhutan and Iran– used 
public-voting systems (Przeworski 2015). However,  
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rewards before the Election Day. In contrast, voters should trust parties’ 
promises if they accede to receive the benefits after turning out. The last 
dilemma is more commonly a patronage arrangement. 
In conclusion, vote buying is a form of clientelism, but distinct from 
other forms of “relational clientelism” (Nichter 2010); especially, when 
translating concepts into measures. Vote buying succeeds with much 
thinner ties. Clientelism is based on long-term interpersonal relationships. 
Vote buying entails contingent individual transfers to voters in exchange for 
votes, restricted to election periods. Instead, clientelism assumes the 
distribution of continued post-electoral benefits to individual or groups of 
voters. 
 
Vote Buying vs Patronage: Benefits Dispensed and Conditions of the 
Dispensation 
 
Literature on clientelism has also related patronage to vote buying as 
studying clientelistic exchanges. Such association responds to two 
constitutive characteristics that patronage shares with vote buying, it is a 
strategy of electoral mobilisation to persuade voters and electors’ support 
is expected at polls. However, two distinct aspects differentiate vote buying 
from patronage, the characteristics of benefits proffered and the promise of 
future deliveries. As vote buying, patronage is a subclass of clientelism 
(Stokes 2007); also called pork barrel, programmatic or redistributive 
politics. Pork barrel denotes mostly legislators biasing the allocation of 
benefits amongst supporters in their geographic constituency through public 
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programmes, hospitals or infrastructure projects (Lancaster 1986). 
Programmatic and redistributive politics allude more to strategies of state 
investments where allocations of expenditure respond to electoral risk 
(Diaz-Cayeros 2008).7 An influential definition understands patronage as 
‘the proffering of public resources (most typically, public employment) by 
office holders in return for electoral support, where the criterion of 
distribution is again the clientelist one [...]’ (Italics in original) (Stokes 2007: 
606). 
As defining patronage, some attempts (Mainwaring 1999) have 
omitted the aspect of proffering benefits during election periods. However, 
literature seems to agree that these promises depend fully on candidates 
holding public offices coming from elections, to reward supporters with state 
resources. Firstly, given that democratic elections have been adopted 
worldwide as a method for politicians to access to public posts, candidates 
promise the allocation of resources during campaigns to persuade voters 
and win elections. As a result, patronage serves as a strategy of electoral 
mobilisation. Secondly, since candidates compete in electoral contests, 
they first need votes to win at polls and then secure resources to fulfil 
promises. Thus, as for vote buying, turnout is a necessary condition for 
patronage. 
In contrast, patronage differentiates from vote buying in two central 
aspects, the promises of benefits and the conditioned fulfilment of such 
                                                        
7 Other labels related to patronage such as bureaucratic clientelism (Schmidt 1974), party patronage 
(Kopecký & Scherlis 2008) and, a recent one known as Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil about 
poverty (Sewall 2008), welfare (Bohn 2011, Hall 2012, Fried 2012, Zucco 2013), and education (De 
Janvry, Finan & Sadoulet 2012); as well as in Mexico (De la O 2013), Honduras (Linos 2013) and 
Philippines (Labonne 2013) are not discussed here. 
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promises. First, in patronage, candidates offer voters promises of future 
benefits instead distributions. Formally, there is no a clientelistic exchange 
during election periods but offers. Patronage strategies, then, imply two 
stages to close a transaction, one in which promises of benefits are 
presented to voters and another in which electors are rewarded. Whereas 
in vote buying rewards for voters depend only on their electoral behaviour, 
in patronage they depend on the electoral outcome. In addition, in a vote-
buying transaction, there is no implication beyond polling days; in 
patronage, instead, once the candidate holds the public office, his 
permanence becomes a public good because an unexpected exit would 
cause the loss of the collective benefits allocated. 
Second, fulfilling promises of future employment, for example, under 
the condition of winning a contest implies that electors should rely on a 
positive election outcome to access the benefits, which makes rewards 
intangible when they turn out. The fact of voters risking their benefits despite 
following through with their side of the agreement creates incentives for 
defection. On the contrary, by binding a prompt enjoyment of the benefits to 
voting behaviour, vote buying provides electors with more certainty over 
rewards regardless the results of the election (Nichter 2014). Another 
aspect here is the type of benefits traditionally proffered in patronage and 
vote buying. Whereas the former tends to distribute public goods, such as 
community services, infrastructure projects or social transfers, literature on 
vote buying seems to agree that contingent exchanges mostly include 
private goods, such as bags of provisions or money (Schedler 2002a). 
Economic approaches to elections (Deacon & Shapiro 1975) have warned 
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about assuming that individual behaviour at polls coming from collective 
goods 8  is similar to those conducts coming from personal benefits. 
Empirical results ‘cast doubt upon the notion that individuals somehow alter 
their preferences (or behavior) away from selfishness and toward the social 
good as they leave the market [...] and enter the polling booth’ (Deacon & 
Shapiro 1975: 954). 
As vote buying, patronage functions as a strategy of electoral 
mobilisation. But, offers of future state-related employment and promises of 
selective allocation of benefits from state resources during campaigns do 
not qualify automatically as a vote-buying deal. Nichter (2014) notes that 
literature on vote buying has lacked conceptual clarity about rewards. 
Whereas a majority of studies exclude this type of benefits from the concept 
of vote buying, others (Schaffer & Schedler 2007, Baland 2007, Lehoucq 
2007, Desposato 2007, Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004) acknowledge 
both promises of employment and selective allocations of public 
programmes as a vote-buying agreement. Such conceptual imprecision 
could ‘distort descriptive findings and threaten the validity of causal claims’ 
(Nichter 2014: 315).  
An illustrative review –rather than rigorous– about recent definitions 
of vote buying shows that literature supports Nitcher’s (2014) claims about 
conceptual consensus. For instance, guided by Stokes (2007), Jensen & 
Justesen (2014: 220) define vote buying as ‘the direct exchange at the 
individual level of rewards and material goods by political patrons in return 
for electoral support by voters’. Likewise, Gonzalez et al (2012: 202) see it 
                                                        
8 On this defintion of collective goods, see Nichter's (2014, 322-3) discussion on Non-Excludable 
Vote Buying and Non-Binding Vote Buying. 
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as ‘the exchange of goods for votes at the individual level’. Hicken (2007: 
51) understands it as ‘the individual, immediate, and private exchange of 
goods, services, or cash for electoral support’. Finally, in a further study, 
Gonzalez et al (2014: 197), adding the time of the exchange, define vote 
buying as ‘[...] the exchange of private goods for votes during electoral 
campaigns’. Focusing on such observation, other studies have particularly 
restricted the exchange to campaigns, despite omitting the aspect of private 
goods. For example, Vicente (2014: F357) defines vote buying as ‘the 
exchange of cash for votes before the elections’. Likewise, Vicente & 
Wantchekon (2009: 293) see it as ‘votes-for-cash, or votes for other fungible 
goods, before the election’. As it can be seen, studies on vote buying, first, 
concur with restricting a vote-buying exchange to private rewards at the 
individual level and, second, they confine the time of the exchange to 
campaigns. 
By contrast, a few studies, as Finan & Schechter (2012), adopt a 
broader definition of vote buying following ideas of a more clientelism 
approach. 9  Authors assume that voters support candidates who have 
previously provided them with particularistic forms of redistribution. This 
definition, first, omits the condition of support at polls as an exchange of the 
reward and, second, by considering the condition of a particular form of 
redistribution, it turns to a long-term relationship as the basis of the 
agreement. As I have discussed, from an instrumental viewpoint of vote 
                                                        
9 Well depicted by Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes (2004: 67), who describe vote buying as ‘the proffering 
to voters of cash or […] minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in 
exchange for the recipient’s vote’. 
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buying, instead affective sentiments between individuals (Lawson & Greene 
2014), tangible rewards sustain the arrangement.  
 
2.3 The Mobilisation to Buy Votes: A Two-Stage Model 
 
What mobilises voters? This is a central question to understanding voting 
behaviour. A pioneer theory (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet 1948) has 
suggested two fundamental elements as individual-level influences (e.g. 
shaped by sociodemographic elements and attitudes) and environmental 
factors (essentially information and campaigns). With a focus on the latter, 
parties design messages and devise campaign structures to persuade and 
mobilise voters. Parties strategies to this purpose, then, play a key role in 
winning elections. They perform actions of canvassing and electioneering 
to influence choices and make voters turnout. Such patterns of electoral 
competition, however, are sometimes a welcome opportunity to conduct 
clientelistic strategies. Given that vote buying leverages the interaction 
between citizens and politicians during election periods, parties, therefore, 
develop tactics to buy votes and mobilise electors as electioneering and 
canvassing. But how are these particular strategies of mobilisation? 
With nuances, literature (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Cruz, 
Keefer & Labonne 2015, Hidalgo & Nichter 2016, Szwarcberg 2012, Nichter 
2008, Stokes 2005, Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004) has agreed that vote 
buying is an effective strategy to mobilise voters. Scholars seem to measure 
the success of vote-buying mobilisation strategies by looking at voters’ 
turnout and voting shares. Although these both measures illustrate well the 
effectiveness of such tactics, they are unable to describe what happens 
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during the period when electors are exposed to offers and when they go to 
polls to cast the vote. I argue that a successful tactic of mobilisation by 
buying votes entails two stages (see Figure 2.1). One, in which parties 
present voters with several offers and, another, in which voters accept or 
refuse the offer but also, accept one amongst a number of offers. Focusing 
exclusively on the behaviour of voters at polls, exclude the possibility for 
exploring that, under multi-offer circumstances, some voters could have 
rejected other deals despite responding to a vote-buying strategy. In 
addition, competing offers indicates that at least one could be rejected, 
which prompts a different angle about the effectiveness of vote buying. 
 




Literature has outlined a two-stage approach to the mobilisation of voters 
by treating targeted and bought electors separately. Nevertheless, the 
distinction is not explicit.10 For example, in a study conducted in Turkey 
entitled ‘Who Gets Targeted for Vote-Buying? [...]’, Carkoglu & Aytac (2015) 
employ a broader definition of vote buying (Brusco, Nazaeno & Stokes 
2004: 67), that understands it as the ‘proffering to voters of cash or (more 
commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in 
opposition, in exchange for the recipient’s vote’. Authors associate the 
activity of proffering goods with the concept of targeting voters. The 
sensitive item of the list experiment is consistent with link11  by asking 
respondents whether or not they were offered goods instead if they were 
given. Proffering goods to voters makes them targeted electors, which 
concurs with the first stage of my model. However, the study concludes 
about the ‘prevalence of vote-buying [...] in Turkey’ (Carkoglu & Aytac 2015: 
16) rather than the incidence of targeting tactics. Proffering goods depicts 
the number of voters exposed to vote-buying offers but it does not 
necessarily mean that all those exposed voters engaged in the deal since it 
is neither clear whether the vote-buying transaction (the exchange of goods 
for votes) has been completed nor the vote choice of the elector. 
By contrast, another study entitled ‘Who Gets Bought? Vote Buying, 
Turnout Buying, and Other Strategies’ (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 
2009) uses a narrower definition of vote buying, stressing the distribution of 
                                                        
10 An initial observation about the difference between measuring “proffering” versus “receiving / 
delivering” a reward is made by Nichter (2014: 319) as analysing several implications of the concept 
for the empirical research. 
11 It is worded as follow, ‘Someone offered you or your family personal services, a job, or similar 
material benefits in exchange of your vote for a party’ (Çarkoğlu & Aytaç 2015: 4) 
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benefits to individuals. ‘Political operatives frequently hand out not just cash, 
but also a wide range of goods and services such as bags of rice, chickens, 
whisky, clothing, soccer balls, Viagra, haircuts, and teeth cleaning’ (Schaffer 
2007: 2). By assuming that voters have received the reward, this study 
effectively associates the fact of delivering goods with the concept of buying 
electors. However, authors manage indistinctly both proffering and giving 
goods. By ensuring that electors do receive benefits from parties during 
election periods, provides feasibility of the consummation of a vote-buying 
transaction. The second stage of the expanded mobilisation model (i.e. 
voters potentially exposed to multiple vote-buying offers, deciding to take 
one of the offers) is in line with this assumption. But what happens between 
the two stages is uncertain. 
The second stage of the mobilisation model is vital for vote buying 
as it is the period when the transaction is closed (benefits for votes). At this 
stage, both individuals, bought voters and buyers, must have fulfilled their 
side of the contract. Given that vote buying is an arrangement of contingent 
exchanges of tangibles benefits for votes confined in election periods, 
current studies seem to agree that vote buying intensifies as polling days 
approach. Studies in the Philippines coincide with the timing of vote buying. 
Abocejo (2015: 37) indicates that ‘[v]ote buying continues to be a 
widespread practice during election period more predominantly during 
election-day when voters are about to go to the polling centers to cast their 
votes’. Likewise, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne (2015: 8) argue that ‘vote buying 
is prevalent and tends to take place a few days before the elections’. 
Similarly, another study in Africa (Lucky 2014: 11) suggests that ‘Nigerian 
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politicians have been known to distribute food stuff and other consumable 
materials to voters shortly before the elections and sometime on Election 
Day [...]’. Equally, Hilgers (2011: 572) agrees that vote buying can be 
reduced to ‘[...] a candidate paying a citizen a certain amount of cash on 
election day for his vote [...]’. In fact, for some authors (Hicken, 2007, 
Schaffer 2007) the timing is ‘[a] key defining attribute of clientelist vote 
buying [...]’ (Nichter 2014: 317). 
Other studies provide worldwide evidence about the timing of vote 
buying and electors mobilised during polling days. From Africa, Jensen & 
Justesen (2014: 221-2) report that, for the 1997 Kenyan Elections, ‘in 13 
percent of polling stations, secret voting was not guaranteed, and vote 
buying was quite common on the day of the election’. Similarly, Mares & 
Young (2016: 16) underline that ‘[m]ost election-monitoring interventions 
focus their resources [African parties] on having a large number of 
observers present on the day of the polls, engaging in very limited 
observation during the weeks or months prior to an election’. Additionally, 
Onapajo, Francis & Okeke (2015: 12) report that, in Nigeria, monitoring, 
[C]ame as a new method after politicians realized that voters in 
most cases do not comply after payment for their votes. 
Therefore, politicians (in connivance with electoral officers) 
influence the creation of congested polling centers that would 
allow for monitoring of how people vote regardless of the fact that 
Nigeria operates a secret ballot voting method. 
  
 
Studies in Latin America find similar strategies of mobilisation. Larreguy, 
Marshall & Querubin (2016: 160-1) argue that in Mexico, ‘brokers typically 
implement voter mobilization strategies on election day because they are 
better informed about the preferences of individual voters than political 
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parties [..] political parties hire brokers to mobilize likely supporters that 
would not otherwise turn out [...]’. Similarly, Mustillo 2016: 21-22) explains 
that in Ecuador,  
Organizationally, a vote-buying party is deployed to execute a 
quid pro quo transaction with voters, one at a time. The party–
voter relationship is an ephemeral one, and an electoral vehicle 
that springs into action around election time can suffice. [...] 
Delegates of the central party quite literally ride into town very 
near election day and conduct their campaign or use local 
affiliates to execute the transactions on their behalf. 
  
 
Research in Asia also shows patterns of vote-buying mobilisation during 
election days. In Taiwan, ‘voters usually received money for the purchase 
of their votes on the eve of election day’ (Wang & Kurzman 2007: 234). In 
the Philippines, Hicken et al (2015: 352) argue that ‘[m]ost of the vote-
buying occurs in the last few days before the election’. A study in China, 
(Kennedy 2010: 617) reports that ‘[o]n Election Day [...] rural voters come 
to the polling site ready to vote. Before eligible voters cast their ballots, 
however, they are treated to an endless flow of beer and wine compliments 
of a wealthy candidate’. 
These pieces of evidence shed light on the degree and intensity of 
parties’ strategies to mobilise electors during polling days by buying votes. 
Despite the fact that these accounts support the last stage of my model -
parties buying electors during the election day, those tactics employed by 
parties to present vote-buying offers to voters (targeting electors) is still 
unexplored. There is a considerable space for research at explaining what 
happens between targeting and buying to those electors engaging in vote 
buying. A recent effort (Greene 2016) has drafted this issue by estimating 
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the effects of vote selling on voting choices. The study employs mixed 
statistical methods to track electors along a campaign for the 2012 Mexican 
Presidential Elections. Although its conclusions suggest opposite trends to 
traditional approaches, further research to explore electors’ attitudes and 
decisions between targeting and buying is still necessary. 
Literature has acknowledged the coexistence of several strategies of 
electoral mobilisation employing the distribution of benefits to voters. 
However, (Nichter 2008: 20) observes that ‘most studies fail to distinguish 
whether rewards are used to influence vote choice or induce electoral 
participation’. To tackle the issue, the author develops of a two-dimension 
model of electoral mobilisation constituted of four strategies (see Figure 
2.2). Each tactic targets different types of voters and meets particular 
monitoring conditions. The first-dimension alludes to voting choices and it 
is divided into two categories, those electors who support the party and 
those opposed to the party. The second-dimension refers to turnout and it 
is also split into two categories, electors inclined to vote and electors 
unwilling to vote. Then, Nichter (2008) explains that in the strategy of 
“rewarding loyalists” (top left cell of the figure), parties reward electors who 
would vote for them regardless the benefit, which requires no monitoring 
actions. In the tactic “vote buying” (top right cell), parties target opposing or 
indifferent voters, intending to switch preferences, which requires 
monitoring activities of compliance. In a “turnout buying” strategy (bottom 
left cell), parties target non-voting supporters, ensuring they go polls; it 
requires monitoring actions of turnout. Finally, in the tactic of “double 
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persuasion” (bottom right cell), parties reward opposing or indifferent non-
voting electors for both turning out and switching voting choices. 
 
Figure 2. 2 Targeting Reward of Electoral Mobilisation 
 
Source: Nichter (2008: 20) 
 
 
Excluding firs cell (rewarding loyalists), this model is in line with the final 
phase of the two-stage model, providing the reasons parties conduct tactics. 
Given that monitoring turnout and compliance are the two causes that 
trigger such strategies, the tasks undertaken by parties to fulfil these needs 
are addressed predominantly to polling days. Yet, the methods by which 
parties find out whether or not voters are supporters, opposing or indifferent 
and whether or not they are inclined or reluctant to turnout is still unknown. 
I argue that in order to obtain such information, parties require a first-stage 
mobilisation strategy to collect information and ensure that they approach 
the right elector with the right tactic. In addition, although Nichter’s (2008) 
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model contributes to literature on electoral rewards by looking at vote buying 
from four different angles, clarifying features and testing his mobilisation 
model, the author uses interchangeably the actions of offering and 
distributing rewards, which, as I have discussed, drive to distinct 
implications for vote buying. Going beyond these analytical refinements, I 
develop a two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation, trying to explain 
what happens during the period of electors exposed to vote-buying offers 
and electors making a final decision. 
  Existing research, therefore, has effectively equated targeting with 
vote-buying and ignored the question of whether someone decides between 
offer or drop the deal. It has also developed the two-stage process of vote 
buying implicitly. To fill this gap, in the following section, I fill this gap, I 
examine the implication of managing proffering and vote-buying indistinctly. 
 
2.4 The Empirical Research on Vote Buying: Conceptual Implications 
and Theories of Mobilisation 
 
Given that literature on clientelism has predominantly framed the empirical 
research on vote buying, I turn to previous efforts to review the literature to 
assess the state of field. Figure 2.3 shows a growing tendency of 
publications studying the subject, accelerating in particular after 2004. 
Despite of decades of publications –to the best of my knowledge–, there are 
only two systematic attempts aiming to evaluate the state of the research 
(Lande 1983, Lehoucq 2003). The first study, published in the eighties, 
makes ‘an assessment of the [...] state of research’ (Lande 1983: 435), 
surveying 25 articles. The second article, published a couple of decades 
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later, makes a critical assessment about ‘the handful of studies that discuss 
the types, magnitude, and determinants of electoral fraud [...]’ (Lehoucq 
2003: 234) including 23 books and articles, focused more on patron-client 
empirical approaches. Both works concur with the predominance of 
historiographical and ethnological descriptive account in empirical research. 
In addition, Lande (1983) detected that those scholars studying less 
developed countries consistently associated informal political structures or 
political cultures with clientelism. By relating politics to clientelistic structures 
in undeveloped countries, this finding pinpoints the historical assumptions 
of clientelistic politics (Powell 1970) –benefits for support– and the origins 
of the asymmetrical dyad in clientelistic ties –poor, deprived and not well-
educated people versus powerful, wealthier leaders. 
 
Figure 2. 3 Publications on Vote Buying (1969-2014) 
 
Source: Author (see Appendix 2.1 for details of the tabulation). 
Notes: Google N-grams reports the relative frequency of mentions of the phrase ‘vote buying’. It 
represents the number of times that such phrase was printed in scanned books in each given period, 
per billion two-word phrases (“bigrams”). Data are from 5.2 million scanned books until 2008. Own 
data are reported on the secondary axis. 
* ‘[A] steady increase in both the quantity and quality of this literature […]’ (Landé 1983: 435-6); ‘A 
majority of the studies use historical accounts and contemporary fieldwork […] a minority of the 
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** ‘Like ethnologists, historians and some social scientists concentrate on cataloguing and describing 
fraudulent activities. Historians, in fact, have been among the few analysts to move beyond the 
anecdotal or prurient interests of so many chronicles of the electorally illicit [...]’ (Lehoucq 2003: 234). 
 
 
Both efforts note a prevalence of historical accounts over formal models 
testing hypotheses. As Lande (1983: 438) describes, ‘[r]esearch methods 
used by the great majority of the authors of these articles were those of 
intensive field observation usually employed by social anthropologists, 
supplemented by a search of historical literature and the recollections of 
older informants’. Similarly, Lehoucq (2003) finds a small number of surveys 
covering the subject versus those using narratives. Interestingly, similar 
observations seem to remain in current publications. For example, Stokes 
(2007: 618) underlines ‘a general lack of quantitative cross-country 
analyses of clientelism and vote buying’. Gonzalez et al (2012: 203) argue 
that ‘[m]ost of the existing knowledge on vote buying remains based on 
qualitative case studies that employ ethnographic techniques to study the 
ways in which clients interact with political brokers and how clients view 
such exchanges’. 
Discussions on research designs have also opened a debate about 
competing methodological approaches and their implications for the study 
of vote buying. About disadvantages of qualitative designs, Landé (1983: 
438) argues that, 
While models of this sort [descriptive case studies] are useful to 
provide insight into the dynamics of complex political systems, 
they suffer from the facts that they are not definitive, and they 
cannot be falsified. Different scholars, examining the same 
political systems from other points of view, could produce 
different models that seem equally coherent and supported by 
selected descriptive material. Another shortcoming of such 
models is that each of them is designed to fit a specific country 




Empirical studies appear to concur with such arguments. Gonzalez et al 
(2012: 203) argue that ‘[a]lthough these studies [ethnographies] have 
greatly increased our understanding of the processes undergirding vote 
buying in specific contexts, this qualitative literature is limited by its inability 
to measure the extent of vote buying and test competing theories about 
party macrostrategy’. Likewise, Weitz (2012: 569) suggests that, 
[S]cholars working in the tradition of ethnographic research have 
demonstrated with great richness how clientelism and closely 
related phenomena operate [...] Although this type of research 
illuminates the inner workings of clientelist exchange, the intense 
amount of fieldwork it requires makes replicating such studies for 
a large number of locations difficult.  
 
In contrast, Lehoucq (2003: 234) underlines advantages of qualitative 
designs, ‘[t]he ethnographers of fraud help us understand what separated 
right from wrong to the people who participated in fraud-tainted elections 
[…] the anthropologists of fraud try to make sense of the dilemmas that 
fraud posed to its perpetrators, its audience, and its observers’. Likewise, 
as a more recent study (Munoz 2014: 95) argues that, 
While survey research and experimental designs have made 
important contributions to the study of such an elusive 
phenomenon, many of these results cannot be adequately 
interpreted in the absence of in-depth knowledge of the political 
setting. In particular, much more attention should be given to 
studying the clients’ point of view. 
 
Both views demonstrating advantages of competing methods for studying 
vote buying suggest that mixed-method designs are essential for providing 
valid and reliable results of a complex phenomenon. Scholars select some 
methods over others to answer specific questions and understand different 
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aspects of the same object of study. But divergent definitions across 
disciplines might prevent research from examining vote buying more 
precisely. In order to explore whether the interchangeably use of offering 
rewards to refer to vote buying has affected findings, I turn to research 
designs relying on operationalisation process to explain this puzzle. 
 
Traditional Survey and Innovative Experimental Designs in the Study 
of Vote Buying 
 
‘Divergent definitions of clientelist vote buying affect not only conceptual 
clarity, but also, empirical analyses’ (Nichter 2014: 319). Given that the 
concept of vote buying emerged from the literature on clientelism, a variety 
of definitions have been employed by scholars, which have lead empirical 
research to actually conclude about patronage and clientelism when 
referring to vote buying. Additionally, such puzzle has driven scholars to 
explore two different stages of parties’ mobilisation strategies and equally 
allude to only one tactic. To examine conceptual implications for research 
in the ground, I turn to the proliferation of surveys and a growing field of 
experiments. These designs are particularly useful as a natural need of 
conceptual operationalisation of variables to construct items and indicators. 
I focus on the development of tools to measure vote-buying incidence in 
both surveys and experiments; the former especially in the Latin American 
Region. 
Research has treated the distinction between proffering and 
distributing/receiving rewards in vote-buying transactions as a unit. 
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Whereas proffering rewards depicts a party’s strategy making offers to 
voters, distributing/receiving such rewards suggest that targeted voters 
have accepted the deal. The discussion of the two-stage model of parties’ 
mobilisation strategy (see Section 2.3) serves to clarify such difference. 
Empirical research on vote buying has tended to conclude about proffering 
as a consummated act of vote buying. The fact of proffering rewards 
illustrates more precisely, indeed, the degree of exposition of electors to 
vote-buying proffers from parties. Although measuring such action shed 
light on the problem, mobilisation strategies at this stage depict the interest 
of parties in buying certain electors rather than electors already bought. In 
his examination, Nichter (2014: 319) observes this point by arguing that 
‘[t]he Nigeria study asks about whether an individual received a vote buying 
offer, not whether he or she actually received the reward’. The test of the 
observation shows that, 
[R]egression findings can be sensitive to the particular definition 
of vote buying employed. Unfortunately, researchers who seek 
to test theoretical predictions about clientelism with survey data 
may conduct regressions using only one definition –and their 
findings may hinge on which definition they employ (Nichter 
2014: 320). 
 
Literature on vote buying has mostly been interested in revealing parties’ 
strategies to target electors and the mechanisms to enforce compliance in 
order to overcome the secrecy of the ballot. However, scholars have also 
shown a novel interest in measuring the spread of the two tactics. Survey 
and experiment designs have mostly provided answers to the problem. At 
the beginning of the Twentieth-First Century, initial efforts published about 
Latin America generated compelling discussions. For example, a nationally 
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representative survey conducted in Brazil report that 6% of Brazilian voters 
were exposed to vote-buying offers during the 2000 Municipal Elections 
(Speck & Abramo 2001). The same research design was reproduced for the 
2002 Municipal Elections, whose results show a considerable decrease 
compared to the previous survey as half of the respondents (3%) admitted 
to being exposed to vote-buying offers (Speck & Abramo 2002). 
Similar efforts were conducted in the region; also, in Argentina, two 
influential studies were published about vote buying. The first (Brusco et al 
2004) conducted two local surveys between 2001 and 2002, which show 
that 7% of Argentinian electors received something from candidates and 
parties. The second (Stokes 2005), employing same datasets in addition to 
other surveys conducted in the country, developed a breakthrough 
analytical strategy for the empirical examination of vote buying. The author 
compared measures between a direct question, i.e. did you receive [...], and 
an indirect question, i.e. did you know if in your neighbourhood a party 
distributed [...]. As expected, results show a difference. Whereas the direct 
question shows that 7% of the Argentinian voters received goods from 
parties, 44% of respondents admitted to knowing that parties distributed 
goods in their neighbourhood. Such analytical strategy guided a national 
representative survey conducted in Mexico for the 2006 Presidential 
Elections (UNDP 2006). Although the variation between direct and indirect 
questions is smaller than the Argentinian case, the difference still remains. 
Only 1.9% of respondents acknowledged to have been offered or rejected 
from a public programme; in contrast, 7.9% of them admitted to knowing 
about other people’s cases. But what explains the differences between 
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countries? What are the implications of the type of questions? Do those 
numbers illustrate the spread of vote buying in each case? 
There are two plausible explanations. Firstly, in connection with the 
design of questionnaires, previous discussions in this chapter (Sections 2.2 
and 2.3) provide some answers. Based on the particular conditions12 of the 
systematic definition of vote buying (Nichter 2014) and the two-stage model 
of mobilisation (targeting and buying) I assess potential implications of the 
items employed to measure vote-buying incidence on the results. Table 2.1 
shows the literal wording for surveys conducted in Brazil, Argentina and 
Mexico. For both studies in Brazil (Speck & Abramo 2001, 2002), wordings 
succeed by restricting transactions to campaigns and rewards to voting 
behaviour; also, it emphasises excludable rewards as money. These 
conditions locate the question within a vote-buying arrangement. However, 
the item asks respondents to think of proffering rather than receiving 
rewards, which places the action into the targeting stage, depicting an 
uncompleted vote-buying transaction. The wording of the first publication on 
Argentina (Brusco et al 2004) also confines the transaction to campaigns, 
alludes to individual rewards and focuses on the physical exchange, which 
depicts a closed transaction. But the item unbinds the clientelistic exchange 
from electoral behaviour by omitting support at polls or votes. This aspect 
locates the measurement closer to a patronage transaction instead vote 
buying. The second publication in Argentina (Stokes 2005) also restricts the 
deal to campaigns, asks respondents about the reception of private rewards 
                                                        
12 The four conditions as 1) the support expected from electors is confined exclusively to the polls, 2) 
vote-buying transactions are completed within election periods, 3) contingent exchanges, and 4) 
tangible, personal and excludable benefits distributed to individuals and small groups. 
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and conditions benefits to voting behaviour by detecting how much the 
transaction influence voters’ decisions. Overall, this item fully locates the 
measurement into a completed vote-buying transaction. Finally, the wording 
of the item for Mexico (UNDP 2006) refers to a transaction outside the 
electoral arena, despite including key elements as parties, voting behaviour. 
By alluding to state programmes, the item works with future benefits which 
means promises rather than personal, tangible rewards. In sum, excluding 
Stokes (2005) the majority of these incipient attempts for measuring the 
incidence of vote buying in Latin America illustrate more patronage 
transactions and the degree of electors exposed to vote-buying offers. 
Although the spread of vote-buying across countries in the region varies, it 
is still discussed whether surveys’ differences depict the dimension of 
electors bought or the number of clientelistic offers. 
 
Table 2. 1 Items Employed by Survey-Based Studies on the Incidence 






















During the campaign for the 
2000 municipal elections, did 
any candidate (or go-between) 
offer you money in return of 
voting for him?’ [...] ‘If yes, 
how much was offered to 
you?’ ‘[…] did you accept it?’ 
‘[…] did you vote for the 
candidate? 
Targeting 





During the campaign for the 
2000 municipal elections, did 
any candidate (or go-between) 
offer you money in return of 
voting for him?’ [...] ‘If yes, 
how much was offered to 




























In the campaign, did you 
receive something from a 
candidate or party? 
Buying 
(D) P 7 Argentina 
Stokes 
2005 
Did you receive goods 
distributed by a party in the 
last campaign? Did the fact of 
having received goods 
influence your vote?’ 
Buying 
(D) VB 7 Argentina 
Stokes 
2005 
[Did you know if] ‘a party 
distributed private rewards in 
[your] neighborhood during the 
campaign? 
Buying 
(I) P 44 Argentina 
UNDP 
2006† 
Have you been offered or 
rejected [from a public 
programme] as an exchange 
of your vote for a political 
party? 
Targeting 
(D) P 1.9 Mexico 
UNDP 
2006† 
Have you known about some 
authority offering benefits or 
public services as an 
exchange of people’s vote? 
Targeting 
(I) P 7.9 Mexico 
Source: Author 
Notes: 
* See Figure 2.1 in this Chapter; (D) Direct question, (I) Indirect question. 
** Clientelism (C), Vote Buying (VB), Patronage (P). 
Bold and brackets in the wording are mine. 
† Own translation from Spanish. 
 
 
A second plausible explanation about the findings emerges from Stokes 
(2005) analytical strategy (i.e. comparing direct versus indirect questions). 
Survey-based initial attempts to measure the spread of vote buying in Latin 
America mostly used direct questions in face-to-face conversations. Given 
that there is a negative perception about vote buying and it is illegal in many 
democratic regimes, interviews might undermine the incentives of 
respondents to tell the truth. Therefore, social desirability bias, that is a 
systematic error in self-report measures, resulting from the desire of 
respondents to project a positive image of themselves to others, threatens 
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the validity of vote-buying measures.13 A typical tool employed by scholars 
to mitigate its effects is indirect questioning (Chaudhuri & Christofides 
2013), which basically asks people to answer sensitive questions from 
others’ viewpoints. As Table 2.1. shows, Stokes (2005) and UNDP (2006) 
word the item in both ways directly and indirectly to estimate potential bias. 
The studies stated the indirect question as did/have you know/known if [...] 
others [...]. As theoretical claims would expect (Tourangeau & Yan 2007), 
results showed sensitivity to the indirect wording since subjects reported a 
higher number of cases compared to the direct question. Although some 
issues have been addresses against indirect questioning,14 Stokes’ (2005) 
findings advanced enormously research designs measuring vote buying. As 
a result, innovative methods and techniques have been developed to 
explore the level of bias from self-reported vote-buying behaviour (e.g. 
Gonzalez et al 2012). 
Beyond the social desirability bias, depending on the regime, the 
illegality of vote buying entails official procedures and punishment going 
from offences to criminal prosecution. From this angle, respondents have 
incentives to hide the truth in order to escape from potential charges or 
avoid engagement in trials as reporting others’ behaviour. Even though 
such idea relates to the strength and effectiveness of the rule of law in each 
country, subjects might reflect a reluctance to admit any engagement with 
vote buying. A common sense of individuals about what is good and wrong 
is enough to under-report vote buying in surveys. Therefore, for some 
                                                        
13 For a further discussion on social desirability bias, see Gonzalez et al (2012: 203-4). 
14 Asking about other’s behaviour might have some inferential problems about individual-level vote 
buying. Also, as respondents might support some parties more than others, they can over-report rival 
parties’ strategies of vote buying. 
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authors (Wantchekon 2003: 402) ‘survey methods do not provide reliable 
and unbiased measures’. 
In contrast, experimental designs offer ‘advantages for studying 
clientelism and vote buying’ (Gallego & Wantchekon 2012: 177). A growing 
area of experiments have re-examined measures, results and findings; 
mostly, field and list-experiments. The first effort (Wantcheckon 2003) 
assess how clientelistic strategies affect voting decisions for the 2001 
Presidential Elections in Benin, Africa. The experiment in the ground 
included real candidates in ongoing elections. It randomly selects villages 
and divides them into three groups,15 exposing voters from each group to 
selective information based purely on clientelistic, public-policy platforms 
and non-platform. Results demonstrate that vote buying is overall effective, 
but it tends to work better for local incumbent candidates in Benin. Another 
field-experiment (Vicente 2014) in Africa on vote buying is conducted for the 
2006 Presidential Elections in Sao Tome and Principe. The study divides a 
national sample into two groups, control and treatment, exposing voters 
from the control group to anti-vote-buying messages, asking all the subjects 
to respond a few pre and post-election survey questions.16 Results show a 
                                                        
15  The study sampled non-competitive electoral districts, dominated by the incumbent and by 
opposition parties, and then divided each one into three subgroups: clientelistic treatment, public-
policy treatment, and control one. Each subgroup was exposed only to certain type of messages to 
then compared electoral variability. Experiment’s results indicated that voting behaviour was not 
determined by ethnic affiliation and clientelist appeals are not totally accepted among poor voters as 
believed. Although slightly differences vote-buying definition versus clientelism relationships, findings 
illustrate well a general view of the phenomenon. The questions are: given ethnic affiliation, do types 
of message (clientelism or public policy) have an effect on voting behavior? Is clientelism always a 
winning strategy? Under which types of message do incumbents or opposition hold a comparative 
advantage? Are female voters as likely to respond to clientelism as men? Are younger voters more 
likely to respond to clientelism than older voters? (Wantchekon 2003: 400). 
16 The voter education campaign occurred in 40 enumeration areas of STP, with the sponsorship of 
the National Electoral Commission of STP. It was based on a leaflet distributed, read and discussed 
door-to-door. The leaflet was mainly legalistic in that it stressed the illegal nature of vote buying. 
Orally, the campaign underscored the idea that voting decisions should be conducted in good 
conscience, even if gifts were accepted. Measurement comes from a panel survey in treatment and 
control enumeration areas, and from the official electoral results per ballot station. The panel survey 
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significant effect of anti-vote-buying messages on voters’ perceptions of 
such phenomenon and also suggest variations on voting behaviour 
resulting from vote buying. 
List-experiments, based on the item count technique (ICT),17 have 
equally advanced research for studying vote buying (e.g. De-Jonge 2015, 
Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Çarkoğlu & Aytaç 2015, González et al 2014, 
2012, Corstange 2012). List-experiments have successfully been tested in 
other sensitive aspects as, for example, racism (Kuklinski, Cobb & Gilens 
1997, Kuklinski et al 1997). The first study using the ICT on vote buying 
(González et al 2012) in Latin America, conducted in Nicaragua, gauges the 
magnitude of social desirability bias. Returning to previous Stokes’ (2005) 
findings of the differences between direct and indirect questions, the study 
introduces the ICT to traditional surveys questions.18 Results first confirm 
Stokes’ (2005) observations as a higher number of respondents admitted to 
knowing about other individuals receiving gifts (17.84%) than those self-
reporting receiving goods (2.39%). But an even higher number of 
respondents admitted to receiving goods through ICT (24.34%). The study 
demonstrates that list-experiments provide research on vote buying al 
alternative method to solve bias problems. The method offers respondents 
anonymity and confidentiality answer vote buying questions directly. 
                                                        
conducted before and after the elections included 1,034 respondents (more than 1% of the electorate 
of STP) (Vicente 2014: F357). 
17 For a detailed methodological description of ICT, see Holbrook & Krosnick (2009); for a revision of 
the results from the technique, see Droitcour et al (2011). 
18 The study splits the sample into random halves, a treatment and a control group; each group is 
read the same question and shown a card with the response options, which differs only in the number 
of response categories. The question does not ask respondents to reveal to the interviewer the 
specific activities parties or activists practiced. The respondents only have to tell the inter- viewer 
how many activities were carried out, so the question provides the respondent a high degree of 
anonymity since the interviewer cannot ascertain which activities the respondent indicates (Gonzalez 
et al 2012: 205). 
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However, as authors argue, the nature of the method prevents scholars 
from knowing which individual reported an act of vote buying. 
Given that list-experiments offer a method to solve bias problems of 
self-reported vote buying, I now examine the wording of some sensitive 
items used by scholars to ask respondents about vote buying. To analyse 
the items, I employ the conceptual distinctions and the two-stage model 
discussed previously (see sections 2.2 and 2.3). As I have argued, there 
are four imperative conditions to distinguish vote buying from patronage and 
clientelism as a) the restriction of the expected support exclusively to polls, 
b) the transaction is confined to election periods, c) exchanges are 
contingent, and d) benefits distributed to individuals and small groups are 
tangible, excludable. In addition, the two-stage model divides the phase of 
targeting from buying (offering versus giving). It works on two main 
assumptions as a) electors are exposed to multiple offers of vote buying, 
assessing all the offers and deciding on one or even rejecting all of them, 
and b) once electors accept a gift, we can assume that they have entered 
the deal. Therefore, the first stage refers to targeted voters and the second 
stage refers to bought voters. 
Thus, Table 2.2 shows the wording employed in seven list-
experiment publications conducted in several countries. Firstly, several 
wordings used in the ICT (Greene 2016, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015, Palmer-
Rubin & Nichter 2014, Corstange 2009) included jobs and access to public 
services as proffered rewards. As I have discussed, both benefits belong to 
a more patronage transaction as the enjoyment of the benefit is conditioned 
upon electoral victory rather than voting behaviour. Also, it is interesting that 
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the highest estimations of vote buying seem to be related to those wordings 
stated more openly, i.e. Corstange (2009) and Carkoglu & Aytac (2015) 
including benefits offered to respondents’ relatives and family. This 
observation suggests a degree of sensitivity of individuals responding to 
wording, although further research in same countries should test this claim. 
Secondly, as the third row Table 2.2. indicates, excluding Corstange (2009), 
the items presented in the ICT are asked directly, which suggests the power 
of the technique to provide respondents with confidentiality and anonymity 
to answer the sensitive question. This observation is interesting when 
comparing ITC results (fifth row) to those items asked directly in traditional 
surveys (Table 2.1). Whereas the highest number estimated by ICT is 35% 
(in Turkey), the highest estimated by surveys rises 7% (in Argentina). 
Although such differences do not necessarily represent the level of 
effectiveness of the ICT over traditional surveys, they illustrate a degree of 
reliability of the technique. In particular, Gonzalez et al (2012), argue this 
claim. Thirdly, another observation of the wording is the stage in which 
studies locate vote buying (targeting versus buying). Excluding Cruz, Keefer 
& Labonne (2015), Carkoglu & Aytac (2015) and Corstange (2009), ICT’s 
items employed the phrase have you received and been given, alluding to 
a consummated vote-buying transaction, referring then to the phase of 
buying of the two-stage model. By contrast, the majority of traditional 
surveys (Table 2.1) used the phrase have you been offered, alluding to the 
stage of targeting. 
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Table 2. 2 Wording of Questions Employed by Experimental Designs 

























Received a gift or favor in 
exchange for your vote 
Buying 





Receive a gift, favor, or 
access to a service in 
exchange for your vote 
Buying 





Did someone offer you 
money for your vote? 
Targeting 








Receive a gift, favor, or 
access to a service in 
exchange for your vote 
Buying 
(D) P 7 Mexico 
Gonzalez 
et al 2015 
They gave you a gift or did 
you a favor 
Buying 




They gave you a gift or did 











Someone offered you or 
your family personal 
services, a job, or similar 
material benefits in exchange 
of your vote for a party 
Targeting 
(D) P 35 Turkey 
Gonzalez 
et al 2012 
They gave you a gift or did 
you a favor 
Buying 
(D) VB 24 Nicaragua 
Corstange 
2009 
Someone offered you or a 
relative, personal services, a 
job, or something similar. 
Targeting 
(I) P 55 Lebanon 
Source: Author. 
Notes: 
* See Figure 2.1 in this Chapter; (D) Direct question, (I) Indirect question. 
** Clientelism (C), Vote Buying (VB), Patronage (P). 
† By asking gifts, campaign materials and clothing are excluding; Cross-country method, in which the 
estimation in Mexico is 14%. 
¥ List-experiment embedded in a panel study. The results presented in the table refer to the highest 
number estimated in either of the waves. 
 
 
Experiments have provided empirical research with more tools to measure 
a sensitive theme as vote buying. Direct questions work much better in the 
list-experiment than survey-based designs, which suggests more 
confidentiality and anonymity for voters. Overall this growing field of 
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In this chapter, I have underlined that the variety of mentions of the term 
vote buying in literature have misguided some findings. Scholars have 
employed the concept vote buying to study three distinct fields, which has 
driven to a variety of definitions, affecting methodological procedures, as 
operationalisation of variables. For instance, whereas shareholders vote 
buying alludes to a set of payments and incentives given to owners of 
shares in companies towards manipulating business decisions in a 
corporate structure, the legislative vote buying refers to benefits distributed 
to representatives to shape bills and influence legislative power towards 
particular interests. By contrast, electorate vote buying alludes to the 
selective distribution of benefits to voters to influence voting behaviour. 
Although these activities entail the illegitimate exchange of rewards for 
voting decisions, legislative and electorate vote buying are located in the 
public arena. Located in the field of electorate vote buying, this study 
contributes to literature by reviewing the concept and revisiting its defining 
attributes. Such analytical tasks drive the development of the extended two-
stage model of vote-buying mobilisation. 
Literature on clientelism has framed the study on electorate vote 
buying. However, scholars have used diverse definitions, which have driven 
research to conclude about vote buying when actually they are referring to 
clientelism and patronage. Three conceptual attributes distinguish vote 
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buying from clientelism, the foundation of the arrangement, the restriction 
of the transaction to election periods, and the condition of contingent to the 
clientelistic exchange. Whereas the tie of clientelism is based on the long-
term relationship, vote buying is based on the reward. In addition, as a result 
of the long-term relationship, a transaction in clientelism can occur beyond 
election periods. In contrast, a vote-buying arrangement is restricted to 
campaigns and polling days. Thirdly, in vote buying, the exchange between 
rewards and votes is contingent and opportunistic. In clientelism, instead, 
the exchange is more consistent and durable; also, the support expected 
from electors goes beyond polls. As a result, in contrast with clientelism, 
vote buying requires more rigorous strategies for monitoring and 
compliance. Therefore, vote buying is a form of clientelism, but not a 
synonym of clientelism. Scholars have also associated vote buying with 
patronage. Both are strategies of electoral mobilisation; however, the 
characteristics of the benefits distinguish one form the other. Whereas vote 
buying relies on tangible, personal and excludable benefits, patronage 
works on promises of futures benefits conditioned upon victories at polls. In 
addition, benefits in patronage include collective rewards as hospitals, 
roads or public programmes amongst other similar deliverables. Patronage 
transactions are called also pork-barrel, redistributive and programmatic 
politics. 
Literature concurs that vote buying is an effective strategy of 
mobilisation. Scholars have turned to turnout and voting shares to explain 
the effectiveness of vote-buying strategies. What happens during the period 
when electors receive multiple vote-buying offers and they make a final 
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decision at polls, remains unexplained. My two-stage model of vote-buying 
mobilisation provides some answers to this problem. Since parties are 
competing for votes, when devising strategies of vote buying, they first 
present offers to electors, once individuals assess multiple offers and 
decide to take one, parties conduct other mechanisms of monitoring and 
compliance. Literature has mostly emphasised this last stage. By omitting 
the first stage, research assumes that electors are not able to decide over 
several vote-buying offers but overlooks the possibility of electors aborting 
a vote-buying deal.  
Survey-based methods initially offered some interesting answers to 
solve the problem of knowing the extent of vote buying. They worked first 
with direct questions and then they turned to asking respondents indirectly 
finding striking differences. Such results stimulated scholars to rethink 
research tools and re-discuss methods to collect sensitive information. A 
new area of experimental designs was developed, offering research 
innovative instruments to measure sensitives topics as vote buying. Direct 
questions have proven to work much better in the list-experiment than 
survey-based designs, which suggests, amongst other beneficial aspects, 
more confidentiality and anonymity to respondents. Although experiments 
have contributed to overcoming shortcomings for studying vote buying, 
there are two essential problems to take into account as external validity 
and randomisation. Field and list-experiments are unlikely to vanish social 
desirability bias. List-experiments have intrinsic problems as it is hard to 
know which respondent engaged in vote buying. 
 58 
Having reviewed the use of the term vote buying in literature, 
deconstruct the concepts of clientelism, patronage and vote buying by 
attributes, developed the two-stage model of vote buying mobilisation, 
assessed the implications for empirical research, with an eye on surveys 
and experiments; in the following chapter, I discuss vote buying in Mexico 
and the characteristics of the particular case. I then contrast two sources of 
qualitative evidence against the implications of this review. I finally proceed 






Chapter 3. Vote Buying in Mexico: Electoral 






In Chapter 2, I underlined the variety of uses of vote buying and some of its 
implications on empirical research. By revisiting its attributes and refining its 
model of mobilisation, I showed how literature has employed indistinctly the 
terms of clientelism and patronage when alluding to vote buying. In addition, 
I showed the benefits of looking at the vote-buying model of mobilisation 
from two stages. In this Chapter, I outline how Mexico is a useful case for 
addressing such indistinct use of vote buying, clientelism and patronage. I 
also explain the social embeddedness of vote buying as a result of a political 
machine, electoral manipulation and competing constitutional reforms. 
In Mexico, a political party ruled the country for seven decades 
employing non-democratic methods (Knight 1996, Camp 1993).  
The PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] maintained its 
electoral hegemony mainly through a combination of 
manipulation of the rules governing elections and government-
formation, abuse of state resources, media domination, and 
through a vast system of electoral clientelism—particularly strong 
in rural areas—involving both individual- and group-based 
particularism […] (Birch 2011: 147) 
 
From 1910 to 1970, executive and legislative branches managed to enact 
electoral laws, which restricted opposition from competing in elections. Until 
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1999, the government turned to fraudulent tactics to maintain the control by 
manipulating electoral institutions. Since 2000, another set of illegitimate 
activities have been employed –not exclusively by incumbent parties– as 
seats in local Congresses and other elected posts began to be shared. 
Although Chambers have amended legislation to deter electoral fraud and 
guarantee a fair competition (Balinski & Gonzalez 1996), I argue that law 
changes seem to be encouraging politicians in conducting other illicit 
exchanges. Based on the definitional approach to ‘electoral malpractice’ 
(Birch 2011), this chapter examines the three main methods of electoral 
manipulation in Mexico such as the law, the vote and the voter. I argue that 
the dominant party maintained its hegemony mainly through the 
manipulation of the electoral rules, the misuse of state resources, an 
overwhelming media control and a solid corporatist structure. Following the 
defeat in the 2000 Presidential Elections, however, politicians from all 
political parties have engaged in clientelistic tactics (Magaloni 2006) such 
as vote-buying to win elections. 
Scholars have largely studied the Mexican electoral system (Nohlen 
2005, Klesner 2005, Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2001, Cornelius & Craig 
1991, Molinar 1989), its fraudulent elections (Magaloni 2010, Díaz-Cayeros 
& Magaloni 2004, Lehoucq 2003, Schedler 1999, McCann & Domınguez 
1998), corporatist policies implemented by the government (Chapman 
2012, Grayson 1998), its distributive and clientelistic politics (Diaz-Cayeros, 
Estevez & Magaloni 2016, Palmer-Rubin 2016, Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 
2003, Shefner 2001, Fox 1994, Foster 1961), conditional cash transfers 
CCTs (Layton & Smith 2015, De la O 2013, Grimes & Wängnerud 2010, 
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Sewall 2008) and the foundations of electoral reforms since 1970 (Serra 
2009, Cordova 2008, Becerra, Salazar & Woldenberg 2000, 1997, Barquin 
1987). Whilst these studies have aimed to understand problems and 
implications to the political system, literature has partially analysed the 
effects of these aspects altogether on vote buying. I argue that after the 
revolution, the dominant party developed a national structure constituted of 
members, partisans, government officials, volunteers and people, which 
provided the party with solid networks to distribute state resources 
efficiently. Likewise, the legislative branch –responding somehow 
unconditionally to ruling party’s interests– submitted and approved bills 
designed to maintain the status quo. Equally, to contain the pressure of the 
opposition, the government implemented inclusive corporatist policies and 
national programmes on conditional cash transfers to persuade groups and 
recipients to vote for them. Additionally, electoral reforms addressed to 
deter electoral frauds and guarantee fair contests resulted in incentives for 
other parties to conduct vote-buying actions in the field; worsening the 
distrust and negative perception of parties, not just the ruling one (McCann 
& Dominguez 1998). Thus, a national machinery of party, voters highly 
familiarised with deliveries from the government and electoral reforms 
forcing parties to conduct work in the field set appropriate conditions for vote 
buying to succeed. 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, I discuss Mexico’s 
transition from an authoritarian to a dominant-party regime by controlling 
and weakening the growth of an opposition institutionally and legislatively. I 
explain how contributing factors such as favourable electoral legislation and 
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political operation in the ground helped the government to maintain the 
power. Second, I analyse how the government turned to social welfare 
policies, distributing resources to individuals and social groups, shaping a 
paternalist state to extend the political control. Thirdly, I explain the 
transition from distributive policies into vote buying, through a national party 
structure and voters highly familiarised with clientelistic exchanges. I 
discuss how the results of the 2000 Presidential Elections pressured other 
parties to turn to clientelistic tactics as a method to campaign. Additionally, 
I introduce intuitive methods employed by politicians to make money, which 
potentially go to cover vote-buying expenses amongst other goals. Finally, 
I analyse the implications of recent electoral reforms for vote buying despite 
their conceptual foundations of fair competition. 
 
3.1 The Manipulation of Elections in Mexico: How Electoral Fraud 
Shaped Parties Through Political Machine 
 
Elections have been a crucial factor of stability of the Mexican political 
regime after the Revolution,19  though from 1910 to 1940 governments 
arrived by military power. In 1911, the dominant party was founded 20 
claiming fundamental ideals of the Revolution. Although the establishment 
of an opposition opened the electoral competition in 1939,21 the dominant 
party had developed authoritarian methods to retain the power. Politicians 
                                                        
19 One of the legacies of the Revolution impacting the electoral system is the so-called slogan 
“Effective Suffrage–No Reelection” (see Weldon 2004) that prohibits the consecutive legislative and 
presidential re-election. 
20 Originally named as National Revolutionary Party (PNR), afterwards Party of Mexican Revolution 
(PRM) and then Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). 
21 Through the Revolutionary Party of National Unification (PRUN), resulting from the religious conflict 
called “Cristero War” 1926-1929 (see Wilkie 1966 for an introduction to political implications); named 
afterwards National Action Party (PAN). 
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shaped electoral rules, which rewarded disproportionately existing 
majorities, discouraging emerging majorities from strengthening. Clinically 
designed, the electoral system offered short-term political benefits to 
‘fractions of the opposition, in exchange of rules that would eventually make 
the incumbent party even more difficult to dislodge’ (Díaz-Cayeros & 
Magaloni 2001: 272). Equally, tight regulations on political freedom with low 
levels of electoral competition explain the success of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) as ruling party in Mexico (Díaz-Cayeros & 
Magaloni 2004). There are at least four key moments in the history of the 
fraudulent elections that illustrate well the methods employed by the ruling 
party. These stages gradually moulded an authoritarian government into a 
clientelistic dominant party and delineated the basis for an expectant 
electorate to wait for deliveries during campaigns. 
 The first election held in 1940 with a multiparty model was rather 
conflictive. An opposition candidate pressed the incumbent President for 
democratic ideals, which caused repressive measures to guarantee public 
order (Shirk 2005). In response, opposition supporters turned campaign 
propaganda and rallies into violent acts, opting for using weapons. The 
opposition accused the government of repression asking, unsuccessfully, 
international support, mainly from the American Government. With constant 
confrontations along the campaign, a violent and anomalous Election Day 
favoured the dominant party for nearly 94%. Police officers presumably 
stopped opposition followers from going to polls and electoral officers 
removed them from the National Electoral Register. Authorities closed 
polling stations earlier arguing the risk of violence. A well-known Mexican 
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newspaper announced the electoral result before the official counting 
(Michaels 1971). 
 The second key moment was the 1952 Presidential Election. With 
more parties competing, it signified a serious challenge to the ruling party 
(Gillingham 2012). The government had already begun to deliver a public 
speech based on national progress, economic growth and democratic 
freedom to persuade electors. But opposition parties accused the 
government, again, of authoritarianism and repression. During campaigns, 
opponents claimed consistent harassment and bullying and throughout the 
Election Day, they also reported a number of irregularities conducted by the 
ruling party. Mainly, the deployment of intimidating brigades to losable 
electoral precincts to stop voters from turning out (Weldon 1997). There was 
an increase of restrictions of polling stations access to representatives of 
opposition parties based upon undisclosed electoral procedures. The secret 
count of votes by officers, providing no record of the sum of votes, 
presumably stuffing ballots. Although this new sort of mobilisation gave a 
sense of victory among opposition supporters, official records favoured the 
candidate of the ruling party. The conditions of this stage, in fact, 
represented a need for the dominant party to constitute coordinated teams 
of loyalists to conduct actions in the ground. 
 The third moment took place in the 1958 Presidential Election. 
Repeatedly, opposition candidates accused the government of bullying and 
harassment but this time they added death threats, physical attacks and 
short periods in prison (Taylor 1960). On polling day, opposition parties 
reported numerous malpractices, such as voters holding several valid 
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electoral ballot papers, casting votes in different polls. 22  Once again, 
electoral officers stopping opposition parties’ representatives from 
performing their duties. Within anti-government areas, pro-ruling party’s 
groups moved polling stations to a different building with neither notice nor 
legal reason. Also, they registered voters far away from the original 
address.23  Electoral Registration Offices sent announcements of voting 
eligibility after the Election Day. Eventually, the candidate of the ruling party 
won the election with a vast majority of votes. This notable electoral success 
of the political-machine operation set the basis for the party to strengthen 
and consolidate such structure. 
 Finally, the fourth moment was the 1998 Presidential Elections. A 
‘crossroad’ (Reding 1988) in Mexican electoral history, when the ruling party 
faced an unprecedented competition and the most controversial as regards 
as allegations of electoral fraud. A former member of the ruling party 
challenged the establishment. Leading a united opposition, this contender 
became a strong Presidential candidate. His campaign quickly expanded, 
capturing gradually and consistently new supporters. On the other side, the 
government faced international pressure for corruption, authoritarianism 
and repression. Additional factors such as high unemployment rates and 
cost of living upset people and discouraged own supporters from proving 
unconditional loyalty (Dominguez & McCann 1995). 
 This time, the method of the political machine began before polling 
day and went beyond (Maganloni 2006). Officers of the opposition party got 
                                                        
22 Known informally as ‘carousel’. 
23 So-called ‘crazy mouse’, made voters spend considerable time seeking the right polling station, 
discouraging them from voting. 
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regularly intimidated, attacked and even killed (Cornelius & Craig 1991). 
During the Election Day, news reports suggested that the President realised 
that the ruling party’s candidate could lose the election since early hours.24 
As a result, he instructed the Minister of Interior, serving as Chief Executive 
Officer of the National Electoral Commission (CFE), to withhold all the 
information about the election. Over two hours after the polling stations 
closed, the national voting computing system was struggling but reporting 
an overwhelming partial victory of the opposition candidate. But an apparent 
disruption stopped the system from continuing to deliver information on the 
election outcome. The CFE announced technical difficulties, which delayed 
partial information. While the system got fixed, national rumours of an 
opposition’s victory spread quickly. However, a restored system –more than 
two hours delayed–, reported the candidate of the ruling party as the 
frontrunner.  
 Immediate protests and demonstrations against alleged electoral 
fraud took place for weeks demanding the call of new elections. In response, 
senior officials of the government met defeated candidates, persuading 
them to reach political agreements. Excluding one party, the principal 
demand of the opposition was to open ballot boxes and recount the votes. 
The Chamber of Deputies declared the ruling party candidate as the elect 
President, moderate opposition parties, however, admitted the decision on 
condition of substantial changes in electoral laws and administration 
(Magaloni 2010). Addressing fairness, impartiality and transparency, the 
                                                        
24 La Jornada, ‘De la Madrid me ordenó no informar que Cárdenas iba ganando, asegura Bartlett’, 
Sunday 6 July 2008, Politica, 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/07/03/index.php?section=politica&article=013n1pol (accessed 
on Monday 14 July 2014). 
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runner-up announced the creation of a new unified opposition political 
party.25 The president-elect signed a letter of intent promising to enact the 
reforms in exchange for his opponents’ complicity in certifying the 1988 
election (Eisenstadt 2004: 176). 
 Two years after the allegedly fraudulent election, the Congress 
enacted a new electoral legislation,26 which impacted considerable four 
central areas (see Section 3.3 for a further discussion). Firstly, legislators 
transformed the Electoral Commission into an Electoral Institute, 
autonomous and independent from the government. Secondly, they created 
a new National Electoral Register with enhanced security measures in the 
process of application and confirmation of eligibility. Thirdly, they 
redesigned a ‘sortition’ procedure for electoral officers, making it more 
transparent and public. Fourthly, new criteria of electoral districting 
increased the number of polling stations distributed across the country, 
reducing the number of voters for each station. 
 As I have discussed the transition of Mexico from an authoritarian to 
a machine-party regime succeeded as a result of methods to control and 
weaken signs of opposition. Tailored electoral bills submitted and approved 
enhanced PRI’s majorities in Chambers. Coordinated operations between 
the dominant party and governmental structures guaranteed success at 
polls. Fraudulent practices such as ballot stuffing, crazy mouse, carousel, 
electoral register pregnancy27 and voting miscounting completed the work 
                                                        
25 Named Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). 
26  Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Codigo Federal de Instituciones y 
Procedimientos Electorales’, Wednesday 15 August 1990, 
http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Federal/OA/IFE/Codigos/15081990.pdf (accessed on Wednesday 
4 February 2015). 
27 The number of votes counted in a polling station exceeded the number of eligible voters registered. 
Electoral officers, working for the ruling party, allowed disentitled supporters to cast the vote. 
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in the field. Although the dominant party flighted to keep the power during 
the 1988 Presidential Elections, previous elections served to constitute a 
solid political machine. 
 
3.2 Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) in Mexico: How Corporatist 
Policies Shape the Electorate Through Vote Buying 
 
As I have discussed, electoral rules favoured the ruling party, lessening the 
opposition influence over political decisions. After 1946, as reshaping its 
structure, the ruling party developed a mass inclusive patronage policy 
known as ‘corporatism’ (Grayson 1998; Chapman 2012). Based on 
deliveries of benefits to social groups,28 the method utilises government 
agencies to control the distribution of money and goods (see Lazaro 2014 
for a description of the Mexican case). Such policy is structured as a 
pyramid (Stokes et al 2013), which seeks to create networks of loyal support 
(Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2012). Usually, activists constitute the 
lowest level of the pyramid, reaching neighbourhoods; some of them (Diaz-
Santana 2011) are non-partisan individuals hired by parties to reduce legal 
risks.29 Conversely, senior politicians running top positions in the public 
administration represent the top level of the pyramid. 
                                                        
28 Organised into four sectors such as workers (Confederation of Workers of Mexico, CTM), peasants 
(National Peasant Confederation, CNC), state servants (Federation of workers in the State service, 
FSTSE) and civil organisations (National Confederation of Popular Organisations, CNOP). 
29 In some cities political parties hire fleets of taxi drivers to mobilise voters the Election Day. In some 
cases, taxi drivers increase fares, offering the service to the highest bidder or in exchange for other 
benefits. Diario Zeta, ‘Distrito 12: compra de votos y taxis acarreando; se abrieron 112 paquetes’, 
Monday 13 June 2016, http://zetatijuana.com/2016/06/13/distrito-12-compra-de-votos-y-taxis-
acarreando-se-abrieron-112-paquetes/ (accessed on Sunday 17 July 2016). Diario El Veneziano, 
‘Partidos acarrean a votantes en taxis hidrómilos’, Sunday 4 July 2010, Coatzacoalco, 
http://imagendelgolfo.mx/resumen.php?id=184696 (accessed on Thursday 17 July 2014). 
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 Gradually, this method consolidated a solid structure with a capacity 
to meet social demands, monitor and, if the case, dissipate potential signs 
of dissent. This sort of relationship between government and people shaped 
a ‘distributive coalition’ (Dresser 1994: 145). It remained robust 30  for 
decades allowing the ruling party to hold the power and rule with some 
degree of stability. However, a growing opposition, increasing pressure to 
electoral equality and dissenting voices from the ruling elite urged the 
government to design new strategies to respond to social demands for 
assistance programs (see Grimes & Wängnerud 2010: 674). In 1973, the 
government strengthened conditional cash transfers (CCT), launching the 
State Investment Programme for Rural Development (PIDER) to eradicate 
poverty and funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Since 
then, all the administrations have held at least one anti-poverty national 
plan. 31  A controversial programme regarding electoral clientelism was 
PRONASOL (De la O 2012) as its benefits distributed under discretionary 
criteria of allocation around the midterm 1991 elections (for further details 
of PRONASOL, see Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2012: 52-60 and 
De la O 2012: 2). As a result, agencies decided to standardise processes 
of application, coverage and monitoring for all the following government 
programmes.32 
                                                        
30 Recent evidence (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015: 1190) from Mexico and Colombia has suggested 
‘that organizational membership is an important predictor of reported offers of vote buying: A typical 
woman who participates in no organizations has a predicted probability of being a target for vote 
buying of 8%, while a woman at the highest level of participation has a predicted probability of 32%’. 
31 PIDER (1973-1976); the National Plan for Deprived Zones and Marginalised Groups, COPLAMAR 
(1977-1988); the National Solidarity Program, PRONASOL (1989-2002); National Programme of 
Food Supply, Health and Education, PROGRESA (2003-2006); Oportunidades (2007-2012); 
Prospera (2013-currently). 
32 The main breakthrough was the creation of the Technical Committee for Poverty Measurement in 
Mexico, materialised by the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL 
in Spanish) in 2003. 
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 The delivery of the benefit is a sensitive stage of the policy as the 
personal interaction between officers of the CCTs and recipients. This 
interaction potentially develops clientelistic relationships (Diaz-Cayeros, 
Estevez & Magaloni 2012). Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
these deliveries have increasingly been the core of allegations against the 
government for manipulating electors (UNDP 2007). Procedures of these 
programmes allowed face-to-face enrolments and collection of benefits. 
Equally, schedules of deliveries have matched campaigns’ agendas, 
supplying goods on condition that recipients voted for the incumbent party. 
Experimental evidence from Mexico and Latin America (Layton & Smith 
2015, De la O 2012, Grimes & Wängnerud 2010, Sewall 2008) has 
confirmed those claims with a positive correlation between enrolments and 
vote shares. For this reason, the involvement of civil society associations in 
combating corruption (Grimes 2008) has been a key tool for monitoring the 
performance of the agencies managing CCTs. 
Eradicating corruption in public welfare services has proven to 
be quite difficult in many contexts and the CCT answer to this 
challenge is transparency in the process of selecting recipients, 
direct transfers of cash to recipients from administrative offices 
protected from political interference, and precise expectations on 
recipients (Grimes & Wängnerud 2010: 674).  
 
Birch (2011) distinguishes four strategies against CCTs corruption: a) 
adjusting the law, b) auditing resources, c) addressing officially state 
budget, and d) delivering more efficient policies. In other words, increasing 
the costs and reducing rewards of clientelism to make it less attractive to 
candidates and individuals. The first strategy entails sufficient political will 
to alter the electoral law. The purpose is to make illegal conducts such as 
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proffering rewards as an exchange of votes, intimidating electors reluctant 
to engage in clientelistic practices and conditioning the access to state 
services. ‘While legislation can rarely eliminate clientelism, it can at least 
provide the legal standard against which the activities of electoral actors 
may be evaluated (Birch 2011: 136). Apparently, this strategy functions 
more efficiently in non-clientelistic systems. In some countries, politicians 
seem to be aware that these exchanges are a need during campaigns to 
stay in the contest. 33  In other words, patrons know no other forms of 
campaigning and there is nothing wrong with clientelism for clients. 
However, when these practices are illegal, governments laid grounds to act 
against them. 
 The third strategy entails the restriction of forms of rent-seeking 
naturally related to the elected official. Some public offices hold a significant 
amount of resources as the nature of their duties. These resources become 
sort of rewards to applicants for those posts. When the provision of office’s 
resources is more significant than those benefits obtained from clientelistic 
practices, heads of the offices would not have incentives to engage in 
clientelism. ‘If that cost–benefit relationship is altered by reducing the 
benefits of office, potential patrons may not feel it is worth the effort and may 
seek to enhance their wealth through more legitimate channels in the private 
sector’ (Birch 2011: 137). In fact, national electoral bodies and tribunals in 
Mexico are well-known for offering higher wages to their employees than 
other public institutions. 
                                                        
33 For the Peruvian case, Muñoz-Quirinos (2014: 79) demonstrates the extent in which the supply of 
goods is ‘considered crucial to effective campaigning’ despite knowing this practice does not 
guarantee the support of voters at the polls.  
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The fourth strategy assumes that providing people with more efficient 
public policies, they will find more incentives to engage in them, finding 
clientelistic transactions costlier and less attractive. However, achieving this 
requires three conditions such as changing the perception of clientelistic 
rewards, seeing direct benefits from democratic processes and feeling 
political parties and governments closer to people.  
 Mexican governments have designed anti-corruption programmes 
covering the four Birch’s (2011) strategies. For example, the inter-
government agreement of transparency and anti-corruption 34  sought to 
tackle corruption by standardising main guidelines on CCTs management, 
especially during campaigns. Amidst the goals, the agreement bound all 
government agencies to a) promote transparency by making public 
presentations about potential illegitimate links between CCTs and politics at 
a local level. The measure involved borough, state and federal 
governments, civil society associations and electoral bodies; b) organise 
workshops and summits for transparency and legality, consisting of 
meetings with officers and recipients; c) sign the programme ‘clean hands’ 
–an agreement of ethics code for the staff of all CCTs; d) schedule deliveries 
of CCTs and other activities for non-campaigns periods and non-polling 
days; e) work towards further agreements, when required, on transparency 
and anti-corruption; f) set up reliable hotlines to report malpractices and 
provide overall attention, especially to recipients (see Chapter 4); g) fund 
                                                        
34 Diario Oficial de la Federacion (Official Gazette), ‘ACUERDO por el que se crea la Comisión para 
la Transparencia y el Combate a la Corrupcion en la Administración Publica Federal, como una 
comision intersecretarial de caracter permanente’, Monday 4 December 2000, 
http://www.programaanticorrupcion.gob.mx/web/doctos/citcc/acuerdo_de_creacion.pdf (accessed 
on Wednesday 4 February 2015).accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015). 
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and promote studies on the transparency and anti-corrupted performance 
of CCTs; h) develop plans to publish and distribute booklets, posters and 
flyers among recipients to disseminate essentials such as codes of conduct, 
guidelines and hotline numbers. A compulsory message has been 
appearing in all the deliveries indicating ‘this programme is public and 
unrelated to any political party. Law prohibits any misuse.’35 
 Yet, international reports36 have still pointed out discretional gaps in 
the mechanisms of transparency, access to information and accountability 
in Mexico since 2001. CCTs’ officers with strong party ties can still misuse 
these programs with sophisticated methods, hampering detection, reporting 
and punishing irregularities. Additionally, the growing number of CCTs 
implemented at local level increases the complexity, lessening the ability of 
associations to monitor illegal activities and authorities to react promptly. 
  For instance, during the 2006 Presidential Elections, domestic 
electoral observation reports (Alianza Civica 2006) detected officers 
conditioning access and deliveries to vote for a party. Equally, records from 
the hotline for electoral crimes (FEPADE 2012) reported ‘different types of 
manipulation’ in the access and deliveries of CCTs. These records gave an 
idea about the different way in which boroughs and states perform CCTs 
locally. As Mexican Federalism, the report (Alianza Civica 2006) also 
suggested that the level of efficiency of a CCT is determined by local factors. 
                                                        
35 Own translation. Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Ley General de Desarrollo 
Social’, Monday 20 January 2004, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lgds/LGDS_orig_20ene04.pdf (accessed on Thursday 
22 November 2012). 
36 UNDP for Mexico, Cuba and Dominican Republic, Bulletin 2881, ‘Informe sobre el cumplimiento 
de las recomendaciones emitidas por el Alto Consejo por la Transparencia de los Programas 
Sociales Federales, 
http://www.cinu.org.mx/prensa/comunicados/2006/06060PNUDInformecumplimientodrecomendaci
ones.htm (accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015). 
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Regions with weak authorities seem to be as well those reporting more 
problems of CCTs during campaigns, whereas those with stronger 
institutions seem to report fewer issues associated with the management of 
these programmes. 
 For the 2006 Mexican Presidential Elections, an international study 
about the perceptions of CCTs (UNDP 2006) surveyed thousands of 
recipients, non-recipients and officers from semi-urban and rural areas. 
Results show than most of the people knew procedures and rights. In 
contrast, they reported low levels of people’s knowledge about other 
procedures. Non-recipient respondents lacked precision about eligibility 
criteria, procedures of application and rules of delivering, which reflects the 
need of meeting CCTs’ officers personally. Although recipients knew well 
their rights and evaluated positively the procedure of the CCTs, they 
attributed the success of the programmes to government’s kindness and 
will. This finding flagged a potential reciprocal arrangement between the 
ruling party and voters.37 Results also suggested that recipients perceive 
the benefit of opening CCTs to transparency and accountability. 
 The study also demonstrated gaps of communication of recipients on 
particular procedures. Respondents struggled to describe mechanisms of 
complaints and, even more, reports on malpractices. This finding suggests 
failures on the methods to convey information at all levels. In rural areas of 
Mexico, there are speakers of other indigenous languages38 who struggle 
                                                        
37  Ethnographic work conducted in Mexico (Hagene 2015) provides evidence on how people 
perceived political clientelism as a legitimate action, whereas they saw vote buying as illegal. 
Furthermore, people assumed this sort clientelist tie as help and support. 
38 Mexican government itself recognises officially 68 national indigenous languages, 2nd Article, 
Constitution Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/htm/1.htm (accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015). 
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to understand official bulletins and communications but additionally, 
government agencies have noted that booklets and flyers contain copy-
pasted content of the law, which hardens the comprehension even for 
Spanish speakers.39 
 A majority of respondents reported a positive perception of the CCTs 
as they help people in need. These programmes appeared to have a 
positive impact on people’s evaluation of the President, which substantiates 
the traditional idea of a paternalistic state. The main national CCT was 
associated more to the President’s kindness than a right of people in-need, 
only isolated cases responded correctly when asked about the relationship 
between the programme and the ongoing administration. This finding 
supports the success of the change of names by governments to a similar 
CCT since 1973 described before. Results show a) unclear criteria for 
accepting or rejecting applications to a CCT, sometimes unfair and opaque; 
b) lack of information about the range of benefits of the CCTs and the way 
they work; c) small impact on the life of recipients despite the accessibility; 
d) cases of poor quality and slow reactions of authorities when reporting 
malpractices, crimes and offences. The study (UNDP 2006) also found 
inefficiency in attending reports of potential offences associated with 
deliveries; a considerable number of gaps of discretion over the 
management of state resources; and unclear recruitment criteria of the 
members of the staff. There was a little knowledge about the ways people 
–especially recipients– could report anomalies. The procedures seemed to 
                                                        





be complex as several authorities involved in the process of receiving and 
attending reports. This fact increases confusion to address appropriately 
any issue. 
 Despite established procedures to recruit officers, there has been a 
considerable mobility in posts, lessening staff’s ability to develop long-term 
skills. People expressed different opinions about officers (UNDP 2006). 
Some respondents recognised their work beneficial for recipients, whereas 
others tended to stereotype them as egoistic, opportunistic and 
unprofessional workers. For the latter, officers were untrustworthy, willing to 
perform coercion or threat to manipulate electors. In contrast, some 
respondents found CCTs’ staff closer to the community than majors, 
governors and deputies. Officers closer and more aware of local needs 
gives them more credibility, which is highly valued during campaigns. News 
reports have accused top officials of having strong party’s background, and 
not having previous work experience in the area. Some of them have also 
been appointed by the Secretary of Social Development without a job 
advertisement.40 This strategic selection is followed by the fact that these 
officials seemed to be more familiarised with electoral legislation than the 
implementation of CCTs. 
 Irregular deliveries reported over fifteen years suggest corruption 
and misallocations of CCTs benefits (UNDP 2007) but more importantly 
they have accustomed the electorate to the distribution of benefits during 
elections. The survey (UNDP 2006) found a negative perception of both 
                                                        
40 El Financiero, ‘Los cuadros priistas que llegaron a Sedesol’, Monday 22 April 2013, Politica, 
http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/politica/los-cuadros-priistas-que-llegaron-a-sedesol.html (accessed 
on Friday 6 June 2014). 
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recipients and non-recipients on how senior positions and officers misuse 
CCTs during campaigns. Non-recipients seemed to disregard parties’ 
manifestos and feel unrelated to democratic values. Individuals targeted by 
CCTs’ officers and politicians showed an even worse perception of the 
performance of the government. This finding goes beyond the electoral 
arena since it involves levels of trust in institutions and values. It also affects 
the credibility of the efficiency of the justice’s system (Cornelius & Shirk 
2007).41 Additionally, voters seem to have been learning to take the rewards 
offered during campaigns despite admitting to voting for another party.42 
 Patterns of clientelistic rewards persist. Even though the protection 
of the secrecy of the vote has improved, there are concerns about the 
reliability and certainty of the elections’ outcome. Although poor voters have 
learnt to face campaigns, their expectations of a good government remain 
low (UNDP 2006). People are more focused on short-term needs, solving 
daily life issues than long-term Democratic views. Moreover, in those places 
with high levels of criminality,43 people tend to distrust more of elections 
than those places with higher levels of life. This fact relates to the method 
to manage CCTs (UNDP 2006), threatening electors. Poor people living 
                                                        
41 BBC News, ‘Mexico's justice system on trial’, Tuesday 1 March 2011, World News America, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/world_news_america/9410972.stm (accessed on 
Wednesday 19 November 2014). 
42 Proceso Magazine, ‘Presentan campaña “agarra lo que te dan y vota por el PAN” en Guanajuato’, 
Friday 15 June 2012, Estados, http://www.proceso.com.mx/311080/presentan-campana-agarra-lo-
que-te-dan-y-vota-por-el-pan-en-guanajuato (Accessed on Monday 4 February 2013). 
43  More than a hundred candidates and senior politicians have been reportedly killed and 
disappeared since 2006 in Mexican cities such as Juarez, Cuernavaca, Tijuana, Reynosa and 
Acapulco. BBC News, ‘Mexican candidate shot dead on campaign trail’, Monday 28 June 2010, Latin 
America & Caribbean News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10441619 (accessed on Wednesday 28 
January 2015). 
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within areas with violence admitted fearing to go out,44 which discourages 
them from involving in outdoors politics and turning out during polling days. 
 In conclusion, the ruling party reshaped its strategy of control by 
developing a national corporatists policy, which focused on deliveries of 
benefits to individuals and social groups. The government institutionalised 
clientelism by exchanging benefits not just during campaigns but throughout 
and employing government agencies to meet the needs. This policy 
strengthened government networks, going from high level officials to 
activists in the ground, to gain loyalty and electoral support. Additionally, 
ruling party extended the menu of manipulation (Schedler 2002) by taking 
away voting cards of recipients, 45  promoting CCTs during campaigns, 
appointing officers of CCTs with strong ties with the party and no related 
work experience, conditioning CCTs’ access and deliveries, and using 
CCTs’ registers for electoral purposes. 
 
3.3 The Pluralisation of Vote Buying: How Parties Turn to Clientelistic 
Strategies 
 
In Mexico, vote buying is not a strategy restricted to the ruling party anymore 
since the opposition has entered the game. There have been tens of reports 
and accusations of vote buying from all over the country (Alianza Civica 
                                                        
44 BBC News, ‘Mexico's Zetas drug gang split raises bloodshed fears’ Tuesday 11 September 2012, 
Latin America & Caribbean News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-1954328 
(accessed on Thursday 13 March 2014). 
45 The elector’s voting card is a document with photography launched on July the 3, 1992. It is 
compulsory to show it to electoral officers at polling stations when voting. It is officially recognised as 
a national ID and equals the Passport to fulfil procedures besides voting such as acquiring a property, 
obtaining official documents and even for alcohol buying and entering to a nightclub. Manufacturing 
each item can cost up to 1.5 dollars as it holds 7 enhanced technological security measures (see 
credencial para votar con fotografia, INE, http://www.ine.mx/archivos2/portal/credencial/ (accessed 
Friday 14 March 2014). 
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2006, 2012). In addition, electoral trials in Mexico have progressively 
addressed vote buying as grounds of anomalies (Weinberg 2008). There is 
a growing concern about the conduction of elections with democratic values 
resulting of the perception of impunity. In fact, charging people with vote 
buying is very unlikely. There are no more than a few cases reported over 
the last thirty years (FEPADE 2012). For some scholars (Diaz-Santana 
2011), reporting vote buying,46 collecting evidence and prove it according to 
the criminal legislation47 is a monumental effort. For these authors, this fact 
partially explains the small number of successful cases in tribunals. 
Additionally, since regulations allow candidates to hand giveaways, 
merchandise and promotional products during campaigns as a campaign 
strategy, voters get confused about what action is legal or illegal.48 
 As a result of political machines, parties perform successfully tasks 
of electioneering and canvassing, covering the three areas of brokers’ 
interest as partisan, rent-seeking and social (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 
2015). According to this typology, partisan activists support a party for 
programmatic reasons. They find long-term benefits from the electoral 
outcomes, i.e. the expansion of party’s power or incumbency. With similar 
sort of relationship but not tied to a one party, rent-seeking brokers employ 
party resources for more personal reasons. For example, local leaders 
pursuing political careers receive the support of a party in exchange for 
                                                        
46 A study conducted in Mexico (Vilalta 2010) found correlations between electoral crimes reports 
and people’s education level, indigenous background, income, as well as population size and ruling 
party. 
47 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette) ‘Código Nacional de Procedimientos Penales’, 
Wednesday 5 March 2014, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/declara/cnpp/CNPP_orig_05mar14.pdf (accessed on 
Friday 26 June 2015).(accessed on Friday 26 June 2015). 
48 Evidence from Nicaragua (González-Ocantos et al 2012) shows that 12% of survey’s respondents 
associated campaign giveaways to vote buying questions. 
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political returns such as rallies’ attendance and turnout. The third type of 
brokers’ interests refers to those who support activities of a party motivated 
by interests of the community. This sort of brokers neither have personal 
ambitions nor follow partisan goals. Instead, they support parties in 
exchange of preferential public policies, the delivery of collective goods or 
social benefits. In Chapter 5, I provide qualitative evidence about the 
interests of brokers by investigating structures and networks, and the way 
they employ them to attract voters. Such pieces of evidence are consistent 
with Holland & Palmer-Rubin (2015) ideas. 
Parties have also developed methods to take advantage of a 
complex legislation. Due to the party machine discussed before, parties are 
also able to evaluate circumstances from a national to a polling-station 
levels (Alianza Civica 2012). They, first, map closely regions, compiling lists 
of voters manually49 (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2014) and, second, 
they perform compliance tactics in the field to cross check these lists. On 
the Election Day, near polling stations, brokers match these lists with those 
voters who have turned up to cast the vote (Mercado 2013). Based on 
anonymous interviews, some studies have provided qualitative evidence on 
the Mexican case (see Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Mercado 2013). Equally, in 
Chapter 4, I discuss plenty of accounts from the National Hotline Service for 
Electoral Crimes, which support literature about monitoring tactics, the 
compilation of lists and matching names near polling stations. For instance, 
                                                        
49 Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin (2014: 164) show visual evidence of the lists of promised voters to 
be completed by brokers in a given electoral precinct. ‘The top of the sheet (first three rows) indicates 
the name of the broker, address, telephone number, and electoral precinct. Below this are the details 
of voters, including their name, electoral card number, electoral precinct, address, and phone 
number’. 
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for the 2006 Presidential Elections a caller from a borough in Mexico City 
reported that ‘PRI candidates are knocking doors offering bags of provisions 
as an exchange of their vote [asking] those residents who accept the deal 
to sign a list in which they commit to vote for PRI and they take voting card’s 
details’ (Call No.: 0000055, 13/01/2006). Also, for the 2003 Midterm 
Elections a user, calling from a capital city near the northern City Hermosillo, 
reported that ‘outside the polling station located near the shopping arcade 
[…], there are a few people with lists of electors, giving provisions to people 
voting for PRI’ (Call No.: 0000696, 06/07/2003). 
 Whereas parties have access to the National Electoral Register50 
and results of elections, brokers map neighbourhoods to estimate the 
number of votes they already have and the extra required to win an election. 
By doing this, they both visualise votes they might obtain at a polling-station 
level to set expectations from each precinct and evaluate the amount of 
work in the ground.51 Then, numerous private meetings between parties 
and activists take place to set a strategy. Activists attend these meetings 
with some potential voters. At this stage, parties have identified electoral 
precincts with adverse preferences to pressure activists to work harder 
(Ugalde & Rivera 2013).52 Commonly, this pressure entails the removal of 
individual privileges and benefits. On the contrary, successful work in the 
                                                        
50 By law, political parties have full, permanent access to the Electors’ National Register. Elections 
Law, Article 148: 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette) ‘Ley General de Instituciones y 
Procedimientos Electorales’, Friday 23 May 2014, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_130815.pdf (accessed on Friday 26 June 
2015). 
51 Just to put it into context, for the 2015 Midterm National Elections, the Electors’ National Register 
was constituted of 83 and a half million people fully eligible to cast the vote. Nearly 149 thousand 
polling stations were open. Each Polling station held up to 750 voters. The annual budget that year 
reached up to Mx$18,500m, domestic currency (about £723m). 
52 Clientelistic networks addressed to maximise the number of votes have been tested in Latin 
America (Schaffer & Baker 2015) showing social multiplier effects of one single pay-off. 
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field tends to provide extra bonuses and rewards. likewise, evidence from 
callers’ accounts and interviews with brokers discussed in Chapters 4 and 
5 supports these claims. For example, an anonymous broker tells that he is 
‘even doubled his income a few times when doing a good job but equally 
lost half of the expected money when thigs went wrong’.53 
 When it comes to what happens during polling days, evidence from 
previous studies have suggested two types of parties’ mobilisation, polling-
station representatives and vote buyers (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 
2016, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). Parties firstly deploy a group of 
representatives to polling stations54 whose job is to observe the legitimacy 
of the electoral outcome. In fact, these representatives sign the validity of 
the result for each polling stations. Additionally, parties deploy activists 
whose task is to corroborate the number of votes previously compromised 
for brokers by the lists (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Ugalde & 
Rivera 2013). This method allows parties to screen closely minute-by-
minute the volume of votes they are presumably getting. Also, this action 
gives them sufficient time, if it is the case, to conduct knocking-doors actions 
to make more voters go to polls. Although parties forecast with accuracy the 
potential result, the success of this tactic is based on the capacity to make 
all pieces work together. 
 Secondly, during the Election Day, parties send another set of 
brokers to streets. These teams usually go to more competitive precincts, 
                                                        
53 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala 
(Tuesday, 23rd May 2017). 
54 By law, up to thirteen days before the Election Day, political parties can appoint representatives 
for each polling station. Elections Law, Article 259, Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette) 
‘Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales’, Friday 23 May 2014, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_130815.pdf (accessed on Friday 26 June 
2015). 
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in which a few votes can make the difference (Mercado 2013). Their job is 
to buy votes. Civil society’s reports (Alianza Civica 2016) point out that these 
brokers are hanging around polling stations throughout the day targeting 
and buying voters. They intercept electors going to polls to make an offer. 
Equally, supporting examples of such tactics are discussed in Chapter 4. 
Once an elector engages in the transaction, they both enter into a process 
of negotiation about rewards. This talk is crucial for brokers as evidence 
suggests that vote-buying activities might represent a source of extra 
income for brokers (Mercado 2013). Interviews conducted have revealed 
that brokers have a room for more margin of profit during these negotiations 
(see Chapter 5 for a further revision). As parties and brokers have set up 
rates and rewards by the time negotiations begin, brokers can manage the 
budget freely once they have reached the bottom line of votes. 
 Once brokers and voters have verbally reached a deal, the former 
employ two essential tactics of compliance such as photographing ballot 
papers marked with mobile devices (Vicente 2014) and using children as 
witnesses (Alianza Civica 2006, 2012).55 These kids are known as ‘little 
hawks’ whose job is to attest voters’ choice, accompanying adults into the 
voting booth. Although the literature has provided no conclusive evidence 
whether people receive the payoff after or before casting the vote, calls 
examined here (see Appendix 4) show voters complaining that they 
received no reward after selling their vote. On the contrary, I also found 
evidence against sellers and buyers closing the deal after casting the vote. 
                                                        
55 Sin Embargo, ‘PRI y PVEM utilizaron niños (#halconcitos) para vigilar que adultos votaran a su 
favor: Alianza Cívica’, Wednesday 4 July 2012, Elecciones 2012, http://www.sinembargo.mx/04-07-
2012/285081 (Accessed on Wednesday 30 July 2014). 
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Depending on the tactic of compliance, voters show the photographed ballot 
paper or the kid (the attester) confirms electors’ choice. Civil society’s 
organisations (Alianza Civica 2012) have expressed serious concerns in 
connection with children’s rights, as parents seem to agree with this activity 
and sometimes even force children to do it. For the 2012 Presidential 
Elections in Mexico, there were blistering discussions on the prohibition of 
using mobile devices at polling stations, currently, it is allowed, however.56 
 As the illegality of the activity, it is hard to establish with certainty the 
sum of the money or type of reward in clientelistic vote buying. Yet, some 
studies have estimated it based on qualitative interviews and surveys 
(Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Alianza Civica 2012, UNDP 2006, 
Cornelius 2002). These payoffs have varied along the time (see Table 3.1). 
These sums of money might sound low in British Pounds for the UK’s rates 
but by January 2016, the minimum wage in Mexico had risen by Mx$73.04 
(£2.85) per day, so the lowest payoff might represent up to one and a half 
work day. Putting this into UK’s minimum wage, the margin would be 
equivalent to something between £80 and £634 for turning out o polling day. 
The buying power and the level of electoral competition determine payoff 
rates by region (Ugalde & Rivera 2013). In Chapter 4, I also assess the 
delivery of rewards based on callers’ quotes; however, rates found in these 
studies are consistent with my findings. 
 
 
                                                        
56Proceso, ‘Rechaza IFE prohibir uso de celulares en las casillas’, Thursday 21 June 2012, Comicios 
2012, http://www.proceso.com.mx/311718/rechaza-ife-prohibir-uso-de-celulares-en-casillas 
(accessed on Wednesday 30 July 2014). 
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Table 3. 1 Estimations of Vote-Buying Payoff 
Presidential Election Minimum Maximum 
2000 Mx$100 Mx$500 
 [£4] [£20] 
2006 Mx$250 Mx$500 
 [£10] [£20] 
2012 Mx$200 Mx$800 
 [£8] [£31] 
Source: Author with information from Mercado, 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Alianza Civica 2012, 
UNDP 2006, Cornelius 2002. 
 
 
There is another question. Where does the money to buy votes come from? 
If a party needed to buy three thousand votes with the lowest rate, they 
would require at least Mx$300,000 [£13,000] in cash, free of taxes and out 
of expenses’ reports. In Mexico, parties are mostly funded by state 
resources and supervised when receiving private and international funds. 
As funding regulations have been tightened,57 parties require other sources 
to buy votes. Senators, governors, mayors, deputies, top politicians and 
high-level officials start playing a vital role during campaigns (see Chapter 
6 for a further discussion). Informally, when these actors acknowledge their 
support for a candidate, what it means is that they will be contributing 
financially to the campaign. In fact, politicians have been arrested at airports 
for carrying enormous amounts of cash without declaration.58 Presumably, 
politicians embezzle state resources amongst other corrupt schemes to fulfil 
such promises (Ugalde & Rivera 2013). 
                                                        
57 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Ley General de Partidos Politicos’, Friday 23 
May 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGPP_130815.pdf (accessed on Thursday 
25 June 2015). 
58 Animal Politico, ‘Detienen a colaboradores de Duarte por trasladar 25 mdp en avión oficial’, 
Monday 30 January 2012, Nacional, http://www.animalpolitico.com/2012/01/retienen-avion-de-
javier-duarte-con-25-mdp-en-efectivo/ (accessed on Friday 29 March 2013). 
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  Exploring monetary effects of the elections in 85 democratic 
countries, Aidt et al (2015) argue that a systemic, large-scale vote buying 
has short-run aggregate effects since this action requires cash right before 
the election. ‘This creates a spike in the demand for money with a very 
specific timing pattern’ (Aidt et al 2105: 8). The correlation is stronger in low-
income countries, which suggests that the demand for cash in certain time 
responds to systemic vote-buying actions. 
 A few studies (Singer 2009) and non-academic sources have 
suggested other methods employed by top politicians and high-level 
officials to make money through public procurement. It is believed that they 
tailor calls and tender notices to pre-selected companies, which increase 
the price of the project to distribute bribes. Some information suggests that 
by the time governments publish the notice, they have already discussed 
and agreed terms, conditions and rates –real and corrupted with 
corporations.59 Newspapers have reported the creation of networks of shell 
companies closely related to governors through relatives and friends.60 
These manoeuvres entail the involvement of other actors such as solicitors, 
notaries public and magistrates. Furthermore, newspaper reports have 
accused companies of being paid for delivering no service, exposing the 
fact of having neither offices nor employees.61 
                                                        
59 There are tens of news reports about corruption at all levels. A basic search of ‘corrupción México’ 
in Google News produced 1.7 million links. One domestic newspaper has created a web page 
gathering top cases of political corruption in Mexico, see El Economista, ‘Corrupción en México’, 
http://eleconomista.com.mx/corrupcion-mexico (accessed on Tuesday 2 September 2106). 
60 Animal Politico, ‘Las empresas fantasma, creadas con irregularidades y por notarios ligados al PRI 
y a Duarte’, Monday 30 May 2016, Nacional, http://www.animalpolitico.com/2016/05/entre-los-
notarios-que-legalizaron-las-empresas-de-veracruz-hay-diputados-del-pri-e-hijos-de-funcionarios-
de-duarte/ (accessed on Tuesday 30 August 2016). 
61  La Jornada de Oriente, ‘Deslinda Corona Cremean a gobierno del estado de empresas 
fraudulentas’, Tuesday 6 September 2016, Politica, 
http://www.lajornadadeoriente.com.mx/2016/09/06/deslinda-corona-cremean-a-gobierno-del-
estado-de-empresas-fraudulentas/ (accessed on Monday 12 September 2016). 
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 Another method to raise money is the trade of bureaucratic posts. 
Despite regulations established by the civil service,62 when the president, 
governor or mayor get the post, a new cabinet is appointed. Therefore, a 
considerable number of changes in middle positions take place throughout 
–usually negotiated before campaigns. Journalists have argued that people 
get a public post without any related work experience. Prospective 
employees presumably pay for the post in two ways. One is by sharing 
periodically an agreed proportion of the wage and the other is by making a 
one-off payment according to the rate of the position.63 Although police have 
investigated cases over the years, just a few people have been sent to jail. 
  A similar method seems to be employed by parties when deciding 
candidates. The more abundance of office’s resources (Birch 2011: 137), 
the more posts to trade. This is an extra motivation for people to want to be 
a candidate. Moreover, some reports have demonstrated similar practices 
adopted in legislative64 and judicial65 branches. As illegal, there are no 
records about the sum of money negotiated but these reports suggest 
between 10% and 50% of the wage of the post for monthly fees and up to 
MX$200,000 (about £7,795) for the one-off payment. 
                                                        
62 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la 
Administración Pública Federal’, Thursday 10 April 2003, HYPERLINK 
"http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/260.pdf"ht (accessed on Thursday 25 June 
2015).accessed on Thursday 25 June 2015). 
63 UNOTV, ‘Lo agarran porque “vendía” plazas en el Gobierno de Oaxaca’, Thursday 4 February 
2016, Oaxaca, http://www.unotv.com/noticias/estados/oaxaca/detalle/prometia-plazas-trabajar-
gobierno-estado-detenido-326786/ (accessed on Sunday 10 April 2016). 
64  La Jornada Jalisco, ‘Diputados cobran derecho de piso a supernumerarios’, Saturday 10 
November 2012, Guadalajara, 
http://www.mediasolutions.com.mx/ncpop.asp?n=201210110740141915&t=7177 (accessed on 
Friday 29 March 2013). 
65 El Universal, ‘En el Poder Judicial federal trafican plazas’, Tuesday 22 September 2009, Nacion, 
http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/171432.html (accessed on Friday 29 March 2013). 
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 A third method to fund political activities is by laundering money. As 
more sophisticated, it usually implies robust networks between senior 
politicians, high-level officials and organised criminal groups (Lilley 2006, 
Richards 1998). Amongst scandals in Mexico from 2001 to 2016, there have 
been over seven former governors arrested for money laundering and drug 
trafficking by American authorities.66 Some of them already convicted and 
others are facing trials. Although some studies have suggested this idea 
(Singer 2009), there is no evidence that money made under these schemes 
of corruption goes to vote-buying. 
As I have argued, at the beginning of the Twentieth-century, the 
Mexican political system was highly familiarised with corporatist policies of 
deliveries and campaigns developed through clientelistic tactics. Whereas 
all parties have turned to clientelistic exchanges, brokers have begun to 
perform vote-buying actions without strong ideological ties with parties. This 
fact, has made brokers more opportunistic and more business oriented, 
selling services to the highest bidder. Brokers have also devised methods 
of targeting and buying in two main stages in which the Election Day is the 
most intense and crucial time. Politicians and high-level officials of the 
government engage in corruption to make money, which on one side, gives 
them incentives to hold public posts and, on the other side, helps them to 
make money for political needs. 
 
                                                        
66 El Economista, ‘En 15 años, 7 gobernadores ligados a la corrupción y la delincuencia organizada’, 
Friday 15 January 2016, Sociedad, http://eleconomista.com.mx/sociedad/2016/01/15/15-anos-7-
gobernadores-ligados-corrupcion-delincuencia-organizada (accessed on Sunday 10 April 2016). 
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3.4 Competing Constitutional Reforms: How Amendments Aiming 
Free and Fair Elections Have Boosted Vote Buying 
 
As I have argued, elections have been a crucial factor of stability for the 
Mexican political system. The legislation of elections has changed as a 
result of political and social pressure, seeking legitimacy for the regime. 
After the Mexican Revolution, the establishment first shaped authoritarian, 
paternalistic rules to keep the power. Then, it developed strong corporatist 
mechanisms of control to rule the country with stability. Finally, vote-buying 
reached other parties, spreading itself as a campaign method. In this 
section, I review the path of vote buying in the legislation and how electoral 
reforms, pursuing ideals of fairness and equality, have deterred the 
government and ruling party from manipulating electoral institutions. Yet, 
the changes in the legislation have forced parties to conduct knocking-doors 
campaigns as a result of the media restriction, limit of spending and 
enhanced measures of inspection. These factors have incentivised 
personal interactions between voters and brokers. 
 
Reforms on Political Pluralism 
 
Since the 1970s, electoral laws, codes and legislations have been lively 
debated within the Mexican Congress, shaping the existing legal frame. The 
end of the prevalence of the one-party system (Solinger 2001) in Mexico 
began with the 1977 electoral reform. 67  There is a somewhat diffuse 
                                                        
67 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Reforma y adiciones de los artículos 6, 41, 51, 
52, 53, 54, 55, 60, 61, 65, 70, 73, 74, 93, 97 y 115 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos’, Tuesday 6 December 1977, 
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reference to vote buying in the bill. In Chapter III, Sanctions, Article III 
specified that all those individuals who vote more than once or force other 
voters to vote for a candidate or party would be going to jail for up to a year 
with electoral crime. As it can be seen, there is no a direct reference to the 
exchange of benefits for votes, which it might illustrate the political 
circumstances of the period. By contrast, this reform allowed opposition 
parties to participate in elections more fairly and reducing considerably 
restrictions on the registry of new parties. Opposition groups had access to 
the Chamber of Deputies as 25% of the whole seats (400) were set to 
proportional representation. Parties also had the opportunity to broadcast 
propaganda by having access to media. Although this reform is known for 
giving representation to minorities and widening room of debate to 
antagonistic ideas, electoral colleges and voting counting were still 
jurisdictions of the Chambers. In other words, senators and deputies self-
judged elections from which they were elected. Likewise, the Supreme 
Court settled elections controversies. 
 The 1986 electoral reform68 introduced significant changes to the 
institutional design (see Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2001: 282-287). In terms 
of vote buying, the amendment drastically modified the criminal definition. 
Chapter Third, Sanctions, Article 340 states that public servants who force 
or induce electors to vote for a candidate or party would be fined, barred 
                                                        
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_086_06dic77_ima.pdf (accessed on 
Sunday 15 November 2015). 
68 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Reforma de los artículos 52, 53 Segundo Párrafo, 
54 Primer Párrafo y Fracciones II, III y IV, 56, 60, 77 Fracción IV y Décimo Octavo Transitorio de la 
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos’, Monday 15 December 1986, 
/www.sitios.scjn.gob.mx/constitucion1917-
2017/sites/default/files/CPEUM_1917_CC/pdf/00130002.pdf (accessed on Sunday 20 December 
2015). 
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and sent to jail for up to three years with electoral crime. The interesting 
side of the criminal definition is the restriction of perpetrator in the 
government arena. In contrast, the reform expanded the number of the 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies from 400 to 500, increasing also the share 
of proportional representation from 25% to 40% (for a further theoretical 
discussion see Balinski & Gonzalez, 1996). It also established a specialised 
jurisdictional authority in elections called Electoral Tribunal (TRICOEL) 
whose job was to conclude over acts and decisions of the Federal Electoral 
Commission. The electoral system, however, was still showing signs of 
unfairness since an overwhelming majority of the Commission’s officials 
were members of the ruling party. This Commission, indeed, was accused 
of the 1988 electoral fraud (see Section 3.1). Equally, tasks of electoral 
colleges and voting counting were still under the jurisdiction of the Chamber 
of Deputies. 
 The 1990 electoral reform69 switched the approach to vote buying. 
Legislators redefined the criminal structure of vote buying. Chapter XXIV, 
Electoral Crimes, Article 406 specified that all those party officials forcing or 
inducing electors to vote for a candidate or party would be fined and sent to 
jail up to five years. On the other hand, the reform transformed the Electoral 
Commission into an autonomous constitutional body called Federal 
Electoral Institute (IFE). The governing board, still chaired by the Secretary 
of the Interior, included members of the legislative branch, parties and civil 
                                                        
69  Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Código Federal de Instituciones y 
Procedimientos Electorales y se adiciona el Título Vigésimo Cuarto del Código Penal para el Distrito 
Federal en Materia de Fuero Común, y para toda la República en Materia de Fuero Federal’, 
Wednesday 15 August 1990, http://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red/marco/PDF/O.%201995-
2011/g)%20COFIPE%20de%201990/01.%20COFIPE%201990.pdf (accessed on Sunday 27 
December 2015). 
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society associations. Also, there were new rules for the National Electoral 
Register and the method to fund political parties (Diaz-Santana 2002). This 
reform also changed the TRICOEL into the Federal Electoral Tribunal 
(TRIFE), expanding its responsibilities and scope. The country was divided 
into four geographical jurisdictions, holding one local chamber each area. 
Yet, TRIFE had to work together with electoral colleges –senators and 
deputies, on voting counting and other affairs. Also, the Article 190, number 
2 of the Electoral Code established that ‘it is forbidden electioneering, 
promoting and conducting party’s meetings and rallies during the period 
going from three days before the Election Day to the closing time of the 
polling stations (own translation). 
 
Reforms on Autonomy and Institutional Strengthening 
 
The work of electoral management bodies (EMBs) is to ensure free, fair and 
meaningful elections. To gain credibility, EMBs must demonstrate reliability 
to people (Birch 2011). The organisation of EMBs worldwide is diverse 
regarding their structure, attributions, competencies, and factual power 
within the state. Mexico has transited from a governmental to an 
independent model of EMBs (Wall 2006). There are three main models of 
electoral administration (Lopez-Pintor 2000): a) elections run by the 
government, in which a civil service is accountable to politicians; b) elections 
run by the government but subject to supervision by another body –usually 
independent; c) elections run by a wholly independent electoral 
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commission. For the Mexican state, the transition from the first to the third 
model signified a considerable challenge. 
 The 1993 reform sustained a similar structure of vote buying but it 
expanded the extent of perpetrators entitling any single individual 
conducting such activities (Diaz-Santana 2002). Thus, Article 403 states 
that all those asking for votes favouring a candidate or political party as an 
exchange of payment, gifts, a promise of money or any other reward during 
campaigns and elections days, would be fined and sent to jail up to two 
years. In addition, there was a restriction of electioneering and conducting 
rallies from Friday before polling days (voting day in Mexico is always on 
Sundays). In contrast, one of the features of the 1993 electoral reform70 was 
the removal of electoral colleges from the jurisdiction of the Chambers (for 
a further description see Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2001). This decision 
entailed, at last, the establishment of the TRIFE as a judicial body wholly 
attributed to decide the outcome of elections, voting counting, electoral 
controversies amidst other procedures (Nohlen 2005). It also introduced 
limits on the spending of campaigns, appealed to fairness between ruling 
and opposition parties. 
  Meeting expectations of democratic values for the 1994 Presidential 
Election (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2012), the reform71 signified a 
breakthrough for the appointment of electoral commissioners. Called 
                                                        
70 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Reforma y adición de los artículos del Código 
Federal de Instituciones y Procedmientos Electorales’, Friday 24 September 1993, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/abro/cofipe/COFIPE_ref03_24sep93_ima.pdf (accessed 
on Tuesday 12 January 2016). 
71 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Reforma, adición y derogación de diversos 
artículos del Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales’, Wednesday 18 May 
1994, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=4696377&fecha=18/05/1994 (accessed on 
Friday 15 January 2016). 
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magistrate-directors, the change included for the first-time, non-party 
appointees and representatives of opposition parties in IFE’s governing 
body. This change made citizens eligible to take over such duties. Such 
body was constituted by six magistrates-directors and four deputies of the 
legislature representing opposition parties, chaired by the Secretary of the 
Interior. Also, the reform introduced new regulations on national and 
international electoral observers. With this change, citizens and specialised 
groups took part more actively in monitoring the elections. The reform also 
denied winning parties’ rights to get a legislative majority, giving opposition 
parties more access to media too. Finally, as a result of the complexity to 
punish electoral offences, legislators established a specialised agency in 
electoral crimes with attributions and technical autonomy to prosecute these 
offences. Called Attorney General Office Attending Electoral Crimes, since 
then, this office has been in charge of preventing, investigating and 
prosecuting vote buying among other crimes. 
 The 1996 electoral reform72 presented no change in vote buying. By 
contrast, it strengthened the autonomy of the IFE by detaching all the 
jurisdiction of the government on electoral affairs (Eisenstadt 2007). Nine 
citizen directors appointed by the Chambers (one of them serving as the 
President) and representatives from each party constituted the governing 
body of IFE, called the Council General. The restructuration widened 
faculties of the IFE considerably. It absorbed the control of the budget of 
political parties, being empowered to perform audits, request accountant 
                                                        
72 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Reforma a diversos artículos de la Constitución 
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos’, Thursday 22 August 1996, 
http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=4896725&fecha=22/08/1996 (accessed on 
Wednesday 20 January 2016). 
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reports, conduct inspections, establish procedures and more importantly 
fine parties. 
  Additionally, the reform gave the federal electoral court extra 
jurisdiction over appeals of local electoral disputes (Eisenstadt 2007). This 
fact empowered TRIFE as an authority of the judicial branch with full 
autonomy, increasing the number of areas to five with an equal number of 
regional chambers. This change expanded TRIFE’s attributions over 
constitutional decisions, becoming the only electoral body to decide 
ultimately over elections. Other important changes were the access to 
Radio and Television, new rules of distribution of state funding, linked to the 
voting share obtained in the last election, and the control of party’s private 
contributions from members and supporters. As discussed, the 1996 reform 
focused on strengthening the institutional design. IFE and TRIFE got 
attributions to conduct punitive binding actions over parties. In fact, the date 
of the reform was a fundamental factor since rules entered into force, just 
weeks before the official opening of the 1997 Midterm electoral process. A 
relevant outcome credited to this reform is on political pluralism as the ruling 
party lost the majority in both the lower Chambers and the upper House. 
 The 1996 rules served as bases for the 2000 Presidential Election, 
which represented the first political transition in recent Mexican political 
history (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni 2012). An air of foreboding 
prowled around the environment when polling stations closed. Around 
11pm, the Mexican President acknowledged the adverse outcome on 
national TV and Radio, leaving seven decades of the dominance. The 1996 
reform has received all credits of these moments of excitement. From 2000 
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to 2007, IFE recorded its threshold of people’s trust (Mendizabal & Moreno 
2010), its performance has received the credits of the political transition. 
The public perception on the executive board increased considerably 
beyond the political arena. They delivered speeches of fairness, 
transparency and reliability every day with hints of a celebration of 
democratic values. People rejoiced in the streets to see the ruling party 
losing the power. 
 In conclusion,  
The 1990–6 electoral reforms involved the establishment of an 
electoral commission that was independent both de facto and de 
jure, and which thereby insulated electoral processes from 
manipulations of electoral administration by the ruling 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). These reforms ushered in 
a change of regime, when the PRI, which had ruled Mexico for 
seven decades, first lost control of the lower house of parliament 
in 1997 and then of the presidency in 2000 (Birch 2011: 147). 
 
Reforms on Fair Elections 
 
Rules coming from the 1996 reform remained for about a decade; the 2006 
Presidential Elections, however, brought unexpected challenges. The 
electoral legislation seemed to be overtaken for the most competitive 
election ever recorded. After an unprecedented controversy, less than 1% 
of winning margin, legislative debates on a new electoral reform began to 
take place straightway after the election. Amongst other points, the bills 
focused on (not necessarily in this order of relevance):73 
• The regulation of access to media for political parties. 
                                                        
73 Gaceta Parlamentaria (Parliamentary Gazette), año IX, número 2083-I, lunes 28 de agosto de 
2006, ‘Modificació del numeral 3 y adición de los numerales 4 y 5 del artículo 4 del Código Federal 
de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales’, 
http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/59/2006/ago/20060828-I.html (accessed on Saturday 30 
March 2013). 
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• The re-establishment of the limits of campaign expenses. 
• New rules and regulations of communication of governments. 
• The appointment of the citizen director of IFE. 
 
Vote buying remained firm for the 2007 reform.74 Instead changes affect 
IFE, TRIFE and parties directly. A new regime of sanctions was created, 
giving to IFE full responsibility. Equally, a new set of offences against 
elections covered other political areas and individuals. The jurisdiction of 
TRIFE was adjusted, making regional chambers permanent and 
empowering the institution to declare the validity of a Presidential election, 
attracting and delegating cases from and to local chambers. These new 
rules also affected the traditional relationships between political actors and 
mass media. They restricted private negotiations on broadcasting’s rates 
for electoral propaganda and inspected the contents of messages before 
broadcasting (Serra 2009). Claims of the defeated presidential candidate 
about unfairness and media attacks (so-called dirty campaign)75 motivated 
these changes. A sensitive aspect was the restriction of non-political groups 
to influence the decision of voters. The runner-up candidate argued that 
wealthy groups funded thousands of media messages against him illegally. 
Also, they pressurised owners of broadcasting companies to manage with 
discretion rates of political propaganda. 
 In this aspect, the 2007 reform was considered rather radical since 
eliminated any possibility for anyone to access the media during political 
                                                        
74 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Reforma de los artículos 6, 41, 85, 99, 108, 116 
y 122; adición del artículo 134 y derogación de un párrafo al artículo 97 de la Constitución Política 
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.’, Tuesday 13 November 2007, 
www.diputados.gob.mx/.../55_CPEUM_13nov07.doc (accessed on Tuesday 9 December 2014). 
75 La Jornada, ‘Televisa impulsó la guerra sucia para impedir que fuera presidente: AMLO’, Thursday 
28 June 2007, Política, 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/06/28/index.php?section=politica&article=008n1pol (accessed 
on Saturday 2 February 2013). 
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campaigns (Serra 2009). Broadcasting political propaganda on radio and 
television is nowadays fully forbidden. Journalists and social groups have 
severely criticised this measure for infringing freedom of speech.76 It is 
debatable the extent of such limitation, but these claims flagged something 
deeper. The quest for fair, impartial, transparent elections was conflicting 
other democratic interests (Serra 2009). There are no many examples of 
democratic regimes restricting free access to the media. Social groups have 
access to radio and television to support those candidates whom they 
believe are the best option. 
 Concerning the inspection, the reform also sought to foster sensible 
campaign messages and ruling dirty politics. It regulated the type and format 
of political messages. Subjectively, negative words, phrases and comments 
were fully forbidden. The reform, indeed, warned parties of issuing 
messages “denigrating” or “slandering” opponents. This enactment was 
meant to protect the reputation of candidates. Yet, these measures were 
rigorously disapproved by sectors for depriving citizens of their right to know 
the truth about politicians (Serra 2009). For them, instead of inspecting the 
negativity of the content subjectively, the reform must have focused on the 
reliability of the sources not to publicise false or incorrect information. 
 Related to media access, the 2007 reform impacted the limit of the 
spending of campaigns. Different from the 1993 reform, this change 
established a reduction of the amount of money given to parties. A new 
formula for calculating public funding to parties included the number citizens 
                                                        
76 Cámara Nacional de la Industria de Radio y Televisión, ‘La ley electoral y los criterios de la 
autoridad atentan contra la libertad de expresión y limitan la actividad periodística’, Wednesday 15 
February 2012, http://www.cirt.com.mx/portal/index.php/comunicacion/desplegados/647-ley-
electoral-atenta-contra-libertad-de-expresion (accessed Sunday 17 March 2013). 
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enrolled in the national register and the number of illegible parties. The 
method assigned 30% of the public funds evenly distributed to each political 
party, and 70% according to the number of votes each obtained in the last 
election. The reform also established new procedures for the liquidation of 
the extinct parties, in which assets and remaining resources should be given 
to the national treasury. There were new limits on private contributions 
additionally. 
 The communication of federal and local governments has usually 
been controversial since officials have used it to promote themselves and 
parties. For example, for the 2006 Presidential Elections, international 
reports suggested a meddling of the Mexican president in campaigns 
through government’s messages, magnifying his successes intentionally 
(Arias 2007). The reform established limits on the dissemination of the 
communication of governments and recognised IFE as the sole authority 
responsible for distributing and allocating time in media for electoral 
purposes. The decision prohibited officials from using state resources to 
self-promotion, it restricted times for governments to advertise, from the 
beginning of the campaigns until polling day. It confined broadcasting 
geographically, depending on the election. It also impacted contents, 
excluding imperative themes such as education, health, safety and security, 
and emergency. For some authors (Serra 2009), the foremost point of the 
2007 reform was the extension of IFE and TRIFE’s faculties to impose 
sanctions to the executive branch. They both were fully allowed to order the 
removal of political spots from Radio and TV. Although there has been a 
consistent pattern in the decisions between the two authorities, some 
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conflicting decisions have reportedly confronted cases opened by IFE and 
revoked by TRIFE.77 
 Staggered appointments entered equally into force for the nine 
members of the executive board. Three citizen directors were replaced 
immediately, including the director president; three more were meant to 
leave the post three years after the reform, in 2010, and the three remaining 
would complete the period until 2014. This rush caused uncertainty since 
restrictions for former parties’ members and partisans to serve as citizen 
directors disappeared, creating doubts about IFE’s neutrality, impartiality 
and autonomy (Schedler 2007). Likewise, the change reduced the waiting 
period for former candidates to be eligible for running a post at IFE from five 
to four years. 
 
A Reform on Institutional Re-redesign 
 
The 2014 reform78 renewed the jurisdiction of vote buying but the essence 
of criminal definition remained. It also developed two new legislations such 
as the general law on parties, the general law of institutions and procedures. 
They empowered federal authorities to conduct binding actions over local 
elections. It also transformed IFE into the Electoral National Institute (INE), 
entitling it to fulfil electoral duties nationally and absorbing former states 
EMBs. Amongst other changes, the jurisdiction of INE was extended to the 
                                                        
77 Files SUP-RAP-75/2009, SUP-RAP-82/2009, SUP-RAP-87/2009 and SUP-RAP-89/2009. 
78 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Reforma, adición y derogación de diversas 
disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia política-
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10 February 2014, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5332025&fecha=10/02/2014 
(accessed on Friday 30 October 2015). 
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organisation and decisions over local elections, employing local agencies 
as regional coordinators. To accomplish these duties, INE created a large 
liaison unit in charge of coordinating new local EMBs, although a sensitive 
aspect was the appointment of the executive boards of local EMBs. INE was 
also attributed to recruit and appoint up to 224 electoral officials. However, 
some newspapers have reported tough discussions in local congresses to 
allocate public resources to these EMBs.79 This aspect has represented 
tensions between Federation and states about sovereignty. 
 The reform established criteria for grounds of the nullity of elections 
resulting from serious, intentional and decisive violations to fairness such 
as exceeding campaign spending (up to five percent of the amount 
authorised), accessing to radio and television through illegal individual 
negotiations and managing illegal resources in campaigns. 
 Legislators are allowed to re-stand for a seat and potentially re-
elected for consecutive periods. With some restrictions, it was established 
up to two legislative terms for senators and up to four for deputies (12 years 
for both of them). Equally, local legislatures were allowed to enact similar 
changes to states’ constitutions according to their circumstances but in any 
case, not exceeding terms of three years. 
 There was a new establishment of procedures and sanctions for 
electoral crimes, which were removed from the Federal Criminal Act to a 
new specialised general Act on electoral crimes. The definition of vote 
buying was modified. The reform prohibits vote buying at any time during 
                                                        
79 Animal Politico, ‘Lo bueno, lo malo y lo incierto de la reforma electoral’, Columna Invitada, Tuesday 
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political campaigns; previously it was focused on the Election Day. Another 
addition was the fact of establishing intangible goods as part of the rewards, 
stating ‘any remuneration’. Moreover, sellers of votes, not just buyers, are 
subjected to sanctions. One problem is that the fact of punishing both –
buyers and sellers– restricts incentives for people to report crimes. 
Therefore, it is hard to assume that this change will contribute to prosecute 
perpetrators more efficiently or even more to deter vote buying from 
happening. This reform also set the autonomy of the National Council for 
Evaluation of Social Development Policy, which is the agency in charge of 
evaluating misuses of CCTs with electoral purposes (see Section 3.2). 
  The 2014 reform also changed the procedure from which the head 
of the office is appointed. The legislative branch should now decide over 
candidates unanimously. Among other requirements, this new procedure 
entails a national recruitment call, face-to-face interviews between 
prospects and Congressmen and the ratification of the Senate. This new 
method also relates to a substantial coming change. In a three-years period, 
the Attorney General’s jurisdiction will be removed from the executive 
branch. The idea is to make the head of the office fully independent from 
the influence of the President. In theory, this change establishes an optimal 
scenario for prosecuting independently and more efficiently electoral crimes 
(Diaz-Santana 2013). 
 The reform ruled private contributions to political campaigns again. 
Newspapers have reported parties exceeding spending limits.80 Most of the 
                                                        
80  Reforma, ‘Acusan exceso en campañas de Guerrero’, Friday 17 April 2015, Estados, 
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money presumably parties overspend comes from private funds and, a few 
times, from illegal sources.81 In fact, since then, EMBs have opened tens of 
investigations against parties and politicians for campaign misreporting.82 
INE and TRIFE have spared an equal number of penalties. The new reform 
establishes new limits on private contributions and incorporates compulsory 
actions to take by political parties, which for some scholars, had been 
required years before (Diaz-Santana 2011). 
 Another change was the fact of making non-party candidates eligible 
to stand for elected positions. With specific criteria, singular citizens are now 
allowed to conduct and lead campaigns. Likewise, the rights of abroad 
voters were extended to senators and governors, potentially through 
electronic-voting in addition to post-voting. Despite existing for about ten 
years, the procedure of abroad voters seemed to be hard to comprehend 
concerning steps and stages, however, Mexicans abroad have consistently 
participated in elections (Lafleur 2011). 
Although analysts have acknowledged positive aspects of these 
changes,83 the 2014 reform increased the number of regulating electoral 
articles from 394 to 590. This rise represents 49.7% more rules in seven 
years. Just to place this point into context, whereas the American 
Constitution is formed of seven articles, the Mexican one contains 135. 
Furthermore, Mexican Congressmen have changed it about 200 times in 99 
years, whilst their American counterpart has amended it 27 times in 229 
                                                        
81  El Universal, ‘Hay dinero del narco en campañas políticas: González Garza’, Nación, 
http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/522422.html (accessed on Sunday 11 November 2012). 
82 La Jornada, ‘Gastó el PRI más de $4 mil 500 millones en la campaña de Peña Nieto en 2012’, 
Wednesday 12 March 2014, Política, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2014/03/12/politica/008n1pol 
(Accessed on Wednesday 15 July 2015). 
83 Nexos, ‘Lo que hay que cambiar en las leyes electorales de México’, Tuesday 1 November 2016, 
Política, http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=30061  (Accessed on Thrusday 15 December 2016). 
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years (Mahoney et al 1986). Beyond the view of enforcement, the 2014 
reform imposes practical constraints for the rule of law. The secretary of the 
interior has recognised the over regulation of the electoral legislation.84 
Equally, specialists have agreed with the high complexity to make it work.85 
As I have discussed, a problem of elections and politics in Mexico has been 
money (see Section 3.3). Despite hundreds of articles enacted against 
corruption, illegal money flows through campaigns (Singer 2009). Mexicans 
live corruption in daily politics, it is hard to believe that politicians will not find 
another method to make money. Although there are cases in which 
centralisation plays an important role to standardise procedures efficiently, 
the decision of concentrating authority does not guarantee that parties will 




As I have argued, the transition of the Mexican political system from an 
authoritarian to a machine party is explained by mechanisms to control the 
opposition. Electoral bills helped the PRI to get more robust majorities in 
Chambers. In addition, by controlling electoral institutions and procedures, 
the government manipulated the vote with certain level of ease. They in 
combinations with the ruling party consolidated a solid complex network 
constituted of politicians, officials, partisan, volunteers and voters. Equally, 
                                                        
84 Milenio, ‘Con reforma electoral se acabaron los pretextos: Osorio’, Monday 27 January 2014, 
Política http://www.milenio.com/politica/electoral-acabaron-pretextos-Osorio-
Chong_0_234577049.html (accessed on Friday 3 Septmeber 2016). 
85 Cambio, ‘Carlos Ugalde realiza aguda crítica a nueva Ley Electoral’, Monday 20 April 2015, Zoon 
Politikon, http://www.diariocambio.com.mx/2015/zoon-politikon/item/4877-carlos-ugalde-realiza-
aguda-critica-a-nueva-ley-electoral (accessed on Saturday 15 August 2015). 
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corporatist policies make Mexicans more familiar with clientelistic and 
paternalistic practices. Such relationship strengthened ties of loyalty and 
support to the government. The dominant party also devised effective 
tactics of manipulation performed during campaigns.  
Clientelistic exchanges have been employed by all parties as an 
effective method for campaigning. Brokers are now more opportunistic and 
business oriented, devising more sophisticated methods of targeting and 
buying. Also, politicians and government high-level officials in Mexico have 
found corrupt forms to manage state resources. 
 Although legislators adjusted the criminal definition of vote buying in 
forty years of electoral reforms, the tendency towards free and fair elections 
has boosted spaces for vote buying. First, restricting the access of political 
parties to mass media has promoted a fair contest to all parties. However, 
it also pressed campaigners to develop more strategies in the field to get 
supporters. This fact leveraged face-to-face interaction, which can develop 
stronger ties between brokers and people (Powel 1970). Secondly, the 
prohibition for governments to broadcast messages during campaigns 
caused a similar outcome. Politicians need self-promotion in media (Nacif 
1995); therefore, they need to develop effective methods of communication. 
Radio and television are natural means to reach more people cheaper and 
promptly. Although restricting the access to media might contain top 
politicians and high-level officials from promoting themselves with state 
resources, they inevitably need to find alternative methods to interact with 
voters. This measure encouraged politicians to conduct other illegal ways 
to continue promoting themselves. In Mexico, there have been scandals of 
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corruption involving considerable amounts of money during campaign 
periods (Morris 2009). Given that some local governments struggle to 
develop effective systems of accountability and transparency, the 
illegitimate fabrication of reports about the public budget is simple (Kind 
2003). Thirdly, the regulation on limits of campaign spending enforced 
parties on accounting inspection. But it generates also motivations for them 
to find methods to underreport resources they use. Since politicians had 
already got tactics to deal with accounting matters, the reform just urged 
them to be even better at doing this. 
Having discussed how Mexico provides a good opportunity to 
investigate vote buying as similar conditions of a highly institutionalised 
parties’ machines, selective deliveries of benefits and constitutional reforms 
addressed to free and fair elections, I now turn to investigate how Mexican 
voters face vote buying, how parties and brokers conduct strategies of 
targeting and buying, and what are the effects of vote buying on voting 
choices in Mexico. In Chapter 4, I examine thousands of accounts of callers 
from all over the country reporting vote buying; in Chapter 5, I conduct a 
series of interviews with brokers; and in Chapter 6, I conduct an alternative 







Chapter 4. Vote Buying, Campaigns and Polling 
Days in Mexico: An Account from the Mexican 





Given that this dissertation uses a mixed-method research design, it does 
not include a separate chapter outlining the data and method. Instead, I 
introduce and assess methodological implications in each chapter since 
data sources and analytical approaches differ across the three following 
techniques. Literature has largely study clientelistic exchanges from several 
angles and employing several techniques (e.g. Diaz, Estevez & Magaloni 
2016, 2012, 2007, Hilgers 2011, Shefner 2001, Ayuero 2000, 1999, Gay 
1994, Fox 1994, Lemarchand & Legg 1972, Powell 1970). However, 
empirical findings differ about the extent and intensity of the problem. 
Whereas qualitative evidence as focus groups, in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews and direct observation (e.g. Hagene 2015, Schedler & Manriquez 
2004) suggest large operations of clientelistic distributions from politicians, 
statistical evidence as nationally representative surveys (Speck & Abramo 
2001, 2002, Brusco et al 2004, Stokes 2005) indicates small numbers of 
voters entering such arrangements. Why does evidence differ from each 
other? I then approach vote-buying from two qualitative techniques and a 
statistical test to cover both angles of the problem. This study then aims to 
fill this gap. 
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Scholars have employed the two approaches for the empirical study 
of clientelistic vote-buying and other forms of distributive politics such as 
quantitative and qualitative in the Latin-American region. Quantitative 
methods have provided tools to measure the incidence of vote buying 
(UNDP 2006, Stokes 2005, Brusco, Nazareno & Sotkes 2004, Cornelius 
2004, Speck & Abramo 2001, 2002), turn out buying (Larreguy, Marshall & 
Querubin 2016, Vicente 2014, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2014, 
Simpser 2012, Nichter 2008) and estimate vote-buying effects on election 
outcomes (Gallego & Wantchekon 2012) and voting behaviour (Hicken et al 
2015). Qualitative techniques have theorised on campaign clientelism 
(Munoz 2014), contributed to the understanding of people’s evaluation of 
political and electoral clientelism (Schedler & Manriquez 2004, Auyero 
1999), the method relationships brokers–clients (Hagene 2015, Auerbach 
2016) and state–citizens work (Lazar 2004).  
 Whilst interviews, focus groups, participant and direct observation 
have predominated in political science, innovative, unconventional methods 
(Terry & Wong 2005, Arbon et al 2006) have been developed in other 
disciplines to explore, for example, puzzles on victims and crimes (Meng 
2001, Sherman et al 1992). Drawing upon an unexplored data set of the 
National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in Mexico, in this chapter, I 
firstly assess some theoretical claims on 1) brokers’ strategies for targeting 
people, 2) electors’ engagement in vote buying and 3) compliance 
mechanisms, with a particular focus on the sort of goods distributed and the 
timing of these transactions. Extending qualitative tools, I develop an 
analytical framework based upon the accounts given by non-recruited 
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interviewees. The users of the telephone service call to report electoral 
crimes –amongst other electoral malpractices (Birch 2011)– sometimes in 
real-time. This fact offers an opportunity to capture crucial details of 
sensitive aspects of vote buying, which could be hard otherwise. Whereas 
traditional interviewing techniques have developed strategies to ask 
individuals about illegal and unacceptable actions with empathy to access 
to this sort of information, in this analysis, I rely on safety and convenience 
that the hotline offers callers to report relaxingly sensitive information and 
crimes anonymously (Novick 2008). The service provides callers with the 
two most important aspects that research on vote buying has faced as 
anonymity and confidentiality. It covers users’ identity, it is guided by 
professional telephonists and it is a free service. Therefore, I expect those 
testimonies to serve as a rich source of information on how individuals face 
vote buying strategies. In addition, as mobile phones and landline services 
have improved in Mexico in recent years, rural and urban areas have easy 
access to the hotline. In some cases, in fact, telephone services are 
understood as the only channel of communication and response to help 
vulnerable people. 
This assessment of the Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in 
Mexico contributes to qualitative literature on vote buying by providing a 
new perspective of analysis on the conditions voters cope with brokers 
along the electoral campaigns. This examination is unique in the sense that 
involves accounts from electors targeted and bought in ongoing elections 
and campaigns’ periods. As a result, methods to help survey’s respondents 
to remember facts, dates and other crucial information are not required. To 
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the best of my knowledge, it is the first ever hotline study on vote buying 
with these characteristics. Likewise, there is no previous exploration of this 
database with academic purposes. 
 This chapter is organised in the following way. I firstly discuss the 
origins and purposes of the Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in Mexico, 
exploring basic descriptive statistics of calls received in 2012 and introduce 
the contribution of this unexplored data set to the research on vote buying. 
Second, I analyse the content of calls focusing on strategies of targeting 
with a particular interest in the action of proffering. I also explore the 
implications of the difference between offering and delivering. Thirdly, I 
examine the conditions and methods that brokers reportedly employ to 
deliver clientelistic rewards and how voters accept the deal. Then, I evaluate 
some mechanisms of compliance against calls’ reports. Most of these 
claims have come from newspapers and electoral observation reports. The 
following section analyses negative vote buying by selecting reports 
denouncing collection of voting cards. To conclude the Chapter, I assess 
the content of calls received on polling days, focusing on tactics of targeting 
and delivering near polling stations. I provide an extended report of the calls 
examined in Appendix 4.1. 
 
4.1 The Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes 
 
Governmental hotline services are meant to assist people in several ways. 
Some of these might include, for example, providing advice, support and 
immediate response, information provision, counselling services or A&E 
assistance (Rosenfield 1996). The national hotline service FEPADETEL (01 
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800 833 7233), provided by the Attorney General’ Office Attending Electoral 
Crimes, is the only line specialised on electoral crimes. It began in 2002 as 
a free legal advice service on electoral criminal justice, operating under 
24/365 basis (FEPADE 2005). Given that Mexicans do not usually report 
crimes in police stations for some reasons (Cornelius & Shirk 2007), this 
service intended to offer individuals with extra means to report electoral 
malpractices. Although it has served as grounds for launching some police 
investigations, just a few cases have been successfully proven in tribunals. 
As a result of criminal procedures, police effectivity amidst other factors, an 
imminent investigation from a call is not straightforward. 
 After a first year active, the hotline extended services to a broader 
set of supporting activities, for instance, the attention of general queries on 
elections and the reception of reports and information for ongoing 
investigations. A multidisciplinary team of telephonists has covered an 
extensive range of enquiries with powers to launch police investigations, 
substantiate trials with evidence and capture the social perception of 
electoral criminality. Since 2006, the team receives a standardised training 
concentrating essentially on electoral criminal law, elections’ regulations, 
human rights, interrogation techniques and communication skills. Although 
other electronic-based services have been created to achieve the same 
purpose (e.g. FEPADENET, Fiscal en linea, PREDEF, interactive chat), the 
hotline continues to be the most robust source of information (see Customer 
Services Section, FEPADE 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 & 2012, 
2014, 2015, 2016). 
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 The records compiled by the hotline consisted of 26 data identifying 
user’s details (with the option of anonymity), call location (borough and 
state), date and incident, additionally to internal codes (see FEPADETEL 
Diagram for further details, Appendix 4.9). The first analytical exercise of 
calls’ classification was conducted for the 2006 Presidential Elections 
(FEPADE 2007). It produced figures about three main categories such as 
enquiries, complaints and reports. The first type comprised a diverse range 
of election-related questions, not necessarily misconducts. The category of 
complaints was constituted of potential minor offences, which despite not 
entailing prosecuting purposes, they were a matter of further interrogations. 
Occasionally, these calls were referred to competent authorities with the 
power to execute other measures. The last category included all suspected 
episodes of crimes that provided sufficient information to open a police 
investigation. This sort of calls, therefore, required referral to the specialised 
criminal team who officially began a binding procedure. 
 The second analytical effort was developed for the 2009 Mid-term 
Elections. This classification of calls -which remains active- went further. It 
set up types of incidents rather than the type of services provided, in which 
telephonists allocate calls into one of 52 categories (see Electoral 
Categories, Appendix 4.9). The data produced by FEPADETEL, then, 
provide scholarship with an opportunity to explore electoral incidents from 
a different perspective. As telephonists are trained for interrogating callers 
to discover potential crimes, the sort and tone of questions they ask to 
classify the call are rather relevant to academic goals. As the hotline has 
enabled the anonymous reception of criminal reports, both victims and 
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witnesses find more incentives to talk openly over the phone than by face-
to-face means. Since users can call from remote and deprived places in 
Mexico, telephonists are assisted by translators86 and other professionals 
provide a wider service to ensure communication. Different from other 
studies on hotline services (Sherman et al 1992), I do analyse the content 
of the call, focused on the “conceptualisation of vote buying” (Nichter 2014). 
Although records of FEPADETEL give information to develop a full study on 
electoral misconduct (Birch 2011), this analysis focuses only on vote-
buying. 
 I requested formal access to 50,453 records of 15 years of service, 
from 2002 to 2016, to capture the activity of two presidential (2006 and 
2012) and three mid-term elections (2003, 2009 and 2015). Although local 
elections provide FEPADETEL with interesting accounts on vote buying, 
federal contests such as senatorial, congressional and presidential have 
generated nearly two-thirds of the whole information (see Table 4.1). 
Overall, I examined 38,772 records with a focus on federal elections (2002-
2015). Due to unclassified calls from 2002 to 2009, I employed a search of 
key words associated to vote-buying, for instance, sell, trade, money, goods 
and exchange to extract those relevant accounts. From 2009 to 2015, I used 
FEPADETEL’s classification to select those records related to vote-buying. 
As the access to this information was given by a governmental body, this 
data is classified as public. Callers’ accounts provide sensitive personal 
                                                        
86 Data from the 2015 National Census (National Commission for the Development of Indigenous 
Peoples, CDI) and the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI) reported 25,694,928 self-identified 
indigenous people, constituting about 21% of the whole population of Mexico in 2015. Additionally, 
68 indigenous languages are officially recognised by law. It is estimated by these two agencies that 
in Mexico there are over 6 million speakers of indigenous languages, representing about 5% of the 
population. 
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data of people’ identity; as a result, names, addresses, email-accounts and 
other pieces of data, are not disclosed within the narratives. However, this 
prohibition does not affect the goal of the chapter. 
 
Table 4. 1 Calls received through the Mexican Hotline Service for 
Electoral Crimes 2002-2016 
Year Calls Elections 
2002 101 10 local elections. 
2003 944 Midterm Federal Elections; 12 local elections. 
2004 1,088 14 local elections. 
2005 686 9 local elections. 
2006 5,183 Federal Elections; 13 local elections. 
2007 1,904 15 local elections. 
2008 1,348 6 local elections. 
2009 5,708 Midterm Federal Elections; 17 local elections. 
2010 3,768 20 local elections. 
2011 1,998 10 local elections. 
2012 16,026 Federal Elections; 17 local elections. 
2013 NA 16 local elections. 
2014 NA 7 local elections. 
2015 5,879 Federal elections; 4 local elections 
2016 5,820 16 local elections. 
Total 50,453  
Source: Author with information from Attorney General’s Office Attending Electoral Crimes, Annual 
and Monthly Reports, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010-11, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016. Mexico 
City, PGR. 
NA = Not available; 
Shading: black, presidential elections; grey, mid-term elections, white, local elections. 
 
 
The examination of calls generated from the FEPADETEL has some 
limitations and advantages regarding reliability and validity. Given that this 
dataset has produced thousands of reports uninterruptedly for more than 
sixteen years, I expect accounts to show some consistency and stability on 
the dynamics of vote buying since the periodic elections. By contrast, even 
though frequencies can illustrate a trend of the phenomenon, the dataset 
lacks accuracy and completeness as a non-randomised sample, which 
lessens statistical analysis at individual-level. As a result, I use the dataset 
for a qualitative exploration, expecting reports to provide a reliable picture 
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of the range of activities rather than a precise estimation of vote-buying 
incidence. Despite generating thousands of reports, it is likely that electoral 
malpractices are underrepresented in the dataset; nevertheless, I rely on 
the precision of the details in the accounts since anonymity and 
confidentiality.  
 In addition, there is some margin of bias. Given that telephonists tend 
to individuals with large experience and they type the vast majority of data, 
there is room for conformation bias (Nickerson 1998) as capturing and 
interpreting accounts (see FEPADETEL Diagram, Appendix 4.9). Although 
the hotline has adopted technological tools to provide the service (FEPADE 
2016), the quality of the information depends largely upon skills of the 
operators. For example, the location of incoming calls is established by 
asking callers addresses and matching them with the codes of mobile-
landline displayed on the screen of the PBX system (Private Branch 
Exchange, a telephone network). Likewise, the location of the incident 
reported is found by matching street names and postcodes reported by the 
users to a national database. There are callers who know places by 
unofficial names, report locations with missing words or simply they have 
no reference point about the place, which makes rely on callers and 
telephonists’ communication. In some cases, operators even help callers to 
set times, dates and facts. Some fields are uncompleted, especially 
socioeconomic data coming from anonymous callers. Despite data source 
is not perfect, it can advance our knowledge significantly on vote buying. 
Finally, the responsibility of the translation is my own. 
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The team of telephonists increase considerably during presidential 
elections to guarantee a national coverage (FEPADE 2007). This support is 
usually provided by other offices of the Attorney General and private 
companies specialised in call-centre services. Although the agency 
undertakes the task of planning and implementing a standardised training 
programme, the supporting team of telephonists are neither expert in 
elections nor crimes. Additionally, despite the fact supporting team is 
constituted of professional telephonists, these operators do not necessarily 
have work experience in prosecuting agencies. Although the examination 
of the hotline is not representative, my findings serve to test theoretical 
claims about vote buying from a different angle. 
 
4.2 Mapping the Contours of Reported Vote-Buying in Mexico 
 
Since the 2012 Presidential Elections has generated the biggest number of 
annual records (16,026), I have selected this year to firstly explore the 
distribution of calls on vote buying amongst other aspects. Overall, the 
hotline classified 1,724 incidents as vote buying, 10.75% of the total. As 
Figure 4.1 shows, four weeks around the Election Day is the most intense 
period of attention; however, within the seven days before polling day, from 
June the 24th to the 30th, the hotline reported 847 calls denouncing vote 
buying (49%). Moreover, just on polling day, July the 1st, the service 
attended 666 calls (38%). In summary, in only eight days the hotline 
received 87.75% of the calls of the whole year about vote buying. This trend 
supports Nichter’s (2014: 317) idea about timing as “[a] key defining 
attribute of clientelist vote buying [...]. Scholars typically emphasize that 
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exchanges are not only ex-ante in that benefits are distributed prior to 
voting, but also that exchanges occur on or soon before Election Day”. Also, 
it is consistent with Hagene’s (2015: 141) observation about the divergent 
characteristics of vote buying and political clientelism. For the author, 
whereas cleintelistic ties require more than a year before polling days, vote-
buying transactions do need just a few days before the Election Day. 
However, it is likely that the concentration of calls in eight days is 
overrepresented as during Presidential elections, the agency launches 
massive media campaigns. Such increasing trend near polling days might 
influenced by individuals simply exposed to media campaigns. 
A second aspect relates to those political parties involved in vote-
buying incidents. Although there are missing data (67 records), I found 
1,657 calls implicating a party in reports. So far, the PRI was the most 
mentioned party in 2012 with 1,206 references, 72% of the total, followed 
by PAN with 248 (14%), and PRD with 133 (8%). The rest of the parties, 
PVEM, Nueva Alianza and Convergencia, represented 4% altogether. 
Although this data is consistent with Greene’s (2016: 19) findings that 
“indicate that the PRI was the main vote buyer in the 2012 presidential 
election”, it is plausible an overrepresentation of PRI, given evidence from 
other studies in Mexico (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). As I 
discussed in Chapter 3, in Mexico practices of vote buying have spread to 
opposition parties. In addition, all these reports on vote buying do not 
necessarily mean automatic transformations into votes for PRI. 
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Figure 4. 1 Distribution of Calls Reporting “Vote Buying” to the 
Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in 2012 (by week) 
 
Source: Author with information from The Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes (2012). 
 
 
A third aspect is about the geographical distribution. Figure 4.2 shows that 
the State of Mexico was the main state emitting calls about vote buying. 
Although this state is the biggest one in terms of population and, therefore, 
more eligible voters, newspapers’ reports suggest a considerable vote-
buying operation in that region, particularly in the latest local elections.87 
Despite the fact that Mexico City and Jalisco appear in the figure, it is 
interesting that the third most important state, Nuevo Leon (the second state 
from the right to the left on the top) is far from the top callers reporting vote 
buying. Equally, Veracruz, the state by the Gulf of Mexico, and Chiapas 
recorded a fair amount of calls despite not being very populated states. On 
the contrary, six states, Baja California Sur, Sinaloa, Tlaxcala, Zacatecas, 
                                                        
87 Proceso, Eleccion Edomex 2017, ‘En Edomex, el operativo de compra del voto “más grande en 
la historia electoral del país”: #NiUnFraudeMas’ Sunday 4 June 2017, http://liderweb.mx/autoridades-
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Colima and Chihuahua do not record more than ten calls each. This finding 
supports previous research (Vilalta 2010) suggesting no correlation 
between population size and reports on vote buying. Moreover, this data 
substantiates qualitative evidence (Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Mercado 2013) 
from interviews with brokers who claim to use more sophisticated 
information to target electors rather than the number of voters. Whereas this 
data is neither representative nor significant to measure vote-buying 
incidence, it does provide research with an illustration about the location of 
the reports. 
 
Figure 4. 2 Geographical Distribution of Calls Reporting “Vote Buying” 




The anonymity and confidentiality are fundamental factors for the service; 
telephonists usually record the gender of the callers without asking. 
However, this category has 519 missing data of calls on vote buying. 
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Removing missing cases, female users made 53% of the reports (641), 
whereas male made 46% (564). These numbers illustrate quite well national 
demographic data concerning the structure of the population, 51% and 49% 
respectively. This data supports previous findings (Vilalta 2010) for the 2006 
Elections, in which gender did not have a strong effect on the decision of 
people to report vote buying activities. 
  
4.3 How Electors Face Targeting Activities: Strategies of Proffering 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, after holding meetings to set the number of 
voters required and the strategy to follow for each electoral precinct, brokers 
go to streets to conduct knocking-doors activities (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & 
Rivera 2013). In this section, I asses targeting strategies reported by callers 
with a focus on timing and rewards proffered. With an especial focus on 
timing and rewards, I divide this analysis into i) the compilation of lists of 
electors, ii) the recollection of copies of voting cards, iii) the offer of goods 
and money as an exchange for votes, and iv) activists and parties 
conducting strategies of targeting. 
 
The compilation of Lists as a Targeting Mechanism 
 
Targeting potential voters by compiling lists is part of the “role of brokers” 
(Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016). These lists allow political parties to 
verify that brokers are performing the task in the field and targeting 
favourable electors. Equally, the lists determine whom brokers commit to 
sending to polls during the Election Day. Eventually, brokers matched the 
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lists with those electors who have turned out (Mercado 2013). Larreguy, 
Marshall & Querubin (2016: 164) offer a photo of a list of promised voters 
for the PRI that broker must have completed in a given electoral precinct. 
This targeting process is confirmed by several callers from urban, rural, 
wealthier and poorer cities from central, northern and southeast Mexico who 
reported similar patterns. 88  As calls show, for 2004, 2005, 2010 local 
election and 2006, 2009 and 2012 federal elections, the hotline describes, 
while before polling day, 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that within the 
neighbourhood “El Salado”, PRI activists, Mr […] amongst them, 
are knocking doors proffering people sacks of cement to vote for 
PRI on the Election Day. Activists are also asking people to sign 
a list, which states they’re willing to [vote for it] (Call No.: 
0000210; 03/05/2005) 
 
The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that Mrs […] 
and Mr […], PRI candidates, are knocking residents’ doors to 
give them bags of provisions as an exchange of their vote. The 
user also states that these people ask those residents who 
accept the deal to sign a list in which they commit to vote for PRI 
and they take voting card’s details […] (Call No.: 0000055; 
13/01/2006).89 
 
The user calls presumably from Campeche City, Campeche to 
report that Mrs […] has knocked residents’ doors to proffer them 
MX$500 [£22] to vote for a candidate; she’s doing this with a list, 
asking residents to sign it (Call No.: 0003089; 01/07/2006). 
 
The user calls presumably from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report 
that PRI activists go over the town, intimidating residents into 
voting for PRI and asking for a copy of their voting card; they take 
                                                        
88 A considerable number of calls have identified government officials conducting targeting actions. 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, given that the involvement of state employees in electoral mobilisation 
strategies illustrates more patronage than vote buying (see Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2016), 
in this chapter I ignore patronage, where political leaders distribute favours, most frequently public 
employment, to party activists in return for their efforts and loyaltyI exclude these records from the 
analysis; however they are reported in full in Appendix 4.3 (calls No.: [2006] 0002557, 0002681, 
0002760, 0002798, 0002892, 0002817, 00003332, 002917, 0002945, 0002596, 0003094, 0003106, 
0003108, 0003143, 0003254, 0003564, 0003836, 0004831, 0004123, 0004674, 0004938, 0004944; 
[2009] 0000400; [2010] 0000028; [2011] 0000030; [2012] 0000029, 000189, 000281, 0000346, 
0000360, 0000463, 0000531, 0000557, 0000709, 0001085, 0001193, 0001424, 0001542, 0001767, 
0001887, 0001987, 0002033, 0002168, 0002218, 0001899; [2015] 0000018). 
89 Although I had access to both dates, the call and the incident, in this Chapter, I report only the date 
of the incident (for the whole record, see Appendix 4). 
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the details in there and threaten people with removing state 
programmes from the town (Call No.: 0000006; 11/09/2009). 
 
The user calls from Lampazos de Naranjo, Nuevo Leon to report 
that PRI activists are asking people details of their voting card to 
compile registers of [favourable] voters for PRI gubernatorial 
candidate, on the Election Day (Call No.: 0000102; 08/01/2012). 
 
An interesting finding here is that this targeting strategy starts a while before 
campaigns. In Chapter 5, brokers interviewed90 suggest three explanations: 
a) the magnitude of work in the field, b) exploration of the electorate support 
and c) expectations of a tight contest (Mercado 2013). Even though 
electoral districts are same sized –regarding the number of voters– some 
rural areas are geographically remote, which requires a longer time to cover 
them. In some contexts, brokers seem to evaluate the type of campaigns 
and election they might expect by knocking doors to capture people’s 
feelings about politicians and parties. With this information, they begin to 
count potential votes to forecast somewhat how tough elections will be. 
Finally, some brokers just start earlier as political parties have already 
estimated a tight contest. Another explanation could be just enforcing loyalty 
to reset the tie (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2012). 
 During the campaign and up a few days before polling day, callers 
report similar activities. However, it is interesting that as getting closer to the 
Elections Day, cash appears as a reward. This finding substantiates 
journalistic reports about the management of large amounts, resulting in 
politicians arrested.91 As record describe, 
                                                        
90 Anonymous interviews with two brokers conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (2 May 2017) and San 
Pedro Tultepec, State of Mexico (10 June 2017). 
91 Aristegui Noticias, ‘Detienen a funcionario de Monreal y denuncian agresión de priistas’ Sunday 4 
June 2017, Politica, http://aristeguinoticias.com/0406/mexico/detienen-a-funcionario-de-monreal-y-
denuncian-agresion-de-priistas/ (accessed on Monday 5 June 2017). 
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The user calls from Zacapoaxtla, Puebla to report that [unknown 
activists] are asking residents to sign a list in which they commit 
to vote for PRI. As an exchange, these activists are promising 
bags of provisions. The user also states that residents who 
engage in the deal are giving a copy of their voting card for 
activists to take card’s details […] (Call No.: 0000772; 
19/10/2004) 
 
The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that within 
Onix Street, between Agatha and Conchita Roads, in a 
neighbourhood called “Jardines del Pedregal”, [unknown people] 
are proffering residents MX$200 [£9] and a bag of provisions to 
vote for a PRI’s senatorial candidate; asking for, additionally, 
details of their voting card and handing a list for residents to sign 
it (Call No.: 0002778; 29/06/2006). 
 
The user calls from Tenango de Doria, Hidalgo to report that 
within a town called “San Pablo El Grande”, the two keepers of a 
primary and secondary schools are knocking residents’ door with 
lists in hands, in which they note down voting cards’ details of the 
people, promising some benefits to the community on condition 
that they vote for PRI’s congressional and gubernatorial 
candidates […] (Call No.: 0000344; 14/06/2010) 
 
The user calls from Campeche, Campeche to report that within 
the area called “Ah Kim Pech”, local political leaders have been 
taking residents to a campaign headquarters located in Ramon 
Pina Chan Street, proffering people MX$1,000 [£43] and other 
goods for details of their voting card, increasing this reward 
MX$500 [£22] for each extra copy they deliver. The user also 
states that these leaders make people sign for it […] (Call No.: 
0000294; 27/06/2012) 
 
Collection of Copies of Electors’ Voting Card 
 
Despite the fact that other users mention lists of voters handed by activists, 
no call reports such compilation during the Election Day. I found, 
nonetheless, the match of lists near polling stations (CF. Section 4.7). 
Another point to make here is that even without the mention of lists, a big 
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number of calls92 report similar knocking-doors strategies. Instead, these 
records involve copies of electors’ voting cards and electoral details. I 
assume that the reasons activists need these copies are for supporting 
evidence for political parties. Several months before polling day, records 
from central, northern and lowland cities in Mexico describe for different 
elections, 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report the that Council 
candidate Mr […] has been giving residents –most of them native 
Otomi speakers– bags of provisions […], asking for a copy of 
their voting card and forcing them to vote for him in the next 
elections […] (Call No.: 0000058; 26/02/2003) 
 
The user, who claims to be a self-employed trader, calls 
presumably from Ajalpan, Puebla to report that activists lead by 
Mr […], a local leader of the association called “Antorcha 
Campesina”, are asking people to vote for PRI’s federal 
congressional candidate, Mrs […]; additionally, they’re asking for 
copies of people’s voting cards (Call No.: 0000368; 18/01/2012). 
 
The user calls from Alvaro Obregon, Mexico City to report that 
within Colina Street in the neighbourhood called “Ampliacion 
Aguilas” [unknown people] are handing bags of rice and beans 
to people for them to vote for the PRD Council candidate, Mr […] 
The user also that these people ask for a copy of the electors’ 
voting card to take the official code (Call No.: 0000532; 
01/02/2012). 
 
The user calls from Matamoros, Tamaulipas to report that within 
the neighbourhood called “Acuario 2001”, PRI activists, Mr […] 
amongst them, are asking people to vote for PRI as an exchange 
of a bag of provisions; asking for a copy of residents’ voting cards 
(Call No.: 0001249; 10/02/2012). 
 
The user calls from Valle Santiago, Guanajuato to report that 
within the village called “San Francisco Chihuindo”, PRD activists 
were encouraging people to support PRD mayoral candidate and 
now they’re compiling copies of electors’ voting cards as an 
exchange of blankets, bags of provisions and raffle tickets. The 
user also states that she knows this information by others […] 
(Call No.: 0000940; 20/02/2012) 
 
                                                        
92 For an extended report of these records, see Appendix 4.7 (calls No.: [2006] 0002922, 0003243; 
[2012] 0000107, 0000737, 0000782, 0001007, 0001044, 0001281, 0001391, 0001547, 0001803, 
0002084, 0002143, 0002182). 
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The user calls from Los Mochis, Sinaloa to report that PRI 
activists –Mrs […] amongst them– are knocking residents’ doors 
to ask for a copy of the voting card and their support to the PRI 
gubernatorial candidate Mr […] (Call No.: 0001550; 25/03/2012) 
 
 
In addition, I found similar accounts reported from weeks before up to polling 
days. For 2004, 2006 2009, 2010, 2012, 2015 Presidential, Midterm and 
local elections, records describe, 
The user calls from Durango to report that PRI candidates and 
activists are knocking doors, asking for voting card’s details and 
forcing residents to vote for their party […] (Call No.: 0000327; 
04/07/2004) 
 
The user calls from San Francisco Huehuetlan, Oaxaca to report 
that a local party leader named […] is asking people to vote for 
PRI; additionally, he asks for people’s voting card to take the 
details in there, proffering as an exchange bags of provisions 
(Call No.: 0002855; 29/06/2006). 
 
The user calls from San Luis Potosi City, San Luis Potosi to 
report that PAN activists are buying votes for MX$500 [£22], 
delivering bags of provisions to people and asking for a copy of 
their voting card (Call No.: 000249; 03/07/2009). 
 
The user calls from Chicontepec, Veracruz to report that borough 
employees forced electors to vote for PRI, proffering them money 
and other community benefits as an exchange for it; they also 
asked for a copy of electors’ voting card (Call No.: 0000103; 
14/06/2010). 
 
The user calls presumably from Chiapa de Corzo, Chiapas to 
report that a person is giving [people] bags of provisions as an 
exchange of their vote and this person also asks for a copy of 
people’s voting card (Call No.: 0000102; 02/07/2010). 
 
The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report 
that a tall, curly haired, brown skinned person, perhaps in her late 
40s, using a walking stick, is buying votes for PRI for MX$200 
[£9]. The user states that this person knocked the door of user’s 
cousins, proffering the money and asking for a copy of their 
voting card. The user also claims to know about other residents 
who have gone to some places to deliver a copy of the voting 




The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that right now, a 
gathering is taking place in a building with PRI’s logos in which 
[activists] are collecting a copy of attendees’ voting cards and 
giving them money in exchange for it (Call No.: 000039; 
06/06/2015). 
 
Offers of Rewards as an Exchange for Votes 
 
As I have shown, a substantial number of callers provide accounts of 
targeting tactics mentioning the compilation of lists and voting card details. 
Such strategies have been associated by literature with mechanisms of 
monitoring (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Mercado 2013, Ugalde & 
Rivera 2013). Nonetheless, another set of calls report activists proffering 
goods despite not mentioning any register. This tactic relates to the activities 
discussed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1), in the two stage-model of vote-
buying mobilisation, as parties looking for/confirming information of electors 
and proffering benefits as an exchange of support at polls. As I argue, whilst 
activists proffering goods illustrates strategies of targeting, electors 
receiving benefits depicts the engagement of voters in the deals. I examine 
calls then from several cities reporting activists proffering goods and 
money.93 For 2003, 2006, 2015 elections, about a month before polling 
days, records from industrial, trading and farming cities across Mexico 
describe, 
The user calls from Guanajuato to report that five unknown 
people, presumably for PRI, offered him MX$400 [£17] to vote 
                                                        
93 For an extended report of these records, see Appendix 4.2 (calls No.: [2004] 000052, 0001076; 
[2006] 0000021, 0002464, 0002468, 0002471, 0002498, 0002504, 0002512, 0002571, 0002575, 
0002699, 0002764, 0002856, 0002858, 0002943, 0002950, 0002977, 0003035, 0003041 0003075, 
0003150, 0003185, 0003327, 0003469, 0003524, 0003772, 0003835, 0003859, 0004025, 0004032, 
0004124, 0004335, 0004124, 0004335, 0004346, 0004525, 0004536, 0004550, 0004697, 0004811, 
0004928; [2009] 0000009; [2010] 0000274; [2012] 0000199, 000268, 000325, 0000355; [2013] 
000345; [2015] 0000354).  
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for PRI’s federal congressional candidate […] (Call No.: 
0000206; 22/05/2003) 
 
The user calls from Torreon, Coahuila to report that within the 
block of flats “Manhattan”, PRD activists were offering [people] 
scholarships and pensions (Call No.: 0002502; 27/05/2006).  
 
The user calls from Tuxpan, Michoacan to report that, around 
3pm, PRD candidate’s activists were proffering three vouchers 
entitling people to sacks of cement and [other materials for 
construction] to vote for PRD. The user also states that he’s 
received these vouchers […] (Call No.: 0000012; 06/06/2015). 
 
Focused on the opportunistic aspect of vote buying (Hagene 2015, Nichter 
2014), I analyse the following records focusing on the offer of rewards 
during the Election Day. Some studies argue that targeting tactics during 
polling days tend to be directed to poor, deprived communities as it is more 
likely for people in need to engage in vote buying (Udalge-Ramierz & Rivera 
2013, Mercado 2013). The following records are particularly focused on 
poor regions reporting activists proffering money as an exchange for votes 
on polling days. As narratives for the 2004 and 2006 elections describe, 
 
The user calls from Tlaxcala to report that PRI activists are 
buying votes within the neighbourhood called “Nativitas”, they 
are knocking door by door, offering MX$200 [£9] (Call No.: 
0001027; 14/11/2004) 
 
The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz presumably, to report that 
within the neighbourhood called “10 de Mayo”, some activists 
[not specifying party] are offering [people] between MX$1000 
and MX$1500 [£43-67] to vote. The user also states that this has 
been happening since yesterday and these activists look like 
gangsters, which scare residents (Call No.: 0004461; 
02/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that five 
passengers in a new van, type pick-up Ford Lobo, number plate 
[…], are proffering [electors] money in exchange for people’s 
vote; they’ve been doing this for a little while but the user states 
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he doesn’t know what party they are promoting (Call No.: 
0004039; 02/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Heroica Ciudad de Huajuapan de Leon, 
Oaxaca to report that within the neighbourhood called “Alta Vista 
de Juarez”, Mr […] is ‘inviting’ people to vote for PRI, receiving 
bags of provisions as an exchange (Call No.: 0004535; 
02/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Acatlan de Perez Figueroa, Oaxaca to report 
that Ms […] is buying votes, proffering [electors] MX$100 [£4] to 
vote for PRI. The user agreed to send a fax with further 
information (Call No.: 0004537; 02/07/2006). 
 
Who Conducts Strategies of Targeting 
 
Results here about what parties conduct vote-buying strategies support 
similar findings on the Mexican case (Greene 2016, Cornelius 2000, Nichter 
& Palmer-Rubin 2015, Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016), suggesting a 
prevalence of PRI’s activists. Such studies have equally been cautious 
about the sort of conclusions we can state. Although I do not have statistical 
evidence to test it, examining names of parties involved in reports, the PRI 
is frequently mentioned. Nonetheless, some users report offers from other 
parties. Interestingly, those offers, according to callers’ reports, describe 
divergent amounts of money. This fact suggests a market competition 
(Corstange 2012) rather a process of negotiation between vote sellers and 
buyers (Lehoucq 2007). But also, it supports the idea about the pluralisation 
of vote buying discussed in Chapter 3. Calls reporting offers from several 
parties for the 2006 and 2012 Presidential elections describe, 
The user calls from San Pedro Actopan, Mexico City to report 
that within Hidalgo Street […], PRI and PRD activists have been 
buying votes since Friday […], offering MX$500 [£22] the former 
and MX$150 [£6] the latter (Call No.: 0003475; 30/06/2006). 
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The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that activists 
from several political parties have been giving people sacks of 
cement for them to vote for these parties. The user also states 
that the borough mayor is giving people bags of provisions and 
cash to vote for PRD (Call No.: 0004015; 02/07/2006).  
 
The user calls from Copala, Guerrero to report that [activists] are 
proffering people money […] and materials for construction to 
vote for a political party, asking for a copy of their voting card. 
The user also states that both parties PRI and PAN have been 
conducting these activities within the neighbourhood […] (Call 
No.: 0000287; 29/06/2012)  
 
In contrast with those claims assuming a difficulty of proving vote-buying in 
courts as a result of well-devised tactics unbinding politicians to vote-buying 
in the field (Diaz-Santana 2011), these records demonstrate quite the 
opposite. Whereas it is assumed that candidates hire brokers to perform 
vote-buying activities (Mercado 2013) –which leads them to an easy 
exoneration–, a number of calls provide names, addresses and other crucial 
details about candidates performing targeting activities. In addition, local 
Mexican judges have stated that one of the reasons vote-buying is hard to 
punish is due to police inability to patrol territory and catch brokers red-
handed.94 However, some of the reports demonstrate that users have called 
the hotline as being offered in several stages of the campaigns and during 
election days. Although these records provide information about 
candidates, most of the statements denounce borough, mayoral and 
congressional candidates but not presidential contenders. For 2003, 2006 
                                                        
94 Lider Informativo, ‘Autoridades electorales van contra la compra del voto’ Friday 28 July 2017, 
http://liderweb.mx/autoridades-electorales-van-contra-la-compra-del-voto/  (accessed on Saturday 
29 July 2017). 
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and 2012 Presidential and Midterm elections, records from the countryside 
and mayor cities describe,95 
The user calls from Canutillo, Durango to report that PRI’s 
candidates Mr […] and Mr […] have been buying votes within the 
community. They are proffering Day Nursery children’s parents, 
materials for construction […] The user refuses to go to a police 
agency to report this (Call No.: 0000314; 31/05/2003). 
 
The user calls from Veracruz, Veracruz to report that PRI’s 
federal congressional candidate Mrs […] is offering breakfast for 
free and bags of provisions on July the 6th [in the area located] 
in Sur 11 between Oriente 20 and 22, City Centre (Call No.: 
000436; 05/07/2003). 
 
The user calls from, Magdalena Contreras, Mexico City to report 
that PRD’s candidates, Mr […] and Ms […], located in […], are 
inviting those who walk near them free meals today and 
proffering MX$650 [£29] to vote for them (Call No.: 0002691; 
01/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Housing Estate called “Providencia” to report 
that Mr […], mayoral candidate, is pressing people and offering 
them MX$700 [£30] to vote for him; he’s knocking doors within 
the whole housing estate […] The user states she’s got a witness 
and evidence (Call No.: 0003017; 30/06/2006).  
  
The user calls from Ayotlan, Jalisco to report that Mr […], who 
works for the borough, and Mr [...], the PAN mayoral candidate, 
are knocking residents’ doors asking for a copy of their voting 
card as an exchange of MX$2,000 [£86]. The user also states 
that these men have already compiled quite a few […] (Call No.: 
0000853; 12/02/2012)  
  
The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that about 
9am, PRI activists –a candidate amongst them– were at the 
sports centre called “Gustavo Baz Prada” handing bags of 
provisions to people for them to support PRI and asking for a 
copy of electors’ voting cards (Call No.: 0001242; 09/03/2012).  
 
In conclusion, calls have shown that strategies of targeting begin from very 
early stages of the campaign. Users of the service have reported an ample 
variety of rewards proffered by activists as an exchange of their vote. Cash 
                                                        
95 For an extended report, see Appendix 4.2 (Calls No.: [2003] 0000303; [2006] 0002671, 0003777, 
0003802, 0004118; [2012] 0000192, 0000466, 0000561, 0001546). 
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begins to be a stronger reward offered as the Election Day approaches. A 
prevalent tactic of targeting developed by parties is the compilation of lists 
of potential voters by proffering rewards as an exchange of voting card’s 
details and photocopies of the document. This targeting strategy seems to 
be only the first stage of the vote buying as activists tend to close the deal 
near polling days. Although the number of calls reporting candidates 
conducting targeting activities is not robust, these records contribute to the 
understanding of the type of relationships between parties and brokers. 
Moreover, these calls provide evidence against two aspects. First, the 
assumption of independent brokers opened to listen to several parties, 
accepting to work for the highest bidder. Second, the idea of much more 
restricted budget to hire brokers as candidacies are more local, making 
candidates themselves to conduct the work in the field. Although PRI was 
the party targeting more voters for the 2012 Presidential Election, these 
strategies are not exclusive to one party. Callers reported indistinctively 
names of political parties. 
 
4.4 Who Gets Bought in Vote Buying: Deliveries to Close Deals 
 
Guided by the conceptual distinction between targeting and buying voters 
developed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1) in this section, I examine records 
reporting physical distributions of rewards. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
delivering, handing and receiving tangible goods entail aspects of closing 
vote-buying deals. Firstly, the physical exchange of goods between activists 
and electors provide conditions to assume that electors have engaged in a 
vote buying. The fact of electors receiving rewards provides a more reliable 
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scenario of a vote-buying deal already closed, they would not be receiving 
such goods, otherwise. Secondly, given that social desirability bias 
(Gonzalez-Ocantos et al 2012) and potential prosecution procedures 
threatens self-reporting vote buying, I analyse these records relying on the 
anonymity and confidentiality of the service and accounts from witnesses. 
As I have underlined in the introduction of this Chapter, the identity of the 
callers is hidden, resulting in rich testimonies of very sensitive aspects of 
vote buying. I then assess these calls with an eye on timing. 
Records96 from the 2006 and 2012 Presidential elections, received 
months before polling day, describe, 
The user calls from Toluca, State of Mexico to report that within 
a rally of the campaign, [PRI activists] gave people gift tokens, 
which can be exchanged for goods in the chain of supermarket 
called “Soriana”97 […] (Call No.: 0000013; 08/03/2006) 
 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that in 
the block of flats she lives, located on Magnolia Street, within a 
neighbourhood called San Mateo Nopala, the administrator has 
asked tenants to attend a PRI’s rally, in which they would receive 
sacks of cement. The user also states that the rally will be held 
by the PRI congressional candidate, Mr […] (Call No.: 0000846; 
18/02/2012) 
 
The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that Mrs 
[…] is giving people bags of provisions asking them to vote for 
PRI presidential, congressional and mayoral candidates (Call 
No.: 0001960; 17/04/2012). 
 
As accounts show, clientelistic deliveries happening months before polling 
days are mainly based on physical goods. Although these exchanges 
include handy pieces such as gift tokens and bags of provisions, they also 
                                                        
96 For an extended report of these records, see Appendix 4.4 (calls No.; [2006] 0002840, 0002894, 
0002952, 0002953, 0003075, 0003086, 0003128, 0003132, 0003159, 0003173, 0003179, 0003212, 
0003244, 0003333, 0003389, 0003426, 0003667, 0003801, 0003853, 0004137, 0004222, 0004399, 
0004527; [2009] 000009, 0000339; [2012] 0000139, 0000251, 0000565, 0000798, 0000951, 
0001002, 0001041, 0001104, 0001373, 0002220; [2013] 0000305). 
97 For a detailed study on “Soriana’s” gift tokens see Cantu (2014a). 
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incorporate materials for construction hard to transport and noticeable for 
people; for example, sacks of cement and water tanks. However, as polling 
days approach, users of the hotline service report the distribution of cash 
more frequently. This idea is consistent with Hagene (2015) as monetary 
rewards of vote buying are distributed just a ‘few days before’ election 
(Hagene 2015: 141). Records from seaside and central cities a day before 
polling day for the 2006, 2012 and 2013 Presidential and local elections, 
explain 
The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that PRI 
[activists] are giving people bags of provisions, materials for 
construction and between MX$ 300 [£13] and MX$500 [£22] to 
vote for PRI (Call No.: 0003131; 01/07/2006).  
 
The user calls from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report that a 
neighbour of her has mentioned that within a parties’ venue 
called “Grupo Varsa”, opposite to Tabasco Memorial, PRI 
activists are handing bags of provisions and MX$100 [£4] to 
attendees for them to vote for PRI (Call No.: 0003172; 
01/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that at the 
shopping arcade located in Ignacio Zaragoza Road, by the 
underground station called “Acatitla”, within the supermarket 
“Soriana”, PRI activists are giving people gift tokens to vote for 
PRI (Call No.: 0000208; 30/06/2012). 
 
The user calls from Ajalpan, Puebla to report that PRI ‘followers’ 
are delivering bags of provisions and money to people. The user 
also requires police and army officers for [the Election Day] as a 
measure of security for residents (Call No.: 0000150; 
06/07/2013). 
 
Interestingly, the most significant amount of money recorded (£109) was 
reported on the Election Day. Since calls suggest an intensification of 
deliveries during polling days, further analyses of the dataset should 
separate calls during elections days to calculate, for each election, the 
proportion of reports involving the means amount. Such essential analysis 
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would confirm what these quotes suggest, the closer the polling day, the 
more intense the distribution of rewards. As records from a variety of cities 
for the 2006, 2011 and 2015 elections show, 
The user calls from Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico City to report that, at 
the PRD’s campaign headquarters located at the corner of 
“Benito Juarez” and “Guillermo Prieto” by a place called “Pepes”, 
Mrs […] is delivering bags of provisions and MX$200 [£9], which 
meant to be distributed to mums as part of a public programme 
during Mother’s Day (Call No.: 0004185; 02/07/2006).  
 
The user calls [presumably] from Michoacán to report that, during 
the polling day, PRI activists handed MX$2500 [£109] to people 
to vote for the PRI’s candidate (Call No.: 0000028; 13/11/2011). 
 
The user calls from Campeche City, Campeche to report that 
within the village called “Los Laureles”, a PRI activist handed 
bags of provisions to people in the streets for them to vote for 
PRI (Call No.: 0000062; 01/07/2012).  
 
The user calls from Calvillo, Aguascalientes to report that in the 
place of residence of Mr […], [unknown people] are [buying] 
votes for PRI, paying MX$500 [£22] (Call No.: 0000255; 
07/06/2015).  
 
Another particular aspect of brokers’ role (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 
2016) near the Election Day is the fact of getting appropriate venues for 
stocking up goods before delivering. 98  The job entails the search of 
buildings serving as warehouses located in strategic spots to ease the 
distribution. The size and conditions of venues varies according to the 
needs of each electoral precinct, for example, distances and times are 
important to reach remote places or discrete visibility of the venue are 
required in crowded urban areas. Although the action of collecting goods is 
not necessarily a crime, it represents a suspicious activity regarding vote 
buying. I have found a few records reporting to have seen Lorries 
                                                        
98 Anonymous interviews with two brokers conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (2nd May 2017) and 
Buenavista, State of Mexico (Saturday, 3rd June 2017). 
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transporting rewards and buildings serving as warehouses near polling 
days. Particularly for the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections, callers from 
diverse places describe, 
The user calls from Bolanos, Jalisco to report that neighbours 
have found lorries full of sacks of cement and bags of provisions 
within indigenous areas. The user also states they presumably 
gather these people to buy their vote as handing goods […] The 
user mentions that he’s already reported this to a police station 
with the investigation number AP225/2006 but he doesn’t trust 
local police bodies as he believes local state employees are 
involved in the delivery (Call No.: 0002647; 26/06/2006). 
 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that PRD 
activists are getting lots of bags of provisions into a parties’ venue 
called “Pili”. The user also believes that these activists will deliver 
such bags from this site (Call No.: 0002848; 01/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Huehuetoca, State of Mexico to report that 
the members of the family […], two brothers and a man named 
Mr […], who live in […], within the neighbourhood called “Ex-
hacienda de Xalpa”, are handing bags of provisions to people 
from a warehouse, asking them to vote for PRI federal 
congressional candidate Mr […] The user also states that he’s 
reported this to a police station near them but officers don’t want 
to investigate anything (Call No.: 0003131; 01/07/2006).  
 
The user calls from Guerrero to report that someone has 
commented about a warehouse from which a local councillor 
whose last name is “Abundis”, is handing roofing sheets and 
bags of provisions […] (Call No.: 0003164; 30/06/2012). 
 
In this section, I have shown evidence of brokers’ strategies to close vote-
buying deals by examining those records reporting the delivery of goods 
and money. I have described the implications of handing and receiving 
goods for vote buying. Firstly, the physical exchange of goods between 
activists and electors provide evidence to assume that a vote-buying deal 
has been closed. An interesting finding here compared to the activity of 
targeting is the fact of witnesses calling to report such actions rather than 
people engaged in the vote-buying deals. Different from the previous 
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section, a minority of these calls come from targeted electors. This fact 
suggests both social desirability bias to talk to people about sensitive 
themes and self-protection against prosecution procedures. The variety of 
rewards reported by callers in clientelistic transactions for the 2012 Mexican 
Presidential Elections seems to be consistent with previous findings 
(Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Nichter & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Cantu 
2014a). 
 
4.5 Vote Buying and Some of Its Mechanisms of Compliance 
 
Several reports on the 2006 parliamentary elections included references to 
the use of these techniques to ensure that vote-buying transactions were 
enforced. Namely observers reported that cell phones with camera devices 
had been supplied by vote buyers outside the ballot stations in order for the 
voters to take photographs of the filled in ballot paper. Note that both photos 
and blank ballot paper were serving as proof that the agreed voting action 
was taken. (Vicente 2014: F372). 
  A study conducted in Africa for the 2006 Parliamentary Elections 
provides evidence on mobiles phones with camera being supplied by vote 
buyers outside polling stations in order for voters to take photographs of the 
marked ballot paper (Vicente 2014: F372). This finding opens a path of 
examination as assumptions of trust, solidarity (Auyero 1999, 2000, 
Gonzalez et al 2014) and reciprocity (Lawson & Greene 2014, Finan & 
Schechter 2012) are necessary conditions to reach a vote-buying deal. In 
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Mexico, Newspapers99 and electoral observation reports (Alianza Civica 
2006, 2012) have reported similar tactics and also published evidence on 
the use of children to witness the sense of the vote. Children walk with 
electors inside polling stations to attest choices once voters have marked 
the ballot paper. However, besides such reports, a little is known about the 
conditions around these mechanisms of compliance and their prevalence in 
Mexico. Based on these ideas, I examine the following calls focusing on the 
use of children and cameras as tactics to ensure choices at polls. 
Records from the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections explain, 
The user calls from Orizaba, Veracruz to report that unknown 
people were buying PRI’s votes for $500 [£21]. To prove they do 
it, activists gave them as well a mobile phone with a camera to 
take a photo of the ballot paper already marked (Call No.: 
0002603; 20/06/2006). 
 
The user, who didn’t want to provide the location [presumably 
from Hidalgo], calls to report that employees of DIF [a Federal 
institution] have asked for copies of electors’ voting card. The 
user also reports that these employees have asked electors to 
take a photo of the ballot paper to prove they voted for PRI (Call 
No.: 0000582; 03/02/2012). 
 
The user calls [presumably from Hidalgo] to report that Miss […] 
and Mr […], employees of […] are proffering an increase of wage 
to those electors voting for PRI on condition that they take a 
photo of the ballot paper to prove their vote (Call No.: 0001208; 
08/32/2012). 
 
Guided by the trend discussed in Figure 4.2 in this Chapter, I analyse calls 
received close to polling days for 2004, 2006 and 2012 elections. Reports 
from a variety of northern, southern and central cities describe, 
The user calls from Socorro de Jesus, Oaxaca to report that an 
official of a local government institution –omitting the name to 
protect the victims– compelled employees to gather twenty-two 
                                                        
99 Sin Embargo, ‘PRI y PVEM utilizaron niños (#halconcitos) para vigilar que adultos votaran a su 
favor: Alianza Cívica’, Wednesday 4 July 2012, Elecciones 2012, http://www.sinembargo.mx/04-07-
2012/285081 (Accessed on Wednesday 30 July 2014). 
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electors each; invite them to have breakfast on Sunday 1st July 
[polling day] and then taking them to the polling station to vote 
for PRI. The official also asked them to ensure taking photos of 
the ballot paper already marked to prove electors’ vote. Finally, 
the official threatened employees with dismissal if they didn’t 
accomplish the task (Call No.: 000456; 01/08/2004). 
 
The user calls from Sahuaripa, Sonora to report that activists 
were proffering electors MX$500 [£21] to vote for PRI. They were 
actually giving voters a mobile phone with camera to prove their 
vote, […] (Call No.: 0002462; 29/06/2006) 
 
The user calls from Ciudad Madero, Tamaulipas to report that in 
the shop called […] located in […], the owner’s wife offers beers 
for free on condition that people vote for PAN. She is also asking 
them to take a photo of the ballot paper with a mobile phone’s 
camera to prove it (Call No.: 0002880; 01/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that activists 
were threatening him with beating him up if he didn’t vote for their 
political party. They were also asking him to take a photo with 
user’s mobile phone’s camera of the ballot paper already marked 
to prove his vote […] (Call No.: 0002909; 26/06/2006) 
 
The user calls from Jalisco to report that campaigners from the 
candidate of PRI are proffering people MX$800 (£34) to vote for 
PRI. They are also lending mobile phones with a camera for 
electors to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked (Call 
No.: 0003004; 01/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Nicolas Romero, State of Mexico to report 
that someone has offered MX$800 [£34] the user to vote for PRI, 
asking as well to take a photo of the ballot paper as proof of the 
vote (Call No.: 0000275; 29/06/2012). 
 
Callers also report activists lending cameras to electors and taking them 
back after casting the vote. Presumably activists want to keep the photo. 
This action suggests a method for activists to collect supporting evidence 
about the job done. Another interesting finding is timing of the reward. 
Callers report having seen activists giving electors rewards after casting the 
vote and looking at the picture taken inside the polling station. As calls from 
2006, 2009, 2011 and 2013 from urban and rural cities describe, 
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The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that an 
unknown woman representing PRD offered MX$300 [£13] to 
vote for federal and local candidates of her political party. This 
woman was also given a mobile phone with a camera to take a 
photo of the ballot paper already marked. The user also states 
that a similar pattern happened to a relative of her, but the activist 
proffered MX$1000 [$43]. […] (Call No.: 0004884; 02/07/2006) 
 
The user calls from Jalisco to report that PVEM activists proffered 
MX$500 [£21] the user to vote for that political party, asking the 
user to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked to close 
the deal (Call No.: 0000100; 05/07/2009). 
 
The user calls from Acapulco, Guerrero to report that by a polling 
station near the Hospital […], a group of activists of the coalition 
“Tiempos Mejores” […], are approaching electors proffering 
MX$1000 [£43] to vote for the coalition. They are giving them as 
well a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot 
paper already marked to prove the vote and receive the money. 
The user also states there are more witnesses of these facts (Call 
No.: 0000353; 30/01/2011). 
 
The user calls from Pachuca, Hidalgo to report that near the 
polling station located in […], there are PRI activists approaching 
electors buying their votes. They are paying them MX$500 [£21] 
on condition that they […] take a photo of the ballot paper already 
marked and show it afterwards to activists to receive the agreed 
amount of money (Call No.: 0000075; 01/07/2012). 
 
The user calls from Acambaro, Guanajuato to report that 
someone has offered people MX$1000 [£43] to vote for PRD; 
giving people a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of 
the ballot paper already marked and show it afterwards to receive 
the cash […] (Call No.: 0000184; 01/07/2012). 
 
As described above, activists employ children as compliance mechanisms. 
Human rights implications have come to the discussion as under-age 
individuals are involved. Although this hotline dataset does not provide 
evidence about the way children are recruited, some callers report tactics 
similar to those accounts from newspapers and electoral observation 
reports. However, I did not find more than a few calls associated with this 
practice. For the 2006 and 2009 elections in Mexico, records describe, 
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The user calls from Azcapotzalco, Mexico City to report that PAN 
activists are buying votes for MX$300 [$13], asking electors to 
take a kid with them within the voting booth to witness the way 
electors mark the ballot paper (Call No.: 0004741; 02/07/20006). 
 
The user calls from Nuevo Leon to report that Ms […]’s daughter, 
who is about 13 years-old has been walking with electors to 
polling stations to witness, within the voting booth, they voted for 
PRI. The user also states that days ago this woman and other 
unknown activists were presumably negotiating with electors a 
payment of MX$1000 [£43] […] (Call No.: 0000328; 05/07/2009) 
 
 
4.6 Abstention Buying 
 
Another strategy is abstention buying, which basically makes electors not 
turn out (Cox and Kousser, 1981; Schaffer, 2002; Cornelius, 2000). This 
demobilisation strategy, rather than adding, reduces votes for other 
candidates and parties. Amongst tactics, parties basically reward electors 
for i) staying at home on polling days, ii) being away from the polling stations 
and iii) buying voting cards, making people ineligible to cast the vote. In 
Mexico, this activity is a crime according to the Criminal Act.100 In addition, 
electoral procedures force voters to show the original voting card to officers 
in polling stations, which makes this strategy a very effective method buy 
abstention. With this particular aspect in mind, I examine calls101 received 
from the 2003, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2012 elections. It is important to say 
that, to best of my knowledge, this is the first study in Mexico providing 
qualitative evidence about mechanism of abstention buying. Thus, weeks 
                                                        
100 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Ley General en Materia de Delitos Electorales’, 
Friday 27 June 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGMDE_270614.pdf (accessed 
on Sunday 27 December 2015). 
101 For a full report of these reports, see Appendix 4.7 (Calls No.: [2004] 0000815; [2006] 0002483, 
0004939; [2012] 0000121, 0000262, 0000469, 0000877, 0000927, 0000961, 0001057, 
0001136,0001157, 0001634, 0001727). 
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before polling days, records from countryside, trading and farming places 
describe, 
The user calls from Saltillo, Coahuila to report that a member of 
the staff of a congressional candidate whose last name is 
“Rocha”, were collecting citizens’ voting cards as an exchange of 
materials for construction […] The user also states he didn’t give 
them his voting card, but he saw a few others doing it (Call No.: 
0000242; 02/06/2003). 
 
The user calls from Tultepec, State of Mexico to report that a 
woman named Mrs […] was knocking doors within A. Lopez 
Mateos cul-de-sac, a neighbourhood called “San Juan Tultepec”, 
proffering MX500 [£22] for residents’ voting cards. However, up 
to the date, this man has neither delivered the money nor 
returned voting cards […] Amongst those affected are Mrs […] 
and Mrs […] (Call No.: 0001247; 10/01/1012) 
 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that 
within the primary school called “San Carlos” located in Nuevo 
Laredo Street, two teachers and some students are collecting 
students’ voting cards, promising a higher mark and MX$500 
[£22] […] The user also states that this has been happening over 
the last 15 days ish (Call No.: 0000520; 31/01/2012). 
 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that in the 
butcher’s called “Hueso de Oro”, [unknown people] are collecting 
electors’ voting card as an exchange of bags of provisions and 
other goods […] (Call No.: 0000724; 14/02/2012) 
 
The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that in the 
shop called “Abarrotes Blanquita” located in Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez 
Street, neighbourhood called “El Coyol”, the owner whose name 
is […], is offering people MX$300 [£13] as an exchange of 
electors’ voting card, saying she’ll return them later. The user 
also states he knows three local residents whose voting card has 
been collected, Mr […], Mr […] and Mr […] (Call No.: 0001163; 
06/03/2012) 
 
In contrast with other strategies analysed here, a particular finding is the 
presence of cash from months before polling days. As I have discussed, 
whereas the practice of handing goods has been more frequent in earlier 
stages of the campaigns, money tends to be used near election days. This 
is interesting as it suggests a difference in the way activists buy abstention 
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employing cash as a more persuasive handout. As the voting card is 
mandatory to cast the vote, collecting the document at any time produces 
the same result as long as it is conducted before polling days. Regarding 
goods of dispensation, the feature that remains in targeting mechanisms is 
the delivery of bags of provisions and materials for construction. 
Another set of calls received just a few days before the polling days 
describe, 
The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that within 
surrounded rural areas from his place, a PRI activist is paying up 
to MX$1,000 [£43] for electors’ voting cards, saying they’d give 
them back to the legal owner after polling day […] (Call No.: 
0000559; 04/09/2004) 
 
The user calls from Tijuana, Baja California to report that 
[unknown people] were collecting people’s voting card for 
MX$1,300 [£56]. The user also states she reckons these people 
have collected about 500 pieces (Call No.: 0004186; 
01/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Zacatecas City, Zacatecas to report that 
within the neighbourhood called “Trinidad”, PRD activists are 
proffering people MX$200 [£9] to vote for PRD’s mayoral 
candidate or give their voting card, promising to return them after 
polling day with extra MX£200 (Call No.: 0002622; 01/07/2006). 
 
The user calls presumably from Campeche City, Campeche to 
report that [unknown people] have taken user’s voting card as an 
exchange of MX$600 [£26] (Call No.: 0000347; 03/07/2009). 
 
The user calls from Donato Guerra, State of Mexico to report that 
a man is knocking doors proffering residents between MX$1,000 
[£43] and MX$2,000 [£86] to vote for PAN; he otherwise offers 
such amount of money as an exchange of electors’ voting cards. 
The user also states she refused to do so (Call No.: 0000351; 
29/06/2012). 
 
The user calls from San Francisco Tepeolulco, State of Mexico 
to report that Mrs […], who owns the ironmonger’s located in […], 
asked user’s grandson […] his voting card as an exchange of 




As accounts show, as polling days approach, callers report cash as an 
exchange of the voting cards and consummated collections of cards, which 
implies a deal already completed. The following set of calls refers to reports 
received on polling days for 2004, 2006 and 2012 elections, which describe, 
The user calls from Sinaloa to report that within the region called 
“Tamazula, Durango” […] the borough mayor’s daughter was 
collecting electors’ voting cards in the morning. The user claims 
to have evidence such as videos, photos and witnesses (Call 
No.: 0000378; 04/07/2004). 
 
The user calls from Juchitepec, State of Mexico to report that 
within the village called “San Matias Cuijingo”, PRI activists and 
the borough mayor Mr […] are knocking doors to proffer 
residents between MX$200 [£13] and MX$500 [£22] for their 
voting card. The user also states that at this moment these 
people at the corner of Ignacio Zaragoza and Francisco I. 
Madero Streets (Call No.: 0003688; 02/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mr […] has 
collected electors’ voting cards […] as an exchange of a cheque 
for MX$5000 [£216] […] But the bank account is fake. Amongst 
those residents affected are [twelve full names] (Call No.: 
0001267; 12/03/2012). 
 
In contrast with targeting mechanisms, abstention buying –by collecting 
voting cards– is not confined to electoral periods. As records show, the 
amount of cash and goods delivered are similar to those reported during 
earlier stages of contests. Although the largest amount of money reported 
happened on the Election Day, the user also stated that money was fake. 
However, some records demonstrate more precisely the foundations of 
abstention buying. Calls received for the 2004, 2006 and 2012 elections 
show a strategy constituted by an exploration of the parties’ preferences 
followed by a buying tactic.102 First, activists conduct vote-buying offers but 
                                                        
102 For an extended report of these calls see Appendix 4.4 (Calls No.: [2004] 000428; [2006] 0002472, 
0004186, 0003528; [2012] 0001462, 0001834, 0000372, 0000132. 
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once electors have expressed a negative preference, activists turn to 
abstention buying, proffering even more money for voting cards. These 
accounts suggest an effective method for activists to ensure favourable or 
reduce negative votes in one attempt.  
 Records for the 2004, 2006 and 2012 elections from very diverse 
cities, towns and villages describe, 
The user calls from Union Hidalgo, Oaxaca to report that within 
Emiliano Zapata and Matamoros Streets, there were outsiders at 
night delivering bags of provisions and money to people for them 
to vote for a political party; these people were otherwise 
collecting residents’ voting cards […] (Call No.: 000428; 
31/07/2004) 
 
The user calls from Atitalaquia, Hidalgo to report that Mrs […], a 
PAN local leader, is proffering bags of provisions to those who 
vote for PAN or MX$1,000 [£43] to those anti-PAN, collecting 
their voting cards (Call No.: 0002472; 30/06/2006). 
 
The user calls from Santa Maria Jalapa del Marques, Oaxaca to 
report that [unknown people] are offering people a sack of 
cement to vote for PRI’s presidential candidate, they offer 
otherwise 8 sacks of cement for electors’ voting card (Call No.: 
0003528; 02/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Juchitepec, State of Mexico to report that 
[unknown people] are knocking doors offering residents money 
to vote for a political party; they collect their voting cards 
otherwise (Call No.: 0000372; 15/06/2012). 
 
The user calls from San Martin Texmelucan, Puebla to report that 
Mr […] who lives in […] has collected electors’ voting cards of 
PAN candidate’ supporters […]; however, the user states that 
this man was actually supporting PT’s candidates, hence he 
collected those voting cards. Electors affected won’t be able to 
cast their vote […] (Call No.: 0001332; 14/03/2012) 
 
The user calls from Xochimilco, Mexico City to report that 
[unknown people] are giving people money as an exchange of 
the voting cards of those electors who won’t vote for Mr […], 




In this Section, I have discussed the way negative vote buying works by 
taking away voting cards from electors. Activists hand rewards to electors 
as an exchange of the mandatory document ensuring abstention for other 
contenders. Although Mexican authorities conduct campaigns about the 
importance of the voting card to cast the vote, hotline’ accounts provide 
evidence about successful methods to take the document away from the 
holders. Despite not having data to test statistically the effects of this 
strategy on electoral outcomes, my exploration indicates an important 
prevalence of negative vote buying in Mexican elections since 2004. 
 
4.7 Polling Days: The Last Opportunity to Win  
 
Mexican electoral regulations prohibit electronic, post and other forms of 
voting, making turnout the only method to cast the vote. As a result, polling 
days are crucial for parties, –particularly in tight contests– for succeeding. 
Literature has agreed that vote buying happens near or during elections 
days (Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2016, Hicken et. al. 2015, Nichter 2014, 
Owen 2013). In fact, for some scholars (Hicken 2007, Schaffer 2007) timing 
is the differentiating aspect of vote buying from other concepts such as 
relational clientelism (Nichter 2014) and patronage. For these group of 
authors, election days represent a fundamental stage for deliveries. 103 
Guided by this argument, I examine calls reporting activists buying votes 
                                                        
103 Another considerable number of calls received reporting an old tactic for Mexican elections known 
as “acarreo”, which entails taking voters to polls. There have been studies exploring this practice 
(Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Mercado 2013); electoral observation’s 
reports (Alianza Civica 2006, 2012) have denounced a substantial proportion of taxis hired to fulfilling 
this task for the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections. In problematic areas to access to polling 
stations, this practice is usually seen as a daily activity despite the prohibition. However, in this study, 
most of the calls involving acarreo involve vote buying. In other words, acarreo is usually an extension 
of vote-buying mechanisms to ensure turnout (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016). 
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near polling stations.104 For 2003, 2004 and 2012 elections, records from 
mostly urban places describe,  
The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report 
that near the polling stations 3075 and 3485, PRI activists were 
handing money and bags of provisions to electors (Call No.: 
0000755; 06/07/2003).  
 
The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that, near 
the polling station 4413, PRI activists were buying votes (Call 
No.: 000591; 05/09/2004). 
 
The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz to report that there are 
unknown people buying votes outside the polling station located 
within the Primary School “Miguel Hidalgo” at Vicente Beach. 
These people are giving electors between MX$500 [£21] and 
MX$1000 [£43] to vote for PAN […] (Call No.: 0004125; 
02/07/2006) 
 
The user calls from Guanajuato to report that, at the polling 
station located in a place named “El Jacalon”, activists 
nicknamed “Camarones” who live in […], are buying votes, 
handing electors up to MX$100 [£43] […] (Call No.: 0004285; 
02/07/2006) 
 
The user calls from Coahuila to report that close to the polling 
station, which the user cast the vote, there are PRI activists 
proffering people MX$200 [£9], MX$500 [£21], petrol vouchers, 
and pieces of meat to vote for PRI (Call No.: 0004730; 
02/07/2006). 
 
Repetitively, users report cash as part of the transactions amidst other 
goods. Different from other tactics, calls reporting both targeting and buying 
activities near polling stations come mostly from witnesses. I found just a 
few calls made by targeted electors. As an opportunistic strategy, 
institutively activists need less burden to carry in order to move around or 
run away if required. Indeed, voters reported being approach by people on 
their way to polls, as a couple of records describe, 
                                                        
104 For an extended report of records, see Appendix 4.8 (calls No.: [2003] 0000572, 0000671; [2006] 
0003495, 0003551, 0003699, 0003773, 0003839, 0004017, 0004063, 0004175, 0004196, 0004267, 
0004641). 
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The user calls from Magdalena Contreras, Mexico City to report 
that, when walking to polling station 3872, an unknown person 
approached him, asking if he wouldn’t want to vote for PRD in 
exchange for a certain amount of money (Call No.: 0003449; 
02/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from San Pedro de Acatama, San Luis Potosi to 
report that the mayoral candidate’s staff are approaching people, 
proffering MX$100 [£4]. They are managing to take blank ballot 
papers out from the polling station, marking them outside and 
giving them back to electors for them to cast the votes. This is 
happening in streets named Cactus and Acatama near the 
polling station (Call No.: 0004003; 02/07/2006). 
 
 
Another tactic on polling day entails brokers moving around polling stations 
to match the lists compiled (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016) as voters 
turn out (Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Mercado 2013). Ethnographic work 
(Hagene 2015) in Mexico also describes a broker ticking the name of a 
woman just outside a polling station for the 2016 Presidential Elections. This 
strategy is, indeed, the completion of the targeting action discussed before 
(see Section 4.3). Records particularly from the 2003 and 2006 elections 
confirm, 
The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that, outside the 
polling station located near the shopping arcade called […], there 
are a few people with lists of electors, giving provisions to people 
for them to vote for PRI (Call No.: 0000696; 06/07/2003). 
 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that near 
the polling station 1385, there are PRI activists, with green 
folders in hands, who are giving sanitary towels and pens to 
women and men, asking them their voting card […] (Call No.: 
0003422; 02/07/2006) 
 
The user calls from Veracruz to report that Mr […], PRI activist, 
is buying votes near the polling station the user’s cast the vote, 
asking also a copy of electors’ voting card (Call No.: 0003565; 
02/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report 
that within the polling station located in Pantitlan street, Reforma 
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neighbourhood, an unknown person, wearing a green shirt, is 
offering elderly people MX$400 [£17] to vote for PRI’s 
candidates; after casting the vote, this person is asking them to 
sign a piece of paper stating they voted PRI (Call No.: 0003771; 
02/07/2006). 
 
The user calls from Calderitas, Quintana Roo to report that 
people wearing all red, presumably with lists of the official 
electors’ register, are buying votes close to the polling station […] 




Advancing qualitative approaches for the empirical study of vote buying, I 
develop an innovative, unconventional analytical framework to examine 
how electors face strategies of vote buying. By dividing tactics of targeting 
and buying, mechanisms to enforce compliance, I provided evidence from 
the unexplored Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes. Extending 
processes to recruit people experiencing clientelism to conduct interviews 
and focus groups, I provide an examination of this dataset focused on 
accounts given by callers exposed to vote-buying activities. I rely on the 
safety and convenience offered by a hotline to report sensitive information 
anonymously and confidentially, hence the scientific relevance of these 
accounts. Hotline’s procedures for asking questions to users to set a report 
suit well academic methods to collect information in the ground. Equally, 
training plans for telephonists attending calls fulfil adequately conditions of 
qualitative research to interview people about sensitive phenomena. 
  This compilation of calls from across the country has offered a 
possibility to assess theoretical claims about several aspects of vote buying. 
I, therefore, provide research with an account of the phenomenon in Mexico 
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from a different angle by analysing the content of calls received between 
2002 and 2016. 
 The PRI was reportedly the main vote buyer for the 2012 Mexican 
Presidential Elections. Additionally, the State of Mexico seems to be the 
most intense area from which users report vote buying incidents. Gender 
has no effect on the decision of callers to report vote buying. 
 The conceptual distinction between targeting and buying is 
supported by callers reporting being offered or given. The timing of targeting 
strategies responds to causes such as the amount of work brokers have to 
perform, the conditions of the electoral precinct and the level of the electoral 
competition is expected. There is an extensive variety of rewards, but bags 
of provisions are the most prevalent in clientelistic transactions regardless 
parties and area. Proffering cash is a strong reward but it is mostly offered 
as the Election Day approaches. 
 The compilation of lists of potential voters obtaining voting card’s 
details is a targeting tactic conducted from early stages of the campaigns, 
which is not exclusive to one party. Although most of the targeting activities 
are conducted by brokers, some records demonstrate that candidates tend 
to perform the job in the field. 
 Tactics of delivering are mainly reported by witnesses rather than 
voters bought. Activists close vote-buying deals near polling days. Although 
further tests are required, the delivery of goods gets intensified as the 
Election Day approaches. The second stage of the compilation of lists 
entails matching names with those electors as turning out. Those 
opportunistic strategies for buying votes are performed near polling days. 
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There is a big number of callers reporting unknown people and outsiders 
delivering goods and money, which supports the idea about contingent vote 
buying and thinner ties compared to clientelism. Abstention buying is 
another effective method to guarantee abstention for opponents. Activists 
hand rewards to electors as an exchange of the voting card at any time once 
they know voters’ adverse preference. 
 Having examined how voters face strategies of vote buying from a 
citizens’ perspective by assessing timing of targeting, dispensation of 
goods, in the following chapter, I provide a full picture from a brokers’ 
viewpoint to know how they relate to parties, create structure for operation 
and conduct vote buying strategies and mechanism of compliance in order 




Chapter 5. Vote Buying in Mexico from a Brokers’ 
Perspective: Networks and Tactics of Targeting, 





The previous chapter show how Mexican voters face tactics of vote buying 
from parties and activists by assessing thousands or reports from the 
National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes. I discussed that vote buying 
is reportedly widespread across Mexico. Such clientelistic deals entail three 
central actions, offers, deliveries and compliance. Activists knock on doors 
proffering a variety of rewards as an exchange of support at polls. In some 
cases, they ask voters to sign lists and give copies of their voting cards to 
reaffirm commitment. This tactic is consistently conducted from months 
before campaigns to days before the Election Day. Also, it is not exclusive 
to a party. Instead, it is performed by many parties along campaigns. As 
having visited, voters get targeted by brokers but by signing lists and giving 
voting cards copies, electors engage in vote buying. 
 Voters are exposed to offers thoroughly as an exchange of support. 
The distribution of goods and money have some features though. Months 
before campaigns and up to election days, people reportedly receive 
several goods from different parties such as bags of provisions and 
materials for construction. However, as the Election Day approaches, 
activists hand cash as a reward and use sites as clientelistic depots to stock 
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up more goods and cash. Additionally, activists turn to negative vote buying 
once targeted electors have rejected the offer or admitted to supporting 
other parties. Activists give people money as an exchange of their voting 
card; as collecting them, activists make electors ineligible to vote, reducing 
automatically opponent votes. 
 Those electors who have engaged in vote-buying deals are equally 
expected to perform further actions of compliance. There are two essential 
mechanisms in Mexico, photos of the ballot paper marked and the use of 
kids. First, electors are required to take photos of the ballot paper –mostly 
with mobile phones– inside the booth to prove the way they marked it. 
Second, children walk with bought electors inside the polling booth to attest 
the option marked by voters. These actions allow activists to ensure votes. 
Nevertheless, evidence from the previous Chapter provided accounts about 
the way Mexican voters cope with vote buying. But some questions still 
remain unanswered, why activists conduct those strategies, how effective 
these tactics are and how they do them. In this Chapter, I provide some 
answers through semi-structured interviews with brokers. In order to 
address the questions, I explore how do brokers and parties organise this 
operation to achieve the goal successfully? What are the mechanisms to 
make targeting, delivering and compliance work together? What do brokers 
get from conducting these tasks? What are the incentives to do this work? 
How do campaign leaders assign roles to brokers? How do they ensure 
success? Based on semi-structured interviews (Leech 2002) with brokers, 
in this Chapter, I describe how clientelist networks are configured, moulded 
and executed. I also explain the ways tactics of targeting, buying and 
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compliance work. The Chapter contributes to the literature by offering 
narratives from brokers working in the ground about the duties they perform 
for parties and their implications for vote buying in Mexico. 
 Scholars have extensively studied clientelistic exchanges (e.g. see 
Powell 1970, Lemarchand & Legg 1972, Eisenstadt & Roniger 1980, Gay 
1998, Shefner 2001, Hallin & Papathanassopoulos 2002, Lazar 2004, 
Stokes 2007, Hilgers 2008, 2011, Hicken 2011, Stokes et al 2013). In Latin 
America, influential ethnographic work (Ayuero 1999, 2000) conducted at 
the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, attributed the success of 
clientelistic politics to networks and ties established between local leaders 
and communities. Recent studies (Schaffer & Baker 2015) have also 
pointed social networks and the role of leaders of organisations (Holland & 
Palmer-Rubin 2015) as crucial factors of clientelistic exchanges. Literature 
has equally underlined the access of clientelistic networks to public funds 
for the benefit of clients. Such mechanism has been understood as the 
‘democratization of clientelism’ (Hagene 2015: 157). 
 Qualitative efforts conducted in Mexico have mainly approached 
clientelistic vote-buying from people’s views. Less evidence has come from 
brokers to understand their view and the reasons they perform these 
activities and the way they do it. For example, Schedler & Manriquez (2004) 
analyse the morality of clientelism by interviewing eighty-one citizens for the 
2000 Presidential Elections. In contrast with traditional perspectives, poor 
people seemed to reject clientelistic exchanges as they threaten individuals’ 
freedom to decide. A long-term ethnographic study (Hagene 2015) explores 
the problem from both sides –broker and voter– in a small community of 
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Mexico City for the 2006 and 2012 Presidential Elections. Clients seemed 
to accept rewards coming from clientelistic transactions as long as they feel 
neither force nor threat about the deal. A recent mixed-methods study 
theorises about the role of brokers for the 2012 Presidential Elections 
(Mercado 2013). Based on surveys, focus groups and interviews with 
brokers, the study develops a theory on how brokers organise, assign and 
execute tasks during campaigns and the Election Day to buy votes. Overall, 
the author identifies three stages of vote buying, i) brokers and parties 
holding numerous previous meetings to define strategies and duties, ii) 
brokers deployed in streets to target electors –not necessarily confined in 
campaigns period but sometimes much earlier–, and iii) brokers closing 
vote-buying deals during polling days by monitoring voters, enforcing 
compliance and reporting closely the status of the operation to parties. 
 Guided by this study, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
brokers. I first established contact with federal deputies and senators from 
states holding elections in 2017, asking to refer me to people canvassing 
and campaigning with them. Thus, I had access to delegates –as they are 
called informally– working on the ground who, after exploring the type of 
questions I needed to ask, they put me in contact with seven brokers. To 
expand the sample, I contacted local politicians from Mexico City and 
Tlaxcala, who referred me to another set of delegates and twelve more 
brokers. From February to April 2017, I spoke to nineteen brokers about the 
dissertation and purposes of the interviews. Nine of them (from the State of 
Mexico, Mexico City and Tlaxcala) agreed to talk to me about vote-buying 
practices by providing anonymity. I conducted the interviews at locations set 
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by the interviewees. Since some activities they perform during campaigns 
are illegal, brokers chose the logistics of the meetings to self-protection, 
hence the decision to meet me first in a public place and then take me to 
different sites to hold the interviews (see Appendix 5.1). 
 From 19th May to 18th June 2017, I conducted nine semi-structured 
interviews with brokers claiming experience up to twenty-two years in 
canvassing, electioneering and campaigning for the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), the 
Party of Workers (PT), Covergencia Party (PC) and the National Action 
Party (PAN), amidst others already dissolved. Four of brokers claimed to be 
currently employed by a state or local government, despite performing 
brokerage duties.105 The rest of them admitted to having worked in such 
terms at some point. Even though the extent of brokers’ job goes beyond 
elections and it covers other areas of politics (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, 
Hegene 2015, Zarazaga 2014), in this study, I focus only on the duties they 
perform to buy votes. Interviews lasted between one and a half and two and 
a half hours; likewise, questions addressed three aspects: a) brokerage 
structures and networks, b) targeting tactics and c) strategies of buying and 
mechanisms of compliance. I had brief chats with brokers’ friends and 
members of their teams in different points of the meetings, some relevant 
information coming from these conversations is reported as part of the 
interview. All interviews were conducted in Spanish.  
                                                        
105 In Mexico, these practice is called informally aviadores (aviators). With unknown origins, the term 
refers to those people on the payroll of government agencies, who do not perform duties related to 
the post and, sometimes, do not even attend the office, see El Universal, ‘Los pilotos que no vuelan, 
pero cobran’ Wednesday 14 September 2016, Opinion, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/entrada-de-
opinion/colaboracion/mochilazo-en-el-tiempo/nacion/sociedad/2016/09/14/el-aviador-que 
(accessed on Monday 15 May 2017). 
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 In this Chapter, I present qualitative evidence coming from brokers’ 
narratives to understand the way teams of brokers organise themselves to 
conduct vote-buying strategies, the method used to approach and persuade 
successfully electors to enter vote buying. The Chapter is organised in the 
following way. The first section describes how brokerage structures and 
networks are developed, shaped and interconnected for clientelistic 
purposes. I discuss the extent and strength of these aspects and how the 
relationships between parties and brokers leverage. The second section 
explores targeting strategies for buying votes. I explain how brokers and 
parties plan and implement such strategies, and the importance of the 
coordination for the success of vote buying. The third section describes how 
brokers close vote-buying deals. I explain the relationships between the 
distribution of rewards near polling days and the execution of mechanisms 
of compliance. Finally, I address some contributions of the study to research 
on brokers to understand operations to buy votes. I also present some of 
the missing answers. 
 
5.1 Clientelistic Structures and Networks in Mexico: The Organisation 
and Strategies to Buy Votes 
 
‘Political machines around the world [...] have all relied heavily on networks 
of brokers to compete in the political arena’ (Zarazaga 2014: 23). In Mexico, 
brokerage structures have worked in a similar way since the sixties. As 
implementing ‘corporatism’ (Grayson 1998; Chapman 2012), the 
government and the dominant party configurated a pyramidal structure 
(Stokes et al 2013) constituted of three bands: brokers in the bottom, 
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delegates in the middle and –depending upon the task– high-level officials 
or candidates on the top. Despite the fact that local delegates perform 
ground-level brokers’ activities, these people tend to be more influential or 
experienced middlemen with coordination duties. Current organisational 
methods employed by brokers in Mexico have inherited the dynamics of the 
Twentieth-Century arrangements. Such organisational structure does not 
seem to be exclusive to the Mexican case, as other studies have found 
similar patterns. In the Argentinian case, for example, Zarazaga (2014) 
illustrates the pyramid as, 
At the apex are the mayor and an inner circle of two or three 
people who help build and control the network; these usually 
include the municipal secretary of government and secretary of 
social development. Beneath them is a group of municipal 
delegates or council members who deal directly with the brokers. 
Mayors’ challengers run alternative networks of brokers, also 
with pyramidal structures. These compete with the incumbent 
mayor’s network for supporters—although usually with 
substantially fewer resources (Zarazaga 2014: 6). 
 
 
Studies on brokers’ mobilisations (e.g. Larreguy, Montiel & Querubin 2017, 
Larreguy, Marshal & Querubin 2016, Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, 
Hagene 2015, Zarazaga 2014, Lawson & Greene 2014) identify two main 
brokerage structures, a long-term, reciprocal, personal, affective and a 
short-term contingent, voluntary, opportunistic one. The first is based on 
close bonds and material benefits. It is the foundation of the pyramid and it 
refers to those brokers who reach households systematically and 
consistently to know precise details and about voters as well as preferences 
and needs. Such type of structure is also found in a study in Argentina 
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(Zarazaga 2014), which assumes that voters support brokers indefinitely as 
a result of their good reputation for accessing and delivering rewards. 
This structure is configured by three types of networks. One is 
developed by well-known local leaders –some of them can be wealthy, small 
or medium-sized local businessmen but others respectable well-recognised 
advocates, who have bonded strongly with residents by aiding them. The 
support includes personal favours, relatives’ assistance amidst other 
benefits. Ties are voluntary, personal and affective; norms of reciprocity and 
loyalties are solid. Rather than a brokerage strategy, it is a way of life 
(Mercado 2013). This bonding explains why brokers have access to 
privileged information, although it is usually sustained by an asymmetric 
relationship between leaders and people (Powell 1970). As an interviewee 
describes, 
I’ve done business [campaigned] with a few town’s loaded chaps 
[wealthy people] who have decided to play at candidates. They 
didn’t belong to any party [...] they didn’t even know anything 
about politics [...] I remember one of these men, who owned all 
the repair shops and garages here in town and a few tens of ha 
[hectares], asked help to run the campaign but by the time he did 
it, he’d given my wife and brother jobs in one of the shops and a 
garage. He also lent me a site for my daughter’s 15th birthday 
celebration. How to say no, this guy has also been nice with me, 
he’s shot me some bullets [invited pints of beer] a few times and 
offered some party for free […] My wife speaks a lot with his wife 
and sister-in-law at shop, you know women’s stuff, I think he [the 
leader] want to know about us but it’s okay […]106 
 
 
The second network is managed by corrupted, powerful, local leaders and 
based on influence peddling. This system relies on chains of favours and 
high-level relationships. These leaders can be local politicians or have 
                                                        
106 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala 
(Tuesday, 23rd May 2017). 
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strong relationships with government officials by, for example, doing 
business with them or having close relatives working as bureaucrats. These 
connections allow them to access to exclusive resources to assist residents 
as an exchange for support. But such connections equally allow leaders 
exercise control over people by leading dismissals, school expulsions and 
benefit removals amongst other punishments. Even though there might be 
no direct threats, they have the power to do so and people know it. 
Moreover, these leaders are able to trade and purchase impunity locally. 
Brokers’ accounts confirm it, 
[…] Here [broker’s town], there are some ‘sultans’ [powerful 
people] you know, sort of untouchables […] I’ve campaigned a 
few times with them, I’ve seen them in action, the ways they get 
everything done […] You wouldn’t believe the kind of things 
they’re willing and able to do. In the 2000 Presidential Elections 
[in Mexico], I met a ‘heavyweight sultan’ who was supporting a 
mayoral candidate […] I remember that in the middle of a 
meeting, he suddenly received a call, which upset him badly; I 
didn’t get quite well what the problem was but after hanging up, 
he straightaway phoned the local Security Commissioner to tell 
him off embarrassingly and then he called the borough Mayor, 
who didn’t hesitate about dismissing him [Commissioner] Come 
on! How many mortals [ordinary people] do have Mayor’s private 
number ready to sack public employees? […]107 
 
Amongst these claims, another interviewee describes, 
[…] When campaigning for PRI many years ago, since the boss 
[a party’s delegate] found me ‘wrapping dessert to take away’ 
[taking money] one of my kids was expelled from the school for 
disruptive behaviour [laughs] The boss is the Godfather of the 
school’s principal, so I let you reflect upon my son’s behaviour 
[…]108 
 
In addition, a third broker states, 
                                                        
107 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico 
(Sunday, 18th June 2017). 
108 Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City (Tuesday, 6th 
June 2017). 
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[…] In 1994, I didn’t have a job [...] A friend of mine told me about 
parties looking for dodgy snoopy lads [laughs] to work at polling 
stations [as parties’ representatives] and compensating such 
services [paying money] so I talked to a coordinator [party’s 
delegate] who gave me the job. A few months later, he made my 
cousins recipients of the local employment programme and my 
mum beneficiary of the national health programme […] but the 
coordinator had his very hysterical moments. I’ve seen him 
pulling strings to add or remove people from these programmes 
based on his bipolar mood. I’ve had to work with him many times 
because of mum, she’s diabetic, she needs everyday insulin, 
[without the medical service], she would be dead […]109 
 
 
The last type of network is performed by more violent, criminal, groups and 
based on threat and fear. This system suits towns and villages with high 
levels of corruption, criminality and impunity. Local leaders have strong ties 
with criminal organisations or they can even belong to those groups, 
employing intimidation to achieve their goals. They have money and 
connections to corrupt authorities as well as have access to other resources 
such as weapons. These groups have the power to control local trading, 
markets and finances (Bailey & Flores 2007, Bailey & Godson 2000); in 
some cases, they influence significantly political appointments (Bailey & 
Taylor 2009) for their own benefit. Studies indeed suggest that violence is 
an important factor of political participation in Mexico (Trelles & Carreras 
2012). These local leaders can also work as party’s delegates. Influenced 
by this type of network, brokers conduct campaign activities by canvassing 
with intimidating questions and threatening requests. Despite the fact that 
brokers hand rewards, voters are aware about the extent of the damage, 
                                                        
109 Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), Buenavista, State of Mexico (Saturday, 3rd June 
2017) 
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hence their low incentives of rejection or negotiation. A particular broker’s 
account confirms this fact, 
[…] The “war against drugs” launched by the federals [federal 
government] has worsened off the region [near the State of 
Guerrero]. “Los Mañosos” [drug’s barons, hitmen and members 
of cartels] have spread badly and now they rule towns; they 
decide everything. They say whom you must support and how. 
They decide borough mayors, town councillors, police officers 
and everybody really; at least, they have to give the consent; 
elections are just the feint. Residents know that if they aren’t with 
them, they’re against them. There have been many people shot 
dead around [...] Do you remember what happened to students 
in Iguala?110 [...] That’s the way “Mañosos” hit it off [...]. Once 
people know you’re the emissary [working with them], they hardly 
reject your request […]. That eases the job [...]111 
 
The second structure is more volatile. It is designed to attend particular 
circumstances and meet specifics goals. In the case of campaigns, this 
structure usually disappears after the Election Day or it is adjusted to fulfil 
other tasks. Mercado (2013) calls it the structure of promotion as during 
elections its fundamental goal is to get votes for a party or candidate. 
Narratives here support multitask views of brokers, which assumes that 
“brokers do not win elections only by rallying and buying votes; they 
campaign just like other party activists, plastering posters, painting graffiti, 
and organizing party meetings” (Zarazaga 2014: 2-3). For instance, a broker 
says “we quite fit for either of the circumstances […] We know how to do 
many things […] I’ve worked many times in my neighbourhood oiling bolts 
[convincing people] or handing treats [rewards] but also I’ve been sent to 
                                                        
110 BBC, ‘Mexico missing students: Unanswered questions two years on’ Monday 26 September 
2016, World, Latin America, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37460455 (accessed on Tuesday 1st August 2017). 
111 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th 
June 2017). 
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[distant] places [...]”.112 Another account confirms this claim, “[...] when I 
started a few years ago, I used to knock doors, but later I’ve started taking 
over commanding positions [laughs] at HQ to spur sneaky, lazy brothers on! 
[Laughs] Giving orders suits me quite well”.113 
The promotion structure is similarly constituted of three bands. At the 
top, there is a coordinator, below, several regional coordinators and at the 
bottom activists and brokers. I found two fundamental networks that make 
this structure works. The first is based on more anonymous ties, especially 
between the general coordinator and brokers and between brokers 
themselves. Brokers perform precise tasks and are more likely to switch 
pairs for each activity. A couple of accounts here suggest that brokers from 
urban, populated cities are sent to targeted regions during local campaigns, 
sometimes a few months before in competitive precincts, to fulfil particular 
purposes. A broker narrates, 
[…] I worked for PRD in the 2011 Gubernatorial Elections in [the 
State of] Guerrero, it was though as [federal] Government sent 
army officers to maintain public order [...] That was my second 
time working there but it was very different [from the first time]. It 
was more competitive as eventually the [PAN’s] candidate 
passed up the candidacy to PRD [...] I remember that most of my 
colleagues [brokers] went from Mexico City […] They seemed to 
work for boroughs there [in Mexico City] as advisers, directors 
and so on; they said that supporting PRD’s candidate in Guerrero 
was just a Mayor’s superior instruction [...] These guys stayed in 
nice hotels in Acapulco for about two months, cool lads; they 
invited us drinks and food [...] Everything sponsored by the 
[Mexico City’s] Government [laughs!] In the end, we got it, we 
won the election, but I’ve never ever seen them again. That’s 
happened to me more than once with other bros [...]114 
 
                                                        
112 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th 
June 2017) 
113 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico 
(Sunday, 18th June 2017). 
114 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th 
June 2017) 
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Likewise, another broker’s narrative supports this account,  
[…] Look, I’m a very busy businesswoman [laughs!] When 
there’s no election in Mexico City, I disseminate my extensive 
knowledge [work] in other areas with other delegates, [...] I’ve 
lectured [worked with] many rustic men in countryside [laughs!], 
someone has to; luckily, those types whom you don’t see again 
[...]”115 
 
The other network relies on teams of more experienced delegates and 
brokers working together. Likewise, there are brokers multitasking towards 
short-term goals but in contrast with the previous network, this one functions 
as a unit. In other words, it is an itinerant team performing similar activities 
in different elections and places. For instance, PRI, PRD and PAN 
strongholds such as State of Mexico (Rodriguez 1998), Mexico City (Hilgers 
2005, 2008) and Monterrey (Barraza & Bizberg 1991) respectively, send 
teams of brokers to other states during elections. Interviewees report that 
competitive states for PRD and PRI such as Guerrero and Veracruz have 
hosted teams of brokers from Mexico City and the State of Mexico during 
campaigns. Equally, they confirm that strategic states for PAN such as 
Guanajuato and Guadalajara have hosted teams of brokers from Monterrey. 
Moreover, this method is employed from state to a borough level whenever 
necessary. As a broker describes, 
[…] I’m from Mexico City, I’ve lived here all the time […]. For 
about four months, I was sent with three colleagues to Guerrero 
to work for PRD for the 2005 Gubernatorial Elections. We were 
in charge of “La Montaña” [a Guerrero’s region], very poor place! 
[...] Those days were different; drugs barons weren’t a problem 
and you didn’t get shot or killed [...]. We won, indeed [...] despite 
their [PRI] nasty tricks That was the first time we kicked them 
[PRI] out from the office. It was quite enjoyable! [...]116 
                                                        
115 Anonymous interview with a broker (woman 1), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 
19th May 2017). 
116 Anonymous interview with a broker (woman 2), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 
19th May 2017). 
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As another interviewee, who lives in Mexico City, tells 
[…] I’ve worked many times in Veracruz, all of them for PRD with 
my sister [a former local deputy] and her colleagues, she 
introduced me to this business [...] It’s a though state as recent 
events [the arrest of a former Governor] but it’s been like that for 
years [...] We were so close, but we didn’t get it. He [former 
Governor] won the election by paying and delivering a lot of bits 
[rewards]. We [PRD] just couldn’t cope with that. Next time! 
[…]117 
 
In sum, brokerage systems in Mexico have worked in a pyramidal structure 
since the implementation of the corporatist policy: brokers, delegates and 
high-level officials or candidates. This method has been inherited from old 
political arrangements. Evidence here supports previous ideas about long-
term, solid brokers’ networks, but it also extends such views about another 
type of relationship. Accounts tell about more contingent, anonymous 
networks, working together. These do neither compete nor conflict with the 
other structure. Instead, they both work as a group when circumstances of 
the election dictate the need. Overall, there are two basic structures, a long-
term, reciprocal, personal, affective and a short-term contingent, voluntary, 
opportunistic (see Figure 5.1). The former works out with personalised 
distribution of benefits and very close bonds amongst brokers and between 
brokers and voters. It is based on three types of networks, i) well-known, 
charismatic, local leaders, ii) corrupt, powerful, local leaders, and iii) violent, 
more criminal local groups. The second structure works out under more 
volatile basis and it is designed to meet specifics goals. In contrast with the 
                                                        
117 Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City 
(Tuesday, 6th June 2017). 
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first structure, it is based on two itinerant networks, a thinner, more 
anonymous tie and unconnected cells of teams. 
 





5.2 From Devising to Implementing Strategies of Targeting: Adjusting 
Ties between Parties and Brokers 
 
The Planning Stage 
 
Depending upon competitive and logistical factors, brokers can begin 
targeting activities while before the Election Day. At some point, such tactics 
work beside a legitimate strategy of the campaign. Some of these might be 
conducted by brokers but ordinary people help too, which might be partisan 
and share the ideology with parties, but this is not a necessary condition. 
Since those activities are legal, parties usually hire residents to support the 
campaign and people find incentives to perform those duties. Zarazaga 










brokers to execute clientelistic strategies’. On the other hand, Hagene 
(2015: 11) reports how an interviewee admitted that ‘nobody had offered 
him a job in return for his electoral work [...]’. Despite the variety of 
backgrounds of those people willing to help parties, these individuals 
usually have experience in the operation of campaigns (Mercado 2013). 
 There are two main legitimate duties of parties, representation and 
coordination. Representatives meet party’s duties in electoral bodies along 
campaigns; during election days, they stay in polling stations to report 
incidents periodically to coordinators. Coordinators, on the other hand, are 
essentially in charge of the mobilisation in each electoral precinct. Along the 
operation, coordinators are the permanent contact between parties and 
brokers. Their duties are fundamental to make the machinery work (Stokes 
2005). A broker, who claims to have stood as local candidate twice, narrates 
the way he has undertaken such duties,  
[...] Yes, I’ve worked as a coordinator many times. It’s quite tough 
as you have to be good at electoral legislation and other bits [...] 
You don’t know how they [other parties] are, they just wait for you 
to make a mistake to kick your [#%$/&] Honestly, in addition to 
your bosses [parties] and the rest of chaos [coordinate brokers], 
you’ve got to bear much more with annoying paperwork, 
journalists and those voters who suddenly want something from 
you. Whenever I can, I turn down those invitations [working as a 
coordinator], it’s too much work, I’d rather be on the ground. You 
don’t have to be accountable to anyone and there’s more slot for 
making business […]118 
 
 
Coordinators’ responsibilities seem to be associated with the needs of each 
election. Stokes et al (2013: 19) explain that they ‘are agents of the party 
whose actions cannot be exhaustively observed or perfectly monitored by 
                                                        
118 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 21st May 
2017). 
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the party.’ Therefore, they operate with some level of autonomy, which 
explains the type of relationships they establish with the campaign team; 
the more autonomous coordinators are, the less contact with the party they 
have. Brokers interviewed here acknowledged other aspects that influence 
coordinators’ duties, as coalitions, advisers and the type of elections (local, 
regional or national). As a broker narrates, 
[...] I hate working with parties’ coalitions. They don’t let you work, 
[the fact of] sparing regions is a nightmare. My worst experiences 
have been with them […] Other parties don’t give you anything, 
but they blame you for everything […] Sometimes coalitions give 
you more votes but not all the time. Candidates love hearing 
pseudo-pundits who think they know everything [...] Don’t trust 
politicians, they’re bloody liar [laughs!] Believe me, many times 
we’d had everything under control and coalitions just f*#%ed it 
up […]119 
 
Besides the account, another broker describes, 
[...] As you know, intellectuals [pollsters] have recently failed 
badly to predict elections outcomes. After all these years, the 
truth is that you never know what to expect, I can tell. Sometimes 
candidates say [that] it’s going to be [a] very easy [campaign] and 
eventually is a mess, but other times they just don’t expect 
anything, and suddenly it’s done, you get it [...] For the 2015 
midterm elections, I remember that at some point, we were very 
comfortable; surveys were giving us more than four percent of 
advantage and we were doing it quite well but swiftly, you know, 
inflated egos and #%&! internal mistakes just ruined everything 
[…]120 
 
Likewise, a third interviewee narrates, 
[...] I’d rather local elections over federal ones. Although they 
might be a bit boring, there’s no external atmosphere affecting 
your job […] I’ve worked in a variety of circumstances and I’ve 
basically done the same [work] I don’t believe what the Gods of 
the Olympus [pollsters] say about tight campaigns. They just 
                                                        
119 Anonymous interview with a broker (a second man), conducted in Buenavista, the State of Mexico 
(Sunday, 4th June 2017). 
120 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala 
(Tuesday, 23rd May 2017). 
 168 
speak, they don’t act […] I think local elections are more intense 
as many people know better each other [...]121 
 
Once structures, networks and strategies have been set, a brokerage 
operation to get votes commences with two central aspects (Mercado 2013, 
Ugalde & Rivera 2013). First, a schedule of meetings between campaign 
staff -or candidates themselves- and brokers. Along these meetings, the 
staff have already an idea about the conditions of the contest and, most 
importantly, the sum of votes required from brokers to win the election. 
Delegates, on the other hand, have already conducted some fieldwork to 
explore the number of votes they might get and, to some extent, the 
sentiment of people towards parties. These two aspects usually shape the 
level and intensity of the negotiation between parties and brokers. 
Second, campaign staff and brokers engage in budgetary talks to set 
rates, numbers, dates and figures about the clientelistic operation (Mercado 
2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). This point seems to be one of the toughest 
items on the agenda, which is discussed in two parts, the rate per vote and 
the dates of deliveries. Despite potential adjustments to the plan along the 
campaign, these meetings signify the starting agreement on strategies of 
the campaign and clientelistic exchanges. A similar agenda of discussions 
between parties and brokers was found in Argentina, Szwarcberg (2012: 
97) argues that ‘[i]n evaluating the ability of a party broker to mobilize voters 
on Election Day, bosses take into account how many voters the agent 
mobilized in the past adjusted by the popularity of the party’s nominee, the 
economic situation, and certain contextual events such as media scandals 
                                                        
121 Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City 
(Tuesday, 6th June 2017). 
 169 
that can affect the popularity of a party or candidate before an election’. The 
reason monetary discussions are tough is explained by the rates per votes. 
Zarazaga (2014: 24) argues that by ‘paying to voters the minimum amount 
needed to assure their votes, party machines buy votes more efficiently and 
win elections more often than their rivals. Information means for brokers 
more accuracy at buying votes’. Evidence from the Philippines (Hicken et al 
2015: 352) shows that ‘the ‘amount of money offered by candidates varied 
widely, both across races, and between candidates.’ Whereas Mayor and 
vice-mayor candidates proffer between PHP$250 [£3.47] and PHP$500 
[£6.95], councillor candidates offer PHP$20 [£0.28] to PHP$100 [£1.39]. 
All brokers interviewed here support previous claims, referring 
anecdotes about meetings and discussions about money and rates per 
vote, but some relevant narratives describe, 
[...] We meet them [candidates or party officials] to clear things 
up beforehand. Although they tell us how many votes are 
required, we roughly know what they need [...] we have to be 
wise in those meetings because they are funny sometimes, they 
want you to get votes very cheap in tough regions or more 
wealthy areas […] We usually set the rate per vote, which goes 
between MX$250 [£10] and MX$700 [£25] ish although there 
have been a few times in which I’ve given MX$5000 [£200]. You 
should have two things in mind when attending these meetings, 
the intensity of the election, as you have to offer more money or 
deliver more goods, and the income rate of the neighbourhood 
so, as I said, you have you be careful otherwise you might lose 
business [...]122 
 
Additionally, another broker states, 
[...] A boss I had [a delegate] used to take me to those meetings 
with candidates and parties […] Quite a few […] You feel like 
meeting Mafia members, a lot of people around, everything very 
secretive, they don’t allow you even to take mobile phones or 
gadgets with you in there because of social media scandals […] 
                                                        
122 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 21st May 
2017). 
 170 
There’s nothing else to talk but money. How much you need, 
when you’ll get it, concerning the [number of] voters you have to 
persuade [buy], how much you’ll pay voters, which is usually 
about MX$500 [£20] but I’ve handed up to MX$3000 [£120], it 
depends really on how broke people are, how much other parties 
are giving and how many votes you need [...]123 
 
Likewise, a third account describes, 
Before wrangles [campaigns] start, we [brokers] must be as one 
with bosses [candidates or campaigners] on the fare [rate per 
vote]. A few things tune tariffs, but we mainly take into account 
community’s cash flow, the mess of the race, people’s mood with 
parties and, nowadays, insecurity notches for our ‘bros’ working 
in streets [...] I’ve had arguments with candidates about money 
and the number of votes. I give about MX$500 [£20] but I’ve 
given MX$20 [£0.8] [laughs!] and up to MX$1000 [£40]. They 
[candidates] sometimes want you to get a fantasy number of 
votes for a ridiculous amount of money. There are “unwinnable” 
elections, you have to be careful. You’re “sent to war without a 
rifle”, otherwise […]. My colleagues [brokers] have given to me 
up to 300 voters each, guaranteed! We have to set numbers and 
money carefully. If we do it well, we actually get extra tips for our 
remarkable effort [Laughs]124 
 
The Execution Stage 
 
Amongst the diverse portfolio of targeting tactics performed by brokers 
during campaigns, in Mexico, the compilation of lists of electors seems to 
prevail over others (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). Brokers knock 
doors, proffering rewards to residents as an exchange of support for 
candidates and parties. As performing this action, they compile lists of 
voters willing –or tempted at least– to engage in vote-buying deals. Visual 
evidence about such lists (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016: 164) shows 
                                                        
123 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Pedro Tultepec, State of Mexico 
(Saturday, 10th June 2017). 
124 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala 
(Tuesday, 23rd May 2017). 
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a piece of paper with PRI’s logo entitled “register of voters committed to 
taking to polls during the Election Day”. The list also demonstrates that 
brokers fill in seven gaps as i) full name of the voter, ii) code of elector, iii) 
full address, iv) number of the voting card, v) number of the electoral 
precinct, vi) number of folio of the national register, and vii) telephone 
number. By law,125 parties have access at any time to the national register 
of electors, which provides all details above described. Accounts of brokers 
confirm that parties match the information within the lists with the register. 
Undertaking such task suggests another method adopted by parties to 
monitor brokers performance.  
 Although in a different context, a study in Africa also finds tactics of 
compilation of lists. As assessing a party machine in Taiwan, Wang & 
Kurzman (2007) identify two types of targeted voters, i) partisans (member 
of the political machine) and their families, and ii) ordinary voters. 
Particularly, for the first group, authors argue that the party make a full list 
of members and their families and party officers monitor those lists by ticking 
names of those who voted to eventually reward them (Wang & Kurzman 
2007: 234). 
Whereas studies (Lawson & Greene 2014, Finan & Schechter 2012) 
have argued well-accepted norms of reciprocity and solidarity as factors to 
overcome the secrecy of the ballot when buying votes, others (Rueda 2014, 
Gingerich & Medina 2013, Stokes et al 2013, Smith & Bueno 2012) have 
discussed methods of systematic monitoring conducted by the machine 
                                                        
125 Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos 
Electorales: Article 148, 2’, Sunday 1 January 2017, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_270117.pdf (accessed on Saturday 8 july 
2017). 
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party (Magaloni 2014, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2014, Nichter 2008, 
Stokes 2005). Yet, findings of the lists bring another point to the discussion. 
Since personal information of voters is gathered and well organised, any 
broker with access to those lists can conduct further monitoring activities 
despite having no previous contact with electors. Strong ties between 
brokers and voters resulting from systematic interactions along the 
campaign is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for vote buying. 
Although framed by a different context, Zarazaga’s (2014) findings of 
multitasking brokers suggest this pattern. In Chapter 4, I show records of 
callers reporting ‘unknown’ activists conducting targeting actions, 
suggesting no former contact between brokers and voters. This means that 
brokers develop and perform strategies mutually not exclusive. In this 
Chapter, all interviewees confirmed it, as a broker describes, 
[...] As a way to prove the work you’ve done and ensure the vote, 
we go to streets. During campaigns but sometimes much earlier, 
we gather electors’ information by hand, visiting householders. 
There are a few ways to do so. When we don’t have much 
information about the area [working as outsiders], we just knock 
doors to ask. You straightaway notice people’s mood, some of 
them don’t even open the door. But other occasions, [working as 
insiders] you’ve already got a clue about the area and you know 
some information about them; the mission is to confirm it in the 
lists and explore people’s attitudes [...]126 
 
Likewise, another account illustrates, 
[...] We have to canvass for the party by collecting people’s 
information. We ask for the voting card, voters just show them to 
us [...] then we take the essentials [such as] card’s number, 
elector’s full name and the registration code. Having done this, 
parties match those details with the full, updated electors national 
register they have to ensure you’re not lying. They check up on 
                                                        
126 Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), conducted in Buenavista, State of Mexico 
(Saturday, 3rd June 2017). 
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address, names and codes; afterwards, they give you the money 
and goods to hand them to voters [...]127 
 
Along this claim, a third narrative tells, 
[...] You’re asked to get some info. Basically, the one within the 
voting cards. They [parties] give you a piece of paper with gaps 
to fill. Guess they [parties] just want to be sure you’re doing the 
job right. Guys [brokers] sometimes take a picture of the voting 
card to have the info with them but I’ve met voters who feel 
uncomfortable letting you do so. I prefer to do it by hand on the 
spot, you have to double the work otherwise [...]128 
 
Exploring further the action of visiting householders, I asked brokers in 
particular about deliveries when compiling lists. The motivation behind this 
point arises from the interest of establishing the purposes of deliveries at 
several points of the race. Even though no interviewee denied the actions 
of distributing rewards during early stages of the campaign, ‘not all gifts and 
incentives are provided in exchange for votes switching their vote intention’ 
(Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016: 163). Instead, some goods are 
addressed explicitly, for example, to “break the ice” when residents have 
the visit. Brokers here suggest that rewards handed during campaign –and 
while before– are mainly allocated to encourage people to listen to them. 
Early dispensations do not necessarily replace vote-buying rewards. 
Instead, they meet particular needs such as attending rallies (Munoz 2014) 
or meetings. Interviewees emphasised the relevance of deliveries 
conducted at the culmination of race. The dispensation of goods, however, 
seems to be slightly different. Whereas handy goods such as bags of 
                                                        
127 Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 
19th May 2017). 
128 Anonymous interview with a broker (woman 2), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 
19th May 2017). 
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provisions, gift tokens amidst printed caps, t-shirts and other utensils are 
essentially managed earlier, cash and other major goods such as materials 
for construction are handed near the end of the race. Given that brokers 
might not know residents’ preferences when knocking doors, the fact of 
being ready to distribute some goods would suggest a strategy of double 
persuasion (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2009, Nichter 2008). As a 
couple of the broker states, 
[...] Yes, of course, we usually hand bits when knocking doors, 
householders wouldn’t even listen to you otherwise. But it’s more 
about the promises you make and the goods you give them later 
[...] These are the ones that make the difference [...] Also as we 
walk miles for a few days when filing the gaps [of the lists], you 
couldn’t be doing it as carrying a heavy load[...]129 
 
Similarly, another interviewee explains, 
[...] From time to time, we distribute bags of provisions and other 
goods as compiling lists, although the task is just to get the 
[voting cards’] information. You should manage to give [electors] 
something as long as it helps you to get the info but that’s just for 
breaking the ice since eventually we give them the treat [reward] 
for voting [for] us [...]130 
 
In addition, interviews here suggest that strategies of targeting do not get 
stopped but tailored and reshaped accordingly to the stages and needs of 
the campaign. Even though brokers might continue compiling lists up to a 
few days before polling day (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Mercado 
2013), they turn to other tactics. Some of the interviewees underlined the 
importance of having alternative plans mostly in competitive elections. Not 
exclusively but essentially, they focus on two activities, knocking doors with 
                                                        
129 Anonymous interview with a broker (a second man), conducted in Buenavista, the State of Mexico 
(Sunday, 4th June 2017). 
130 Anonymous interview with a broker (woman 2), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 
19th May 2017). 
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rewards in hands and approaching people on streets to get more votes. As 
one broker describes,  
[...] It depends on the case but almost the whole campaign, we’ve 
got to knock doors, I can tell; especially, knowing that we need 
more votes or when the others [parties] are getting more […] But 
as the Election Day comes, we turn to other measures. We go to 
streets to do business [target people] It’s riskier and tougher but 
sometimes it is necessary [...] On polling day, if we still need 
votes, we go to poorer places to make offers; this doesn’t let you 
down; obviously, you’ve got to bear with bumpy roads, long 
distances, nasty people and additionally, you’ve got to be ready 
to hand cash on the spot [...]131 
 
With regard to targeting strategies, another interviewee narrates, 
[...] Yes, once we’ve got our districts assigned, we don’t stop, we 
visit residents all the time [to compile lists]. Just to make sure. 
But, as polling days approach, we enhance measures. We ask 
directly in streets [make vote-buying offers] during the Election 
Day, just you need to have cash with you. When you show the 
money, even the most decent person starts thinking about it. 
Everybody has a price [...]132 
 
Overall, brokers begin targeting activities a while before the Election Day 
and perform legitimate campaign actions. They are helped by ordinary 
people. Parties assign legal activities to residents to support the campaign 
who have usually electoral background and experience in canvassing. 
Basically, representation and coordination are those duties for which parties 
need extra support. Brokers, on the other side, work autonomically and 
make their own decisions along the campaign. During the targeting stage, 
parties and brokers hold a series of meetings in which they both should 
agree on clientelistic strategies and their costs. By the time these meetings 
                                                        
131 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday 21st May 
2017). 
132 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala 
(Tuesday 23rd May 2017). 
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take place, parties have already estimated the number of votes they need 
to win the election and brokers have generated an idea about the sum of 
voters they can mobilise. Money, for buying votes and paying brokers’ fees, 
is the toughest item on the agenda. Once they both have agreed about rates 
and tactics, they turn to action.  
Brokers knock doors, proffering rewards as an exchange of votes. 
They compile lists of electors attracted to sell their vote; the compilation of 
lists is a method mostly employed in Mexico to estimate the number of 
voters that brokers expect to mobilise during the Election Day and it also 
proves the work they are doing in the ground. These findings are support 
previous studies (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Mercado 2013) for 
the 2012 Elections. But they provide more details about the intimacy of 
tough meeting between parties and brokers. Additionally, evidence provides 
insights about the use of voters’ personal details. By organising information 
of voters, brokers create a dataset, which can be accessed by any person 
to conduct further monitoring or targeting activities. Such argument 
contributes to the understanding of the idea about multitask brokers and 
provides an alternative explanation of how close ties between brokers and 
citizens work. The method of compilation of lists is consistently performed 
along the campaigns as it extends from a long time before the beginning of 





5.3 Closing Deals: The Distribution of Rewards and Mechanisms of 
Compliance 
 
Mercado (2013) suggests that another crucial operation begins near polling 
days to ensure two fundamental aspects, a final distribution of goods and 
the execution of mechanisms of compliance. The aim of this late distribution 
of rewards is to close vote-buying deals (Mustillo 2016). Electoral observers 
(Alianza Civica 2006, 2012) and journalistic133 reports have also denounced 
lorries transporting bags of provisions and sites employed as warehouses 
for stocking up goods near polling days. Such reports have equally 
addressed issues about activists carrying and distributing cash close to 
polling stations. Qualitative evidence from Thailand supports the timing of 
compensation. Some interviewees argue ‘[t]he night before the election is 
when most vote buying occurs. We call it the hound dog night’ […] ‘the vote 
buyer’s representative comes to talk with me before the election […] then 
the night before the election, the representative comes and gives me money 
and tells me what number I need to vote, [sometimes] one day before the 
election [or] in secret three days before the election’ (quoted by Owen 2013: 
261). Although all brokers interviewed here related experiences supporting 
this point, there are two particular accounts that describe it more precisely, 
[...] For the last week of the campaign, delegates must have 
“shelters” [warehouses] ready for receiving goods. Candidates’ 
staff manage to set up the distribution, which is usually sorted by 
lorry, van and car. Sometimes they [delegates] use their own 
sites but others they need to rent them. Storehouse’ locations are 
key as they have to be convenient for distributing goods or 
receiving electors to collect them […] For the 2011 Gubernatorial 
Elections in [the State] Guerrero, I was appointed as logistical 
                                                        
133 Milenio, ‘Destamtelan Bodegas con Despensa de Morena’, Thursday 1 June 2017, Politica, 
http://www.milenio.com/politica/elecciones-estado-mexico/naucalpan-despensas-propaganda-
operativo-elecciones-milenio-noticias-edomex_0_967103779.html (accessed on Sunday 4 June 
2017). 
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manager [laughs!] I got the best site ever. An enormous, very 
nice building with a play area [laughs!] [...] a big kitchen, 
appropriate dining and living rooms and a huge parking zone. All 
these sections in addition to the storage area, which let us stack 
about 10 thousand bags of provisions, a few tons of sacks of 
sugar, seeds, cement and other materials for construction, plus 
tens of crates with cash [...] Women were in the kitchen cooking 
meals [offered to electors after casting the vote], the dining room 
held up to 100 voters altogether during the Election Day. The 
“lobby” [laughs!] allowed those people collecting goods to queue 
discretely [...] Taxi drivers hired for ‘acarreo’134 parked cars just 
outside. It was just a paradise [...]135 
 
Likewise, a second broker narrates,  
[...] Between five and four days before polling days, we have to 
sort warehouses out to stock up the big delivery [...] These can 
be provisions, materials for construction, duvets or so, plus 
meals and drinks; it depends on the election, districts and deals 
you’ve made. We fill those [storehouses] at night as snoopy 
people can see you. As we roughly know the number and type of 
goods, you can reckon how many hands [people] you might need 
and how much time it’ll take to complete the job [...] There are 
occasions in which you have to deliver the goods by hand straight 
to the communities but you can also give the address to people 
for them to collect the goods after casting the vote. Again, that 
depends on deals and regions [...]. The thing is that we have to 
get everything ready for the big days [...]136 
 
Mercado (2013) argues that during polling days, brokers verify that those 
electors in lists do go to polls. To achieve it, delegates send brokers near 
polling stations with the lists previously compiled whereas brokers report 
periodically the status of such lists to delegates themselves and campaign’s 
                                                        
134 Acarreo is another strategy conducted by brokers during polling days. Some studies on electoral 
mobilisation (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016) emphasise that acarreo is not an external tactic 
from vote buying and turnout buying. Qualitative evidence from Argentina confirms such claim. 
Zarazaga (2014: 34) explain ‘[b]rokers also provide transportation on election days to ensure that 
resource recipients turn out to vote. During the 2009 election, brokers in San Miguel hired everyone 
in the area who had a car. They gave them US$15 and coupons for gas to drive people to the polls 
[…] Even though brokers invest in mobilizing their own followers […], they use this as a 
complementary rather than an alternative strategy to vote buying in order to harvest every single vote 
in which they have invested. Also, evidence from Mexico City (Hilgers 2011: 577) supports the hiring 
mechanism, ‘politicians hire buses to transport citizens to the polls (an operation known as acarreo). 
135 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico 
(Sunday, 18th June 2017). 
136 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 21st May 
2017). 
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staff. Brokers set around polling stations tick names of voters as they turn 
out. Such activity has been confirmed by ethnographic work (Hagene 2015: 
149) conducted in a borough in Mexico City for the 2006 Presidential 
Elections, which states ‘[o]utside one of [the polling stations] I struck up a 
conversation with Juan, an informant who was ticking off people on a list’. 
The status of the lists is essential for parties to perform, if it is the case, 
further strategies of mobilisation to make more voters turn out. Therefore, 
such active flow of information is vital for making decisions. Some interviews 
conducted here substantiate these claims. As a broker narrates, 
[...] Brothers hanging around voting booths confirm [that] electors 
[in lists] have shown up and, occasionally, they also might verify 
the sense of their vote [conduct mechanisms of compliance] but 
it’s risky since people can report you to police; it really depends 
on the case [...] After ticking their names, electors get rewards. 
[...]137 
 
Along these lines, another broker describes, 
[...] We stick around polling stations all day to check who’s cast 
the vote. Once they [electors] go out from the voting booth, we 
cross the name [...] We’ve got to report the progress every half 
an hour or so [...] This duty is quite important, if we don’t do it 
well, it can cause a shamble [...]138 
 
Finally, a third broker’s account narrates, 
[...] Our duties don’t conclude with the visits [compilation of lists], 
we have to corroborate that voters seal the deal [...] Just to track 
those lazy people [...] But we don’t do everything; we’re very busy 
businessmen [laughs!], sometimes we do but other occasions, 
delegates send other bros to do so [tick names] It’s very boring 
and slow, I’ve got to say [...]139 
 
                                                        
137 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Pedro Tultepec, State of Mexico 
(Sunday, 10th June 2017). 
138 Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City 
(Tuesday, 6th June 2017). 
139 Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), conducted in Buenavista, State of Mexico 
(Saturday, 3rd June 2017). 
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Violating the secrecy of the ballot represents an alternative explanation to 
those approaches based on norms of solidarity and reciprocity (Lawson & 
Greene 2014, Finan & Schechter 2012) since brokers not relying on voters’ 
loyalty, should develop mechanisms to ensure compliance (Nichter 2014). 
Literature (Serra 2016, Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013) and electoral 
observation organisations (Alianza Civica 2012) have supported the use of 
two main tactics in Mexico, the so-called “little hawks” to attest electors’ 
choice and voters taking photos of the ballot paper marked. Whereas 
evidence collected in Chapter 4 confirmed both actions, brokers here 
acknowledged to having exclusively conducted the latter. However, some 
of them admitted to having heard about the “little hawks” system. The 
mechanism entails brokers hiring children, with parental consent, in order 
to accompany voters into the booth to corroborate voters’ mark on the ballot 
paper. Given that these tactics are performed all parties, compliance 
systems become crucial for each party to ensure the expected number of 
votes. As some brokers’ accounts describe, 
[...] Not sure, but I think since 2006, once you encourage voters 
to work with you [agree with vote-buying deals], I ask them to 
take a photo of the ballot as casting the vote. At the beginning, 
we used to handle pocket cameras to do so but now, thanks to 
technology, handsets with cameras are the cheapest quickest 
and most effective way [...] At the current time, almost everybody 
owns a smartphone but with poor, old or novice electors who 
don’t have mobiles or don’t know how to use them, we provide 
such gadgets and they give them back to us with the photo in 
there afterwards; a bit riskier [...] Although police officers and 
electoral authorities [EMBs] have tried to prohibit electors from 
using mobiles when casting the vote, they haven’t got it. It’s a 
madness, can you imagine not letting people using phones [...]140 
 
                                                        
140 Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), conducted in Buenavista, State of Mexico 
(Saturday, 3rd June 2017). 
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Along these lines, another broker states, 
[...] Parties push us to do it. It’s okay, they need evidence [about 
the votes obtained], fair enough [...] Voter must take a photo of 
the ballot paper [marked] if they want to receive the reward, 
otherwise, they don’t get anything [...] They don’t moan about 
that as they know it. That’s part of the deal. Some colleagues 
[brokers] keep the photo for a few months in the mobile, just in 
case, but I think it’s quite risky, if police or other parties find it, 
you might be in troubles [...]141 
 
Likewise, a third broker states, 
[...] Before, everything was based on trust but now, mobiles 
phones help us out [...] We can ask voters to prove the way they 
voted, with a photo [of the ballot paper marked] taken inside the 
polling booth and that’s it! [...] When taking the photo, I usually 
ask voters to hold a personal item as showing the ballot paper 
and make the folio number visible; just to be sure they are the 
ones in the photo. Sometimes we’re required to show all the set 
of photos [to delegates] but not all the time. When you’ve got to 
do everything [compliance mechanisms and distribute rewards], 
voters can delete the photo once they show you the proof. I’ve 
heard about some bros using children, who walk with voters 
inside the [polling] booth to attest the sense of the vote but it’s 
risky and inefficient since they have to get changed a few times 
every hour to not be caught by polling station officers or other 
people. I haven’t done it, though [...]142 
 
 
Another strategy brokers perform during the Election Day (Mercado 2013) 
entails the three activities altogether, targeting, buying and compliance. 
These tactics are more strategies of mobilisation (Larreguy, Marshall & 
Querubin 2016) contingent upon voting needs. Basically, as a result of the 
constant flow of information coming from brokers located near polling 
stations, parties assess the overall status of voting. When the status is not 
fulfilling original expectations, they decide to set up such strategy as the last 
                                                        
141 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala 
(Tuesday, 23rd May 2017). 
142 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 20th May 
2017). 
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chance. Despite the fact that parties begin to plan it before polling days, the 
main targeting criteria of selecting areas are essentially depravation and 
poverty (Jensen & Justesen 2014). Once parties decide to deploy brokers 
to regions, these go out with cash in hands ready to target, buy voters 
(Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013) and ensure compliance. Such 
operation encompasses random targeting actions in streets. Brokers 
approach voters as walking presumably towards polling stations. Based 
upon accounts here, the largest amount of money given by the brokers to 
buy votes has been during polling days and within this operation. Such 
activity is essentially deployed in competitive contests or under scenarios of 
uncertainty (Mercado 2013). All brokers interviewed here relate experiences 
of this operation; four particular accounts, however, tell more precisely, 
[...] Bosses decide whether we go to other places during polling 
days. I’ve done it a few times [...] We first go to HQ to collect the 
money and receive more instructions but there’s no science 
rather than going to the poorest areas to offer cash to people in 
streets [...]143 
 
Additionally, another account tells, 
[...] Sometimes you’ve got to take further actions [vote buying] to 
encourage voters on the Election Day. Going there [selected 
regions], if required, very effective though. Well, as long as you 
select the right district you might increase you support [...]144 
 
A broker who claims to have worked as a delegate in several elections 
confirms, 
[...] Assessing the status of the voting, we might decide to take 
other actions. Roughly speaking, we send members of the team 
working on the ground to specific regions to persuade more 
                                                        
143 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico 
(Sunday, 16th June 2017). 
144 Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City 
(Sunday, 16th June 2017). 
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people on streets [...] I’m not proud of it but it always works out 
within poor places [...] Sometimes, getting the areas it’s tough but 
effective [...]145 
 
Likewise, another broker narrates [...] Depending on how things are going 
on election days, we might be sent to push electors a bit more to specific 
areas; obviously, with incentives in hand [cash] just for them to make an 
effort [...]146 Finally, a fourth broker explains, 
[...] On some occasions, polling days can be annoying. Bosses 
change their mind and we switch our duties. I remember a few 
times in which I was sent to persuade electors on streets when I 
supposed to be handing bits or doing something else at the HQ 
[...]147 
 
Overall, a noticeable mobilisation constituted of a final distribution of goods 
and the implementation of mechanisms of compliance, takes place near and 
during polling days. Late handlings of rewards are primarily addressed to 
close vote-buying deals agreed during campaigns between brokers and 
voters. Sites storing goods and money as well as lorries transporting such 
goods are essentially employed near polling days to ensure the success of 
the mobilisation. During the Election day, brokers return to lists gathered 
during campaigns to supervise what voters have turned out. Delegates send 
teams of brokers near polling stations with the lists; brokers have two duties, 
ticking voters’ names and report the status of the turnout periodically to 
parties. Brokers also perform compliance mechanisms to ensure that 
electors have marked correctly the ballot papers. Essentially, they employ 
two activities, the so-called “little hawks” and photos taken inside the polling 
                                                        
145 Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 23rd May 
2017). 
146 Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 
19th May 2017). 
147 Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), conducted in Buenavista, State of Mexico 
(Saturday, 3rd June 2017). 
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booth. Finally, brokers target and buy voters on streets during election days 
once parties have assessed the status of the election in a negative way. 





Brokerage networks play a fundamental role in the success of the process 
of targeting, buying and complying with vote buying. In Mexico, brokers 
have developed two main pyramidal structures, a long-term, reciprocal, 
personal, affective and a short-term contingent, voluntary, opportunistic 
one. On top, high-level politicians, government officials or candidates make 
decisions and have access to resources, in the middle influential, local 
leaders work as delegates to fulfil coordination tasks, on the bottom, brokers 
and party activists meet ground duties. The first structure relies on close 
bonds and material benefits and it is constituted of a) well-known, 
charismatic, local leaders, b) corrupted, powerful, local leaders, and c) 
violent, criminal regional groups. The other structure is more volatile, and it 
is developed to meet concrete purposes; it is based on itinerant, anonymous 
contingent networks. 
Brokers on the ground begin to conduct targeting activities before the 
campaign to explore voters’ political preferences and attitudes towards 
parties; therefore, to estimate the number of votes the will get. They also 
meet legitimate campaign duties with ordinary people alongside. Brokers 
are autonomous and make their own decisions at different points of the 
race. Within the targeting stage, parties and brokers sustain numerous 
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meetings to discuss clientelistic strategies and rates per vote amidst other 
aspects; they also achieve an agreement about the number of votes needed 
to win the election. Money to buy votes and pay brokers’ fees is the toughest 
item on the agenda of these meetings. 
The compilation of lists is the most common method of targeting to 
buy votes in Mexico. Since brokers knock doors to proffer rewards as an 
exchange of votes, they write down personal information of voters willing to 
sell their vote. Most of the data come from voting cards, which is eventually 
matched with the information of the national register of electors. By 
gathering and organising the information of voters, parties implement 
monitoring activities. Compiling lists of electors is consistently performed by 
brokers from a long time before campaigns up to a few days before the 
Election Day. 
A brokerage mobilisation takes place near polling days, constituted 
of a final distribution of rewards and the implementation of mechanisms of 
compliance. Late handlings of goods and money are primarily addressed to 
close vote-buying deals agreed between brokers and voters during the 
targeting stage. Sites storing such goods and cash as well as lorries 
transporting them are essentially employed to ensure the success of the 
mobilisation. During the Election day, delegates send teams of brokers near 
polling stations with the lists; brokers supervise that those voters targeted 
are turning out by ticking voters’ names and report the status of the turnout 
periodically to parties. On polling days, brokers also perform compliance 
mechanisms to ensure that electors have marked correctly the ballot 
papers. Essentially, they turn to two activities, the so called “little hawks” 
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and photos taken inside the polling booth. Finally, once parties have 
assessed negatively the status of the election, brokers go to streets to target 
and buy voters during election days. Brokers go mostly to poor and deprived 
places with cash in hands to persuade more voters. 
Consistent with previous research, in this Chapter I have offered 
some answers about how brokers and parties organise the operations to 
buy votes, the mechanisms employed to target voters, deliver benefits and 
enforce compliance. Additionally, I provide evidence about brokers’ 
incentive to conduct these tasks and the way the assign roles. Advancing 
research on clientelistic networks, this Chapter contributes to the qualitative 
literature by offering narratives from brokers working in the ground about 
the particular methods for buying votes in Mexico. Having investigated 
citizens and brokers’ perspective about vote-buying, some questions are 
still unanswered. What is the extent of the problem? What are the effects of 










Chapter 6. Vote Buying, Voting Choices and Parties 






My two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation (i.e. targeting and buying, 
Section 2.3, Chapter 2), has offered an alternative theoretical framework to 
analyse evidence emerging from phone call reports on vote buying and 
interviews with brokers. Given that parties compete for voters with vote-
buying strategies, my model assumes that as competing parties, voters are 
likely to be exposed to more than one offer, which they assess, and then 
make a choice. Different from traditional views of clientelistic strategies of 
mobilisations, my two-stage model suggests that voters are able to select 
one amongst several vote-buying offers but also, to reject these deals. This 
assumption is strong and hard to address but underpins two distinct 
scenarios. First, even though electors can enter into a vote-buying 
transaction, the fact of selecting one amongst multiple offers implies that 
they might have rejected at least a vote-buying deal. Therefore, although 
voting choices eventually respond to vote buying, not all the tactics 
conducted were successful. Second, the two-stage model understands vote 
buying as a process (see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2), in which the transition from 
targeting to buying focuses on voters’ decisions rather than tactics of 
parties. The model then opens up the possibility of finding democratic voters 
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who reject vote-buying offers. It is unlikely that all those electors who get 
targeted automatically seal the deal.  
How does this two-stage model work for examining evidence? In 
Chapter 4, I assess thousands of calls reporting vote buying from across 
Mexico. Although the National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes is an 
unconventional source for research, it provides prolific quotes from targeted 
individuals and eyewitnesses to vote buying. Results confirm my conceptual 
distinction between targeting and buying. Parties’ activists can begin to 
target electors from a long time before polling days. There are thousands of 
reports on activists proffering benefits to electors as an exchange for votes, 
compiling as well lists of voters tempted to enter vote-buying deals. 
However, despite hundreds of reports on deliveries along the campaign, the 
number of calls reporting vote buying near the Election Day is considerably 
higher (see Figure 4.2) than weeks earlier. This finding suggests that the 
second stage of my model of vote-buying mobilisation is crucial for parties 
to monitor turnout and voting behaviour. In addition, despite the variety of 
goods proffered during campaigns, the most prevalent benefits reported are 
bags of provisions, money and materials for construction, which confirms 
claims about excludable, tangible and personal rewards in vote-buying 
exchanges (see Chapter 2). 
In Chapter 5, I report results of the semi-structured interviews with 
brokers. Equally, the set of questions about strategies, during targeting and 
buying phases, is based on my two-stage model. Accounts confirm my 
model. Targeting entail activities in the ground; brokers knocking doors and 
exploring voting preferences after agreements with parties. The compilation 
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of lists seems to be the most performed method of targeting as it serves for 
proving parties the job done and counting the number of potential voters. 
Buying tactics to close deals entail a massive distribution of benefits. Near 
polling days parties mobilise resources and brokers. Such deliveries are 
sometimes matched with the lists compiled earlier. On election days brokers 
also conduct mechanism to ensure compliance, entailing photos of the 
ballot paper marked and children walking with voters inside the booth to 
attest the sense of the vote. Another interesting finding in Chapter 5 is the 
constitution of brokers’ structures and networks to perform targeting and 
buying activities. In addition to confirming traditional structures found in 
clientelism, accounts shown provide evidence about a more volatile, short-
term structures built to fulfil specific tasks in elections. In Mexico, vote 
buying is sustained with two pyramidal structures, long and short-term. They 
consist of high-level politicians or government officials at the top, influential 
local leaders or parties’ delegates in the middle and brokers and activists 
on the bottom.  
Research questions of this dissertation involved the three elements 
of vote buying as voters, parties’ activists and voting choices at polls. What 
are the effects of vote buying on voting choices in Mexico? Do outcomes of 
elections respond to vote buying? Why do parties perform such practices if 
they are not successful? Why do electors do engage in it? In order to answer 
each question, I use a mixed-method research design. Methodological 
decisions about techniques for answering each question respond to former 
studies using, for example, interviews to investigate on brokers and political 
elites (Auerbach 2016, Zarazaga 2014, Owen 2013, Szwarcberg 2010, 
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Schedler & Manriquez 2004), surveys to measure the incidence of vote 
buying (UNDP 2006, Stokes 2005, Brusco et al 2004, Speck & Abramo 
2002, 2001), and innovative, unconventional techniques (Meng 2001, 
Sherman et al 1992) to examine how individuals face illegal or socially 
undesirable experiences. Thus, I conduct three methods, semi-structured 
interviews, assessment of thousands of reports on vote buying and a 
nationally representative experiment. 
Having discussed qualitative evidence on strategies of parties to 
target voters and mechanisms to enforce compliance in the previous 
Chapter, I now present empirical evidence testing how vote buying affects 
voting behaviour. Given that parties’ tactics near and during polling days are 
crucial to close vote-buying arrangements, this analysis focuses 
predominantly on the mobilisation of parties during this final stage. In 
addition, assuming that vote buying differs from turnout buying in targeting 
electors against or indifferent to parties (Nichter 2008), this study assesses 
voters switching choices near polling days. In order to test these aspects, I 
conduct an alternative method an unobtrusive technique called LISTIT. This 
chapter aims to determine whether switching voting choices respond to this 
last encounter with activists. Results contribute to a renewed debate about 
the effectiveness of vote buying (Greene 2016). 
The Chapter is organised in the following way. I first show the 
methodological design and data collection by discussing the advantages 
and shortcomings of the method for studying vote buying, the justification of 
control questions and the selection of the case. Second, I show results by 
discussing relevant descriptive statistics, assessing initial tests and 
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conducting regression tests. I fourthly discuss results with other studies and 
present some conclusions. 
 




As I have discussed (see Chapter 2), vote buying has a propensity to social 
desirability. In order to reduce such error, following a growing area of 
experiments (Gonzalez, De-Jonge & Meseguer 2017, Greene 2016, 
Carkoglu & Aytac 2015, De Jonge 2015, Gonzalez et al 2014, Corstange 
2012, Gonzalez 2012), I employ an alternative variation of an unobtrusive 
measurement technique called List-experiment. Scholars have used the 
technique to reduce people’s incentives to hide the truth. The method 
assumes that if a sensitive topic is asked anonymously and confidentially, 
respondents have more incentives to offer a truthful response, mitigating 
then underreporting. Political scientists first employed this method to explain 
racial prejudice (Kuklinski et al 1997, Kuklinski, Cobb & Gilens 1997) but 
also, they have studied other sensitive themes as religion (Kane, Craig & 
Wald 2004). Indeed, a particular study has already proven that the 
instrument works well by testing vote buying and social desirability bias 
(Gonzalez et al 2012). The analysis asks directly, indirectly and embeds the 
experiment in a nationally presentative survey in Nicaragua.  
 The method works as follows, a sample is split into two groups, the 
control and treatment. Respondents from control group receive a list of non-
sensitive items, whereas those from the treatment group receive the same 
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list with the sensitive item added. Since the treatment group has one more 
option to choose, the difference in means test is bounded between 0 and 1 
and represents the proportion of respondents from the treatment group 
admitting the sensitive item, they, 
[A]re asked to tell the interviewer how many of the listed items 
they do/believe, and specifically not which items they are. 
Treatment group respondents, meanwhile, receive the same list 
as the control group, plus one more item that measures a 
sensitive topic, and receive the same instructions. Respondent 
anonymity is assured transparently because no one, not even the 
interviewer or analyst, can know whether or not a treatment 
group respondent’s answer included or excluded the sensitive 
item (Corstange 2009: 48). 
 
 
For instance, if the average number of items self-reported by the control 
group is 2.60 and one indicated by the treatment group is 2.75, we deduct 
that 15% of respondents admitted the sensitive item (2.75 – 2.60 = 0.15, 
and 0.15∗100 = 15%). Thus, if the sensitive item does not occur, we would 
expect no difference in the mean of items reported by each group. Also, the 
technique works with three main assumptions, i) randomisation of the 
treatment group, ii) no design effect, and iii) no liar for any respondent. 
However, list experiments have some problems. The data analysis is 
limited, the technique lacks multivariate regression estimators and the 
design hinders statistical analysis of characteristics of respondents who 
admitted the sensitive items. Glynn (2013) argue that limitations lie in the 
three aspects, the size of the sample –which determines the precision of the 
method–, there is no individual answer for a standard analysis, and the 
ceiling/floor effects. 
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In order to solve some of analytical restrictions, Blair & Imai (2012: 
49) ‘move beyond the standard difference-in-means analysis by developing 
new multivariate regression estimators under various designs of list 
experiments’. Authors argue that this method, called LISTIT, provides 
researchers with tools to examine who is more likely to answer sensitive 
items affirmatively. In this alternative method, there is no change in the 
procedure for the treatment group; however, respondents in the control 
group are asked to evaluate each item as a binomial process ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
By asking each of the items in the list individually to respondents in the 
control group, we can estimate the values of their corresponding covariates 
among the respondents in the treatment group. Guided by Blair & Imai 
(2012), I conduct this alternative version called LISTIT but, I employ this 
method to test one of the control items (see The Phrase of Timing within the 
Sensitive Question below). Carkoglu & Aytac (2015) have tested a LISTIT 
technique for studying vote buying in the 2011 Turkish Parliamentary 
Elections. By testing the ICT against the direct question on vote buying, 
authors find that whereas 35% of the people admitted being targeted 
through LISTIT, 16% acknowledged the exposition when asked directly. 
Mexico provides significant insight into the renewed debate on vote 
buying. Mexican politics works with strong party’s organisation, Mexican 
voters are highly familiarised with clientelistic exchanges and electoral 
reforms have encouraged personal interactions between politicians and 
voters. As I have argued in Chapter 3, Mexican parties and governments 
have traditionally delivered clientelistic benefits to individuals and social 
groups. At first, such distribution was addressed to win loyalty to the regime 
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but as opposition parties began to gain more spaces locally and federally, 
this distribution reshaped its forms, methods and objectives. Mexican 
citizens, on the other hand, have also got used to receive benefits from 
politicians, particularly during campaigns. Mexicans cope with promises of 
goods, policies, programmes and infrastructure plans most of the time. As 
a result, Mexico has developed a strong parties’ organisation to ease 
clientelistic politics, what scholars have studied as machine politics or 
political machines (Larreguy, Montiel & Querubin 2017, Hidalgo & Nichter 
2016, Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Schaffer & Baker 2015, Lawson & 
Greene 2014, Zarazaga 2014, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2014, 
Nichter 2008, Hilgers 2008, 2005, Stokes 2005). In addition, constitutional 
electoral reforms have pursued principles of democratic pluralism, fairness 
and equality; however, such changes have set appropriate circumstances 
for vote buying to succeed. For example, whereas the restriction of access 
to TV and Radio has given more control to electoral authorities over parties’ 
spending audit, it has forced them to develop more strategies in the ground 
contacting electors personally. It has been proven (Hagene 2015, Hilgers 
2008, 2005) that face-to-face interaction enhances clientelistic ties. 
Therefore, theoretical discussion and research design might be extensive 
to those political systems with strong political machines, particularly in the 
Latin-American region. Finally, this analysis contributes to recent 
experimental evidence on vote buying in Mexico (Greene 2016, De-Jonge 
2015, Nichter & Plamer Rubin 2014), which has re-opened the debated 
about the success of this strategy. 
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 Based on the discussion and review of vote buying in Chapter 2 (i.e. 
its defining attributes, its distinct conceptual aspects from clientelism and 
patronage, and the implications on empirical research), I design the LISTIT 
instrument satisfying two conditions. First, the wording of the sensitive item, 
emphasising two factors, the timing and a consummated exchange. 
Therefore, I include explicitly ‘Near the Election Day’. This methodological 
decision is also based on the second phase of my two-stage model (see 
Figure 2.1, Chapter 2) and the prohibition of performing canvassing and 
electioneering three days before the Election Day in Mexico (see Section 
3.4, Chapter 3). Second, I include the action of receiving rather than 
proffering. The fact of offering goods to voters during campaigns illustrates 
targeting but not necessarily a consummated action of vote buying. I ask 
explicitly ‘they gave you money or a gift for you to vote for a candidate or 
party’. 
 I set then the procedure in the following way, after dividing randomly 
the sample into two groups, I expose respondents in each group to two 
different cards. The treatment group received a card asking the sensitive 
item in third place as follows 
A card of various activities will be hand out, and I would like you 
to tell me if candidates or activists carried them out during the 
last Presidential campaign (the one in which Enrique Peña Nieto 
won the presidency). Please, DO NOT TELL ME WHICH ONES, 
ONLY HOW MANY. 
• They visited your home to talk to someone; 
• They put up campaign posters or signs in your 
neighbourhood/city; 
• Near the Election Day, they gave you money or a gift for 
you to vote for a specific candidate or a political party. 
• They broadcasted campaign advertisements on radio or 
television; 
• They communicated you in detail their candidates’ 
manifesto. 
 




The control group, in contrast, received another card with the list of the non-
sensitive items with simple options of “yes” / “no” as follows, a card of 
various activities will be hand out, and I would like you to tell me which ones 
candidates or activists carried them out during the last Presidential electoral 
campaign (the one in which Enrique Peña Nieto won the presidency). To 
overcome social desirability bias, instead of reading the list of items (as 
conducted by Greene 2016, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015), the interviewers gave 
to respondents of both treatment and control groups the cards for them to 
read it and then report their answers. 
There is a limitation. The wording of the sensitive item phrasing ‘near 
the election day’ has not been tested in this Mexico. However, there is a 
study technique on vote buying using ICT in the Philippines (2013) 
demonstrates the effects of a similar wording. The examination focuses on 
the incidence of vote buying on polling days. Therefore, the experiment sets 
explicitly the phrase of timing in the overall question, [h]ere are some things 
that can happen to people during election day. How many of these things 
happened to you? You don’t have to tell us which things happened, just how 
many [...]. (cited in footnote 20, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015: 14). And the 
sensitive item is worded as follow, [d]id Someone Offered you Money for 
your Vote? Despite the fact that the study offers insights about sensitivity of 
respondents to the phrase of during the election day,  
 I elaborate a set of four non-sensitive items based on Glynn (2013). 
I first ask two items to avoid too much low-variance, one very likely and 
another very unlikely to occur. With this decision, I expect to balance the 
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ceiling/floor effects. These items were placed second (campaign poster or 
signs in the neighbourhood) and last (candidates’ manifesto in detail) on 
both cards. In Mexico, posters and signs in streets during campaigns are 
very common strategies, in particular, after restricting parties the access to 
media broadcasting (see Section 3.4, Chapter 3).148 In contrast, parties and 
candidates struggle to communicate their manifesto effectively during 
campaigns.149 It is very unlikely that citizens know parties’ proposals in 
detail. This idea also relates to those claims of democratic disconnections 
between politicians and citizens (Serra 2012). It has been argued that during 
campaigns debates focus on mutual accusations rather discussing 
manifestos and public policies.150  Secondly, I set two more non-sensitive 
items based on media and personal strategies of communication. During 
elections, politicians conduct ground and air tactics. The ground refers to 
activists visiting electors, knocking doors, whereas air refers to broadcasting 
messages on radio and television. There are some reasons to conduct one 
tactic over the other, but it usually depends on the contest and particular 
conditions of the area (i.e. restricted access to areas with adverse 
geographical conditions versus restrictive access to electric energy to watch 
and listen to TV and radio). Air strategies are rather important for 
                                                        
148 The fact of stuffing streets with political advert is indeed a problem in crowded cities since no 
politician accomplishes placing regulations, and additionally, removing these stuffs after elections 
implies high costs. Exclésior, ‘Propaganda política invade las calles’, Sunday 26 April 2015, 
Elecciones D.F., http://www.excelsior.com.mx/comunidad/2015/04/26/1020808 (accessed on 
Wednesday 13 July 2016). 
149 Formato Siete, ‘Carecen de propuestas las campañas de candidatos a gobernador: Ventura’ 
Thursday 14 April 2016, Veracruz, http://formato7.com/2016/04/14/carecen-propuestas-las-
campanas-candidatos-gobernador-ventura/ (accessed on Thursday 14 July 2016). 
150 El Financiero, ‘Hubo campañas sin propuestas ni diagnósticos, critica Córdova’, Friday 3 June 
2016, http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/hubo-campanas-sin-propuestas-ni-diagnosticos-
critica-cordova.html (accessed on Thursday 14 July 2016). 
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campaigns. It is usual for parties to broadcast messages.151 Parties also 
develop ground strategies to interact with electors, especially in those 
remote precincts, whose access to media is limited. As a result, I elaborate 
two non-sensitive items asking whether, during campaigns, activists visited 
households to talk to someone; and if they broadcasted campaign 
advertisements on radio or television. 
To overcome problems of negative correlation, I worded the non-
sensitive items avoiding mutual exclusion. They can concur at any time 
during campaigns up to polling days. Finally, the decision about the number 
of items in both, the treatment and the control groups, responds to Glynn 
(2013) and Tsuchiya, Hirai & Ono (2007) arguments regarding the risks of 




In addition to embedding the LISTIT in a nationally representative survey, I 
included two control questions. Both are based on two particular features of 
a vote-buying transaction, rewarding switching voters and interacting with 
activists to close the deal. Firstly, to test the effects of vote buying on voting 
behaviour, I develop a three-choice question, asking respondents which of 
these suited better their own experience. I worded the question and answers 
as follows, 
                                                        
151  Official reports confirm that for the 2015 Midterm Federal Elections, around 1.6 thousand 
broadcasters transmitted more than 23.1 million political spots across the country from January to 
June. Informe de resultados del monitoreo del primer semestre de 2015, INE, 
http://ife.org.mx/archivos3/portal/historico/recursos/IFE-v2/DEPPP/DEPPP-
MonitoreodeMedios/2015/inf_monitoreo_1er_sem_2015.pdf (accessed on Thursday 10 December 
2015). 
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Regardless of what party you voted, could you tell me which of 
the following statements you would say suits better your own 
experience? 
• I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day, 
and I DID VOTE for that option 
• I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day, 
but I DID NOT VOTE for that option 
• I had made NO choice BEFORE the Election Day 
• DK/Prefer not to say 
 
 
There is a consideration to note; the analysis focuses on switching voting 
decisions. As a result, I intentionally omit party’ names from these questions 
to reduce external effects. In addition, I set the wording in two stages, the 
final voting choice versus a preference previously chosen. 
 Second, based on my two-stage model of the vote-buying strategy 
of mobilisation and the qualitative evidence discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
I assume that interactions of party’s activists with voters a few days before 
and during polling days is crucial to seal vote-buying deals. Literature has 
agreed that timing a defining attribute that distinguishes vote buying from 
other clientelistic exchanges (Nichter 2014). For example, a study in Taiwan 
(Wang & Kurzman 2007) shows that successful electoral mobilisations to 
buy votes occurs during the Election Day. Also, evidence the Philippines 
shows that ‘[m]ost of the vote-buying occurs in the last few days before the 
election’ (Hicken et al 2015: 352). Additionally, based on electoral 
observers’ reports, another study demonstrates ‘that vote buying occurs in 
the days before the election and that candidates and their brokers can re-
target vote buying quickly’ (Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015: 14). As a result, 
the second control quesiton assumes that this interaction between activists 
and voters is addressed to close transactions of rewards and votes. 
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Therefore, I ask respondents whether during the Election Day any activist 
contacted them. The assumption that sustains this question is that the 
reason activists contact voters during polling days is to close vote-buying 
deals. 
In order to estimate effects of the interaction between activists and 
electors during the Election Day and along the campaign, I employ the first 
non-sensitive item of the ICT (i.e. during the last Presidential campaign [...] 
I would like you to tell me if candidates or activists visited your home to talk 
to someone) as control variable (see The Phrase of Timing within the 
Sensitive Question below). 
The designs included another variable such as party identification. 
The question asked respondents to indicate the name of the party and the 
magnitude of their identification between two options such as ‘strongly 
identified’ and ‘slightly identified’. Overall, respondents were given 20 
options to choose (see the Spanish version of questions, 6.1 Survey 
Technical Report). Finally, guided by empirical studies analysing the 
relationship between demographics and vote buying (Jensen & Justesen 
2014, Justesen & Bjørnskov 2014, Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Balafoutas 2011, 
Bratton 2008), I test predictors such as age, gender and education level. 
 There are a few aspects of the research design that can undermine 
the results. First, after modelling list experiments using LISTIT, Corstange 
(2009) has confirmed the limitations of this technique associated with the 
size of the sample. The simulations conducted show that using LISTIT with 
fewer than 1000 cases might lessen its explanatory power. The size of this 
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sample is constituted of 800 cases; therefore, this study is located in the 
bottom borderline. 
 Second, by asking differently to respondents, the list of items 
between the treatment and control groups (how many versus which ones), 
interviewees from the latter might over-report values. Both groups of 
respondents received the card, read the items and reported the answer. 
This procedure suggests that people in the control group can read more 
carefully the list of items since the question is which ones. Conversely, it 
might be the case that people in the treatment group could read more 
carelessly the items because the question states how many. Nevertheless, 
further tests are required to confirm these potential explanations. 
 Third, the wording of the sensitive item is different compared to other 
list experiments on vote buying (Greene 2016, Çarkoğlu & Aytaç 2015, De 
Jonge 2015, González-Ocantos et al 2012). I specified more the vote-
buying exchange, restricted the action to the Election Day, and removed the 
clientelistic factor (favours). As a result, respondents in the treatment group 




I gathered 11 variables divided into three categories as demographics, 
politics-related and experiment-related (see Table 6.1).152 Demographics 
                                                        
152  I embedded an alternative version of list-experiment LISTIT, in a face-to-face, nationally 
representative survey, conducted by Defoe, within the period 11-13 April 2015; including 800 cases. 
The survey employed a multistage random sample with 300 final sampling points (segments), 
including an average of 2-3 respondents per segment. Sampling proceeds as follows, the sample is 
framed by selecting electoral districts with proportional probability to each size of the states (32). The 
questionnaire was applied to one adult (18+) per household, randomly selected, with a valid voting 
id and chosen by the last birthday date. For full details, see Appendix 6.1 Survey Technical Report. 
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are constituted of gender, age education and household income. Politics-
related variables are constituted of party identification, contacting electors 
and first versus final people’s choice. The table also shows the list of items 
presented to the control group for the list experiment. 
 
Table 6. 1 Summary of Variables Gathered 
Variable N 
Demographics 4 
1. Gender (Male=1 / Female=2 / DK=9)  
2. Age (18-99 / DK=9)  
3. Education (None=1 / P=2 / S=3 / PS=4 / T=5 / DK=9)*  
4. Household income Mx (-$1500=1 / $1501-$3000=2 / $3001- $6000 = 
3 / $6001-$12000=4 / 12000+=5 / DK=9)  
Politics-related 3 
1. Party identification (Strongly/Slightly for each party=1-20 / DK=9)  
2. Electors contacted during the Election Day (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)  
3. First versus final choice (Did=1 / Did Not=2 / No choice=3 / DK=9)  
Experiment-related (Control Group) 4 
1. Visiting households (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)  
2. Campaign posters or signs (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)  
3. Broadcasting advert (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)  
4. Communicating manifestos (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)  
Total 11 
Notes: 
* P = Primary (Some high school or less); S = Secondary (High School); PS=Post-
secondary and non-tertiary education (Some college; trade and technical education); T = 




I first explore the reliability of the four non-sensitive items (control group), 
which worked moderately well. The frequencies (see Appendix 6.3 
Experiment Related) show that more than a half (55%) of the respondents 
admitted to seeing posters or signs around their neighbourhoods, whereas 
less than 20% of the people admitted to knowing candidates’ manifesto in 
detail. The other items measuring the field and air strategies of campaigning 
report similar values. Around 25% of the respondents reported being visited 
by activists at home, whereas nearly 60% acknowledged listened to or 
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watching party’s advert on radio or television during campaigns. 
Unexpectedly, this value was higher than the posters or signs around 
neighbourhoods. The lower value of the posters and signs compared to the 
radio and television may cause floor effects, especially in combination with 
non-experimental items and demographics. 
Preliminary results of the control questions (see Appendix 6.4 
Control Questions) show that more than 20% of the respondents changed 
their first choice the Election Day. As there is no similar measure to 
compare, I may say the result is higher than I could expect. Likewise, 
surprisingly, 15% of the whole sample admitted being contacted by activists 
during the Election Day. Although a very basic test, this result is consistent 
with other recent estimations of vote-buying targeting in Mexico (De-Jonge 
2015: 14%). Frequencies and distributions of the demographics (see 
Appendix 6.2 Demographics) are consistent with official national data.153 
 In addition, I conduct a preliminary cross tabulation analysis to 
determine the level of correlation between those respondents contacted by 
activists and those who changed their first choice the Election Day. Results 
(see Appendix 6.5 Cross tabulation) are significant (p < 0.01) and show that 
more than 30% of the respondents contacted by activists also changed their 
first choice the Election Day. Additionally, to test collinearity problems, I 
examine the level of correlation between those respondents contacted by 
activists during the Election Day, and those respondents visited at home by 
activists during the campaign (the first non-sensitive item). Results are 
significant (p < 0.01) and show that more than one-third (37%) of the 
                                                        
153 INEGI, http://www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/mexicocifras/default.aspx?e= (accessed on Monday 
18 January 2016). 
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respondents reported both answers as yes. This value suggests an 
appropriate people’s understanding of the questions. 
 Table 6.2 shows the frequencies of items reported in both treatment 
and control group. As I pointed out, there are floor effects since the nearly 
half of the respondents in both groups admitted zero and one item. 
Furthermore, more than 30% of the respondents of the treatment group 
reported only one item, whereas the control group reported two. 
Unexpectedly, there are four negative values overall. 
 
Table 6. 2 Frequency Report of the List Experiment 
Item 
count 
Control Group (C) Treatment Group (T) Variance 
(T - C) N (%) N (%) 
0 112 28.0 90 22.50 -22 
1 68 17.0 135 33.75 67 
2 124 31.0 107 26.75 -17 
3 74 18.5 51 12.75 -23 
4 22 5.5 14 3.50 -8 
5 .  3 .75 . 
N 400 100 400 100  
 
The Phrase of Timing in the Sensitive Item Question 
 
As I have argued, LISTIT technique asks respondents in the control group 
the non-sensitive items individually. By accessing to separate measures of 
each item, I compare its frequencies with one of the control questions on 
the survey. As I have argued, in the first non-sensitive item I use the phrase 
during the campaign whereas in the control questions I worded during the 
Election Day. Both the non-sensitive item and the control question denote 
the interaction between political activists and voters, which is imperative for 
vote-buying. Figure 6.1 shows a difference of 13 percentage points between 
the item and the question. Activists seem to interact with voters more during 
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campaigns than during the election day. Theoretically, there are more 
reasons for activists to contact voters, some of these interactions are indeed 
legitimate activities of electioneering and canvassing. Results, therefore, 
might indicate some reaction of respondents to the different phrasing during 
the campaign versus during the election day. 
 
Figure 6. 1 Proportion of respondents Self-Reporting contact with 
activists of the List Experiment 
 
Source: Author. 
Notes: (See Appendix 6.3) 
*  LISTIT: N = 393. 





I perform this analysis in two steps. The first estimates the number of 
respondents engaged in vote buying by using the difference in means test 
through the list-experiment. This analysis is straightforward since I just 
compare means values. But, as I employ the modified version of the list-










During the last Presidential Campaign […] I would like you 
to tell me if candidates or activists visited your home to talk 
to someone (Non-Sensitive Item from LISTIT)* 
During the Election Day, did any candidate or activist 
contact you? (Direct question from the survey reported by 
the control group)** 
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mean by adding the individual ‘yes’ answers from the non-sensitive 
questions. Secondly, I also analyse variables coming from the control 
questions and demographic variables such as gender, age, education and 
income. 
 The control group mean was 1.57, whereas the treatment one was 
1.46 (Table 6.3). Contrary to the basis of the list experiment, these values 
produced a negative result (-0.14). Respondents did not engage in vote 
buying overall. Most categories of analysis kept the same negative trend. 
The fact of asking the set of items individually to the control group appears 
to affect responses. Gender does not seem to affect vote-buying activities, 
as men and women reported similar values. More educated people also 
reported similar values to less educated. With negative values, poorer 
respondents seemed to engage in vote buying slightly more than wealthier 
people. 
  










Deviation Var. N 
Ctrl Trtmt 
Sample 1.57 1.43 1.23 1.12 -0.14 800 
Demographic Variables       
Gender (Female) 1.60 1.47 1.24 1.21 -0.13 374 
Gender (Male) 1.53 1.40 1.22 1.04 -0.13 426 
Age (-34) 1.54 1.48 1.12 1.18 -0.06 322 
Age (35-54) 1.57 1.36 1.29 1.11 -0.21 344 
Age (55+) 1.49 1.67 1.32 1.00 0.18 95 
Education (Up to second.) 1.49 1.37 1.22 1.05 -0.12 456 
Education (Post second.) 1.67 1.52 1.24 1.20 -0.15 313 
Household income*       
- MX$3,000 1.50 1.43 1.24 1.10 -0.07 216 
MX$3,001 - 6,000 1.43 1.32 1.23 1.05 -0.11 323 
MX$6,001 + 1.79 1.70 1.16 1.25 -0.09 180 
Control Variables (those…)       
DO lean towards a party 1.47 1.47 1.30 1.24 0.00 368 
DO NOT lean towards a party 1.76 1.59 1.18 1.09 -0.17 253 
Who had already made a choice 
BEFORE the Election Day but 
DID NOT vote for that option 
1.64 1.79 1.28 1.39 0.15 164 
 












Deviation Var. N 
Ctrl Trtmt 
Who had already made a choice 
BEFORE the Election Day and 
DID vote for that option 
1.68 1.50 1.17 1.05 -0.18 377 
CONTACTED by a candidate or 
activist during the Election Day 2.76 1.91 0.95 1.18 -0.85 118 
NOT CONTACTED by a 
candidate or activist during the 
Election Day 
1.40 1.31 1.17 1.08 -0.09 637 
Notes: * Exchange rate: Mx$24 = £1. 
 
 
 However, those people contacted by activists during the Election Day 
were 85 percentage points less likely of engaging in vote buying. While this 
result is unexpected, it may have two explanations. The finding can simply 
indicate that respondents of the control group were much more likely to have 
been contacted. Based on qualitative evidence from Chapters 4 and 5, 
personal interaction between electors and activists is a necessary condition 
of vote buying. Second, despite the fact that records of the National Hotline 
Service for Electoral Crimes show a considerably increasing trend of reports 
on vote-buying within the seven preceding days before the polling day (see 
Figure 4.2, Chapter 4), it is likely that respondents were exposed to non-
party activists performing other duties and non-vote-buying activities. 
Individuals self-reported as not lean towards a party were less likely 
engaged in vote buying tactics than those respondents lean-to. Even though 
Nichter’ (2008) theory refers to voting choices instead voters’ attitudes or 
sentiments, this finding of individuals lean to a party engaging more in vote 
buying suggests mobilisation of turnout buying. 
 Two categories report positive results. First, the fact of dividing age 
values switches the sense. The eldest people (+55) were 18% more likely 
to engage in vote buying, whereas the youngest group was less likely. 
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Secondly, respondents who did not vote for their first option were 15% more 
likely to engage in vote buying. Given that the main sources of shaping 
electoral preferences (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet 1948) as media, 
campaign and individual messages are restricted at this final stage of the 
election, this result suggests a positive effect of vote-buying on switching 
voting choices. This finding appears to be consistent with statistics 
frequencies. Cross-tabulation reports show that more than 32% of the 
people contacted by activists during the Election Day, eventually switched 
voting choices (see Appendix 6.5 Cross Tabulations). However, further 
tests are required to explore such suggestion more rigorously. 
The results from the list experiment estimate averages of vote buying by 
socioeconomic and political categories. Positive results such as age (+55) 
and people eventually voting for a different option are theoretically related 
to vote buying. Additionally, the percentage of respondents rejecting being 
contacted the near the Election Day and the variance of those lean towards 
a party should say something about people getting targeted. To test this 
claim, I conduct an OLS regression analysis proposed by Holbrook & 
Krosnick (2010) predicting the count provided by respondents with a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent received the short list or the long 
list, the changing decision,154 and the interactions of the list length dummy 
variable with each changing decision case. Additionally, I conducted a 
logistic regression analysing the effects of contacting electors during the 
Election Day, demographics such as gender, education level and income, 
and elector’s identification to a party. These tests contribute to exploring 
                                                        
154 Those respondents who had made their decision before the Election Day but eventually did not 
vote for that option. 
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conventional assumptions that poor people get targeted (Jensen & 
Justesen 2014, Justesen & Bjørnskov 2014, Weitz-Shapiro 2012, 
Balafoutas 2011, Bratton 2008) but poor, less educated and uninterested in 
politics people get bought. 
 Table 6.4 presents the estimated effects of respondents switching 
decision on vote buying. There was no significant effect of the interaction of 
variables on vote buying. However, the value is consistent with the number 
reported in the LISTIT (15%, Table 6.3), a positive effect for those 
respondents switching choices and vote buying. 
 
Table 6. 4 Effects of Switching Choices on Vote Buying 
 Item Count Technique Std. Error Beta t 
Changing decision 0.06 0.14 .02 .41 
Interaction 0.15 0.19 .04 .80 
(Constant) 1.59 0.06 .00 25.98 
N 800    
Adjusted R2 0.00    
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
Whether the non-significance is explained by the experiment design, I 
conduct a logistic regression employing demographics and political 
variables. With the questions of control, I created two dummy dependent 
variables, one of those contacted by activists during the election day and 
another of the interaction of those contacted and those switching voting 
choices. 155  Based on my two-stage model, I argue that respondents 
contacted during polling day were highly likely to be exposed to a vote-
                                                        
155 A) During the Election Day, did any candidate or activist contact you? 1) Yes 0) No; B) Which of 
the following statements you would say suits better your own experience? 1) I had already made my 
choice BEFORE the Election Day, but I DID NOT VOTE for that option 0) I had already made my 
choice BEFORE the Election Day and I DID VOTE for that option / I had made NO choice BEFORE 
the Election Day. 
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buying deal and the interaction between people contacted and switching 
choices near the Election Day illustrates individuals closing vote-buying 
deals. In order to examine the effect of demographics in detail, I created 
dummy variables for age, income and level of education testing 
conventional assumptions about the eldest, poorest and least educated 
people more exposed to vote buying.156  
 In models 1 and 3 I use the overall explanatory variables and models 
2 and 4 I use dummy variables (Table 6.5) segmenting such variables. 
Table 6.5 reports only discussable segments of variables. There was, then, 
one significant effect of the demographic variables on people contacted 
during the Election Day, the eldest group of people (+55).157 Nearly 60% of 
the elderly individuals are more likely to get contacted by activists. While 
this significant result is consistent with the experiment, it also suggests that 
elder people were more contacted but less likely to switch choices since the 
shifts from model 2 to 4. Equally, the age changes the direction and 
magnitude of the effect considerably in models 1 and 3, but they are not 
significant. 
 Even though the results of the lowest education level are also not 
significant, they totally swing the effects from negative to positive between 
people contacted and those switching choices. Consistent with studies on 
vote buying (Jensen & Justesen 2014), the least educated people were 
                                                        
156 I analyse for age people 55<; for income >MX$3,000; and for education level >secondary school. 
157 There is an interesting case for the 2010 Local Elections in Veracruz, in which 744 elderly voters 
were charged with lying to the National Electoral Registry when illegally they provided false 
addresses in order to vote for a party in electoral precincts they did not belong to. Despite not being 
vote buying, the case illustrates how the elderly targeted by parties. La Jornada Veracruz ‘744 
órdenes de aprehensión contra turistas electorales’, Monday 26 September 2011, Politica, 
http://www.jornadaveracruz.com.mx/Post.aspx?id=110926_122444_591 (accessed on Monday 30 
October 2017). 
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more likely to be contacted but, in contrast, less likely to switch voting 
choices. Moreover, the same pattern is observed between model 3 and 4. 
Contrarily to other studies (Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Balafoutas 2011, Bratton 
2008), the effect of the income is different between people contacted and 
changing choices (models 2 and 4). The poorest people were equally 
contacted than the others; however, richer people were more likely to switch 
choices. Models 3 and 4 show a different story when analysing the lowest 
income group, results change totally but provide not significant evidence. 
Although party identification similarly presents no effects across the models, 
they are unexpectedly higher in model 3. The poorest and least educated 
electors strongly lean towards a party are less likely to switch choices. 
 
Table 6. 5 Estimation Models of Vote Buying 
 Contacted during the 
Election Day 
Contacted during the 
Election Day / Switching 
choices 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age (1-6) 0.05  -0.20  
 (0.19)  (0.31)  
Eldest group (1-0)  0.59*  -0.01 
  (0.33)  (0.56) 
Gender (1-0) 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.08 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.39) (0.37) 
Education (1-5) -0.13  -0.14  
 (0.14)  (0.42)  
Lowest Educ. Level (1-0)  -.21  0.18 
  (0.26)  (0.40) 
Income (1-5) -0.01  0.32  
 (0.25)  (0.39)  
Lowest income (1-0)  0.02  -0.34 
  (0.28)  (0.44) 
Party Identification (1-0) 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.06 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.40) (0.37) 
Constant -1.50* -1.88*** -3.14* -2.87*** 
 (0.79) (0.44) (1.06) (0.67) 
N 509 509 499 499 
Adjusted R2  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Notes:  
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
Models are logistic regressions. Answers ‘strongly lean towards PAN, PRI, PRD, PT, 
PVEM, Movimiento Ciudadano, MORENA’ were aggregated for party identification (see 
Appendix 6.1 Survey Technical Report, the Spanish version of the survey, p3_1).  
“No answer/prefer not to say” are excluded. 
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Standard Error in parenthesis. 
 
 
In order to explore further the relationship between switchers and activists 
contacting voters during the Election Day,158 I conduct a logistic regression, 
but I test the variables differently. This analysis uses as predictors the 
variable of political activists contacting electors, in combination with party 
identity and demographics. It also employs the variable of switching choices 
as the dependent variable. Although this model requires further tests, I work 
on the assumption of the Mexican case. If campaigning and organising 
rallies and meetings near the Election Day are forbidden activities (see 
Section 3.4, Chapter 3), the objective of contacting electors during that 
period is to manipulate voting choices. 
  Thus, I employ demographics and party identification variables 
similarly as explanatory factors. Overall, results from models 1 and 2 (Table 
6.6) show that political factors are stronger predictors than demographics. 
They also show that more than 80% of the electors contacted by political 
activists during the Election Day changed their first choice. Moreover, the 
poorest, eldest and least educated people seemed to be slightly more 
persuadable than the rest of the respondents. Surprisingly, people 
reportedly lean towards a party were 60% more likely to switch voting 
choices near the Election Day. But the questionnaire does give limited 
information to know whether or not the final choice of respondents is the 
same than the one they feel lean-to. There is a negative relationship 
between age and choice changing. This result suggests that younger 
                                                        
158 A first cross table analysis shows a significant relationship between these two variables p < 0.001 
(see Appendix 6.5). 
 
   
 
213 
people were about 30% less likely to be persuadable to switch choices than 
elderly individuals. Such measure, indeed, doubles in model 2, up to nearly 
60%, but the value is not significant. 
 The rest of the variables are not significant. However, consistent with 
notions about Mexican politics (Ugalde & Rivera 2013), men were 20% less 
likely to change their first choice than women when contacted by activists 
during the Election Day. Contrary to the multivariate analysis (Table 6.6), 
the education level shows a null effect on people’s choices in both models. 
This finding would confirm clientelistic claims (Stokes et al 2013, Stokes 
2005, 2007) that less educated electors are more likely be targeted for vote 
buying, but conversely, it also demonstrates that the least educated people 
were equally likely to switch choices than any other one. In model 1, the 
income shows no effect on people’s choices, but this measure rises 
moderately in model 2 to nearly 10%. Differently from the education level, 
these results suggest that poorer people were fairly more persuadable than 
wealthier individuals. But further research is required to confirm this claim. 
Both values models 1 and 2 are not significant though. 
 
Table 6. 6 Estimation Models of Voters’ Decision 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Age (1-6) -0.29***  
 (0.17)  
Eldest group (1-0)  -0.58 
  (0.37) 
Gender (1-0) -0.23 -0.23 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
Education (1-5) -0.01  
 (0.13)  
Lowest Education Level (1-0)  0.01 
  (0.24) 
Income (1-5) -0.01  
 (.0.23)  
Lowest income (1-0)  -0.08 
  (0.26) 
Party Identification (1-0) 0.64*** 0.62*** 
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 Model 1 Model 2 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Contact of political activists (1-0) 0.82*** 0.85*** 
 (0.26) (0.26) 
Constant -0.73 -1.20*** 
 (0.73) (0.40) 
N 467 467 
Adjusted R2  0.06 0.06 
Notes: 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
Models are logistic regressions.  
Answers ‘strongly lean towards PAN, PRI, PRD, PT, PVEM, Movimiento Ciudadano, 
MORENA’ were aggregated for party identification (see Appendix 6.1 Survey Technical 
Report, the Spanish version of the survey, p3_1). 
“No answer/prefer not to say” are excluded. 




The findings of LISTIT were unexpected. They suggest that respondents 
might be aware of the sensitive item but equally they can reflect that other 
activities involving activists can occur near polling days. Although my effort 
to test the wordings during the election day and during campaign suggests 
some sensitivity of respondents, further research is needed to confirm this 
idea. The interaction between activists and voters during polling days 
seems to have effects on voter’s choices. These effects appear to be 
stronger on the poorest, eldest, least educated people. Alternative items 
retesting direct questioning appear to contribute to overcome potential 
effects of social desirability bias; however, they might present some 
inferential problems. Alternative items asking directly provide insights to turn 
to wording as potential methods for sensitive topics. In the case of vote 
buying, the fact of excluding phrases as “politicians”, “money”, “for your 
vote” when wording the question can provide people with anonymity. The 
15% of individuals contacted by activists during the Election Day estimated 
by the control question provide some insights about the extent of electoral 
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mobilisation highlighted by literature (Greene 2016, Nichter & Palmer Rubin 
2014) and electoral observation reports (Alianza Civica 2012). Although 
these measures can produce issues of external validity, they can be tested 
empirically in any context banning electioneering and canvassing near 
polling days as well restricted access to media. 
 Results from Corstange’s (2009) multivariate regression were not 
significant. However, they suggest a similar number to the direct question 
(15%) of the electors switching choices. Equally, the overall results from the 
list experiment were unexpectedly negative, but they provided insights for 
conducting further with using the factors of timing and electors contacted by 
activists near polling days. Although LISTIT tends to work well when 
assessing vote buying (Carkoglu & Aytac 2015), there is some consensus 
about potential measurement error as it, 
…is unlikely to purge all social desirability bias from responses 
and the point estimate is likely to constitute a lower bound. Vote 
buying may be such a sensitive topic that some respondents may 
be reluctant to “tell the truth” even when provided a forum where 
it is literally impossible to determine which individuals report vote 
buying (Gonzalez et al, 2012: 215). 
 
 
One explanation could be the method of collecting data (LISTIT). It seems 
that phrasing the questions differently could guide respondents to think 
more carefully about each answer, for the control group, and more 
carelessly, for the treatment group, when exposed to a set of options. 
Another explanation may be the adjustment to the sensitive item wording. 
The fact of making explicit the exchange of money or goods near polling 
days for votes could also have triggered some bias. 
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 Studies using list experiments in other countries have estimated an 
incidence of vote buying from 6% (De-Jonge 2015) to 55% (Corstange 
2009). Although predictors such as demographics can explain better this 
level of incidence (Jensen & Justesen 2014, Weitz-Shapiro 2012, 
Balafoutas 2011, Bratton 2008), the proportion of people estimated with list 
experiment seems to respond to the wording (Kuklinski, Cobb & Gilens 
1997). The two highest estimations, 55% in Lebanon (Corstange 2009) and 
35% in Turkey (Carkoglu & Aytaç 2015), employed the more open wording 
for the sensitive items. They both read as follows, ‘someone offered you or 
your family personal services, a job, or something similar in exchange of 
your vote’. The reflection behind respondents’ answers is that vote-buying 
rewards could include benefits for other people, which, in addition to open 
such possibility, it prompts voters to respond yes, more relaxingly. This 
pattern was found in UNDP (2006) when employing direct questioning but 
opening the item to a type of collective behaviour. 
Non-academic claims (Alianza Civica 2012), domestic literature in 
Mexico (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013) and evidence collected here 
(see Chapters 4 and 5) suggest that, averagely, a broker can buy effectively 
up to 100 votes. Besides particular strategies of mobilisation, Corstange 
(2009), for example, estimates 55% of the Lebanese voters exposed to vote 
buying. Given that the national electoral register for the 2009 Lebanese 
Parliamentary Elections rose about 3.25 million,159 it means that more than 
1.75 million voters were involved. To achieve these numbers, Lebanese 
parties would need about 18 thousand brokers in the ground. A similar 
                                                        
159 Source, International IDEA, Voter Turnout Database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-
countries-view/439/169/ctr  (Lebanon: 3,258,573). 
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exercise can be done with the study in Turkey (Carkoglu & Aytaç 2015), 
whose estimation rises 35% of the voters exposed to vote buying. For the 
2015 Turkish Parliamentary Elections, the national electoral register rose 
nearly 60 million,160 which means that almost 21 million voters dealt with 
vote buying. Equally, to succeed in this numbers Turkish parties would need 
about 210 thousand brokers on streets. The question, how many brokers 
would parties need to cover our estimation of vote buying provides an 
opportunity to know the extent of the mobilisation and the validity of our 
method. 
 My findings of 15% switching voting choice (non-significant) differ 
from another list-experiment conducted in Mexico (Greene 2016) in 2012, 
estimating more than 21% of people selling votes. There are some potential 
explanations. First, instead LISTIT the study employed a standard list-
experiment technique. Additionally, the experiment was embedded in a 
panel study with two waves of interviews. Second, although it succeeded 
conducting tests of designs effects (Blair & Imai 2012), the card presented 
to respondents had three non-sensitive items for the control group and four 
for the treatment groups. Third, the wording of the overall question and 
items phrase ‘how many activities you have done’ (Greene 2016: 17) 
instead of how many activities they have done to you. Although it is 
untested, this small change could drive respondents to assume the 
responsibility for the actions, which might enhance bias. 
 In addition, the measure of the study (Greene 2016) does not 
differentiate between legitimate actions of campaigns and illegal activities 
                                                        
160 Source, International IDEA, Voter Turnout Database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-
countries-view/439/287/ctr (Turkey: 56,965,099). 
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of vote buying. Equally, it does not distinguish between vote-buying effects 
from other explanatory factors during campaigns (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & 
Gaudet 1948). In fact, the author recognises that legitimate activities could 
persuade voters’ choices. Moreover, he states that ‘[a]lthough the list 
experiment reveals that more than a fifth of the electorate was involved in 
vote selling in 2012, this does not mean that all 10.9 million vote choices 
were determined by these exchanges’ (Greene 2016: 19). The wording 
employed to measure both targeting and buying contributes to overcoming 
the distinction between legitimate actions of campaigns and vote buying and 
isolate the effects of vote buying on voters’ choice from other factors. 
 My results also differ from Greene (2016) on how effective vote 
buying is. The study concluded that this action ‘flounders because the 
legitimate campaigns force brokers to target many of the wrong voters with 
selective benefits’ (Greene 2016: 21). Overall, the model relied on self-
reporting data of party’s choices in two periods comparing the differences 
of the coefficients to assess the vote-buying effect. The study also 
incorporates other interesting explanatory variables as economic 
evaluations, assessments of the candidates’ competence in managing the 
economy, fighting crime, reducing poverty, and diminishing government 
corruption. By contrast, findings here suggest that vote buying is 
considerably effective during the Election Day; more than 80% of the 
switching-choices electors were contacted by activists during the election 
day. 
 There are two substantial differences compared to that study. First, 
Greene (2016) measured a slightly different type of exchange. Given that 
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the sensitive item included the factor of services as rewards, the expected 
answer might drive conclusions closer to patronage (see Section 2.2, 
Chapter 2). In contrast, I restricted reward to voting behaviour during the 
Election Day. Also, the study gathered robust data at the beginning and the 
end of the campaigns, which allow the author to compare results between 
two waves. This study, instead, segmented a control item on the basis of 
previous preference against final choice. Although these variations in the 
design and distinct methods to collect data can explain the margin of 6% 
between both studies, it is also plausible that such difference is only the 
outcome of two different years. Studies were fielded in different electoral 
years and those number might represent, indeed, the level of vote buying 
for those elections. 
 My findings have some limitations. First, the fact of excluding the 
parties’ names from the alternative measures restricts a wider analysis of 
voting behaviour. For example, this study does not give information about 
preferences of electors. Equally, even though some results are significant, 
the variable party identity limits the extent of responses to two options, 
strongly / not strongly, which eventually could affect the answer.161 Second, 
besides age, despite that demographic variables were consistent with some 
literature (Jensen & Justesen 2014), they were not significant. In this sense, 
Mexico has remote areas quite unreachable to empirical research. A 
proportion of these regions is deprived. It is likely that some of them are 
unrepresented in this study. Third, the alternative control items require more 
tests and they might present restrictions for comparative research. 
                                                        
161  These results, indeed, differ from another study conducted in Mexico on vote buying and 
partisanship (Vidal et al 2010). 
 






This Chapter provided empirical evidence from an alternative technique of 
a list experiment, showing the degree of incidence of vote buying during 
Mexican elections. Vote buying is still prevalent across the country and 
personal interaction between voters and brokers is crucial for this activity. 
Although the overall estimation of switchers in LISTIT seems to be 
consistent with other estimations, more rigorous tests are imperative. 
Although LISTIT presents some shortcomings, it also provides advantages. 
The fact of asking non-sensitive items individually gives the opportunity to 
compare frequencies with other questions on the survey. The most 
prevalent strategies of the campaign are broadcasting messages and 
posters about candidates in neighbourhoods. In contrast, communicating 
contents of parties’ manifesto is still the foremost drawback of parties. 
Finally, given that one in five voters switched their final voting choice 
despite having a different option during the campaign indicates that further 
analysis is required to explore preferences of voters in connection with the 
sources to shape political preferences. Since one in six Mexican voters met 
personally activists during the election day, when it is prohibited by law, 
indicates the level of electoral malpractices in Mexico. Even more, 
considering that eight in ten voters contacted by activists were switchers, 
further examinations on vote buying should take into account the interaction 
between voters and activists over self-reported exposition to the rewards. 
Several sources illustrate a big face-to-face mobilisation of electors during 
polling days, but this evidence provides insights on the extent and power of 
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such mobilisation. Evidence of this Chapter supports the last stage of my 
model of vote buying. (i.e. targeting versus buying). As I argued (see 
Chapter 2), the last face-to-face interaction between electors and activists 














This dissertation examines the effects of vote buying on voting choices by 
exploring how voters face and engage in clientelistic offers and how parties 
mobilise activists to conduct practices of targeting and buying. Significant 
contributions of this dissertation are the proposal of an extended two-stage 
model of vote-buying mobilisation, the development of an unconventional 
qualitative technique for analysing thousands of records on vote-buying and 
the conduction of an alternative experiment design embedded in a 
nationally representative survey. The two-stage model of vote-buying 
mobilisation extends previous efforts (Nichter 2008), which measure the 
success of vote buying against voters’ turnout and voting shares. Although 
this effort reveals voters’ behaviour, it is unable to describe the process 
between the exposition to vote-buying offers and the final choice. In Chapter 
2, I argued that a successful tactic of mobilisation to buy votes implies two 
phases, i) parties presenting voters with several offers, and ii) voters 
accepting one amongst a number of offers or rejecting all the offers. In 
addition, competing offers of vote buying implies that voters could reject one 
offer despite responding to vote buying. The extended two-stage model 
alleviates this puzzle. It divides vote buying into the stages of targeting, 




buying (electors entering the deal, receive rewards and undergo compliance 
mechanisms). By employing the two-phases model, this study shows that 
rewards distributed along the campaign are not confined exclusively to buy 
votes. Whereas a systematic allocation of benefits during earlier stages 
serve activists to access voters, the delivery of rewards near polling days 
intends to ensure the completion of vote buying. 
The analysis of over fifteen years of reports on vote-buying from the 
National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes extends qualitative sources 
(Terry & Wong 2005, Arbon et al 2006). By examining non-recruited 
interviewees quotes, in Chapter 4, I captured crucial details of vote buying, 
some of them in real time, which could be hard to access from other 
methodologies. Given that the service provides callers with anonymity and 
confidentiality, accounts report sensitive information and criminal activity. 
Overall, testimonies served as a rich source to understand how individuals 
face vote buying strategies. Whilst findings here support other studies on 
tactics of vote buying and compliance in Mexico (Greene 2016, Nichter & 
Plamer-Rubin 2015, Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013), they provide 
new evidence on three practices, i) the dispensation of different rewards in 
opening and closing stages of campaign, ii) strategies of abstention buying 
and iii) vote-buying mobilisations around polling stations. Such evidence 
advances research uncovering conditions of vote buying near and during 
polling days (e.g. Hicken et al 2015, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015), the way 
adverse voting preferences are mitigated at polls and the conduction of 
contingent strategies by polling station as the last attempt to buy votes. 




on socioeconomic, geographical factors of callers and classifying rewards 
exchanged by party and level of election is imperative. 
The particular design of the experiment conducted here pinpoints 
extra advantages of LISTIT techniques against shortcomings. Measuring 
the level of incidence of vote buying has particularly been a challenge for 
scholars as its undesirability and illegality. Some efforts have developed 
methods to estimate the number of voters targeted by activists in several 
countries (Speck & Abramo 2001, 2002, Brusco et al 2004, Stokes 2005, 
UNDP 2006). However, recent studies using experimental approaches have 
disputed previous findings (Gonzalez, De-Jonge & Meseguer 2017, Greene 
2016, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015, De-Jonge 2015, Gonzalez et al 2015, Cruz, 
Keefer & Labonne 2015, Nichter and Palmer-Rubin 2014, Vicente 2014, 
Gonzalez et al 2012, Vicente & Wantchekon 2009, Corstange 2009, 
Wantchekon 2003) addressing issues of social desirability bias and self-
protection against prosecution when respondents answer face-to-face 
questions. 
Following a growing area of experiments, in Chapter 6, I conducted 
an alternative technique (LISTIT), embedded in a nationally representative 
survey, to test the effects of vote buying on electoral choices. Instead using 
demographic and political variables as control items, I employed the 
interaction with activists and the changing voting choices near the Election 
Day based on the two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation. Such 
strategy differs from previous efforts (Carkoglu & Aytac 2015). Results were 
non-significant, although the overall estimation generated a number of 15% 




rewards near polling days. While LISTIT provides alternative questions of 
control to estimate direct effects of vote buying on voting choices, the design 
alters wording. Some assumptions of the design require more rigorous 
tests. 
Overall, the previous contributions of this dissertation demonstrate 
the importance of parties’ mobilisations near and during polling days to 
close vote-buying deals, influencing voters’ choices. Activists target voters 
to obtain information proffering rewards and voters face contexts of more 
than one vote-buying offer. But what are the broader implications of these 
findings for literature on vote buying? How do advance our understanding 
of the clientelistic relations between voters and activists? What do these 
findings add to existing debates? To what extent can these findings 
generalise? In following sections, I present theoretical and methodological 
points, dividing these conclusions into three sections, a summary of the 




7.1 Summary  
 
What are the effects of vote buying on voting choices? Do outcomes of 
elections respond to vote buying? Why do parties perform such practices if 
they are not successful? Why do electors do engage in it? Despite decades 
of research, scholars still differ on the extent vote buying the way it affects 
voting behaviour. Whilst qualitative designs suggest citizens disapprove 




to solve the puzzle, I approach vote buying through a case study on Mexico 
by examining, i) voters’ exposition to vote buying, ii) brokers’ tactics for 
targeting and buying voters, and iii) the effects of vote buying on voting 
choices. Given that literature has agreed on the complexity of the 
phenomenon, I make certain methodological and analytical decisions in 
connection with theories and techniques. 
Given than prevalent theories on vote buying are based on 
clientelistic ties, some of its defining boundaries with other concepts as 
patronage and clientelism are a little bit diffuse. In Chapter 2, therefore, I 
review the field and revisit its conceptual features to contribute to clarifying 
differences. In order to achieve the task, I first categorise studies and 
dimensions to, secondly, discuss the core attributes of clientelism and 
patronage. Resulting reflections indicate that scholars tend to state on vote 
buying as managing attributes from patronage and clientelism. By 
examining implications of the distinct uses of vote buying on empirical 
findings, I show that the conceptual ambiguity affects some conclusions, 
particularly, those from designs operationalising definitions. Although 
incipient attempts have contributed to our current understanding, some 
studies have assessed different dimensions of vote buying. Such reflections 
allowed me to develop the alternative two-stage model of vote-buying 
mobilisation. 
Since Mexico has held plenty of studies on clientelistic transactions, 
I selected the case to answer guiding research questions. In Chapter 3, I 
discussed the extensive features of Mexico to other cases coping with vote 




dominant-party system set conditions for clientelist politics. In addition, I 
showed that social welfare policies implemented by the government shaped 
a paternalist state strengthening clientelistic ties making Mexicans highly 
familiarised with deliveries from politicians. In addition, appropriate electoral 
regulations and political machines made vote buying settle comfortably. I 
show how from the 2000 Presidential Elections opposition parties have 
conducted similar tactics during campaigns. Finally, I assess the effects of 
electoral reforms on practices of vote buying. These tasks allowed me to 
decide on research techniques and methods. 
Consequently, I selected a mixed-method research design 
constituted of two qualitative techniques and an experiment. In order to 
investigate how individuals are exposed to vote buying and given the 
sensitivity of the task, in Chapter 4, I conduct an analysis of thousands of 
phone calls from national hotline reporting vote buying. I showed how 
evidence collected from this source provided valuable quotes from a 
citizen’s perspective. By using theoretical claims about targeting tactics, the 
accounts offer particular details involved in a vote-buying exchange, which 
could be hard to address otherwise (i.e. admitting engagement). After 
examining records reporting the distribution of benefits and voters accepting 
the rewards, I elucidate that voters’ conditions as poverty or low education 
level do not seem to serve as fundamental features for targeting purposes. 
However, given that this is the first academic study assessing such 
unconventional evidence, I warn research that further analyses exploring 




however, served to make some decisions about interviews and guiding 
questions in the following chapter. 
In order to cover the factors involved in a vote-buying transaction as 
buyers and sellers, in Chapter 5, I conducted a series of interviews with 
brokers asking about structures and networks, and the extent and strength 
of their relationships with parties. By asking these questions, I provided 
evidence to explain how both brokers and parties plan and implement 
strategies. As I discuss along the chapter, with this information I confirm 
several pieces of the puzzle extracted from the phone accounts as, for 
example, the particular operation taking place during polling days. 
Additionally, by investigating methods and strategies for targeting electors 
and buying votes, I offer an explanation on how brokers close vote-buying 
deals, distribute rewards near polling days and execute mechanisms of 
compliance. Different from other similar studies interviewing brokers 
(Zarazaga 2014), I intentionally biased the selection of interviewees. This 
chapter, then, allowed me to decide over the design of the experiment. 
In Chapter 6, I conduct an alternative technique of a list-experiment 
called LISTIT embedded in a nationally representative survey in Mexico to 
test the effects of vote buying on voting choices. As I discussed above, the 
instrument provided unexpected results, yet the design and data collection 
allowed to test other control items (see 7.3). Secondly, I discuss the results 
by presenting relevant descriptive statistics and testing two regression 
models. I finally discuss results with previous studies and present both 





7.2 Theoretical Implications 
 
In contrast to traditional views focusing only on clientelistic relationships, in 
Chapter 3, I provide new insights into theories addressing external factors 
enhancing vote buying. The discussion on the interaction between strong 
political machines, corporatist policies, and reforms on elections addressing 
non-vote-buying problems identifies hidden structures omitted by literature. 
The Mexican case provides a suitable scenario to understand the combined 
effects of the elements mentioned in vote buying. I showed that the 
transition of the Mexican political system from an authoritarian to a machine 
party succeeded by controlling emerging opposition. Electoral regulations 
eased the dominant party to strengthen its presence in the Chambers. In 
addition, as manipulating elections, the government and the party 
consolidated a solid complex network constituted of politicians, officials, 
partisan, volunteers and voters. Consequently, national corporatist policies 
make Mexicans more familiar with clientelistic and paternalistic practices, 
shaping ties between politicians and citizens through clientelistic 
arrangements. Finally, despite the fact that most of the electoral reforms 
have proven benefits for democratic values of free and fair elections, the 
criminal definition of vote buying show a much slower progress in forty years 
of electoral reforms. The combination of these elements has, in fact, forced 
parties to conduct campaigns at ground-level encouraging the interaction 
between voters and activists. As a result, all parties have turned to 
clientelistic exchanges as a campaign method. Brokers have reshaped 
traditional binding ties with parties. Now they have developed methods 




mechanisms of targeting and buying. Such type of networks and encounters 
between voters and brokers set ideal conditions for vote buying to spread 
and succeed. 
 In Chapter 5, interviews with brokers clarified contrasting theoretical 
views about structures and networks. Whereas traditional clientelism is 
based on strong ties, modern approaches have suggested thinner 
relationships between brokers and citizens. However, evidence collected 
here demonstrates that both structures and networks are not mutually 
exclusive they can work together as long as they contribute to a campaign. 
As I discussed, networks play a fundamental role in the success of targeting, 
buying and complying. Both types of structures are pyramidal. Such finding 
offered insights about how brokers and parties organise operations to buy 
votes, the mechanisms employed to target voters, deliver benefits and 
enforce compliance. 
 The experimental technique called LISTIT identified alternative 
explanations of potential factors making voters switch choices near the 
elections day: money, goods and other benefits. These findings have 
implications for theories on voting behaviour. For example, for the 2012 
Presidential elections in Mexico a defeated candidate attributed the 
outcome to vote buying in favour of the front-runner. Opposition parties and 
social groups supported the idea about a massive vote-buying operation. 
Traditionally, surveys explore theoretical factors from voting behaviour, 
which only include legitimate activities to persuade electors, i.e. media, 
canvassing, electioneering, rallies and meetings. Ignoring material benefits 




adequate explanations. The evidence provided from LISTIT shows the 
degree of incidence of vote buying during Mexican elections through 
switching choices. Although theories on voting behaviour and vote buying 
respond to different interests, combining illegitimate and legitimate factors 
interacting during campaigns can distort measures of both voting behaviour. 
Future research should not discard illegitimate factors as alternative 
explanations.  
  
7.3 Methodological implications 
 
The review of defining attributes of vote buying, conducted in Chapter 2, 
alleviates the complexity of vote buying for empirical measures, identifying 
its boundaries. The variety of uses of the term vote buying has caused 
conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970) and driven empirical findings to 
divergent results. In chapter 2, I classified the diversity, examining its 
conceptual foundations. I then located this dissertation in the field of 
electorate vote buying to review defining attributes. Since scholars have 
included a variety of clientelistic exchanges into the vote-buying category, 
clientelism and patronage have been managed as synonyms of vote buying 
in literature. By conducting a revisit of defining attributes to compare 
similarities and differences served to clarify that clientelism is sustained by 
stronger ties between political elites and citizens, patronage includes 
promises of rewards conditioned upon victories at polls. Extending Nichter’s 
(2014) observations, these conclusions warn further theoretical discussions 
to be attentive to the types of benefits proffered and the conditional delivery 




buying is a complex phenomenon, identifying more precisely its limits 
should help to alleviate doubts about measures. 
Moreover, the distinction between the reception and the offer of 
rewards to refer to a deal already closed advances the operationalisation of 
concepts going from definition to measures. Vote buying implies parties’ 
mobilisation strategies addressed to obtain voters. Scholars, however, have 
assessed these interactions as a unit. Such approach omits the fact that 
there is a period in which electors can assess an offer and decide upon it. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that, in fact, vote buying is a process constituted of 
two phases, a targeting and buying. As electoral contests entail competing 
parties, it is likely that voters are exposed to more than one offer during a 
campaign. They might, therefore, select a vote-buying deal over another. 
Looking at targeting and buying as a unit does not explain what happens 
between the proposal of an offer and the final voter’s decision. Having 
assessed the two-stage model against surveys and experiments already 
conducted gave a clearer illustration of the effects I suspected. Focused on 
the wording of the vote-buying questions, the analysis showed that studies 
might have alluded to uncompleted vote-buying transactions as measuring 
offers instead the delivery of rewards. A physical interexchange depicts a 
closed arrangement than a proposition. Further research should test this 
interesting aspect. Conducting two experiments in parallel with a variation 
of wording, i.e. offering versus receiving, would provide evidence of the 
differentiation between targeting and buying. Moreover, such design would 
reveal other unexplored conditions such as multi-targeted-sold, multi-




As advancing qualitative techniques, the analysis in Chapter 4, also 
provided scholars with new sources of research. Relying on safety and 
convenience of the hotline to report sensitive information anonymously and 
confidentially, thousands of records offered a number of details such as full 
names, number plates or addresses to understand the full picture. The 
National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes fulfils a series of procedures 
offering reliability. Hence the scientific relevance of these accounts. For 
example, the telephonists attending calls get information similarly to other 
qualitative sources interviewing people about sensitive themes (i.e. asking 
about attitudes rather than experiences to break the ice and make callers 
feel more relaxed). Despite the non-randomised process of selecting cases, 
these calls from across the country covered regions which could be hard 
with other methods to access. I, therefore, provide an account of vote buying 
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A.1 Studies Sampled 
 
Albertus, 2013; Alvarez, 2012; Argersinger, 1985; Auyero, 1999; 
Balafoutas, 2011; Banks, 2000; Biais & Perotti, 2002; Birch, 1997, 2007, 
2010, 2011; Bohn, 2011; Bowie, 2008; Bratton, 2008; Brusco, Nazareno & 
Stokes, 2004; Buchanan & Lee, 1990; Buchanan, Lee, 1986; Calingaert, 
2006; Callahan & MacCargo, 1996; Callahan, 2005a 2005b; Calvo & 
Murillo, 2004; Candel-Sanchez & Perote-Pena, 2013; Carlson & Reed, 
2013; Carreras, İrepoğlu, 2013; Casella, Llorente-Saguer, Palfrey & 
Nickerson, 2012; Casella, Palfrey & Turban, 2014; Collier & Vicente, 2012; 
Conroy-Krutz & Logan, 2012; Corstange, 2012; Cox & Katz, 2007; Cox & 
Thies, 2000; Cunningham, 2008; Dal-Bo, 2007; Daumann & Wassermann, 
2009; De Janvry, Finan & Sadoulet, 2012; De la O, 2013; Dekel & Wolinski, 
2012; Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky, 2009; Desmond, 2006; Diermeier & 
Myerson, 1999; Dippel, 2012; Drazen & Eslava, 2010; Eldar, 2008; Enelow 
& Koehler, 1979; Epstein, 2012; Fell, 2005; Figuero &  Sives, 2002; Finan 
& Schechter, 2012; Fortin-Rittberger, 2014; Fox, 1994; Fried, 2012; 
Friedman, 2010; Frost, 2000; Fujiwara & Wantchekon, 2013; Gans-Morse, 
Mazzuca & Nichter, 2014; Gardner, 2008; Gay, 1998, 1999; Gersbach, 
2011; Gerxhani & Schram, 2009; Gherghina, 2013; Giraudy, 2007; 
Goldman, 2001; Gonzalez-Ocantos, Jonge & Nickerson, 2014; Gonzalez-
Ocantos, Jonge, Melendez, Osorio & Nickerson, 2012; Grimes & 
Wangnerud, 2010; Groseclose & Snyder, 1996; Groseclose, 1996; 
Haefele, 1970; Hall & Deardorff, 2006; Hall & Wayman, 1990; Hall, 2012; 
Hasen, 2000; Hawkins, 2010; Heckelman & Yates, 2002; Heckelman, 
1998, 2000; Herron & Theodos, 2004; Herron & Wiseman, 2008; Hicken, 
2011; Hilgers, 2009, 2011; Hoglund & Piyarathne, 2009; Hopkin, 2001; Hu 
& Black, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Jensen & Justesen, 2014; Karlan, 1994; 
Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008; Keefer, 2007; Kennedy, 2010; King, 2001; Klaas, 
2014; Knudsen, 2013; Kochin & Kochin, 1998; Koford, 1982; Komito, 1989; 
Krehbiel, 1995; Kuncic, 2011; Labonne, 2013; Lan & Heracleous, 2007; 
Lazar, 2004; Lehoucq, 2003; Levitt, 1998; Levmore, 2000; Linos, 2013; 
Lippert-Ramussen, 2011; Lust, 2009; McCann & Domiguez, 1998; 
McDonald, 1972; Miller & 1977; Mixon, Crocker & Black, 2005; Molina & 
Lehoucq, 1999; Mookherjee, 2014; Morgan & Vardy, 2012; Moser, 2008; 
Mulgan, 2010; Neeman & Orosel, 2006; Nitcher, 2008; Nyblade & Reed, 
2008; Ockey, 2003; Olarinmoye, 2008; Orr, 2006; Owen, 2013; Persson, 
Tabellini & Trebbi, 2003; Phatharathananunth, 2008; Philipson & Snyder, 
1996; Posadas, 2000; Post, 2010; Powell, 1970; Powell, 1989; Remmer, 
2007; Resnik, 2012; Rodden, 2002; Schaffer, 2002; Schedler, 2002; 
Schmidt, 1974; Schwartz, 1975; Scimemi, 2003; Shefner, 2001; Simpser, 
2012; Snyder & Ting, 2005; Stokes, 2005; Stovel, Golub & Meyersson, 




Taylor, 2008; Tucker, 2007; Ungpakorn, 2002; Van-de-Walle, 2003; 
Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009; Vicente, 2010, 2014; Vidu, 2002; Vilalta, 
2010; Walker, 2008; Wallis & Dollery, 1997; Wang & Kurzman, 2007; 
Wantchekon, 2003; Weghorst & Lindberg, 2011, 2013; Weidmann & 
Callen, 2013; Weiss, 1988; Weitz-Shapiro, 2006, 2012; Wiseman, 2004; 
Wu & Huang, 2004; Wyatt, 2013; Ziblatt, 2009; Zimmer, 2005; Zucco & 






A.1.1 Articles published on vote buying by journal’s name and 
ranking 
 Journal Name Articles SCImago Ranking 
1 Public Choice 16 Q2 
2 American Journal of Political Science 13 Q1 
3 American Political Science Review 9 Q1 
4 Latin American Research Review 6 Q2 
5 Comparative Political Studies 5 Q1 
6 Electoral Studies 5 Q1 
7 Democratization 4 Q1 
8 Latin American Politics and Society 4 Q2 
9 Asian Survey 3 Q1 
10 Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 3 Q2 
11 Journal of Contemporary Asia 3 Q1 
12 Journal of Democracy 3 Q1 
13 Journal of Development Economics 3 NR 
14 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 Q2 
15 Journal of Politics 3 Q1 
16 Theory and Society 3 Q1 
17 American Economic Review 2 Q1 
18 Annual Review of Political Science 2 Q1 
19 Asian Politics and Policy 2 Q3 
20 Comparative Politics 2 Q1 
21 International Political Science Review 2 Q2 
22 Journal of Interdisciplinary History 2 Q2 
23 Journal of Modern African Studies 2 Q1 
24 Perspectives on Politics 2 Q1 
25 World Politics 2 Q1 
26 Administration 1 NR 
27 African Journal of Polit. Sci. and International Relations 1 NR 
28 American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 Q1 
29 American Politics Research 1 Q1 
30 American Review of Public Administration 1 Q1 
31 Annual Survey of American Law 1 NR 
32 Anthropological Forum: A Journal of Social Anthropology and Comparative Sociology 1 Q2 
33 Australian Economic History Review 1 Q3 
34 British Journal of Political Science 1 Q1 
35 Bulletin of Latin American Research 1 Q3 
36 Business Lawyer 1 Q4 
37 California Law Review 1 Q1 
38 Canadian Slavonic Papers 1 NR 
39 China Quarterly 1 Q1 




 Journal Name Articles SCImago Ranking 
41 Crime, Law and Social Change 1 Q2 
42 Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 1 Q2 
43 Developing Economies 1 Q2 
44 Diplomacy and Statecraft 1 Q2 
45 Eastern Economic Journal 1 Q4 
46 Econometrica 1 Q1 
47 Economic Development and Cultural Change 1 Q1 
48 Economic Theory 1 Q1 
49 Economic Journal 1 Q1 
50 Economics and Politics 1 Q1 
51 Economics of Governance 1 Q1 
52 Electronic Government, An International Journal 1 Q3 
53 Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology 1 Q1 
54 Europe-Asia Studies 1 Q2 
55 European Business Law Review 1 NR 
56 European Business Organization Law 1 Q3 
57 European Journal of International Law 1 Q1 
58 European Revi. of Latin Americ. and Caribbean Studies 1 Q4 
59 European Union Politics 1 Q1 
60 Governance 1 Q1 
61 Indian Growth and Development Review 1 Q4 
62 International Journal of Middle East Studies 1 Q1 
63 International Review of Law and Economics 1 Q3 
64 Japan Forum 1 Q2 
65 Journal of Asian Studies 1 Q1 
66 Journal of Corporate Finance 1 Q1 
67 Journal of East Asian Studies 1 Q2 
68 Journal of Latin American Studies 1 Q1 
69 Journal of Legal History 1 Q2 
70 Journal of Policy Practice 1 Q3 
71 Journal of Political Economy 1 Q1 
72 Journal of Political Philosophy 1 Q1 
73 Journal of Public Economics 1 Q1 
74 Journal of the European Economic Association 1 Q1 
75 Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 Q1 
76 Legislative Studies Quarterly 1 Q1 
77 Luso Brazilian Review 1 NR 
78 Macroeconomic Dynamics 1 Q2 
79 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 1 Q3 
80 Pacific Affairs 1 Q1 
81 Party Politics 1 Q1 




 Journal Name Articles SCImago Ranking 
83 Political Science Quarterly 1 Q2 
84 Presidential Studies Quarterly 1 Q1 
85 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 1 Q1 
86 Qualitative Sociology 1 Q2 
87 Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 Q1 
88 Review of Economic Studies 1 Q1 
89 Review of Economics and Statistics 1 Q1 
90 SAIS Review of International Affairs 1 NR 
91 Social Science Journal 1 Q3 
92 Southern California Law Review 1 Q1 
93 Stanford Law Review 1 Q1 
94 The Journal of Southern History 1 Q3 
95 Virginia Law Review 1 Q1 
96 West European Politics 1 Q1 
97 Western Political Quarterly 1 Q1 
98 World Development 1 Q1 
 Total 177  
Source: Author with information from SCImago Journal & Country Rank 
(http://www.scimagojr.com/index.php). 
Q = Quartile 





A.1.2 Distribution of empirical studies on vote buying by country 
fielded 
 Country N (%) Accumulated 
1 United States 21 18.10 18.1 
2 Cross Country  14 12.07 30.2 
3 Argentina 12 10.34 40.5 
4 Brazil 8 6.90 47.4 
5 Mexico 8 6.90 54.3 
6 Thailand 6 5.17 59.5 
7 Africa (regional) 3 2.59 62.1 
8 Japan 3 2.59 64.7 
9 Latin America (regional) 3 2.59 67.2 
10 Taiwan 3 2.59 69.8 
11 Benin 2 1.72 71.6 
12 Colombia 2 1.72 73.3 
13 Ghana 2 1.72 75.0 
14 São Tomé and Principe 2 1.72 76.7 
15 Ukraine 2 1.72 78.4 
16 Venezuela 2 1.72 80.2 
17 Afghanistan 1 0.86 81.0 
18 Albania 1 0.86 81.9 
19 Australia 1 0.86 82.8 
20 Bolivia 1 0.86 83.6 
21 Costa Rica 1 0.86 84.5 
22 Germany 1 0.86 85.3 
23 Honduras 1 0.86 86.2 
24 India 1 0.86 87.1 
25 Ireland 1 0.86 87.9 
26 Jamaica 1 0.86 88.8 
27 Lebanon 1 0.86 89.7 
28 Madagascar 1 0.86 90.5 
29 Nicaragua 1 0.86 91.4 
30 Nigeria 1 0.86 92.2 
31 Paraguay 1 0.86 93.1 
32 Philippines 1 0.86 94.0 
33 Romania 1 0.86 94.8 
34 Spain 1 0.86 95.7 
35 Sri Lanka 1 0.86 96.6 
36 Uganda 1 0.86 97.4 
37 United Kingdom 1 0.86 98.3 
38 Uruguay 1 0.86 99.1 
39 Zambia 1 0.86 100.0 







A.1.3 Articles published about vote buying by journal’s domain and 
method 
Journal’s domain Empirical method 
Theoretical 
method N (%) 
(%) 
Accumulated 
Political Science 33 15 48 26.6 26.6 
Area Studies 32 7 39 21.5 48.0 
Economics 12 24 36 20.9 68.9 
Specific Affairs 19 4 23 13.6 82.5 
Law 6 2 8 4.0 86.4 
History 4 2 6 3.4 89.8 
Business 4 1 5 3.4 93.2 
Sociology 3 1 4 2.3 95.5 
Public Administrat. 2 1 3 1.7 97.2 
Anthropology 0 2 2 1.1 98.3 
Multidisciplinary 0 1 1 0.6 98.9 
Internat. Relations 0 1 1 0.6 99.4 
Social Psychology 1 0 1 0.6 100.0 






A.2 Calls from the National Hotline Service (FEPADETEL) 
 
A.2.1 Voting Cards and Lists of Electors 
 
Official Folio number: 55 
Date of the call: 13/01/2006 
Date of the incident: 13/01/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that Mrs […] and Mr 
[…], PRI candidates, are knocking residents’ doors to give them bags of 
provisions as an exchange of their vote. The user also states that these 
people ask those residents who accept the deal to sign a list in which they 
commit to vote for PRI and they take voting card’s details […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2754 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 31/05/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Toluca, State of Mexico to report that, within Jose 
Martinez de los Reyes cul-de-sac, in the neighbourhood called “San Mateo 
Otzacatipan”, the PAN mayoral candidate, Mr […], was handing bags of 
provisions to people for them to vote for PAN, asking for a copy of the 
residents’ voting card. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 13 
Date of the call: 03/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 03/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Alvaro Obregon, Mexico City to report that, according 
to some neighbours within the neighbourhood called “Olivar de los Padres, 
Mrs […] is asking people to vote for PRD local congressional candidates; 
additionally, she’s asking for a copy of people’s voting cards as an exchange 
of frost frozen turkeys […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 102 
Date of the call: 08/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 08/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Lampazos de Naranjo, Nuevo Leon to report that PRI 
activists are asking people a copy of their voting card to compile registers 
of […] PRI gubernatorial candidate’s voters on the Election Day. 






Official Folio number: 107 
Date of the call: 09/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 09/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that a thin woman, 
who’s a local market’s leader, is asking traders to collect at least five copies 
of electors’ voting cards and ensure these voters will vote for Mrs […] on 
polling day […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 368 
Date of the call: 18/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 18/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user, who claims to be a self-employed trader, calls presumably from 
Ajalpan, Puebla to report that activists lead by Mr […], a local leader of the 
association called “Antorcha Campesina”, are asking people to vote for 
PRI’s federal congressional candidate, Mrs […]; additionally, they’re asking 
for copies of people’s voting cards. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 394 
Date of the call: 20/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 20/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Coyoacan, Mexico City to report that within the 
neighbourhoods called “Carmen Cerdan” and “Emiliano Zapata”, [activists] 
are knocking residents’ doors to ask them to vote for PAN; in addition, 
they’re asking for a copy of their voting card, compiling lists […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 466 
Date of the call: 26/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 26/021/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Coxcatlan, Puebla to report that PRI 
mayoral candidate, Mr […], is collecting copies of those electors’ voting 
cards, who have promised to vote for him. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 532 
Date of the call: 01/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Alvaro Obregon, Mexico City to report that within Colina 




are handing bags of rice and beans to people for them to vote for the PRD 
Council candidate, Mr […] The user also that these people ask for a copy of 
the electors’ voting card to take the official code. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 606 
Date of the call: 06/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 06/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato to report that the 
borough mayor, Mr […] is visiting villages such as “Copales” and “La Lomita” 
to deliver bags of provisions to residents but he also asks for a copy of their 
voting card. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 737 
Date of the call: 15/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 15/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that in the Primary 
School “Juventino Rosas”, Mrs […] is asking for electors’ voting cards as an 
exchange of bags of provisions. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 782 
Date of the call: 16/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 16/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Gustavo A. Madero, Mexico City to report that within 
Primavera Street and Verano cul-de-sac, a group of people, lead by Mrs 
[…] and her husband Mr […], is giving bags of provisions to people, asking 
them to vote for PRD. The user also states that […] they’re asking for a copy 
of electors’ voting cards. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 853 
Date of the call: 18/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 12/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ayotlan, Jalisco to report that Mr […], who works for the 
borough, and Mr [...], the PAN mayoral candidate, are knocking residents’ 
doors asking for a copy of their voting card as an exchange of MX$2,000 
[£86]. The user also states that these men have already compiled quite a 
few […] 






Official Folio number: 940 
Date of the call: 23/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 20/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Valle Santiago, Guanajuato to report that within the 
village called “San Francisco Chihuindo”, PRD activists were encouraging 
people to support PRD mayoral candidate and now they’re compiling copies 
of electors’ voting cards as an exchange of blankets, bags of provisions and 
raffle tickets. The user also states that she knows this information by others 
[…] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1007 
Date of the call: 27/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 27/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlahuac, Mexico City to report that within Benitez Street, 
there were outsiders saying that if residents wanted to receive benefits from 
PRI, they should give them the details of their voting card. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1044 
Date of the call: 29/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 29/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that a few 
neighbours are asking people to vote for PRI as an exchange of bags of 
provisions; asking for as well electors’ voting cards. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1118 
Date of the call: 04/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 04/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Azcapotzalco, Mexico City to report that the local 
congressman Mr […] has been at the local park since 9am asking people to 
vote for PRD and collecting copies of people’s voting cards as an exchange 
of a bag of provisions. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1198 
Date of the call: 08/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 08/03/2012 




The user calls from Tultitlan, State of Mexico to report that two men, 
apparently leader of the association of neighbours in “Ampliacion 
Buenavista”, are delivering bags of provisions to people for them to vote for 
PRI mayoral candidate and also they’re asking for a copy of electors’ voting 
cards; they don’t give them the bags otherwise. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1242 
Date of the call: 10/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 09/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that about 9am, PRI 
activists –a candidate amongst them– were at the sports centre called 
“Gustavo Baz Prada” handing bags of provisions to people for them to 
support PRI and asking for a copy of electors’ voting cards. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1249 
Date of the call: 10/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 10/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Matamoros, Tamaulipas to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Acuario 2001”, PRI activists, Mr […] amongst them, 
are asking people to vote for PRI as an exchange of a bag of provisions; 
asking for a copy of residents’ voting cards. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1260 
Date of the call: 11/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 11/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuautitlan Izcalli, State of Mexico to report that borough 
employees are asking for electors’ voting cards and their support to PRI as 
an exchange of bottles of paint for their houses. 




Official Folio number: 1281 
Date of the call: 12/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 12/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tultitlan, State of Mexico to report that the leader of 
neighbours’ association in “Las Llanuras” was asking for electors’ voting 
cards and the support to PRI as an exchange of bags of provisions. 






Official Folio number: 1391 
Date of the call: 17/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 17/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Atizapan de Zaragoza, State of Mexico to report that 
PRI activists are handing baskets of food as an exchange of people’s 
support to PRI and a copy of their voting card. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1491 
Date of the call: 19/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 10/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Salamanca, Guanajuato to report that in a farm called 
“La Capilla”, Mr […] and Mrs […] were asking for a copy of residents’ voting 
card and their support to PRI Council candidate as an exchange of sacks of 
beans, flour and tinned food. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1546 
Date of the call: 25/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 25/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Union de San Antonio, Jalisco to report that the PRI 
mayoral candidate, Mr […], was asking for details of people’s voting cards 
and their support; as an exchange, he was giving people glasses and 
money […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1547 
Date of the call: 25/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 23/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that a neighbour 
collected a copy of the voting cards of user’s mum, promising a bag of 
provisions. The user also states that this woman has done the same with 
other residents, but she hasn’t delivered anything to anybody. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1549 
Date of the call: 25/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 25/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that Mr […], who 




asking them to vote for PRI presidential candidate […]; he’s delivering bags 
of provisions as an exchange […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1550 
Date of the call: 25/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 25/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Los Mochis, Sinaloa to report that PRI activists –Mrs 
[…] amongst them– are knocking residents’ doors to ask for a copy of the 
voting card and their support to the PRI gubernatorial candidate Mr […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1803 
Date of the call: 07/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 07/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlalnepantla, State of Mexico to report that Mrs […], 
who lives in […] is asking for a copy of people’s voting cards and their 
support to PRI mayoral candidate. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2017 
Date of the call: 19/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 19/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that of within 
the neighbourhood called “Evolucion”, Mr […] –who is a PRI activist– is 
gathering residents at his place, ask their vote for PRI and collecting a copy 
of voting cards. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2084 
Date of the call: 24/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 24/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that at the corner of 
Central Street and Cristobal Sanchez Street, PRI activists are delivering 
bags of provisions to people for them to vote for PRI, asking for a copy of 
their voting card. 
[month s before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2143 
Date of the call: 26/04/2012 




Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tapalpa, Jalisco to report that within a village called 
“Los Robles”, Mrs […] and Mr […] are asking for a copy of residents’ voting 
cards as an exchange of bags of provisions. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2182 
Date of the call: 28/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 28/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that in the local 
PRI campaign headquarters located at the corner of Chimalhuacan and 
Lago Garda Streets […], Mrs […] asked for a copy of user and other 
people’s voting cards […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2237 
Date of the call: 01/05/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/05/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that within 
the neighbourhood called “Campestre Guadalupana”, PRI activists were 
asking for residents’ voting cards, taking the details in there and then 
registering such information in a folder. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 6 
Date of the call: 11/09/2009 
Date of the incident: 11/09/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report that PRI 
activists go over the town, intimidating residents into voting for PRI and 
asking for a copy of their voting card; they take the details in there and 




Official Folio number: 118 
Date of the call: 10/06/2009 
Date of the incident: 10/06/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cordoba, Veracruz to report that within a neighbourhood 
called “San Jose de Abajo”, [unknown people] are handing bags of 
provisions to residents for them to vote for PRI’s federal congressional 
candidate, asking as well for a copy of electors’ voting card. 






Official Folio number: 327 
Date of the call: 04/06/2004 
Date of the incident: 04/07/2004 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Durango to report that PRI candidates and activists are 
knocking doors, asking for voting card’s details and forcing residents to vote 
for their party […] 
[a month before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 309 
Date of the call: 23/06/2009 
Date of the incident: 23/06/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Zinacantepec, State of Mexico to report that PRI 
activists are pushing electors into voting for PRI’s candidates, asking for a 
copy of people’s voting card […] 
[a week before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 344 
Date of the call: 17/06/2020 
Date of the incident: 14/06/2010 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tenango de Doria, Hidalgo to report that within a town 
called “San Pablo El Grande”, the two keepers of a primary and secondary 
schools are knocking residents’ door with lists in hands, in which they note 
down voting cards’ details of the people, promising some benefits to the 
community on condition that they vote for PRI’s congressional and 
gubernatorial candidates […] 
[two weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 103 
Date of the call: 02/07/2010 
Date of the incident: 14/06/2010 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Chicontepec, Veracruz to report that borough 
employees forced electors to vote for PRI, proffering them money and other 
community benefits as an exchange for it; they also asked for a copy of 
electors’ voting card. 
[two weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 772 
Date of the call: 19/10/2004 
Date of the incident: 19/10/2004 




The user calls from Zacapoaxtla, Puebla to report that [unknown activists] 
are asking residents to sign a list in which they commit to vote for PRI. As 
an exchange, these activists are promising bags of provisions. The user 
also states that residents who engage in the deal are giving a copy of their 
voting card for activists to take card’s details […] 
[weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 58 
Date of the call: 26/02/2003 
Date of the incident: 26/02/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Council candidate Mr 
[…] has been giving residents –most of them native Otomi speakers– bags 
of provisions […], asking for a copy of their voting card and forcing them to 
vote for him in the next elections […] 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2593 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 25/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Zacatecas City, Zacatecas to report that 
Mrs […], who works as a teacher for the Public Education Secretary, is 
knocking residents’ doors proffering a bag of provisions to vote for PRD; 
additionally, she asks for a copy of their voting card […] 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2662 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ixtapaluca, State of Mexico to report that [unknown 
activists] are giving people materials for construction as an exchange of 
their vote for PRI; likewise, these activists are asking for a copy of electors’ 
voting card. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2741 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Teotitlan del Valle, Oaxaca to report that at the village’s 
square, the borough mayor, Mr […] is giving people bags of provisions, 
blankets and farm animals to vote for PRI; he also asks for a copy of 
electors’ voting card […] 






Official Folio number: 2778 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that within Onix 
Street, between Agatha and Conchita Roads, in a neighbourhood called 
“Jardines del Pedregal”, [unknown people] are proffering residents MX$200 
[£9] and a bag of provisions to vote for a PRI’s senatorial candidate; asking 
for, additionally, a copy of their voting card and handing a list for residents 
to sign it. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2855 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Francisco Huehuetlan, Oaxaca to report that a local 
party leader named […] is asking people to vote for PRI; additionally, he 
asks for people’s voting card to take the details in there, proffering as an 
exchange bags of provisions. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2922 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Coacalco de Berriozabal, State of Mexico to report that 
PAN activists are giving people MX$200 [£9] to give a copy of their voting 
card. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3039 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that unknown 
people have knocked her door proffering a bag of provisions for her to vote 
for PRI and give them a copy of her voting card. The user also states that 
she turned down the deal. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3089 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 




Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Campeche City, Campeche to report that 
Mrs […] has knocked residents’ doors to proffer them MX$500 [£22] to vote 
for a candidate; she with is doing this with a list, asking residents to sign it. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3243 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Sebastian Atlahapa, Tlaxcala to report that within 
Insurgentes Street, in a neighbourhood called “La Laguna”, members of a 
family whose last name is […] promised user’s mum a bag of provisions to 
vote for PAN; they additionally asked for a copy of her mom’s voting card to 
take the details in there. The user also states she knows about other 
residents who have given such copy of their voting card. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 39 
Date of the call: 06/06/2015 
Date of the incident: 06/06/2015 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that right now, a gathering is 
taking place in a building with PRI’s logos in which [activists] are collecting 
a copy of attendees’ voting cards and giving them money in exchange for it. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 102 
Date of the call: 02/07/2010 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Chiapa de Corzo, Chiapas to report that a 
person is giving [people] bags of provisions as an exchange of their vote 
and this person also asks for a copy of people’s voting card. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 125 
Date of the call: 29/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Penjamo, Guanajuato to report Mrs […] is proffering 
people MX$1000 to vote for PRI’s presidential candidate, asking for a copy 
of their voting card and promising to deliver the money after the Election 
Day. 






Official Folio number: 240 
Date of the call: 30/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that a tall, 
curly haired, brown skinned person, perhaps on her late 40s, using a 
walking stick, is buying votes for PRI for MX$200 [£9]. The user states that 
this person knocked the door of user’s cousins, proffering the money and 
asking for a copy of their voting card. The user also claims to know about 
other residents who have gone to some places to deliver a copy of the voting 
card and collect such amount of money […] 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 249 
Date of the call: 03/07/2009 
Date of the incident: 03/07/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Luis Potosi City, San Luis Potosi to report that PAN 
activists are buying votes for MX$500 [£22], delivering bags of provisions to 
people and asking for a copy of their voting card. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 287 
Date of the call: 29/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Copala, Guerrero to report that [activists] are proffering 
people money […] and materials for construction to vote for a political party, 
asking for a copy of their voting card. The user also states that both parties 
PRI and PAN have been conducting these activities within the 
neighbourhood […] 
[days before polling days] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 294 
Date of the call: 27/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 27/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Campeche, Campeche to report that within the area 
called “Ah Kim Pech”, local political leaders have been taking residents to a 
campaign headquarters located in Ramon Pina Chan Street, proffering 
people MX$1,000 [£43] and other goods for a copy of their voting card, 
increasing this reward MX$500 [£22] for each extra copy they deliver. The 
user also states that these leaders make people sign for it […] 







A.2.2 Proffering Rewards 
 
Official Folio number: 206 
Date of the call: 06/07/2003 
Date of the incident: 22/05/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Guanajuato to report that five unknown people, 
presumably for PRI, offered him MX$400 [£17] to vote for PRI’s federal 
congressional candidate […] 
[two months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 303 
Date of the call: 19/06/2003 
Date of the incident: 09/03/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that the federal 
congressional candidate, Mrs […], is visiting electors’ places […] proffering 




Official Folio number: 436 
Date of the call: 05/07/2003 
Date of the incident: 05/07/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Veracruz, Veracruz to report that PRI’s federal 
congressional candidate Mrs […] is offering breakfast for free and bags of 
provisions on July the 6th [in the area located] in Sur 11 between Oriente 
20 and 22, City Centre. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 314 
Date of the call: 04/07/2003 
Date of the incident: 31/05/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Canutillo, Durango to report that PRI’s candidates Mr 
[…] and Mr […] have been buying votes of people of the community. They’re 
proffering Day Nursery children’s parents materials for constructing […] The 
user refuses to go to a police agency to report this. 
[about month and a half before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 528 
Date of the call:  05/09/2004 
Date of the incident: 26/08/2004 




The user calls from Ignacio de Llave, Veracruz to report that PRI activists 
are buying votes, proffering MX$300 [£13]. The user doesn’t want to give 
names because of fear. 
[a week before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1027 
Date of the call: 14/11/2004 
Date of the incident: 14/11/2004 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlaxcala to report that PRI activists are buying votes 





Official Folio number: 1076 
Date of the call: 03/07/2005 
Date of the incident: 09/12/2004 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the state of Mexico to report that within her 
neighbourhood, every time elections are held, PRI activists buy votes, 
offering bags of provisions, materials for construction, food and drinks. The 
user also states that she’s never seen IFE, FEPADE and IEE [electoral 




Official Folio number: 210 
Date of the call: 03/07/2005 
Date of the incident: 03/05/2005 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from a neighbourhood of the State of Mexico to report that 
within the neighbourhood “El Salado”, PRI activists, Mr […] amongst them, 
are knocking door by door proffering people sacks of cement to vote for PRI 
on the Election Day. Activists are also asking people to sign a list, which 
states they’re willing to […] 
[two months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2464 
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 28/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from a market of Mexico City to report that the PRD local 
candidate Mr […] has proffered the user MX$500 [£21] to vote for him. 
[three days before polling day] 
 
 




Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from a neighbourhood of Jalisco to report that Mr […] has 
offered MX$500 [£21] to vote for PRI. The user states that he doesn’t have 
more information […] 
[three days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2471 
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tecate, Baja California to report that Mrs […] offers 
[people] bags of provisions to vote for PRI within the neighbourhood called 
Terrazas del Rio. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2482 
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 28/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tierra Blanca, Veracruz to report that Mrs […], Mr […], 
Mr […] and Mr […] are proffering [people] MX$500 [£21] to vote for PRI. The 
user clarifies that the offer was given to her neighbour nicknamed “Poli” […] 
[four days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2498 
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/05/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuernavaca, Morelos to report that the PRI’s 
congressional candidate Mrs […] is proffering [people] loans to vote for her. 
[about a month before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2502  
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 27/05/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Torreon, Coahuila to report that within the block of flats 
“Manhattan”, PRD activists were offering [people] scholarships and 
pensions. 
[about a month before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2504 




Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuautitlan, Jalisco to report that Mr […] is proffering 
[people] money to vote for PRI on July the 2nd. The user also states that 
this person is being investigated by police for embezzlement as he was 
presumably a state employee. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2508 
Date of the call:  
Date of the incident: 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from General Escobedo, Nuevo Leon to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “La Unidad”, [unknown people] are proffering 
residents bags of provisions and school supplies to vote for PRI. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2512 
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that Mrs […], 
who lives in […] is proffering [people] between MX$50 [£2] and MX$500 
[£21] to vote [for a political party] […] 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 
Date of the call: 
Date of the incident: 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that PRI 
activists are knocking doors, proffering people money to vote for PRI’s 
candidate. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2571 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Oyameles, State of Mexico to report that ‘AMLO’ [PRD’s 
presidential candidate] activists are proffering bags of provisions and 
MX$250 [£11]; they also made electors sign a list a few days before. 
[one day before polling day] 
 
 




Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that PRD 
activists are offering [people] bags of provisions to vote for this party. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2681 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 28/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Champoton, Campeche to report that Mr […], who is 
Secretary General of […] offered unemployed teachers some job positions 
to vote for […] 
[a week before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2691 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from, Magdalena Contreras, Mexico City to report that PRD’s 
candidates, Mr […] and Ms […], located in […], are inviting those who walk 
near them free meals today and proffering MX$650 [£29] to vote for them. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2699 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Veracruz to report that Ms […], PAN’s representative 
within the community, is proffering money to vote for PAN. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2760 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 28/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Acatlan de Perez, Oaxaca to report that the local mayor, 
Mr […] is taken sacks of cement to a bunch of neighbourhoods within the 
borough, asking people to vote for PRI’s candidates […] 












Official Folio number: 2762 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that a day ago within the 
Housing Estate called “Moctezuma”, Ms […], President of […] offered 
people a five-gallon bottle of paint to vote for PRI’s candidates. The user 
also states that she refused to accept such a reward, receiving threats from 
this woman as a result. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2764 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ixtapan de la Sal, State of Mexico to report that 
[unknown people] are knocking doors proffering [residents] money to vote 
for PRI or threatening them otherwise. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2856 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 28/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Mexico” in Loma de Madrid, local PRI activists are 
knocking doors, proffering [people] money to vote for such political party. 
[four days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2858 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] are 
proffering [electors] MX$200 [£9] to vote for PRD’s congressional candidate 
[…] 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2862 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 




The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that Ms […] 
is proffering to elderly people house water tanks, bags of provisions and 
extra money in pensions to vote for PRD. She holds meetings, promising 
more rewards as she’s got support from the local council. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2881 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Chihuahua to report that within the street 
“Agustin Melgar” […], Mr […] is proffering money to vote for PRD. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2892 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 28/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ixtamalteca, Veracruz to report that Mr […], former 
Mayor and current employee of the Federal Agency […], is offering 
cheques, which he’ll presumably give to those electors who vote for PAN 
[…] 
[four days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2910 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Huicholes”, Lazaro Cardenas, PRI activists are 
offering [people] between MX$200 and MX$500 [£9-22] to vote for PAN’s 
presidential candidate. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2913 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Mexico City to report that unknown people knocked her 
door offering MX$1000 [£43] to vote for PRI, clarifying she’d receive 50% 
before getting to the polling station and the rest after casting the vote. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2943 




Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Vicente Guerrero, Tabasco to report that in the street 
called “Poblado C 29”, Mr […] is proffering [people] money to vote for a party 
[name not mentioned]. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2945 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Acapulco, Guerrero to report that within the area of the 
Regional Military Hospital, opposite to the Preparatory School 17, Mr […], 
presumably army officer, approached [people] for asking whether they were 
going to polling station; proffering electors MX350 [£15] to vote for PRI 
candidates. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2950 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Guaymas, Sonora to report that within the Guaymas 
Valley […], Mr […], Mr […] Mr […] and Mr […] are proffering people MX$200 
[£9] to vote for PRI. The user also states that he’s got witnesses, who are 
willing to formalise the report. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number:2977 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from El Salto, Jalisco to report that Ms […], who is local PRI 
representative is offering people a bag of provisions, free meal and MX$100 
[£4] to vote for PRI in her place of residence, located the street called […] 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3017 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Housing Estate called “Providencia” to report that Mr 
[…], mayoral candidate, is pressing people and offering them MX$700 [£30] 
to vote for him; he’s knocking doors within the whole housing estate […] The 
user states she’s got a witness and evidence. 






Official Folio number: 3018 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Puebla City, Puebla to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Libertad”, [unknown people] are proffering MX$600 
[£26] to vote for PRI 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3028 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Coscosmatepec, Veracruz to report that Mr […], who 
lives in Cordoba, is buying votes for PRI, offering money and promising 
public infrastructure. The user also states that this man has been conducting 
these activities from the beginning of the current State Administration. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3034 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon to report that 
within the neighbourhoods “Villareal” and “Francisco Cardenas”, Mr […] is 
buying votes for PAN, proffering [people] a certain amount of money. The 
user also states that the son of the candidate Mr […] is buying votes as well. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3035 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tabasco to report that within the are called “Ingenio 
Santa Rosa”, PRI [activists] are offering [electors] MX$200 [£9] and a 
provisions’ voucher as an exchange of their vote. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3041 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Chalco, State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] 




marked for PRD. This is happening within Chalco and the surrounding 
areas.  
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3075 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Matamoros, Tamaulipas to report that PRI activists are 
giving bags of provisions and proffering [to people] and proffering free 
breakfast for tomorrow morning [polling day] […] 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3108 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report that Ms […], who might 
work for the local government or at local PRI headquarters, is proffering 
[electors] up to MX$500 [£22] to vote for PRI. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3139 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Madero City, Tamaulipas to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Vicente Guerrero”, Ms […], who leads the local 
organisation of neighbours, is offering [people] MX$300 [£13] to vote for 
PRI. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3150 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 21/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Atzalan, Veracruz to report that staff of the Municipality 
have used state resources to promote political parties. The user also states 
that these employees were proffering MX$500 [£21] and materials of 
construction as an exchange of the vote. 
[about two weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3159 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 




Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tecuala, Nayarit to report that within the indigenous 
community called “Paso Hondo”, Mr […] is handing beer in exchange for 




Official Folio number: 3185 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tizayuca, Hidalgo to report that within the community 
called “El Carmen”, Mr […] and Mr […] are offering electors free breakfast 




Official Folio number: 3327 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Zumpango, Tlaxcala to report that Mr […], PAN activist, 
is proffering [people] bags of provisions to vote for PAN. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3426 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Santiago Totolimixpan, Jalisco to report that presumably 
PRI activists are [buying] votes, giving [electors] bags of provisions and 




Official Folio number: 3469 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that a group of people 




Official Folio number: 3475 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 




The user calls from San Pedro Actopan, Mexico City to report that within 
Hidalgo Street […], PRI and PRD activists have been buying votes since 
Friday the 30th, offering MX$500 [£22] the former and MX$150 [£6] the 
latter. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3524 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that PRI activists, all 
women, are visiting people’s places since early morning, proffering bags of 




Official Folio number: 3744 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Benito Juarez, Quintana Roo to report that within the 
Housing Estate called Framboyanes […], PRI activists are visiting people’s 




Official Folio number: 3772 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from The Port of Veracruz to report that Ms […], nicknamed 




Official Folio number: 3835 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Axapusco, State of Mexico to report that within the 
neighbourhoods named “Purificacion” and “Centro”, two activists on a bike 





Official Folio number: 3859 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 




Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz to report that Ms […] and Ms […] are 




Official Folio number: 3916 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from El Grande, Jalisco to report that within the section 2453, 
between streets called “Huerta” and “Zaragoza”, San Sebastian 
neighbourhood, a woman, chunky, short haired, brown skin, is proffering 
[electors] bags of provisions [and] MX$200 [£9] to vote for the PAN 




Official Folio number: 4025 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that Ms […], who is a 




Official Folio number: 4027 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Toluca, State of Mexico to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Tlacolpa” opposite to a pharmacy located in 
“Barranca” Street 140-A, the President of local Residents Association, 
whose last name is […], is offering paint and roofing impermeable products 




Official Folio number: 4032 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Torreon, Coahuila to report that within the 
neighbourhood “Eugenio Aguirre Benavides”, [unknown people] are offering 








Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that five passengers 
on a new van, type pick-up Ford Lobo, number plate […], are proffering 
[electors] money in exchange for people’s vote; it’s been doing this for a 





Official Folio number: 4087 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Puebla City, Puebla to report that within the streets “21 
Norte” and “52/54 Poniente”, Ms […] is making a group of men sign a list 




Official Folio number: 4118 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Mexico City to report that the local congressional 




Official Folio number: 4124 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tecamac, State of Mexico to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Ojo de Agua”, PRI activists are [buying] votes for 




Official Folio number: 4224 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cosoleacaque, Veracruz to report that within the 
neighbourhood “Patria Libre”, an individual with a copy of the electors’ 
register is knocking doors, proffering [electors] MX$200 and MX$500 [£9-
22] to vote for PRI. The user also states that he’s willing to make an official 







Official Folio number: 4335 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that Ms […] is 




Official Folio number: 4346 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Juan Aldama, Tabasco to report that [unknown people] 




Official Folio number: 4347 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Puebla City, Puebla to report that within the 
communities “Huauchinango”, “Huilacapixla” and “Cuaxinca”, PRI activists 
are proffering [residents] MX$300 [£13] to vote for PRI. The user also states 
that she’s already sent a report by email stating she was offered roofing 




Official Folio number: 4377 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Puebla City, Puebla to report that within the community 
“Xalapa de Villas Oaxaca”, about fifteen people are proffering [electors] 





Official Folio number: 4461 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz presumably, to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “10 de Mayo”, some activists [not specifying party] 




user also states that this has been happening since yesterday and these 
activists look like gangsters, which scare residents. 
[a day before polling day and ongoing] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4525 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Pedro, Veracruz to report that within the community 
called “La Concordia”, [unnkonwn people] are proffering [residents] MX£30 




Official Folio number: 4533 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Calderita, Quintana Roo to report that PRI activists are 




Official Folio number: 4535 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Heroica Ciudad de Huajuapan de Leon, Oaxaca to 
report that within the neighbourhood called “Alta Vista de Juárez”, Mr […] is 





Official Folio number: 4537 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Acatlan de Perez Figueroa, Oaxaca to report that Ms 
[…] is buying votes, proffering [electors] MX$100 [£4] to vote for PRI. The 




Official Folio number: 4550 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 




The user calls from San Martín Coapaxtongo, State of Mexico to report that 
within the town called “Millan Rogel” PRI activists are offering [electors] 




Official Folio number: 4679 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlalpan, Mexico City to report that when walking along 
“Paseo del Pedregal Street”, in the neighbourhood “Jardines de la 
Montana”, PRD activists offered her a blank envelope; then, after opening 
it, the user realised there was money in it. The activists asked her to vote 
for PRD. The user also states she gave the envelope back but there were 




Official Folio number: 4697 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Puerto Chichulup, Yucatan to report that PRI activists 





Official Folio number: 4811 
Date of the call: 03/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that PAN activists 
are inviting lads to […], promising money on condition that they mobilise 
and encourage people to vote for PAN during the Election Day. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4831 
Date of the call: 03/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Agualeguas, Nuevo Leon to report that within the 
shopping arcade called “Mager” located in town centre, Mr […] Mayor of 
Agualeguas ordered Mr […] to offer the user MX$4000 [£173] to vote for 
PRI […] 






Official Folio number: 4928 
Date of the call: 10/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Hidalgo del Parral, Chihuahua to report that Mr […], who 
lives in […] was proffering people MX$1000 [£43] to vote for PAN. 
[three days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4938 
Date of the call: 11/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlaxcala City, Tlaxcala to report that Mr […], Public 
Office […], and his wife, Ms […] were offering elderly people MX$100 [£4] 
to vote for PAN on July the 1st. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4944 
Date of the call: 11/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ixtlahuacan del Rio, Jalisco to report that within the 
community called “San Nicolas”, the Mayor of the town Mr […] was 
supporting illegally PRI’s candidates on July the 2nd [polling day]. He was 




Official Folio number: 4959 
Date of the call: 13/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 05/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Chiapa de Corzo, Chiapas to report that within the 
central square called Angel Albino Corza, Municipality’s employees are […] 
proffering people MX500 [£21] to vote for the Coalition PRI-PVEM […] 
[about two months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 9 
Date of the call: 03/07/2009 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Jalisco to report that the candidate Mr […] met electors 
on July the 2nd in the main square, giving them bags of provisions and 
MX$500 [£22] to vote for him. 






Official Folio number: 12 
Date of the call: 06/06/2015 
Date of the incident: 06/06/2015 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tuxpan, Michoacan to report that, around 3pm, PRD 
candidate’s people were proffering three vouchers entitling people to sacks 
of cement and [other materials for construction] to vote for PRD. The user 
also states that he’s received these vouchers […] 
[about a month before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 21 
Date of the call: 05/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 05/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Teoloyucan, State of Mexico to report that [unknown 
people] are offering brokers up to MX$1000 [£43] to mobilise electors. There 
are about thousand people gathered […] 
[about a month before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 199 
Date of the call: 30/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tihuatlan, Veracruz to report that the activists, 
presumably from the Organisation called “Antorcha”, are offering [people] 
MX$1300 [£56] to vote PRI. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 268 
Date of the call: 01/07/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that, a friend of him 
has [posted] on his Facebook page that within the electoral precinct 22, 
activists are offering elderly people MX$3000 [£130] and a house water tank 
to vote in a special district [polling stations in which electors from different 
precincts are allowed to cast the vote], far away from their original places, 
helping them as well with the transportation. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 325 
Date of the call: 01/07/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Soledad de Graciano Sanchez, San Luis Potosi to report 




Street, is driving a black van with no number plate and offering [people] 




Official Folio number: 354 
Date of the call: 25/05/2015 
Date of the incident: 25/05/2015 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Hueytamalco, Puebla to report that an [unknown] person 
offered the user MX$5000 [£210] to gather people willing to vote for PAN 
[…] 
[about a month before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 274 
Date of the call: 24/06/2010 
Date of the incident: 18/06/2010 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Pisa Flores, Hidalgo to report that within the 
neighbourhood “La Arena”, [unknown people] are gathering settlers, 
proffering bags of provisions, materials for construction to vote for PRI. The 
user also states that these people are compiling lists of names of those 
settlers who have agreed to the offer […] 
[about two weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 345 
Date of the call: 01/07/2013 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2013 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Andres Cholula, Puebla to report that [unknown 




Official Folio number: 355 
Date of the call: 25/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 25/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within the 
square called “30-30”, [unknown people] are collecting documents of those 
residents willing to vote for PRI, proffering materials for construction. 
[about a week before polling day] 
 
 
A.2.3 Involving State Employees and Agencies 
 
Official Folio number: 189 




Date of the incident: 12/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Fernando, Chiapas to report that Mrs […], who is a 
sister of the PRI’s candidate Mrs […], is using state resources and handing 
bags of provision to people on condition they vote for her sister. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 281 
Date of the call: 16/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 16/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user, who claims to work for the Direction of Protection Against Sanitary 
Risks at the Local Health Secretary, calls from Tapachula, Chiapas to report 
that deputy directors, Mr […] amongst them, are forcing employees to 
contribute to PRI’s campaigns by delivering bags of provisions, t-shirts and 
taking people to rallies. They threaten these employees with dismissal if 
they refuse to do so […] The user also states that Mr […] and Mr […], who 
were threatened, are willing to appeal as character witnesses. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 360 
Date of the call: 18/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 18/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that [unknown people] are giving bags of provisions 
opposite to his house. The user also mentions that the place where this is 
happening is a local office of PRD.  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 531 
Date of the call: 01/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlaquepaque, Jalisco to report that Mrs […], who’s in 
charge of the local DIF [a state institution], has given bags of provisions to 
elderly people enroled on the institution’s programmes, conditioning this 
delivery to the support to PRI […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 557 
Date of the call: 02/02/2012 
Date of the incident: Unknown 
Description of the Incident: 
The user, who claims to work for the Local Environment Secretary, calls 




[employees] to visit houses and compile lists of those state programmes 
recipients who support PRI, promising the delivery of bags of provisions. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1085 
Date of the call: 02/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 28/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Agua Prieta, Sonora to report that within a rally of the 
candidate Mrs […], activists were handing bags of provisions presumably 
taken from DIF [a state institution].  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1193 
Date of the call: 08/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 08/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within 
Amapolas Street in a neighbourhood called “Golondrinas”, Mr […] is 
threatening recipients of state programmes with excluding them from the 
benefit if they don’t support PRI.  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1424 
Date of the call: 19/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 16/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Santiago Tulantepec, Hidalgo to report that about 10pm 
Mrs […], Mr […] and Mr […], former Mayors, were knocking doors within the 
neighbourhoods called “2 de Mayo” and “Alvaro Obregon”, giving bags of 
provisions, which apparently belong to recipients of state programmes, 
asking people to reflect upon their vote to PRI. The user also states that 
these people were encouraging residents to go to PRI local office to support 
campaign activities. The user wants to report that Mr […], who works for a 
federal state programme called “Oportunidades” has said to recipients they 
would lose the benefits in case PRI’s candidate didn’t win as this party 
makes it possible […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1542 
Date of the call: 25/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 25/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from the State of Mexico to report that a nice of 
him, who works for the local government, has commented about the 




niece applied for the benefits, an officer said that although recipients receive 
monthly MX$500 [£22], this amount would increase up to MX$800 [£35] if 
Mr […], [the presidential candidate] won the election. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1767 
Date of the call: 04/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 04/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that [government officials apparently] are handing 
roofing metal sheets, which presumably belong to a state programme on 
earthquakes. However, they are giving these materials only to PRI 
supporters. The user mentions she doesn’t know whether or not there is an 
official enrolment list […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1887 
Date of the call: 13/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 12/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that outside of a 
state dairy, located in the neighbourhood called “Rio Hondo”, a few 
[unknown] people were handing plastic buckets with PRI’s logo, asking 
people to vote for this party. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1899 
Date of the call: 13/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 12/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Michac, Puebla to report that [apparently state officers] 
delivered state programme’s bags of provisions to unregistered recipients 
who support PAN presidential candidate, Mrs […] 
[no polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2033 
Date of the call: 20/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 20/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that an employee of DIF [state institution] named Mr 
[…] is delivering bags of provision –presumably from a state programme– 
only to PAN supporters, excluding legitimate recipients from the benefits. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 




Date of the call: 27/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 27/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that [unknown people] are giving people bags of 
provisions and materials for construction, promoting PRD. The one in 
charge of this is Mr […], who is Director of Agriculture and Livestock 
Development. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2218 
Date of the call: 30/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 30/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that employees of the Direction General of Social 
Development are delivering children toys to people, promoting the PRI 
presidential candidate. The user requested the address of the email service 
to add to this report videos she’s got. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2917 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Mazatan, Chiapas to report that mayor’s staff are giving 
bags of provisions in the streets through a speaker, on behalf of a state 
programme called “Vivienda Digna”. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
A.2.4 Delivering Rewards 
 
Official Folio number: 604 
Date of the call: 06/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2011 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that PRI activists visited 
his places to say that if they voted for PRI’s gubernatorial candidate, Mr […], 
they would give them a gift token called “La Efectiva” being worth up to 
MX$1,800 [£79], which would be available once this candidate won the 
2012 election. However, up to the date, they haven’t fulfilled this promise.  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2002 
Date of the call: 18/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 18/04/2012 




The user calls from Benito Juarez, Mexico City to report that since he runs 
a stand within a trading passage between the shops “Sam’s Club” and 
“Walmart”, opposite to the shopping arcade called “Plaza Universidad”, the 
leader of the traders’ association Mrs […] asked the user to support PAN 
senatorial candidate Mrs […] by handing household utensils such as vases, 
mops and brooms, which would be covered by candidate’ staff afterwards.  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 400 
Date of the call: 19/03/2009 
Date of the incident: 19/03/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlahuac, Mexico City to report that the borough mayor 
has organised a party in the night club called “EL Toro Loco”, asking 
borough employees to attend the party for free on condition that they voted 
for PRD. The user also states that this man has been using illegally state 
resources to help PRD’s [candidates].  
[months after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 28 
Date of the call: 04/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 13/11/2011 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls [presumably] from Michoacán to report that, during the polling 
day, PRI activists handed MX$2500 [£109] to people to vote for the PRI’s 
candidate. 
[months after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 90 
Date of the call: 06/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 06/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Hidalgo to report that PRI activists are handing gift 
tokens to partisans, which can be exchanged in several shops […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 709 
Date of the call: 14/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 14/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Kalacmul, Campeche to report that the delegate of the 
SAGARPA [a federal institution], Mr […] has been using official cars to hand 
bags of provisions with the photo of the senatorial candidate Mr […] 






Official Folio number: 798 
Date of the call: 17/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 17/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that the 
administrator of the block of flats she lives, Mrs […], has said to tenants that 
local congressional candidate Mr […] would hold a rally, in which he will 
deliver sacks of cement […] The user mentions that this is happening in 
Magnolias Street, within a neighbourhood called San Mateo Nopala.  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 846 
Date of the call: 18/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 18/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that in the block of 
flats she lives, located on Magnolia Street, within a neighbourhood called 
San Mateo Nopala, the administrator has asked tenants to attend a PRI’s 
rally, in which they would receive sacks of cement. The user also states that 
the rally will be held by the PRI congressional candidate, Mr […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 951 
Date of the call: 24/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 24/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tonala, Jalisco to report that Mrs […] is delivering bags 
of provisions amongst other goods to residents of the borough.  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1002 
Date of the call: 27/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 27/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that [unknown people] have been giving bags of 
provisions to electors for them to support PRD very early.  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1041 
Date of the call: 29/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 29/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that [unknown people] were handing about half ton 
of cement to people for them to support a congressional candidate. The 
user also states that he knows neither where the material comes from nor 




[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1053 
Date of the call: 01/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that Mrs […], who is an influential individual despite 
not holding any public post, is giving people materials for construction such 
as water tanks, roofing metal sheets as well as bags of provisions for them 
to vote for PRI.  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1104 
Date of the call: 03/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 03/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that [unknown people] are delivering vegetables to 
people for them to attend a PRD’s rally.  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1503 
Date of the call: 22/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 21/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Villa de Allende, State of Mexico to report that [unknown 
people] were delivering gift tokens and bags of provisions to those who [on 
July the 7th, 2011] voted for the mayoral candidate Mrs […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1708 
Date of the call: 30/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 30/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from the State of Mexico to report that [unknown 
people] are delivering materials for construction such as cement on behalf 
of a candidate [the user ignores the name and the party]. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1960 
Date of the call: 17/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 17/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that Mrs […] is giving 
people bags of provisions asking them to vote for PRI presidential, 




[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1962 
Date of the call: 17/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 17/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that, in Reforma 
Street within the neighbourhood called “Tolantongo”, Mr […] and Mrs […] 
are giving people bags of provisions for them to vote for PRI. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1987 
Date of the call: 18/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 18/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuautitlan Izcalli, State of Mexico to report that Mr […], 
who works as a supervisor at the local borough […], has offered a bag of 
provisions monthly to employees of a shop called “FAMSA” on condition of 
they voted for PAN. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2043 
Date of the call: 21/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 21/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls apparently from Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon to report that PRI 
activists are giving people bags of provisions and MX$20 [£0.88] to support 
PRI by committing themselves to collect lists of at least 10 potential voters. 
The user also states that the vehicle, which activists are driving is a Silver 
Ford Escort number plate FEX 3217. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2220 
Date of the call: 30/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 29/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that within a religious mass, PRI activists were 
handing rosaries with the image of the PRI mayoral candidate. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 13 
Date of the call: 29/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 08/03/2006 




The user calls from Toluca, State of Mexico to report that within the closing 
rally of the campaign, [PRI activists] gave people gift tokens a, which can 
be exchanged for goods in the chain of shops called “Soriana” […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 565 
Date of the call: 02/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 02/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Hidalgo to report that [unknown people] are handing 
bags of provisions, bed blankets and pennants. The user also states that 
about 500 people have gathered around a van that has just arrived, which 
is full of bags of provisions […] 
[weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 192 
Date of the call: 20/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 20/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Guadalajara, Jalisco to report that [a party’s] 
gubernatorial candidate has been handing gift tokens called “La 
Jaliscience”, which can be exchanged for MX$1,500 [£66] from March 2013, 
only if he wins.  
[weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 251 
Date of the call: 27/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 27/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 27/06/2012 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that outside of a 
hospital, [unknown people] are handing buckets and caps to people for them 
to vote for PRI in the coming presidential elections. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 28 
Date of the call:  12/05/2010 
Date of the incident: 11/05/2010 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Pluma Hidalgo, Oaxaca to report that the borough 
mayor ran a rally, in which bought votes, paying MX$500 [£22] and 
delivering bags of provisions. The user also states that this man offered 
students from the State Institute of A Level Studies to increase their mark 
to rally’s attendees.  






Official Folio number: 2952 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Villa Nazareno, Durango to report that Mr […] visited 
user’s place, located on Morelos Street within the neighbourhood called 
“Ferrocarril”, to deliver a bag of provisions on condition that he voted for 
PAN. This man also mentioned that on the Election Day the user could have 
breakfast for free after going to polls.  
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 29 
Date of the call: 29/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tomoac, Morelos to report that the borough mayor is 
visiting people’s places to give them MX$1,000 [£44] and promise them 
farm animals to those who vote for PVEM.  
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1373 
Date of the call: 16/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 16/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Hidalgo to report that [officers] are holding 
intentionally deliveries of state programmes until the day after polling day 
once they ensure that recipients have voted PAN.  
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2557 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Centla, Tabasco to report that within the neighbourhood 
called “Alvaro Obregon”, a teacher named Mr […] and a councillor named 
Mr […] are handing bags of provisions and MX$1,000 [£44] to people asking 
them to vote for PRI. The user also states that about 150 people have 
already gathered there. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2596 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 




The user calls from Salto del Agua, Chiapas to report that borough police 
[officers in] cars are delivering bags of provisions. The user ignores more 
details as someone else has mentioned in the street. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2647 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 26/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Bolanos, Jalisco to report that neighbours have found 
lorries full of sacks of cement and bags of provisions within indigenous 
areas. The user also states they presumably gather these people to buy 
their vote as handing goods […] The user mentions that he’s already 
reported this to a police station with the investigation number AP225/2006 
but he doesn’t trust local police bodies as he believes local state employees 
are involved in the delivery. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2669 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tecamachalco, State of Mexico to report that PRI 
activists a giving people sacks of cement and other goods for free as an 
exchange of their vote for PRI. This happened in Narciso Mendoza Street 
5-L13, a neighbourhood called “Ampliacion”. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2671 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Abasolo, Guanajuato to report that Mr […], who is a PRI 
candidate is handing cheques and other goods within the religious mass. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2798 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 25/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlacolula, Veracruz to report that Mr […], who works as 
a councillor for the borough, gave materials for construction to those people 
who declared electoral support for PRI. The user also states he ignores 
where the goods come from. 






Official Folio number: 2817 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Pedro Pochutla, Oaxaca to report that within the 
community called “La Pluma Hidalgo”, Mr […], who is the mayor, is handing 
bags of provisions and materials for construction to people for them to vote 
for PRI. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2840 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within the public 
market of the neighbourhood called “Ciudad Azteca” […], PRI activists are 
giving bags of provisions to people as an exchange of their vote for Mr […], 
who is PRI local congressional candidate. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2848 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that PRD activists 
are getting lots of bags of provisions into a parties’ venue called “Pili”. The 
user also believes that these activists will deliver such bags from this site. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2894 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Villaflores, Chiapas to report that the mayor’s wife Mrs 
[…] gave jackets and bed blankets for free to people, saying they should 
vote for the PAN presidential candidate. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2947 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that PRI activists, 
driving a newish green pick-up van number plate XP-63169, are handing 




states that this is happening within the area of “Banderillas” in a football 
pitch called “La Parcela”.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2953 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Valle de Bravo, State of Mexico to report that Mr […] 
and Mr […] are giving people gift tokens on condition that they voted for a 
political party; these tokens can be apparently exchanged in a local shop 
before 8pm.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2960 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Encarnacion de Diaz, Jalisco to report that PRI 
candidate, Mr […], is paying people MX$200 [£9] to vote for him. The user 
also states that [unknown people] will print fake ballot papers to this 
candidate.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3031 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Zautla, Puebla to report that about 6pm within the area, 
there are some vehicles apparently full of bags of provisions, which have 
been handing to people walking around for them to vote for PRI.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3086 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tultitlan, State of Mexico to report that a house, located 
in the neighbourhood called “Prado Norte”, PRD activists are giving people 
bags of provisions to vote for PRD, making them signing lists.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3094 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 




Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Bolanos, Jalisco to report that within the are called 
“Sierra Huichola”, the borough mayor, Mr […], and Mr […] are buying votes 
for PRI; they’re giving people bags of provisions and materials for 
construction such as metal beams and sacks of cement.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3106 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Acatlan de Perez Figueroa, Oaxaca to report that the 
borough mayor, Mr […], his wife, Mrs […] and Mr […], who works for the 
borough as well, are handing bags of provisions to people for them to vote 
for PRI […] 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3131 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that PRI [activists] are 
giving people bags of provisions, materials for construction and between 
MX$ 300 [£13] and MX$500 [£22] to vote for PRI.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3128 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tijuana, Baja California to report that within Monte Tirich 
Sur Street, located in the neighbourhood called “Las Cumbres”, the owner 
of a Local Pharmacy, Mrs […], runs meeting with people and PRI 
candidates, in which they hand materials for construction.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3131 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Huehuetoca, State of Mexico to report that the members 
of the family […], two brothers and a man named Mr […], who lives in […], 
within the neighbourhood called “Ex-hacienda de Xalpa”, are handing bags 
of provisions to people from a warehouse, asking them to vote for PRI 




reported this to a police station near them but officers don’t want to 
investigate anything.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3132 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Huehuetoca, State of Mexico to report that within the 
area of San Miguel Jagueyes, Mrs […], PRI legislative council candidate’s 
wife, is paying people between MX$100 [£4] and MX$1000 [£44] to vote for 
PRI.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3141 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Pueblo Juarez, Colima to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Jardines del Llano” near the area “Higuera”, PRI 
activists so-called “red wave” are knocking doors to deliver bags of 
provisions to residents, pushing them to vote for PRI. The user also states 
that he’s taken photos of these people he wants to add to this report.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3143 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Zacatecas to report that Mr […], who 
works as an official at the borough, is handing money as an exchange of 
people’s vote for PRD.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3144 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Zacatecas to report that Mr […], who’s an 
official at the borough, is knocking doors and handing money [to residents].  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3164 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 




Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Guerrero to report that someone has commented about 
a warehouse from which a local councillor, whose last name is “Abundis”, 
is handing roofing sheets and bags of provisions […] 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3172 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report that a neighbour of her 
has mentioned that within a parties’ venue called “Grupo Varsa”, opposite 
to Tabasco Memorial, PRI activists are handing bags of provisions and 
MX$100 [£4] to attendees for them to vote for PRI.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3173 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tihuatlan, Veracruz to report that Mr […], who’s a 
member of the so-called group “Antorcha Campesina”, is buying votes by 
delivering bags of provisions to people […] 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3179 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that in Lino Celaya Luria 
Street 22, [unknown people] are handing bags of provisions to people for 
them to vote for a political party.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3203 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Acapulco, Guerrero to report that Mrs […] and Mr […] 
handed bags of provisions to people for them to vote for Mr […], PAN 
candidate. The user also states he’s reported this to a police station, 
opening an official investigation number AC/006/2006.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 




Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Durango to report that Mrs […] is giving bags of 
provisions to electors for free.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3244 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Veracruz to report that PRI activists are giving bags of 
provisions to people and other goods as an exchange of their vote for PRI.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3254 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Etchojoa, Sonora to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Guayparin”, Mr […] –who’s a borough councillor– 
and Mr […] are handing bags of provisions to people for them to vote for the 
PRI presidential candidate.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3332 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Jose Independencia, Oaxaca to report that Mr […] 
–who works for the borough Cerro Clarin–, Mrs […], Mrs […] and Mrs […] 
are knocking doors, delivering gift tokens to be exchanged for bags of 
provisions, plastic buckets and money once they’ve voted for PRI.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3333 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ahuacuotzingo, Guerrero to report that PRI activists are 
paying MX$700 [£31].  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3853 




Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that, at the 
recruitment centre located in Adolfo Lopez Mateos Street, a neighbourhood 
with the same name, the owner of the place –who’s a tall, thin, brown 
skinned man– and other people are delivering bags of provisions and 
money.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4393 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Juarez, Chihuahua to report that PAN activists were 
handing t-shirts, caps and bags of provisions to people for them to vote for 
PAN […] 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4527 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Santiago Atitlan, Oaxaca to report that Mr […] –who’s 
originally from a town called “Santa Catarina” – and other PRI activists were 
knocking doors within the borough handing bags of provisions as an 
exchange of people’s vote for PRI candidates. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 208 
Date of the call: 30/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that at the shopping 
arcade located in Ignacio Zaragoza Road, by the underground station called 
“Acatitla”, within the shop “Soriana”, PRI activists are giving people gift 
tokens to vote for PRI. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 150 
Date of the call: 06/07/2013 
Date of the incident: 06/07/2013 
Description of the Incident: 150 
The user calls from Ajalpan, Puebla to report that PRI ‘followers’ are 
delivering bags of provisions and money to people. The user also requires 





[a day before after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 305 
Date of the call: 06/07/2013 
Date of the incident: 06/07/2013 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Francisco de los Romos, Aguascalientes to report 
that PRI [activists] are handing bags of provisions to people. 
[days after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 18 
Date of the call: 26/06/2015 
Date of the incident: 06/06/2015 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tapachula, Chiapas to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Sam Jorge”, the borough mayor, Mrs […], handed 
bags of provisions to people, asking them to vote for the PVEM federal 
congressional candidate.  
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3389 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Atlacomulco, State of Mexico to report that within the 
Nursery School called “Ma. Trinidad R. De Sanchez Colin”, PRD activists –
Mr […] amongst them– are delivering to people bags of provisions and 
around MX$1,500 [£66]. 
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3564 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Salvador Huixcolotla, Puebla to report that Mr […] 
borough mayor, is giving electors tanks of water for free to vote for PRI.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3607 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tecamac, State of Mexico to report that within the 




brand Ford, number plate JJ70-118, are giving bags of provisions to people 
for free to vote for PRI.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3667 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato to report that Mr […], 
from his house, is delivering money [to people], asking them to vote for 
PRD.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3698 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Nicolas Bravo, Quintana Roo to report that Mr […] is 
handing bags of provisions and food to people for them to vote for PRI. The 
user also states that this man is with other people wearing in red […] 
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3801 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Ciudad Cuauhtemoc”, a big, black haired, white 
woman is gathering people to ask them to vote for PRD, giving them as well 
bags of provisions as an exchange. The user also states that this woman 
has been doing the same activity for about a week.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3836 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Trinidad Zaachila, Oaxaca to report that at the main 
entrance of the town called “Santa Maria Roalo”, the borough mayor Mr […] 
is giving [people] bags of provisions for free and MX$100 [£4], for them to 
vote for PRI.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3933 




Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 02/07/2006 
The user calls from Torreon, Coahuila to report that Mrs […] was giving 
people money to vote for PAN from her place, located in Granados Street 
[…] neighbourhood called “Jacarandas” […] 
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4015 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that activists from several 
political parties have been giving people sacks of cement for the to vote for 
these parties. The user also states that the borough mayor is giving people 
bags of provisions and cash to vote for PRD.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4060 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that at Nautla Street 
14 within the neighbourhood called “Roma” […], PRD activists are giving 
suspected parcels to fake taxi drivers, but it isn’t clear that’s inside.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4123 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlaxiaco, Oaxaca to report that, at the main square of 
the town with the same name [Tlaxiaco], Mr […], who’s a delegate of the 
borough government, is giving [people] bags of provisions for free to vote 
for PRI.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4137 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlaxcala City, Tlaxcala to report that, at this moment, 
Mr […] is [delivering] bags of provisions to those people who go to vote for 
PRI.  






Official Folio number: 4185 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico City to report that, at the PRD’s 
campaign headquarters located at the corner of “Benito Juarez” and 
“Guillermo Prieto” by a place called” Pepes”, Mrs […] is delivering bags of 
provisions and MX$200 [£9], which meant to be distributed to mums as part 
of a public programme during Mother’s Day.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4222 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Puente de Ixtla, Morelos to report that within Reforma 
Street, Mr […] is giving people bags of provisions as an exchange of their 
vote for PRI.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4672 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Valle de Chalco, State of Mexico to report that within 
the neighbourhood called “Independencia”, PRD activists were giving 
[people] gift tokens, which can be exchanged for bags of provisions.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4674 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Valle de Elta, Oaxaca to report that an assistant of the 
former governor Mr […] and the former borough mayor were giving 
suspicious papers and cards to electors after going to polls. The user states 
that these men were also taken electors to a restaurant called “Chefi” to 
have a meal; the restaurant is located in the borough market. The user 
knows these details as he claims to have followed them into such market.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4689 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 




The user calls from Tecamac, State of Mexico to report that her auntie Mrs 
[…], who’s eighty years old […], has received bag of provisions […] 
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 256 
Date of the call: 05/07/2009 
Date of the incident: 05/07/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that by a surveillance 
place, PRI activists are delivering bags of provisions and money to those 
electors who have cast the vote.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 339 
Date of the call: 05/07/2009 
Date of the incident: 05/07/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that PRI [activists] are 
giving people MX$1,000 [£44] to vote for PRI’s candidates.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 62 
Date of the call: 01/07/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Campeche City, Campeche to report that within the 
village called “Los Laureles”, a PRI activist handed bags of provisions to 
people in the streets for them to vote for PRI.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 139 
Date of the call: 04/07/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Luis Potosi City, San Luis Potosi to report that 
[activists] were giving people boxes of fizzy drinks […] as running rallies.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 359 
Date of the call: 01/07/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Antonio la Isla, State of Mexico to report that from 
his private place, the PRI’s local delegate, Mr […], is delivering money to 




[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 398 
Date of the call: 07/07/2013 
Date of the incident: 07/07/2013 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tijuana, Baja California to report that from a neighbour’s 
place, [unknown activists] are delivering MX$300 [£13] to people for them 
to vote for PRI. The user also states that from the same place, he’s seen 
vans taking people [presumably] to the polls to vote for PRI.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 242 
Date of the call: 07/06/2015 
Date of the incident: 07/06/2015 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Emiliano Zapata, Morelos to report that [a man on] a 
van is giving people bags of provisions and money to vote the PRD’s 
mayoral candidate. The user also states that other residents have 
witnessed this activity.  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 255 
Date of the call: 07/06/2015 
Date of the incident: 07/06/2015 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Calvillo, Aguascalientes to report that in the place of 
residence of Mr […], [unknown people] are [buying] votes for PRI, paying 
MX$500 [£22].  
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 7 
Date of the call: 06/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 06/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Gomez Palacio, Durango to report that within the 
borough supply centre, [unknown party] activists are giving gift tokens to 
people, which can be exchanged for pairs of shoes.  
[days after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 11 
Date of the call: 07/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 07/07/2006 




The user calls from Tlalnepantla, State of Mexico to report that [unknown 
people] are delivering between MX$2,000 [£88] and MX$3,000 [£131] to 
electors who have cast their vote. The user also states that this has 
happened from 10am until 2.19pm. The site is a trailer park with a big black 
gate.  
[days after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 30 
Date of the call: 03/07/2011 
Date of the incident: 03/07/2011 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tulancingo de Bravo, Hidalgo to report that a local 
councillor is delivering money as an exchange of [people’s] vote.  
[days after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 218 
Date of the call: 02/07/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cordoba, Veracruz to report that [a party’s activists] 
were giving people between MX$500 [£22] and MX$1,500 [£66] as well as 
tinned food. The user also states that these activists hid in a shop called 
“Rosy” located between 10 Street and cul-de-sac 4 […] 
[days after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 40 
Date of the call: 06/06/2015 
Date of the incident: 06/06/2015 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Banamichi, Sonora to report that [unknown people] are 
giving people sacks of cement and bags of provisions or MX$7000 [£307] 
to vote for [a party] mayoral candidate.  
[days after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 106 
Date of the call: 21/07/2015 
Date of the incident: 21/07/2015 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that within the local 
sports centre, [activists from] Nueva Alianza Party are gathering people to 
celebrate their mayoral candidate’s victory but also, they’re paying money 
presumably to those who voted for them. 
[days after polling day] 
 
 




Date of the call: 02/07/2010 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2010 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Juan Colorado, Oaxaca to report that the members 
of the Local PRI campaign are handing bags of provisions to people for 
them to vote for the PRI mayoral candidate.  
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 70 
Date of the call: 02/07/2010 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2010 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Guadalupe Victoria, Durango to report that according to 
people, a teacher from an A Level College is giving [people] between 
MX500 [£22] and MX$1,000 [£44] to vote for PRI. The user also states that 
residents from the rural area called “Calixto” have mentioned that unknown 
activists are giving people money and bags of provisions to vote for PAN 
[…] 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 161 
Date of the call: 11/09/2009 
Date of the incident: 11/09/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Monclova, Coahuila to report that within the town called 
“Ciudad Frontera”, PRI activists are giving people paint buckets, bags of 
provisions and cash (MX$150 [£7]) to vote for PRI mayoral candidate. The 
user also states that in addition to witnessing these activities, other people 
have confirmed it to her.  
[months after polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 185 
Date of the call: 19/07/2015 
Date of the incident: 19/07/2015 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Arriaga, Chiapas to report that from his private place of 
residence, a [mayoral] candidate is giving people MX$200 [£9], the place is 
located at the corner of 13 and 15 West.  
[months after polling day] 
 
 
A.2.5 Mobile Phone’s Cameras as Mechanism of Enforcement 
 
Official Folio number: 2603 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 20/06/2006 




The user calls from Orizaba, Veracruz to report that unknown people were 
buying PRI’s votes for $500 [£21]. To prove they do it, activists gave them 
as well a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper 
already marked. 
[eleven days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2909 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 26/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that activists were 
threatening him with beating him up if he didn’t vote for their political party. 
They were also asking him to take a photo with user’s mobile phone’s 
camera of the ballot paper already marked to prove his vote […] 
[six days before polling day] 
 
 
Date of the call:  02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 28/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user, who is an owner of a small business, calls from Juan de Sabinas, 
Coahuila to report that activists proffered one of the user’s employee 
MX$500 (£21) to vote for PRD on condition that the elector must take a 
photo of the ballot paper already marked with a mobile phone’s camera. The 
victim didn’t want to make the call as feeling fear. 
[four days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 456 
Date of the call: 02/08/2004 
Date of the incident: 01/08/2004 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Socorro de Jesus, Oaxaca to report that an official of a 
local government institution –omitting the name to protect the victims– 
compelled employees to gather twenty-two electors each; invite them to 
have breakfast on Sunday 1st July [polling day] and then taking them to the 
polling station to vote for PRI. The official also asked them to ensure taking 
photos of the ballot paper already marked to prove electors’ vote. Finally, 
the official threatened employees with dismissal if they didn’t accomplish 
the task. 
[three days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2462 
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2006 




The user calls from Sahuaripa, Sonora to report that activists were 
proffering electors MX$500 [£21] to vote for PRI. They were actually giving 
voters a mobile phone with camera to prove their vote, […] 
[three days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2826 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Torreon, Coahuila to report that activists are trying to 
buy electors’ vote for PRD. They’re also handing electors mobile phones 
with cameras to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2880 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ciudad Madero, Tamaulipas to report that in the shop 
called […] located in […], the owner’s wife offers beers for free on condition 
that people vote for PAN. She is also asking them to take a photo of the 
ballot paper with a mobile phone’s camera to prove it. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3004 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Jalisco to report that campaigners from the candidate 
of PRI are proffering people MX$800 (£34) to vote for PRI. They are also 
lending mobile phones with a camera for electors to take a photo of the 
ballot paper already marked. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3091 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Jalisco to report a woman, who knocked the door, has 
invited the user to vote for PAN. This woman has proffered breakfast in a 
place located in […], a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of ballot 
paper already marked, […] and given the user MX$500 (£21). 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 




Official Folio number: 3489 
Date of the call: 09/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mr […] is giving 
blenders and irons for free to those electors who have voted for PRI. This 
person’s also asking voters photos with a mobile phone’s camera of the 




Official Folio number: 4043 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that unknown activists are at 
this time giving people ‘tamales’ [a traditional Mesoamerican corned, 
wrapped meal] and bags of provisions for free to those electors who have 
voted for PAN. They are also […] lending them a mobile phone with a 




Official Folio number: 4207 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Nuevo León to report that Mr […] is asking bus drivers 
to vote for the PRI’s candidate, […], asking them to take a photo of the ballot 




Official Folio number: 4884 
Date of the call: 05/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that an unknown 
woman representing PRD offered MX$300 [£13] to vote for federal and local 
candidates of her political party. This woman was also given a mobile phone 
with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked. The user 
also states that a similar pattern happened to a relative of her, but the 




Official Folio number: 100 
Date of the call: 05/07/2009 
Date of the incident: 05/07/2009 




The user calls from Jalisco to report that PVEM activists proffered MX$500 
[£21] the user to vote for that political party, asking the user to take a photo 




Official Folio number: 353 
Date of the call: 30/01/2011 
Date of the incident: 30/01/2011 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Acapulco, Guerrero to report that by a polling station 
near the Hospital […], a group of coalition “Tiempos Mejores” activists […], 
are approaching electors proffering MX$1000 [£43] to vote for the coalition. 
They are giving them as well a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo 
of the ballot paper already marked to prove the vote and receive the money. 




Official Folio number: 582 
Date of the call: 03/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 03/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user, who didn’t want to provide the location [presumably from Hidalgo], 
calls to report that employees of DIF [a Federal institution] have asked for 
copies of electors’ voting card. The user also reports that these employees 
have asked electors to take a photo of the ballot paper to prove they voted 
for PRI. 
[weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1208 
Date of the call: 08/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 08/32/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls [presumably from Hidalgo] to report that Miss […] and Mr 
[…], employees of […] are proffering an increase of wage to those electors 
voting for PRI on condition that they take a photo of the ballot paper to prove 
their vote. 
[ten days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 75 
Date of the call: 01/07/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Pachuca, Hidalgo to report that near the polling station 
located in […], there are PRI activists approaching electors buying their 




a photo of the ballot paper already marked and show it afterwards to 




Official Folio number: 184 
Date of the call: 01/07/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Acambaro, Guanajuato to report that someone has 
offered people MX$1000 [£43] to vote for PRD; giving people a mobile 
phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked and 




Official Folio number: 275 
Date of the call: 29/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Nicolas Romero, State of Mexico to report that someone 
has offered MX$800 [£34] the user to vote for PRI, asking as well to take a 
photo of the ballot paper as proof of the vote. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 307 
Date of the call: 19/07/2015 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Suchiate, Chiapas to report that some neighbours told 
the user that unknown people were proffering electors MX$500 (£21) to vote 
for […]. Voters had to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked to 




A.2.6 Children (Little Hawks) as Mechanism of Enforcement 
 
Official Folio number: 4741 
Date of the call: 02/07/20006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/20006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Azcapotzalco, Mexico City to report that PAN activists 
are buying votes for MX$300 [$13], asking electors to take a kid with them 
within the voting booth to witness the mark of the vote. 
[polling day] 
 
Official Folio number: 328 




Date of the incident: 05/07/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Nuevo Leon to report that Ms […]’s daughter, who’s 
about 13 years-old has been walking with electors to polling stations to 
witness, within the voting booth, they voted for PRI. The user also states 
that days ago this woman and other unknown activists were presumably 




A.2.7 Buying Abstention with Voting IDs 
 
Official Folio number: 242 
Date of the call: 02/06/2003 
Date of the incident: 02/06/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Saltillo, Coahuila to report that a member of the staff of 
a congressional candidate, whose last name is “Rocha”, were collecting 
citizens’ voting cards as an exchange of materials for construction […] The 
user also states he didn’t give them his voting card but he saw a few others 
doing it. 
[weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 378 
Date of the call: 08/07/2004 
Date of the incident: 04/07/2004 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Sinaloa to report that within the region called “Tamazula, 
Durango” […] the borough mayor’s daughter was collecting electors’ voting 
cards in the morning. The user claims to have evidence such as videos, 
photos and witnesses. 
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 428 
Date of the call: 01/08/2004 
Date of the incident: 31/07/2004 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Union Hidalgo, Oaxaca to report that within Emiliano 
Zapata and Matamoros Streets, there were outsiders at night delivering 
bags of provisions and money to people for them to vote for a political party; 
these people were otherwise collecting residents’ voting cards […] 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 559 
Date of the call: 04/09/2004 
Date of the incident: 04/09/2004 




The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that within surrounded 
rural areas from his place, a PRI activist is paying up to MX$1,000 [£43] for 
electors’ voting cards, saying they’d give them back to the legal owner after 
polling day […] 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 815 
Date of the call: 04/11/2004 
Date of the incident: 04/11/2004 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Morelia, Michoacan to report that Mrs […] 
is collecting electors’ voting card as an exchange of money and bags of 
provisions […] 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2418 
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 26/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from El Salto, Jalisco to report that the current borough mayor 
with other candidates is sending lorries of water to the region and handing 
bags of provisions to people, collecting their voting cards. They promise to 
give them back to the owners the Monday after polling day. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2472 
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Atitalaquia, Hidalgo to report that Mrs […], a PAN local 
leader, is proffering bags of provisions to those who vote for PAN or 
MX$1,000 [£43] to those anti-PAN, collecting their voting card. 
[days polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2483 
Date of the call: 30/06/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that a party activist 
has turned up, offering MX£1,000 [£43] for his voting card. 
[days polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2622 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 




Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Zacatecas City, Zacatecas to report that within the 
neighbourhood called “Trinidad”, PRD activists are proffering people 
MX$200 [£9] to vote for PRD’s mayoral candidate or give their voting card, 
promising to return them after polling day with extra MX£200. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3065 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz to report that in the neighbourhood 
called “Hidalgo”, Mrs […], leader of a local association and PRD activist, is 
proffering people bags of provisions as an exchange of their voting cards. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3528 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Santa Maria Jalapa del Marques, Oaxaca to report that 
[unknown people] are offering people a sack of cement to vote for PRI’s 
presidential candidate, they offer otherwise 8 sacks of cement for electors’ 
voting card. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3688 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Juchitepec, State of Mexico to report that within the 
village called “San Matias Cuijingo”, PRI activists and the borough mayor 
Mr […] are knocking doors to proffer residents between MX$200 [£13] and 
MX$500 [£22] for their voting card. The user also states that at this moment 
these people at the corner of Ignacio Zaragoza and Francisco I. Madero 
Streets. 
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3737 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Sierra Bonita, Linda Vista, Colima to report that a PRI 
activist named Mrs […] is asking people to vote for PRI but also she’s 
collecting electors’ voting cards as an exchange of money. 






Official Folio number: 4036 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Chetumal, Quintana Roo to report that near the 
butcher’s called “12 de Diciembre” located at the corner of Bugambilias and 
Genova Streets, there are people paying up to MX$500 [£22] and delivering 
bags of provisions for electors’ voting cards. 
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4186 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tijuana, Baja California to report that [unknown people] 
were collecting people’s voting card for MX$1,300 [£56]. The user also 
states she reckons these people have collected about 500 pieces. 
[a day polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4930 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Rayon, San Luis Potosi to report that Mr […], who is a 
PRI’s candidate, has proffered the user MX$500 [$22] and a bag of 
provisions for his voting card […] 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 346 
Date of the call: 17/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 17/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tecamac, State of Mexico to report that in cul-de-sac 
“Orea”, a neighbourhood called “Urbi Villa del Campo”, Mr […] wearing a 





Official Folio number: 441 
Date of the call: 24/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 24/01/2012 




The user calls presumably from State of Mexico to report that Mrs […] is 
faking enrolments to the programme “Oportunidades”, collecting people’s 




Official Folio number: 463 
Date of the call: 26/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 26/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cajeme, Sonora to report that in the villa called 
“Quetchehueca”, officers from DIF [a state agency] are collecting people’s 




Official Folio number: 469 
Date of the call: 26/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 26/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Apodaca, Nuevo Leon to report that outsiders are 
knocking doors buying residents’ voting cards for MX$100 [£4]. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 520 
Date of the call: 31/01/2012 
Date of the incident: 31/01/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within the 
primary school called “San Carlos” located in Nuevo Laredo Street, two 
teachers and some students are collecting students’ voting cards, promising 
a higher mark and MX$500 [£22] […] The user also states that this has been 
happening over the last 15 days ish. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 561 
Date of the call: 02/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 02/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Martin Texmelucan to report that the PRI’s mayoral 




Official Folio number: 577 
Date of the call: 03/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 20/01/2012 




The user calls from Venustiano Carranza, Mexico City to report that, within 
the neighbourhood called “Moctezuma”, Mrs […] and Mr […] are collecting 
residents’ voting cards as an exchange of bags of provisions and money. 
The user also states he witnessed these events. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 724 
Date of the call: 14/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 14/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that in the butcher’s 
called “Hueso de Oro”, [unknown people] are collecting electors’ voting card 
as an exchange of bags of provisions and other goods […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 877 
Date of the call: 20/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 20/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mrs […], who works 
as a dentist, is proffering people bags of provisions for their electors’ voting 
card, promising to return them after polling day. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 927 
Date of the call: 22/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 22/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Veracruz to report that the local 
congressman, Mr […], went over to towns called “Arroyo Blanco” and 
“Papantla”, paying residents MX$1,500 [£65] for their voting cards […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 961 
Date of the call: 24/02/2012 
Date of the incident: 24/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Metepec, State of Mexico to report that Mr […] collected 
her voting card as an exchange of a bag of provisions […] promising to 
return it after polling day. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1052 
Date of the call: 01/03/2012 




Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mr […] is […] collecting 




Official Folio number: 1057 
Date of the call: 01/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that [an unknown person] 
is collecting electors’ voting cards as an exchange of sacks of flour, saying 
he will return them later. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1136 
Date of the call: 05/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 05/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that a man is asking electors’ voting cards, proffering 
MX$2000 [£86], saying he’ll return them on July the 2nd [polling day] […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1157 
Date of the call: 06/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 11/02/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mrs […] and Mrs […] 
are asking electors’ voting cards […] they offer people several goods for 
children as an exchange. 
[weeks before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1163 
Date of the call: 06/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 06/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that in the shop called 
“Abarrotes Blanquita” located in Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez Street, neighbourhood 
called “El Coyol”, the owner, whose name is […], is offering people MX$300 
[£13] as an exchange of electors’ voting card, saying she’ll return them later. 
The user also states he knows three local residents whose voting card has 
been collected, Mr […], Mr […] and Mr […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1164 




Date of the incident: 06/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Atlixtac, Guerrero to report that Mr […], who works as a 
teacher for the primary school named “Aquiles Serdan”, is collecting 
electors’ voting cards. The user also states that this man can be found in 
the local council headquarters. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1235 
Date of the call: 09/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 04/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that Mr […] is 
proffering people money as an exchange of their voting card. She organises 
meetings with the local leader of neighbours’ association named Mrs […]. 
The user also states that on Saturday there was a meeting in which these 
people delivered clothing, food, […] bags of provisions and money […] 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1247 
Date of the call: 10/03/1012 
Date of the incident: 10/01/1012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tultepec, State of Mexico to report that a woman named 
Mrs […] was knocking doors within A. Lopez Mateos cul-de-sac, a 
neighbourhood called “San Juan Tultepec”, proffering MX500 [£22] for 
residents’ voting cards. However, up to the date, this man has neither 
delivered the money nor returned voting cards […] Amongst those affected 
are Mrs […] and Mrs […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1267 
Date of the call: 12/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 12/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mr […] has collected 
electors’’ voting cards […] as an exchange of a cheque for MX$5000 [£216] 
[…] But the bank account is fake. Amongst those residents affected are 
[twelve full names] 
[during polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1332 
Date of the call: 14/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 14/03/2012 




The user calls from San Martin Texmelucan, Puebla to report that Mr […] 
who lives in […] has collected electors’ voting cards of PAN candidate’ 
supporters […]; however, the user states that this man was actually 
supporting PT’s candidates, hence he collected those voting cards. Electors 
affected won’t seem to be able to cast their vote […] 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1421 
Date of the call: 19/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 11/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Francisco Tepeolulco, State of Mexico to report 
that Mrs […], who owns the ironmonger’s located in […], asked user’s 
grandson […] his voting card as an exchange of MX$500 [£22], which hasn’t 
been returned yet. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1462 
Date of the call: 21/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 21/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Xochimilco, Mexico City to report that [unknown people] 
are giving people money as an exchange of the voting cards of those 
electors who won’t vote for Mr […], threatening those who refuse to do it. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1510 
Date of the call: 23/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 23/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Jocotitlan, State of Mexico to report that Mr […] is 
collecting elderly people’s voting cards, promising a bag of provisions and 
returning the cards later. The user also states that this man works for the 
local borough at the community centre […] 
[months polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1634 
Date of the call: 28/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 28/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from the State of Mexico to report that Mrs […] 
and Mrs […], who used to work for a local borough, are collecting people’s 
voting cards as an exchange of bags of provisions, promising to return them 
after the Election Day. 






Official Folio number: 1727 
Date of the call: 31/03/2012 
Date of the incident: 31/03/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that Mrs […] and Mr […], who are PRI activists, are 
gathering people in the streets to collect their voting cards as an exchange 
of materials for construction […]  
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1834 
Date of the call: 10/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 10/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls to report that [unknown people] are asking electors to vote 
for PRD and they otherwise collect voting cards of those who won’t do it. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 1838 
Date of the call: 10/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 10/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that Mrs […] 
and Mr […] are collecting electors’ voting cards as an exchange of materials 
for construction, which has been stocked up in these people’s places, 
located in […]; they say they’ll return the cards after the Election Day. The 
user also states that he’s got witnesses willing to talk. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2121 
Date of the call: 25/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 25/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Venustiano Carranza to report that opposite to the 
grocery “Lulu” located in Centenario Street 478, a neighbourhood called 
Merced Gomez, there are people paying MX$200 [£9] for electors’ voting 
cards. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2169 
Date of the call: 27/04/2012 
Date of the incident: 27/04/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Aguascalientes City, Aguascalientes to report that as 
an employee of the Electoral Federal Institute, he’s seen people collecting 




neighbourhoods called “Gomez Portugal” and “Villas de Nuestra Senora de 
la Asunción”. 
[months before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 2983 
Date of the call: 01/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Etchojoa, Sonora to report that borough employees 
offered and delivered materials for construction, bags of provisions and 
cash to people for their electors’ voting card. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 37 
Date of the call: 04/07/2009 
Date of the incident: 04/07/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Monterrey, Nuevo Leon to report that PRI 
[activists] lead apparently by a brother of the head of State Court, are 
collecting electors’ voting cards, promising materials for construction and 
bags of provisions. The user also states that he’s seen some residents 
giving their voting card. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 121 
Date of the call: 26/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 26/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Pinos, Zacatecas to report that [unknown people] have 
just offered the user up to MX$300 [£13] for his voting card. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 132 
Date of the call: 01/07/2012 
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that a man is proffering 
people bags of provisions to vote for PRI; he collects otherwise electors’ 
voting cards with the same reward. 
[a day before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 262 
Date of the call: 30/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 30/06/2012 




The user calls from Tamalin, Veracruz to report that, within the town called 
“Piedra Blanca”, [unknown people] are handing sacks of cement as an 
exchange of electors’ voting cards […] 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 347 
Date of the call: 03/07/2009 
Date of the incident: 03/07/2009 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls presumably from Campeche City, Campeche to report that 
[unknown people] have taken user’s voting card as an exchange of MX$600 
[£26]. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 351 
Date of the call: 29/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 29/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Donato Guerra, State of Mexico to report that a man is 
knocking doors proffering residents between MX$1,000 [£43] and 
MX$2,000 [£86] to vote for PAN; he otherwise offers such amount of money 
as an exchange of electors’ voting cards. The user also states she refused 
to do so. 
[two days before polling day] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 372 
Date of the call: 15/06/2012 
Date of the incident: 15/06/2012 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Juchitepec, State of Mexico to report that [unknown 
people] are knocking doors offering residents money to vote for a political 
party; they are otherwise collecting their voting cards. 
[days before polling day] 
 
 
A.2.8 Vote Buying Near the Polling Stations 
 
Official Folio number: 572 
Date of the call: 01/08/2003 
Date of the incident: 06/07/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that she’s got photos of 
an activist buying votes near the polling station she was a working as a 
representative for PAN during the last elections. She’s willing to report this 






Official Folio number: 671 
Date of the call: 06/07/2003 
Date of the incident: 06/07/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlaltizapan, Morelos to report that PRI activists are 




Official Folio number: 696 
Date of the call: 06/07/2003 
Date of the incident: 06/07/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that, outside the polling 
station located near the shopping arcade called […], there are a few people 
with lists of electors, giving provisions to people for them to vote for PRI. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 755  
Date of the call: 09/03/2003 
Date of the incident: 06/07/2003 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that near the 
polling stations 3075 and 3485, PRI activists were handing money and bags 
of provisions to electors.  
 
 
Official Folio number: 591 
Date of the call: 05/09/2004 
Date of the incident: 05/09/2004 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that, near the polling 
station 4413, PRI activists were buying votes. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3260 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: The user calls from Alvaro Obregon, Mexico City 
to report that about 10-15 people, near the polling station 3576, are handing 
‘tamales’ [a traditional Mesoamerican corned, wrapped meal] to voters in 
exchange for their vote for PRD. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3422 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, the State of Mexico to report that near the 




who are giving sanitary towels and pens to women and men, asking them 
their voting card […] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3449 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Magdalena Contreras, Mexico City to report that, when 
walking to polling station 3872, an unknown person approached him, asking 




Official Folio number: 3495 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, the State of Mexico to report that right outside 
the polling station he went to cast the vote, there were PRI activists giving 




Official Folio number: 3551 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that right outside the polling 




Official Folio number: 3531 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Leon, Guanajuato to report that an unknown person is 
buying electors’ vote outside the polling station, located within the Primary 
School called “Independencia”. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3565 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Veracruz to report that Mr […], PRI activist, is buying 
votes near the polling station the user's cast the vote, asking also a copy of 






Official Folio number: 3654 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Santiago Yancuitlalpan, Puebla to report that two men, 
named […] and […], are outside the polling station 2301, buying votes for 
PRI for MX$100 [£4.30] and fizzy drinks. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3699 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tlahuac, Mexico City to report that there are PRD 
activists around the polling station 3627 handing bags of provisions. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3763 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Coapa, Mexico City to report that Mrs […] is offering 
MX$100 [£4] to those who vote for PRD in the polling station located in 
Francisco I. Madero, Santa Ursula neighbourhood. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3771 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, the State of Mexico to report that within 
the polling station located in Pantitlan street, Reforma neighbourhood, an 
unknown person, wearing a green shirt, is offering elderly people MX$400 
[£17] to vote for PRI’s candidates; after casting the vote, this person is 
asking them to sign a piece of paper stating they voted PRI. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3773 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico City to report that PRD activists 
are buying votes for MX$250 [£10] around the polling stations. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3777 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 




The user calls from Morelos to report that, as coming out from the polling 




Official Folio number: 3802 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Tonaya, Jalisco to report that within the polling station, 
the federal congressional candidate named […] is buying votes for MX$500 
[£21], asking also electors’ voting card […] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3831 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Los Reyes La Paz, the State of Mexico to report a very 
influential local leader named […] is giving electors money to vote for PRI. 
The user also states that there were lots of people outside this leader’s 
office ready to go to the polling station. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 3839 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that an activist is handing 




Official Folio number: 4003 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from San Pedro de Acatama, San Luis Potosi to report that 
the mayoral candidate’s staff are approaching people, proffering MX$100 
[£4]. They are managing to take blank ballot papers out from the polling 
station, marking them outside and giving them back to electors for them to 
cast the votes. This is happening in streets named Cactus and Acatama 
near the polling station. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4017 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 




The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that unknown PRI 
activists offer electors official selling permissions for free within an outdoors 
market, presumably they have to vote for PRI. This is happening a few 
metres from the polling station located in Chalchihuites Street 1, Primary 
School “Mariano Matamoros”, San Jose de Los Leone's neighbourhood. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4063 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Ecatepec, the State of Mexico to report that, right behind 
the polling station 1685, two people named […] and […] are buying votes. 




Official Folio number: 4125 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz to report that there are unknown 
people buying votes outside the polling station located within the Primary 
School “Miguel Hidalgo” at Vicente Beach. These people are giving electors 
between MX$500 [£21] and MX$1000 [£43] to vote for PAN […] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4144 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Venustiano Carranza, Mexico City to report that about 
20 metres from the polling station located in Xaltocan Street 149, Arenal 
neighbourhood, the staff of the PRD’s congressional candidate […] is 
proffering electors MX$50 [£2] to vote for this party. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4175 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that around the polling station 
3116, locate in Libertad Street 230, San Juan Octotan neighbourhood, there 
are people buying votes, offering money […] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4195 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 




The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that, near 
several polling stations within the streets “Pirules” and “Pozos” […], PRI 
activists are handing gifts tokens that can be exchanged for food to those 
people who voted PRI. The user also states that these activists are 
conducting the activities on a white and yellow VW camper van. 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4196 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that in the polling station 3006 
located in Emiliano Zapata neighbourhood, there are people buying votes 
for PRI […] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4267 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from La Joya, Oaxaca to report that outside the polling station 




Official Folio number: 4285 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Guanajuato to report that, at the polling station located 
in a place named “El Jacalon”, activists nicknamed “Camarones” who live 
in […], are buying votes, handing electors up to MX$100 [£43] […] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4337 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Calderitas, Quintana Roo to report that people wearing 
all red, presumably with lists of the official electors’ register, are buying 
votes close to the polling station […] 
 
 
Official Folio number: 4641 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that unknown people 







Official Folio number: 4730 
Date of the call: 02/07/2006 
Date of the incident: 02/07/2006 
Description of the Incident: 
The user calls from Coahuila to report that close to the polling station, which 
the user cast the vote, there are PRI activists proffering people MX$200 





A.2.9 Diagram FEPADETEL (SPANISH) 
 
Sistema creado como herramienta de apoyo informática para la operación 
del proceso certificado “FEPADETEL”, que resguarda los datos de las 
llamadas recibidas por dicho sistema. 
 
Arquitectura del sistema: 
 
La arquitectura del sistema “FEPADETEL” esta basada en un modelo 
Cliente-Servidor que almacena los datos de manera remota y centralizada 















El sistema esta construido bajo una arquitectura de extracción, 
transformación y carga (ETL) con lo cual se almacenan los datos 
históricamente y de manera homogénea para su posterior explotación en 






















El diseño de la base de datos esta construido como un modelo 
relacional que se aloja en el manejador de base de datos SQL Server 
2000 instalado en un servidor configurado con Windows 2000 Server. 
 
El modelo y el diccionario de datos de la base de datos se pueden 
ver en el Anexo I y Anexo II respectivamente de este documento. 
 
 
II.  Diseño de pantallas. 
 
El sistema FEPADETEL consta de dos pantallas principales en su 
interfaz gráfica, para el almacenamiento y la consulta. 
 
a) Pantalla “Captura de llamadas”. 
 
Interfaz de captura para los datos de los tres tipos de llamada 












b) Pantalla “Consulta de registros” 
 
Interfaz de consulta para recuperar información de las llamadas 


















c) Transferencia de información por medio de archivos en 
formato de BD SQL 
 
Se requiere de una interfaz de envío y recepción de información 





Se requiere de tomar un numero de folio consecutivo a partir de 
un numero especificado de los 1000 en adelante para distinguir 
y  diferenciar los que se generan a partir del sistema origen del 
FEPADETEL local. 
 
Se requiere capturar los elementos base de la tabla principal para 
anexar el arhivo en forma transparente para los usuarios del 
sistema. 
 
La carga de los archivos sera en forma de lotes (Batch) al final 
de la jornada normal para no interferir con la captura  del sistema 
local. 
 
La transferencia de información puede ser bajo transmisión  FTP 









Herramientas de desarrollo y lenguajes de programación: 
 
Plataforma de desarrollo   ----   Visual Basic v.6.0 
 
Manejador de Base de Datos ----   SQL Server 2000 
 




• EQUIPO con Windows 2000 Server (servidor de base de datos) 
 




• Módulos de captura, motor de búsqueda ---- 100% 
 









Diccionario de Datos Tabla “FEPADETEL”  
Campo Descripción Tipo Longitud 
Folio Numero consecutivo de la tabla fepadetel Numérico 9 
Apaterno Apellido paterno de la persona que realiza 
la llamada 
Carácter 20 
Amaterno Apellido materno de la persona que realiza 
la llamada 
Carácter 20 
Nombre Nombre de la persona que realiza la 
llamada 
Carácter 20 
Sexo Sexo de la persona que realiza la llamada Carácter 10 
Edad Edad de la persona que realiza la llamada Numérico 5 
Telefono Teléfono de la persona que realiza la 
llamada 
Carácter 18 
Domicilio Domicilio de la persona que realiza la 
llamada 
Carácter 250 
Ocupación Ocupación de la persona que realiza la 
llamada 
Carácter 90 
Entidad Entidad federativa de la persona que realiza 
la llamada 
Carácter 25 
Identificación Identificación de la llamada, pueden ser tres 
tipos, denuncia, queja y orientación e 
información  
Carácter 25 
Competencia Es de la competencia de la fiscalía Carácter 2 
Información Información que proporciono el ministerio 
público que atendió la llamada 
Carácter 16 
Respuesta Respuesta que le dio el ministerio público 
que atendió la llamada 
Carácter 16 
Seguimiento Seguimiento que se la da a la llamada, en 
caso de proceder 
Carácter 16 
Servidor Servidor público que atendió la llamada Carácter 80 
Area Área a la que se turna la llamada Carácter 20 
Fecha Fecha en la que se recibe la llamada Fecha 8 
Hora Hora en la que se recibe la llamada Fecha 8 
Servidor1 Servidor público al que se turna la llamada Carácter 80 

























































A.3 Interviews Conducted 
 
A. Anonymous broker (a woman), who has worked for PRD; 





B. Anonymous broker (a woman), who has worked for PRD, Morena 











C. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI and PT; 






D. Anonymous broker (a man) who has worked for PRI, PRD, PT and 











E. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI and PAN; 






F. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI and PAN; 










G. Anonymous broker (a woman), who has worked only for PRD; San 






H. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI; San Pedro 










I. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI; Tejupilco de 













A.4 The Survey 
 
 
A.4.1 Survey Technical Report 
 
Survey Firm: DEFOE (http://www.defoe.com.mx) 
Country: Mexico (32 states) 
Fielding date: 11-13 April 2015 
Type of study: Sate Household Survey 
Method: Omnibus face-to-face (74 interviewers and 7 overseers) 
Sampling 
universe: 
Nationally representative, adults (18+) settled in those 
selected areas at the time of the interview. 
N: Eight hundred (800) interviews fielded in 80 electoral 
sections reported by the Electoral National Institute 
(INE) 10 interviews each. 
Sampling 
design: 
The selection of electoral districts is systematic with 
probability proportional to each state’s size. In the house 
selected randomly, an adult is chosen under the last 
birthday criterion. The systematic jump is three houses 
whether or not interviewed. 
Confidence 
and error level: 
Assuming a simple random sampling, the error 




In the fielding is recorded a completion rate of 36.1%, 
estimated by formula RR1 published in standard 
definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and 





Those as non-sampling errors phrasing of questions, 
unanticipated effects of pre or post-questions to other 
questions in the questionnaire, and contingencies that 






A.4.2 Spanish Version of The Survey Items (Control Group) 
 
 
Buenos (as) días / tardes / noches / Mi nombre es_________________, vengo de una 
empresa de opinión, estamos haciendo una encuesta para conocer los temas que le 
interesan a los ciudadanos de nuestro país. Quisiera hacerle unas preguntas. Su 
respuesta es confidencial y los datos serán utilizados con fines estadísticos. 
Intentos'para'conseguir'la'
entrevista' 1' 2' 3' 4' 5' 6' 7' 8' 9' 10' 11' 12' 13'














A) ¿Tiene usted credencial de elector para votar? 
1) Sí  2) No (Enc: agradezca y TERMINE la entrevista) 
9) Ns/Nc (Enc: agradezca y TERMINE la entrevista)   |____| 
 
B) ¿A usted le corresponde votar en esta localidad?  
1) Sí  2) No (Enc: agradezca y TERMINE la entrevista) 
9) Ns/Nc (Enc: agradezca y TERMINE la entrevista)   |____| 
 
C)  Género: (Enc: anotar SIN preguntar) 
1) Masculino 2) Femenino    |____| 
 
D) ¿Qué edad tiene usted? (Suspender si es menor de 18 años) 
|____|____|             99) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
 
I . PREFERENCIA ELECTORAL  
ENCUESTADOR ENTREGUE LA BOLETA 1 AL ENTREVISTADO Y LEA: En estos 
momentos le voy a dar una hoja con una pregunta, por favor marque su respuesta y 
deposite la hoja en esta urna. Como usted ve esta hoja es diferente a las boletas 
electorales y se usará solamente en esta encuesta. Su respuesta es confidencial y se 
utilizará con fines estadísticos.  
 
(ENCUESTADOR: PREGUNTAR DESPUES LA BOLETA 1) 
p1_1) Y si no votara por la opción que acaba de elegir, ¿cuál sería su segunda mejor 
opción?  
1) PAN 5) PVEM             9) Encuentro Social 
2) PRI  6) Movimiento Ciudadano    10) Partido Humanista     99) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
3) PRD 7) Nueva Alianza           11) Otro__________ 
4) PT  8) MORENA          12) Ninguno (Esp) |____|____| 
 
II. VOTANTES PROBABLES 
CERTEZA DE VOTO 
p2_1) ¿Qué tan seguro está usted de votar el día de la elección para elegir diputado 
federal por el mismo partido que acaba de preferir hoy?  
1) Muy seguro 3) Poco seguro     
2) Algo seguro 4) Nada seguro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)            |___| 
 
VOTO EN EL PASADO 
p2_2) ¿Por cuál partido o candidato votó usted para Presidente en la pasada elección de 
2012? Encuestador: lea opciones 
1) PAN-Josefina Vázquez Mota  5) No pude votar (Esp) 
2) PRI-PVEM-Enrique Peña Nieto  6) No recuerdo (Esp) 
3) PRD-PT-MC-Andrés Manuel López Obrador     7) Otro (Esp): __________ 
4) PANAL-Gabriel Quadri de la Torre 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
p2_3) ¿Usted sabe cuándo van a ser las próximas elecciones para elegir diputado federal? 
(Enc: Respuesta espontánea. Si la persona responde –Sí-, preguntar: ¿Cuándo?) 
1) Sí, el 7 de junio   3) No   
2) Sí, otra fecha____________  9) Ns/Nc    |___| 
 
p2_4) En términos generales, ¿Qué tan interesado está usted en la próxima elección para 
elegir diputado federal? 
1) Mucho  3) Poco  9) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
2) Algo  4) Nada     |___| 
 
p2_5) En una escala del 1 al 10, donde 1 es Nada probable que vaya a votar y 10 es muy 
probable que vaya a votar, dígame ¿qué tan probable es que usted sí vaya a votar en las 
próximas elecciones de diputado federal? 
 Nada Probable Muy probable Ns/Nc (Esp)  
 1     2      3      4      5      6      7     8     9     10 99 |__|__| 
 
p2_6) ¿Usted diría que es una persona que se interesa mucho, algo, poco o nada en la 
política? 
1) Me intereso mucho   3) Me intereso poco  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)     
2) Me intereso algo  4) Me intereso nada    |___| 
 
p2_7) La última vez que asistió a una casilla o urna para votar, ¿en qué momento decidió 
el partido o candidato por el cual iba a votar? 
1) Con más de un mes de anticipación   4) Otro (Esp) _________________ 
2) Una semana antes    
3) En el momento que llegué a la casilla  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)    |___| 
 
p2_8) Cada vez que hay elecciones ¿con qué regularidad acude usted a votar? 
1) Siempre  3) Algunas veces 5) Nunca 
2) Casi siempre 4) Rara vez 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
III. TEMAS ACADÉMICOS 
IDENTIFICACIÓN PARTIDISTA 
p3_1) Independientemente de por quién haya votado, ¿con cuál partido político se 
identifica usted más? (Enc. espontánea, insistir: ¿Mucho o poco?)  
1) PAN mucho     9) PVEM mucho  17) Encuentro Social mucho 
2) PAN poco      10) PVEM poco    18) Encuentro Social poco 
3) PRI mucho    11) Movimiento Ciudadano mucho  19) Partido Humanista mucho 
4) PRI poco       12) Movimiento Ciudadano poco  20) Partido Humanista poco 
5) PRD mucho   13) Nueva Alianza mucho  21) Otro _______________ 
6) PRD poco      14) Nueva Alianza poco  22) Ninguno  
7) PT mucho      15) MORENA mucho   






p3_2) Independientemente de su participación y del partido o candidato que prefiera, ¿cuál 
partido cree usted que vaya a ganar la elección para diputado federal? (Enc: Espere 
respuesta y codifique) 
1) PAN 5) PVEM             9) Encuentro Social 
2) PRI  6) Movimiento Ciudadano    10) Partido Humanista     99) Ns/Nc 
3) PRD 7) Nueva Alianza           11) Otro__________ 
4) PT  8) MORENA          12) Ninguno  |___|___| 
 
p3_3) Suponiendo que usted participara en la próxima elección para diputado federal, 
¿qué influiría más en su voto, el candidato o el partido? 
1) El candidato 3) Ambos (Esp)  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  
2) El partido 4) Otra (Esp) ______________       |___| 
 
RAZONES DE VOTO 
p3_4) ¿Qué tanto influirá en su decisión de voto el desempeño de los actuales diputados 
federales? 
1) Mucho  3) Poco 
2) Algo   4) Nada  9)Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
p3_5) Para decidir su voto. ¿Qué tanto influyen en usted los anuncios de los partidos 
políticos en (....), mucho, algo, poco o nada? 
Enc: Rotar Mucho Algo Poco Nada Ns/Nc (Esp)  
a) La televisión 1 2 3 4 9  
b) Los periódicos 1 2 3 4 9  
c) El radio 1 2 3 4 9  
d) Internet 1 2 3 4 9  
e) Los Espectaculares 1 2 3 4 9  
f) Bardas pintadas 1 2 3 4 9  
g) Twitter 1 2 3 4 9  
h) Facebook 1 2 3 4 9  
i) Youtube 1 2 3 4 9  
 
IDEOLOGÍA  
p3_6) En política frecuentemente se habla de izquierda y de derecha, en una escala del 1 
al 7 donde 1 significa muy de izquierda y 7 muy de derecha… 
Enc: Rotar Izquierda Derecha Ns/Nc (esp)  
a) ¿Dónde se ubicaría usted? 1    2     3     4     5     6     7 9  
b) ¿Dónde ubicaría al PAN? 1    2     3     4     5     6     7 9  
c) ¿Dónde ubicaría al PRI? 1    2     3     4     5     6     7 9  
d) ¿Dónde ubica al PRD? 1    2     3     4     5     6     7 9  
e) ¿Dónde ubicaría a MORENA? 1    2     3     4     5     6     7 9  
 
CULTURA POLÍTICA 
p3_7) En caso de que su partido perdiera las elecciones ¿usted participaría o no en una 
protesta? 
1) Sí      2) No    9) Ns/Nc (Esp)    |____| 
 
p3_8) ¿Usted es miembro de algún partido político, sindicato u organización no 
gubernamental?  
1) Sí      2) No    9) Ns/Nc (Esp)    |____| 
 
p3_9) Alguna vez usted ha presentado alguna queja o denuncia ante la Comisión 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos? 
1) Sí      2) No    9) Ns/Nc (Esp)    |____| 
 
p3_10) Alguna vez usted ha presentado alguna queja o denuncia ante la PROFECO? 
1) Sí      2) No    9) Ns/Nc (Esp)    |____| 
 
SOFISTICACIÓN POLÍTICA 
Ahora pasaremos a una sección de preguntas sobre el Gobierno Federal. Muchas 
personas no conocen las respuestas a estas preguntas, así que si hay respuestas 
que usted no conozca sólo dígamelo y seguiremos adelante con la encuesta.  
 
p3_11) ¿Usted sabe o no cuáles son los tres Poderes de la Unión? 
1) Sí     2) No (pase a p3_13)   9) Ns/Nc (pase a p3_13) (Esp)    |____| 
 
p3_12)  ¿Me podría decir cuáles son los 3 Poderes de la Unión? 
(Enc. Esperar respuesta y codifique los mencionados según sea el caso) 
         
(…) Sí mencionó No mencionó  
a) Ejecutivo 1 2 |__| 
b) Legislativo 1 2 |__| 
c) Judicial  1 2 |__| 
 
p3_13) Ahora dígame por favor, ¿usted sabe cuál es el partido que tiene actualmente 
más diputados federales en el país?  
1) Sí 2) No (pase a p3_15)  9)Ns/Nc (pase a p3_15) (Esp)   |____| 
 
p3_14) ¿Qué partido es el qué tiene actualmente más diputados? (Enc. Esperar 
respuesta y anotar) 
1) PAN  2) PRI 3) PRD 9)Ns/Nc (Esp)   |____| 
 
p3_15) ¿Sabe o no sabe cuánto tiempo dura el cargo de Presidente Municipal (Delegado 
en caso de Distrito Federal)?  
1) Sí   2) No  (pase a p3_17)  9)Ns/Nc (pase a p3_17) (Esp)  |____| 
 
p3_16) ¿Me podría decir cuánto tiempo dura el cargo de Presidente Municipal (Delegado 
en caso de Distrito Federal)? (Enc. Esperar respuesta y anotar) 
1) 3 años          2) Más de 3 años      3) Menos de 3 años   9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |____| 
 
p3_17) ¿Usted sabe cómo se llama el Gobernador de este estado? (Si es el caso del DF, 
el jefe de gobierno)  
1) Sí   2) No  (pase a p3_19)  9)Ns/Nc (pase a p3_19) (Esp)  |____| 
 
p3_18) ¿Me podría decir cómo se llama el Gobernador de este estado? (Si es el caso del 
DF, el jefe de gobierno) (Enc. Esperar respuesta y anotar) 
1) ________________________________  99)Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___|___| 
 
p3_19) ¿Sabe o no sabe cuál es la autoridad que organiza las elecciones federales?  
1) Sí    2) No (pase a p4_1)  9) Ns/Nc  (pase a p4_1) (Esp)    |____| 
 
p3_20) ¿Me podría decir cómo se llama la autoridad que organiza las elecciones 
federales? (Enc. Esperar respuesta y anotar) 
1) INE 2) Otro_________________ 99) Ns/Nc (esp)   |___|___| 
 
 
Encuestador Cuestionario Encuesta Nacional                                              





 |____|____|____|____|____|  
 
FECHA____/____/________     




Municipio/Delegación: ________________        |___||___|___|                 Entidad: _________________________   |___|___| 
 
Distrito: ______ |___|___|            Sección:___________|___|___|___|___|                    Tiempo de Inicio |___|___| : |___|___| 











IV. POLÍTICA PÚBLICA Y GOBIERNO  
p4_1) De los siguientes programas sociales del Gobierno Federal, dígame por favor, si 
usted o algún miembro de su hogar es beneficiario de alguno de ellos:  








a) Seguro Popular 1 2 9 |___| 
b) Madres solteras 1 2 9 |___| 
c) Prospera 1 2 9 |___| 
d) Niños y jóvenes 1 2 9 |___| 
e) Estancias Infantiles 1 2 9 |___| 
f) Despensas 1 2 9 |___| 
g) Liconsa 1 2 9 |___| 
h) Procampo 1 2 9 |___| 
i) 70 y más 1 2 9 |___| 
j) Piso firme / Vivienda 1 2 9 |___| 
 
EVALUACIÓN DE AUTORIDADES 
p4_2) En general, ¿usted aprueba o desaprueba la forma en que (...) realiza su trabajo? 
(Enc: Insistir ¿Aprueba/desaprueba mucho o algo?) 























a) El Presidente de la República Enrique Peña Nieto 1 2 3 4 5 9 
b) El Gobernador de su estado (Jefe de gobierno) 1 2 3 4 5 9 
c) El presidente municipal (Delegado) 1 2 3 4 5 9 
d) Los Diputados Federales 1 2 3 4 5 9 
e) Los Senadores 1 2 3 4 5 9 
f) Los Diputados Locales 1 2 3 4 5 9 
g) El Ejército 1 2 3 4 5 9 
h) La Gendarmería Nacional Mexicana 1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
p4_3) ¿Cómo calificaría el desempeño del Presidente de México Enrique Peña Nieto en 
los siguientes aspectos, muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal? (Enc: Rotar opciones cada vez) 




Mal Muy mal 
Ns/Nc 
(esp) 
a) Combate a la  corrupción             1 2 3 4 5 9  
b) Combate a la delincuencia           1 2 3 4 5 9  
c) Combate al narcotráfico 1 2 3 4 5 9  
d) Combate a la pobreza                  1 2 3 4 5 9  
e) Generación de empleos                1 2 3 4 5 9  
f) Mejora de caminos y vialidades    1 2 3 4 5 9  
g) Mejora de vivienda                        1 2 3 4 5 9  
h) Apoyo al campo 1 2 3 4 5 9  
i) Promoción del Turismo                 1 2 3 4 5 9  
j) Apoyo a las mujeres  1 2 3 4 5 9  
k)Transparencia 1 2 3 4 5 9  
l) Apoyo a los jóvenes 1 2 3 4 5 9  
m) Manejo de la economía 1 2 3 4 5 9  
n) Educación  1 2 3 4 5 9  
o) Servicios de salud        
 
EVALUACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIAS 
 
p4_4) Ahora voy a leer una lista de dependencias. 
Por favor, dígame ¿qué nivel de confianza tiene en 























a) Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) 1 2 3 4 9  
b) Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los 
Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE)  1 2 3 4 9  
c) Comisión Federal de Electricidad  (CFE) 1 2 3 4 9  
d) Servicio de Administración Tributaria (SAT)  1 2 3 4 9  
e) Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) 1 2 3 4 9  
f) Comisión Nacional del Agua (CONAGUA) 1 2 3 4 9  
g) Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 1 2 3 4 9  
h) Banco de México (BANXICO) 1 2 3 4 9  
i) Caminos y Puentes Federales (CAPUFE) 1 2 3 4 9  
j) Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los 
Trabajadores  (INFONAVIT) 1 2 3 4 9 
 
k) Presidencia 1 2  4 9  
l) Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP) 1 2 3 4 9  
m) Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) 1 2 3 4 9  
n) Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información (IFAI)       
 
p4_5) De las siguientes instituciones que le voy a leer, dígame el nivel de corrupción que 
usted cree existe en ellas, ya sea mucha, algo, poca o nada. 
 Mucha Algo Poca Nada Ns/Nc 
(esp) 
 
a) El ejército 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
b) La policía federal 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
c) La policía estatal 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
d) La policía municipal 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
e)  Los jueces y magistrados 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 

























POSICIONAMIENTO DE PERSONAJES 
p4_6) ¿Ha oído hablar o no de (...)?    
 
Enc: Rotar cada vez 
 
→Encuestador: si –SÍ- ha oído, pregunte:  
p4_7) ¿Y cuál es su opinión sobre esta persona 
(...)? 
 







a) Miguel Ángel Osorio 
Chong  1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
b) Luis Videgaray 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
c) Manlio Fabio 
Beltrones 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
d) Eruviel Ávila 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
e) Ernesto Cordero 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
f) Margarita Zavala 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
g) Gustavo Madero 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
h) Ricardo Anaya Cortés 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
i) Santiago Creel 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
j) Miguel Ángel Mancera 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
k) Ricardo Monreal Ávila 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
l) Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
m) Manuel Velasco 
Coello 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
n) Rafael Moreno Valle 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
o) César Camacho 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
p) Carlos Navarrete Ruíz 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
q) Marcelo Ebrard 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
r) Enrique Peña Nieto 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
 
PRINCIPALES PROBLEMAS 
p4_8) Pensando en los problemas del país ¿Cuál cree usted que es el problema más 
importante en estos momentos? (Enc: Rotar opciones) (Mostrar TARJETA 1)  
1) Inseguridad              5) Desempleo 
2) Crisis económica   6) Educación 
3) Narcotráfico   7) Otro (esp) ¿Cuál?___________ 
4) Mal gobierno/Gobernantes  9) Ns/Nc (esp)  |___| 
 
EDUCACIÓN 
p4_9)  ¿Qué tan satisfecho o insatisfecho está con la educación que reciben sus hijos en 
las escuelas?  
1) Muy satisfecho 4) Algo insatisfecho 6) No tengo hijos (esp)    
2) Algo satisfecho 5) Muy insatisfecho 7) Mis hijos no estudian (esp) 
3) Ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)            |____| 
 
p4_10) ¿Cómo considera el nivel educación que se ofrece en (…)? 
 Bueno Regular Malo Ns/Nc 
(esp) 
 
a) Escuelas públicas 1 2 3 9 |____| 
b) Escuelas privadas 1 2 3 9 |____| 
 
GASTO PÚBLICO 
p4_11) ¿Usted cree que el Gobierno Federal  ha gastado demasiado, lo adecuado, o muy 
poco en publicidad para dar difusión a sus programas y obras? 
1)  Demasiado 2)  Lo adecuado 3)  Muy poco 9)  Ns/Nc (esp)    |___|    
 
p4_12) ¿En su opinión, el actual Gobierno Federal ha administrado bien o mal el dinero de 
todos los ciudadanos? 
1) Bien     2) Mal     9) Ns/Nc (esp)                            |___|                                                           
 
TRANSPORTE 
p4_13) De los siguientes medios de transporte público que le voy a mencionar, dígame por 
favor con qué frecuencia los utiliza, si mucho, algo, poco, o nada. 
 Mucho Algo Poco Nada Ns/Nc (esp)  
a) Combis 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
b) Microbuses 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
c) Camiones 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
d) Taxis 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
Preguntar sólo en el área metropolitana de la Ciudad de México 
e) Metro 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
f) Metrobús 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
g) Trolebús 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
Preguntar a todos si existe algún otro medio de transporte que utilicen 
h) Otro__________ 1 2 3 4 9 |___| 
 
p4_14) ¿Cómo calificaría la calidad de los medios de transporte que utiliza? 
1) Bueno  2) Regular (esp) 3) Malo      9) Ns/Nc (esp)  |___| 
 
V. EVALUACIÓN DE LA ECONOMÍA 
PERCEPCIÓN DE LA ECONOMÍA 
p5_1) Considerando todas las cosas, ¿cree usted que México va por el camino correcto o 
por el camino equivocado? 
1) Camino correcto 
2) Camino equivocado  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |___| 
 
p5_2) Considerando la situación económica del país, ¿usted diría que la economía es 
mucho mejor ahora, mejor ahora, igual que antes, peor ahora, o mucho peor ahora que la 
que se tenía hace un año?  
(Enc. si contesta –igual-, pregunte: ¿igual de bien o igual de mal?) 
1) Mucho mejor ahora   5) Peor ahora  
2) Mejor ahora   6) Mucho peor ahora 
3) Igual de bien que hace un año (Esp)  
4) Igual de mal que hace un año (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
p5_3) Pensando en la situación económica del país para el siguiente año, ¿usted diría que 
la economía estará mucho mejor, mejor, igual que ahora, peor, o mucho peor que la que 
tenemos actualmente? 
(Enc. si contesta –igual-, pregunte: ¿igual de bien o igual de mal?) 
1) Mucho mejor   5) Peor 
2) Mejor    6) Mucho peor 
3) Igual de bien que ahora (Esp) 
4) Igual de mal que ahora (Esp)  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
p5_4) Ahora quiero que piense en las condiciones económicas actuales que enfrenta el 
país. ¿Describiría el estado de la economía en este momento como Excelente, Bueno,  
Malo o Muy malo? 
1) Excelente 3) Malo 














Enc: Si p5_4 es “Excelente/Bueno” utilizar [“crédito”]. Si p5_4 es “Malo/Muy” malo 
utilizar [“culpa”] 
p5_5) Le voy a leer ahora una lista de personas o grupos, y quiero que me diga qué tanto 
[crédito/culpa] cree usted que merecen por las condiciones económicas actuales.'
¿Merece (…) mucho [crédito/culpa], algo de [crédito/culpa], poco [crédito/culpa]  o 
nada de [crédito/culpa] por las condiciones económicas que enfrenta actualmente el 
país? 
Enc. Rotar cada vez Mucho Algo Poco Nada Ns/Nc (esp)  
a) El Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto 1 2 3 4 9  
b) El ex presidente Felipe Calderón  1 2 3 4 9  
c) La bancada del PRI en el 
Congreso de la Unión 1 2 3 4 9  
d) La bancada del PAN en Congreso 
de la Unión 1 2 3 4 9  
e) La bancada del PRD en el 
Congreso de la Unión 1 2 3 4 9  
f) El Banco de México 1 2 3 4 9  
g) Los bancos y otras instituciones 
financieras 1 2 3 4 9  
h) La Secretaría de Hacienda 1 2 3 4 9  
 
p5_6) Pensando en la situación de su propia economía, actualmente ¿usted diría que es 
mucho mejor ahora, mejor ahora, igual que antes, peor ahora, o mucho peor ahora que la 
que usted tenía hace un año?  
(Enc. si contesta –igual-, pregunte: ¿igual de bien o igual de mal?) 
1) Mucho mejor ahora   5) Peor ahora  
2) Mejor ahora   6) Mucho peor ahora 
3) Igual de bien que hace un año (Esp)  
4) Igual de mal que hace un año (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
p5_7) Pensando en la situación de su propia economía para el siguiente año, ¿usted diría 
que su economía estará mucho mejor, mejor, igual que ahora, peor, o mucho peor que la 
que usted tiene actualmente? 
(Enc. si contesta –igual-, pregunte: ¿igual de bien o igual de mal?) 
1) Mucho mejor   5) Peor 
2) Mejor    6) Mucho peor 
3) Igual de bien que ahora (Esp) 
4) Igual de mal que ahora (Esp)  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
VI. EVALUACIÓN DE LA SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA 
PERCEPCIÓN DE LA INSEGURIDAD 
p6_1) Cambiando de tema, si compara la seguridad pública en el país con la que había 
hace un año, ¿usted diría que la seguridad  ha mejorado o ha empeorado?  
(Enc. Insistir: ¿Mejorado/Empeorado mucho o poco?) 
1) Mejorado mucho  4) Empeorado poco   
2) Mejorado poco  5) Empeorado mucho   
3) Sigue igual (Esp)  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)    |___| 
 
p6_2) Pensando en los próximos 12 meses, ¿usted diría que la seguridad pública del país 
mejorará o empeorará? (Enc. Insistir: ¿Mejorará/Empeorará mucho o poco?) 
1) Mejorará mucho  4) Empeorará poco   
2) Mejorará poco  5) Empeorará mucho  
3) Seguirá igual (Esp)  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |___| 
 
p6_3) En su opinión, ¿quién tiene mayor responsabilidad de la seguridad de los 
ciudadanos como usted, la policía federal, la policía estatal, o la policía municipal? 
1) La policía federal  4) Todas las policías (Esp) 
2) La policía estatal 
3) La policía municipal  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |___| 
 
p6_4) ¿Usted fue o no víctima de algún asalto o robo en los pasados 12 meses, es decir, 
en el periodo de abril de 2014 a abril de 2015?  
1) Sí      2) No    9) Ns/Nc (Esp)    |____| 
 
p6_5) En su opinión, ¿mayores penas para quienes cometen delitos, ayudaría o no 
ayudaría a disminuir los delitos? 
1) Sí ayudaría a disminuirían los delitos 3) Se mantendrían igual (esp) 
2) No ayudaría a disminuirían los delitos 9) Ns/ Nc (esp)                     |___|   
 
 VII. PLÁTICAS DE POLÍTICA 
Dígame por favor si usted se entera o no de lo que pasa en la política por medio de (...) 
p7_1) Dígame por favor si usted se entera 
o no de lo que pasa en la política por 
medio de (...) 
Encuestador: ROTAR cada vez  
 
→Encuestador: si –SI- se entera, 
pregunte:  
p7_2) ¿Y con qué frecuencia se entera 
por ese medio?  























































a) Las noticias en la televisión 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
b) Periódicos 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
c) Las noticias en la radio 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
d) Revistas 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
e) Anuncios de algún partido 
político 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
f) Declaraciones del Presidente 
de la República 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
g) Declaraciones de diputados 
y senadores 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
h) Declaraciones de funcionarios 
de gobierno 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
i) Programas sobre política  1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
j) ) Familiares (padres, hijos, 
hermanos, suegro, primo) 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
k) Amigos 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
l) Profesores 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
m) Compañeros de trabajo     1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
n)Sacerdotes 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
o) Compañeros de escuela 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
p) Vecinos 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
q) Internet 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
r) Twitter 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
s) Facebook 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
t) Youtube 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
u) Mensajes de texto en su 
celular 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
 
p7_3) ¿Usted considera que estas conversaciones influyen o no influyen en su punto de 
vista acerca de las campañas o de los candidatos? 
1) Mucho  3) Poco  9) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
2) Algo  4) Nada     |___| 
VIII. CAMPAÑAS 
MENSAJES DE CAMPAÑAS 
p8_1) Pensando en 
esta semana, ¿usted 
ha visto o ha 
escuchado anuncios 
































) Enc: Si ha visto y/o ha 
escuchado pregunte: 
 
p8_2) ¿Qué es lo que usted más 
recuerda de estos anuncios? 
a) PAN 1 2 3 4 9  
b) PRI 1 2 3 4 9  
c) PRD 1 2 3 4 9  
d) PVEM 1 2 3 4 9  
e) MORENA 1 2 3 4 9  
 
IX. TEMAS DE INTERÉS 
EVALUACIÓN DE PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS 
Ahora vamos a hablar sobre los partidos políticos. De los siguientes partidos, dígame por 
favor ¿cuáles conoce y qué opinión tiene de ellos? 
p9_1) ¿Ha oído hablar o no  
(...)?   (Encuestador: rotar 
partidos cada vez) 
  
→Encuestador: si ha oído sobre el 
partido, pregunte: 
p9_2) ¿Y cuál es su opinión sobre este 
partido: Muy buena, buena, mala o muy 
mala? 
















a) Partido Acción 




1 2 |__| → 1 2 3 4 5 9' |__| 
c) Partido de la 
Revolución 
Democrática                       
1 2 |__| → 1 2 3 4 5 9' |__| 
d) Partido del 
Trabajo 1 2 |__| → 1 2 3 4 5 9' |__| 
e) Partido Verde 
Ecologista de 
México 
1 2 |__| → 1 2 3 4 5 9' |__| 
f) Movimiento 
Ciudadano 1 2 |__| → 1 2 3 4 5 9' |__| 




1 2 |__| → 1 2 3 4 5 9' |__| 
i) Encuentro 
Social  1 2 |__| → 1 2 3 4 5 9 |__| 
j) Partido 
Humanista 1 2 |__| → 1 2 3 4 5 9 |__| 
 
9_3) Independientemente de qué partido se beneficie más con las alianzas y coaliciones, 
¿la opinión que usted tiene del (…) mejora o empeora cuando va en alianza con otro 
partido? 
(Encuestador: Rotar 
opciones e insistir 
mucho/algo) 
Mejora 
Ni mejora ni 
empeora 
(esp) 
Empeora Ns/Nc (esp)  
a) PAN 1 2 3 9  
b) PRI 1 2 3 9  
c) PRD                       1 2 3 9  
d) PT 1 2 3 9  
e) PVEM 1 2 3 9  
f) Mov. Ciudadano 1 2 3 9  
g) PANAL 1 2 3 9  
h) MORENA 1 2 3 9  
i) Encuentro Soc. 1 2 3 9  
j) P Humanista 1 2 3 9  
 
COYUNTURA 
COYUNTURA A: RENUNCIA DE DAVID KORENFELD 
A_1) ¿Usted se enteró de que esta semana el titular de la CONAGUA, David Korenfeld, 
renunció a su cargo, o no se enteró de esto? 
1) Sí 2) No (Pase a A_3) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a A_3)  |___| 
 
A_2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la renuncia de 
David Korenfeld como titular de la CONAGUA? 
1) Twitter  5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares 
2) Facebook 6) Periódico   
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias  
4) Radio  8) Otro__________________ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
A_3) David Korenfeld renunció como titular de la CONAGUA después de que se diera a 
conocer que usó un helicóptero del gobierno para un asunto personal. ¿Usted está de 
acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que David Korenfeld haya renunciado a su cargo? 
1) Muy de acuerdo        4) En desacuerdo                               
2) De acuerdo               5) Muy en desacuerdo  
3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp)  9) Ns/Nc (esp)  |____|  
 
COYUNTURA B: AGENTES EXTRANGEROS 
B_1) ¿Usted se enteró de que esta semana el Senado aprobó una ley que permitirá que 
agentes extranjeros puedan portar armas en México, o no se enteró de esto? 
1) Sí 2) No (Pase a B_3) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a B_3)  |___| 
 
B_2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la aprobación de 
esta ley? 
1) Twitter  5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares 
2) Facebook 6) Periódico   
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias  
4) Radio  8) Otro__________________ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___|___| 
 
B_3) El Senado aprobó una ley que permitirá que agentes extranjeros puedan portar 
armas en México para ejercer facultades en materia de migración, aduanales y de 
seguridad en visitas oficiales, a jefes de Estado, jefes de Gobierno o ministros. ¿Usted 
está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que agentes extranjeros puedan portar armas en 
México? 
1) Muy de acuerdo        4) En desacuerdo                               
2) De acuerdo               5) Muy en desacuerdo  
3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp)  9) Ns/Nc (esp)  |____|  
 
COYUNTURA C: CARMEN SALINAS DIPUTADA 
C_1) ¿Usted se enteró de que la actriz Carmen Salinas fue designada candidata a 
diputada federal por el PRI, o no se enteró de esto? 








C_2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la asignación de la 
actriz Carmen Salinas como diputada federal del PRI? 
1) Twitter  5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares 
2) Facebook 6) Periódico   
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias  
4) Radio  8) Otro__________________ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
C_3) ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la actriz Carmen Salinas sea 
candidata a diputada federal? 
1) Muy de acuerdo        4) En desacuerdo                               
2) De acuerdo               5) Muy en desacuerdo  
3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp)  9) Ns/Nc (esp)  |____|  
 
COYUNTURA D: CUAUHTEMOC BLANCO PRESIDENTE MUNICIPAL 
D_1) ¿Usted se enteró de que el futbolista Cuauhtémoc  Blanco fue designado candidato 
a la presidencia municipal de Cuernavaca, Morelos, por el Partido Social Demócrata, o no 
se enteró de esto? 
1) Sí 2) No (Pase a D_3) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a D_3)  |___| 
D_2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la asignación del 
futbolista Cuauhtémoc Blanco como candidato a la presidencia municipal de Cuernavaca? 
1) Twitter  5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares 
2) Facebook 6) Periódico   
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias  
4) Radio  8) Otro__________________ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
D_3) ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que el futbolista Cuauhtémoc Blanco 
sea candidato a presidente municipal? 
1) Muy de acuerdo        4) En desacuerdo                               
2) De acuerdo               5) Muy en desacuerdo  
3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp)  9) Ns/Nc (esp)  |____|  
 
COYUNTURA E: EL HIJO DEL PERRO AGUAYO 
E_1) ¿Usted se enteró de que el mes pasado murió el Hijo del Perro Aguayo por un golpe 
que recibió en una función de lucha libre, o no se enteró de esto? 
1) Sí 2) No (Pase a E_3) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a E_3)  |___| 
 
E_2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la muerte del Hijo 
del Perro Aguayo? 
1) Twitter  5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares 
2) Facebook 6) Periódico   
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias  
4) Radio  8) Otro__________________ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
E_3) ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con que se practique la lucha 
libre? 
1) Muy de acuerdo        4) En desacuerdo                               
2) De acuerdo               5) Muy en desacuerdo  
3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp)  9) Ns/Nc (esp)  |____|  
 
COYUNTURA F: 007 EN MÉXICO 
F_1) ¿Usted se enteró de que la semana pasada se grabaron escenas de la película 007 
en el zócalo de la Ciudad de México, o no se enteró de esto? 
1) Sí 2) No (Pase a G_1) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a G_1)  |___| 
 
F_2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de esta grabación en 
el zócalo de la Ciudad de México? 
1) Twitter  5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares 
2) Facebook 6) Periódico   
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias  
4) Radio  8) Otro__________________ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
COYUNTURA F: 007 EN MÉXICO 
G_1) ¿Y usted se enteró de que esta semana se dio a conocer un video en el que la 
primera dama, Angélica Rivera, y sus hijas están de compras en tiendas de lujo de 
Estados Unidos, o no se enteró de esto? 
1) Sí 2) No (Pase a p10_1) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a p10_1)  |___| 
 
G_2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar del video de la 
primera dama y sus hijas de compras en Estados Unidos? 
1) Twitter  5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares 
2) Facebook 6) Periódico   
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias  
4) Radio  8) Otro__________________ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
X. TEMAS DEFOE 
TEMA A: AEROLINEAS 
p10_1) En los últimos doce meses ¿Cuántas veces ha viajado en un avión comercial? 
(contando cada ida y vuelta como un solo viaje) 
1) Ninguna                        3) 3-4 veces                                      
2) 1-2 veces                               4) 5 veces o más                 9) Ns/Nc (esp)             |____|        
 
p10_2) En los últimos doce meses ¿Cuántas veces ha viajado en un camión comercial? 
(contando cada ida y vuelta como un solo viaje) 
1) Ninguna                        3) 3-4 veces                                      
2) 1-2 veces                               4) 5 veces o más                 9) Ns/Nc (esp)             |____|        
     
Ahora le voy a preguntar sobre las aerolíneas en México: 
 p10_3) ¿Ha oído hablar o no 
de (…)?   Encuestador: rote 
cada vez   
p10_4) →Encuestador: si –SI- ha oído, 
pregunte:  
… ¿Y cuál es su opinión sobre esta aerolínea 
(…)? 
















a) Aeroméxico 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
b) Interjet 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
c) Magnicharters 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
d) VivaAerobus 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
e) Volaris 1 2  1 2 3 4 5 9  
 
p10_5) Además de las aerolíneas tradicionales, a partir del año 2005 se introdujeron las 
llamadas aerolíneas de bajo costo en México. ¿Cree usted que los precios bajos hacen 
más accesible el viajar por aire? 
1) Si                        2) No                     9) Ns/Nc (esp)                   |____| 
 
TEMA B: CREDIBILIDAD EN LAS ENCUESTAS 
p10_6) Pasando a otro tema, dígame por favor, ¿Qué tanto confía usted en los resultados 
que se obtienen en las diferentes encuestas para diversos temas? 
1) Mucho           3) Poco                     9) Ns/Nc (esp)                      
2) Algo              4) Nada                                                           |____| 
 
p10_7) En el caso de las encuestas del ámbito electoral, ¿usted considera que los 
resultados de las diferentes casas encuestadoras coinciden entre ellos o no? 
1) Si                   2) No                           9) Ns/Nc (esp)       |____|                                      
 
 
p10_8) Ahora, ¿usted diría que generalmente se entera de los resultados de las diferentes 
casas encuestadoras en el ámbito electoral o generalmente no se entera? 
1) Generalmente sí me entero 2) Generalmente no me entero (Pase a p10_10) 
9) Ns/Nc (esp) (Pase a p10_10)     |____| 
 
p10_9) ¿Por qué medio se entera de los resultados de las diferentes encuestas? 
1) Twitter  5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares 
2) Facebook 6) Periódico   
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias  
4) Radio  8) Otro__________________ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
TEMA C: DEPRESIÓN 
p10_10) Podría decirme si en la última semana ha experimentado alguna de las 
siguientes:  
 
Si No Ns/Nc (esp) 
 
a) Preocupación 1 2 9 |____| 
b) Felicidad 1 2 9 |____| 
c) Tristeza 1 2 9 |____| 
d) Gozo 1 2 9 |____| 
e) Estrés 1 2 9 |____| 
f) Satisfacción 1 2 9 |____| 
g) Frustración 1 2 9 |____| 
h) Enojo 1 2 9 |____| 
 
p10_11) Pensando en su situación general de vida actualmente ¿usted diría que es mucho 
mejor, mejor, peor, o mucho peor que en los últimos 12 meses? 
(SI CONTESTA IGUAL, INSISTE IGUAL DE BIEN O IGUAL DE MAL) 
1) Mucho mejor  5) Peor  
2) Mejor   6) Mucho peor  
3) Igual de bien que hace 12 meses (Esp)  
4) Igual de mal que 12 meses (Esp)  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |____| 
 
p10_12) Pensando en su situación general de vida actualmente ¿usted diría que en los 
próximos 12 meses será mucho mejor, mejor, peor, o mucho peor? 
(SI CONTESTA IGUAL, INSISTE IGUAL DE BIEN O IGUAL DE MAL) 
1) Mucho mejor    5) Peor  
2) Mejor      6) Mucho peor 
3) Igual de bien que ahora (Esp)    
4) Igual de mal que ahora (Esp)   9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |____| 
 
p10_13) En general ¿Qué tan satisfecho o insatisfecho se siente con la vida que lleva 
actualmente? 
1) Muy satisfecho        4) Insatisfecho 
2) Algo satisfecho           5) Muy insatisfecho 
3) Ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho (esp.)  9) Ns/Nc (esp)  |____|  
 
TEMA D: CONSUMO DE PRODUCTOS MEXICANOS 
p10_14) Cuando va de compras ¿Suele fijarse o no suele fijarse si los productos que 
compra tienen el registro de “Hecho en México”? 
1) Si                         2) No                       9) Ns/Nc (esp.)                  |____| 
  
p10_15) ¿Usted prefiere o no prefiere comprar productos hechos en México? 
1) Si prefiero     
2) No prefiero (Pase a p10_17)         9) Ns/Nc (esp) (Pase a p10_17)     |____| 
 
10_16) Cuando compra productos mexicanos lo hace por (…)? 
 Si No Ns/Nc(esp.) 
 
a) Calidad 1 2 9 |____| 
b) Para apoyar a la industria mexicana 1 2 9 |____| 
c) Precio 1 2 9 |____| 
d) Porque sus amigos/familiares los compran 1 2 9 |____| 
e) Por su imagen 1 2 9 |____| 
f) Otro 1 2 9 |____| 
 
10_17) ¿Cuál es la principal razón por la que compra productos importados? 
1) Calidad  4) Por su imagen                                   
2) Precio  5) Otro 




T_1) Ahora dígame por favor, ¿Cuenta usted con (…) en su vivienda o no? 
Enc: Rotar Sí No Ns/Nc  
a) Televisión de cinescopio (convencional) 1 2 9 |___| 
b) Televisión de plasma, lcd, led (pantalla) 1 2 9 |___| 
b) Teléfono fijo 1 2 9 |___| 
 
T_2) De los siguientes artículos, dígame por favor ¿usted cuenta o no con (…)?: 
Enc: Rotar Sí No Ns/Nc  
a) iPod o reproductor de MP3 1 2 9  
b) Tableta 1 2 9  
c) Cámara digital 1 2 9  
d) Video cámara 1 2 9  
e) GPS 1 2 9  
f) Kindle (Lector electrónico de libros) 1 2 9  
g) Reproductor DVD 1 2 9  
h) Reproductor Blu-Ray 1 2 9  
i) Computadora de Escritorio 1 2 9  
j) Computadora Laptop 1 2 9  
k) Consola de videojuegos (Play Station, X Box, Wii, etc) 1 2 9  
 
ACCESO Y USOS DE INTERNET 
T_3) ¿Usted utiliza Internet? 
1) Sí          2) No (Pase a T_11) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_11) |___| 
 
T_4) ¿Para acceder a internet usted suele utilizar (…)? 
Enc: No rotar opciones Si No Ns/Nc  
a) Banda ancha (WiFi, cable, satélite) 1 2 9 |___| 
b) Conexión por cableado (Fax Modem interno/ 
línea telefónica directa a la computadora) 1 2 9 
|___| 
c) Conexión de banda ancha móvil (3G/4G) 1 2 9 |___| 
 
T_5) ¿Principalmente en qué lugar suele conectarse a Internet?  
1) En casa                                 5) En el trabajo 
2) En un café internet                6) Otro__________ 
3) En casa de un amigo o familiar                    
4) En el lugar de trabajo de un amigo o familiar 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) |___| 
 
T_6) ¿Con que frecuencia utiliza internet? 
1) Diario   4) Una vez al mes 
2) Una vez a la semana 5) Cada dos meses o más 







T_7) ¿Cuántas horas se conecta cada vez que utiliza Internet? 
|____|____| Horas  99) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
 
T_8) Aproximadamente ¿Cuántos años lleva siendo usuario de internet? 
1) 6 meses o menos 4) 3 años   7) 6 años o más 
2) Un año  5) 4 años  
3) 2 a 3 años 6) 5 años   9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
T_9) ¿Usted cuenta o no con correo electrónico? 
1) Sí   2) No (Pase a T_11)    9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_11) |___| 
 
T_10) ¿Con qué servidor tiene su cuenta de correo electrónico principal? 
1) Hotmail  4) Outlook 
2) Gmail  5) Otro: ______________________ 
3) Yahoo  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)    |___| 
 
CELULARES 
T_11) ¿Tiene celular propio o no? 
1) Sí 2) No (Pase a T_23) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_23)   |___| 
 
T_12) ¿Paga su celular por medio de tarjetas pre-pagadas o de un plan? 
1) Tarjetas de prepago          2) Plan         9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |___| 
 
T_13) ¿Aproximadamente cuánto gasta al mes en su celular? 
1) De $100 -$300  4) De $1001- $1500 
2) De $301-$500  5) Más de $1500 
3) De $501-$1000  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |___| 
 
T_14) ¿Con qué compañía tiene contratado su servicio de celular? 
1) Telcel  4) Nextel  9) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
2) Movistar  5) Unefon  
3) Iusacell  6) Otro (Esp): _________________  |___|       
 
T_15) ¿El celular con el que usted cuenta es un teléfono inteligente o no? 
1) Si         2) No (Pase a T_18) 9) Ns/Nc (Pase a T_18) |___| 
   
T_16) ¿Qué sistema operativo tiene su teléfono inteligente? 
1) iOs (Mac)   4) Windows Phone  
2) Android   5) Otro (Esp): ________________ 
3) Blackberry OS  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)                      |___| 
 
T_17) ¿Accesó a Internet o no desde su teléfono inteligente ayer? 
1) Sí   2) No  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
T_18) ¿Su celular tiene o no acceso a internet? 
1) Sí  2) No (Pase a T_20) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_20)  |___| 
 
T_19) ¿Usted accede a internet en su celular a través de WiFi o Red 3G o similar? 
1) WIFI   2) 3G o similar 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
T_20) A continuación le voy a leer una lista, dígame si alguna vez ha utilizado o no su 
teléfono celular para realizar cualquiera de las siguientes cosas. ¿Utiliza su teléfono celular 
para (…)? 
Enc: Rotar Si No Ns/ Nc  
a) Enviar o recibir correos 1 2 9 |___| 
b) Acceder a internet 1 2 9 |___| 
c) Jugar 1 2 9 |___| 
d) Chatear 1 2 9 |___| 
e) Escuchar música 1 2 9 |___| 
f) Ver videos 1 2 9 |___| 
g) Buscar información 1 2 9 |___| 
h) Hacer compras 1 2 9 |___| 
i) Participar en una video llamada 1 2 9 |___| 
j) Realizar pagos     
 
Enc: Pregunte T_21 si utiliza internet (T_3=1) y cuenta con acceso a internet en su 
celular (T_18=1). En otro caso pase a T_23 
T_21) En general, cuando usted utiliza Internet ¿lo hace principalmente desde su teléfono 
inteligente o desde algún otro dispositivo como una computadora de escritorio, laptop o 
una tableta? 
1) Desde mi teléfono inteligente (Pase a T_22)  4) Desde una tableta  
2) Desde una computadora de escritorio 
3) Desde una laptop    9) Ns/Nc (Esp) |___| 
Enc: Pase a T_23 
 
T_22) ¿Cuál es la razón principal por la que usted usa Internet principalmente en su 
teléfono celular en lugar de utilizar algún otro dispositivo? (Enc: Esperar respuesta 
espontánea y codificar) 
1) El teléfono celular me es más conveniente 
2) Mi teléfono celular está siempre conmigo 
3) El teléfono celular es más fácil de utilizar que una computadora 
4) No tengo computadora en casa 
5) Sólo tengo acceso a Internet en el teléfono celular / No tengo acceso a Internet en casa 
6)!Velocidad / teléfono es más rápido que la computadora 
7)!Utilizo el teléfono para trabajar 
8) Otro: ________________________  9) Ns/Nc  |___| 
 
REDES SOCIALES 
T_23) ¿Usted es miembro de alguna red social? 
1) Sí        2) No (Pase a X_1A)     9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a X_1A) |___| 
 
T_24) ¿Tiene usted o no 
una cuenta de…?  T_25) ¿Y con qué frecuencia utiliza esta red social?  
Enc: Rotar Sí No → Diario 
Una 













a) Twitter 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
b) Facebook 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
c) Myspace 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
d) Linkedin 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
e) Tumblr 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
f ) Youtube 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
g) Vimeo 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
h) Instagram 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
i) Google Plus 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
j) Pinterest 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
k) Hi5 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
l) Metroflog 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
m) Taringa 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
 
T_26) ¿Cuál es la cuenta que más utiliza? (Enc: Esperar respuesta espontánea) 
1) Twitter           4) Youtube 
2) Facebook 5) Otra: ____________________________ 
3) Myspace 9) Ns/Nc     |___| 
 
 
T_27) Principalmente, ¿Para qué utiliza usted las redes sociales?   
1) Platicar con los amigos 3) Hablar de política 
2) Informarse  4) Otro (Esp): _____ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) |___| 
 
T_28) Aproximadamente, ¿cuántos amigos o “contactos” tiene usted en la cuenta que más 
utiliza? 
|___|___|___|___| Amigos o “contactos” 9999) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
 
T_29) ¿Con qué frecuencia escribe usted mensajes para que todos sus contactos los 
vean? 
1) Menos de una vez por semana 
2) Una vez a la semana  6) Cinco veces a la semana 
3) Dos veces a la semana  7) Seis veces a la semana 
4) Tres veces a la semana  8) Diario 
5) Cuatro veces a la semana  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
X: ‘ITEM COUNT TECHNIQUE’ (A) 
X_1A) Le voy a mostrar una tarjeta donde se describen algunas actividades relacionadas 
con la última campaña electoral para presidente de la República en la cual resultó ganador 
Enrique Peña Nieto. Me gustaría que me indicara cuáles de las siguientes actividades 
fueron llevadas a cabo por algún candidato o representantes de partidos políticos (señalar 
sinónimos como operadores políticos, activistas o militantes para asegurar la 
comprensión). (Entregar TARJETA 2) 
Enc: No rotar opciones Si No Ns/Nc  
a) Visitaron tu casa para hablar con alguien 1 2 9 |___| 
b) Colocaron posters y pintaron paredes en tu 
colonia (Enc: señalar comunidad o 
vecindario, según área geográfica) 
1 2 9 |___| 
c) Lanzaron promocionales por radio y televisión 1 2 9 |___| 
d) Te informaron detalladamente sus propuestas 
de gobierno 1 2 9 |___| 
 
X_2) En las elecciones para presidente de la República en la cual resultó ganador Enrique 
Peña Nieto, el día de las votaciones ¿algún candidato o alguien ligado a algún partido 
político lo contactó? 
1) Sí   2) No  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
X_3) Independientemente de por cuál partido político o candidato votó, podría decirme cuál 
de las siguientes frases aplica más a usted y su experiencia… 
1) Había decidido mi voto antes del día de las elecciones y SÍ voté por esa opción. 
2) Había decidido mi voto antes del día de las elecciones pero NO voté por esa opción. 
3) No estaba seguro de por quién votar antes del día de las elecciones. 
9) Ns/Nc (Esp)      |___| 
        
XIX. Socio-Demográficos 
 
E) ¿Hasta qué año estudió usted? 
1)  Nada     3)  Secundaria   5)  Universidad o más 
2)  Primaria   4) Preparatoria, bachillerato o carreras técnicas  
9) Ns/Nc (esp)      |______| 
 
F) ¿Sumando todo lo que ganan en su familia, como cuánto ganan todos los que trabajan 
en su familia al mes? 
1) Hasta $1,500 3) $3,001-$6,000 5) Más de $12,000 
2) $1,501-$3,000 4) $6,001-$12,000 9) Ns/Nc (esp)                          |______|             
 
G) ¿Cuál es su principal ocupación?  
1) Sector público (no maestro)    8) Maestro 
2) Trabajador por cuenta propia    9) Desempleado 
3) Sector privado (no maestro)   10) Jubilado          
4) Sector agropecuario    11) Otro (esp) __________________ (anotar) 
5) Obrero                       99) Ns/Nc (esp)                                                                                             
6) Ama de casa                                                                                                                             
7) Estudiante                                                                                           |____|____| 
 
H) ¿Podría decirme cuál es su estado civil actualmente? 
1) Soltero (a)                5) Separado(a)  
2) Casado(a)                6) Viudo(a) 
3) En unión libre  
4) Divorciado(a)            9)Ns/Nc                                                                    |____| 
 
I) ¿Tiene hijos que dependan económicamente de usted? 
1) Sí  2) No  9) Ns/Nc (esp)               |______| 
 
J) ¿Practica usted alguna religión? 
1)   Sí,    ¿Cuál?_________________                                                               |______| 
2)   No  
9)   Ns/Nc 
 
K) Si usted recibe una solicitud para hacer una encuesta como ésta, ¿preferiría participar 
en una entrevista cara a cara en su vivienda, en una entrevista telefónica, en una 
entrevista a través de su teléfono celular o a través de una encuesta por internet? 
1) Cara a cara en vivienda  
2) Por teléfono  5) Otro (Esp): ____________ 
3) Por teléfono celular  6) Ninguno en particular (Esp) 
4) A través de internet  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |___| 
 
 
ENCUESTADOR: Pida y escriba el nombre del entrevistado  
_______________________________________________________ 
ENCUESTADOR EXPLIQUE LO SIGUIENTE “Para efectos de medir la calidad de mi 
trabajo, una persona de esta empresa se comunicará con usted. Para este fin le 
agradecería  mucho que me diera su número telefónico o celular para que puedan realizar 
esta supervisión 
_______________________________________________________ 
Enc: Anote la hora en que terminó la entrevista:                                       
                                                                                     |___|___| : |___|___| 
Hora         Minutos 
Enc: Anote la duración aprox. de la entrevista (en minutos):_______   
 


















Municipio/Delegación: ________________        |___||___|___|                 Entidad: _________________________   |___|___| 
 





Marque con una cruz su respuesta a esta pregunta y deposite la hoja en esta urna. Como usted ve, 
esta hoja es muy diferente a una boleta electoral y se usará solamente en esta encuesta. Su 
respuesta es confidencial. 
Si hoy fuera la elección para elegir DIPUTADOS FEDERALES,  
¿Por cuál partido votaría usted? 
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T_7) ¿Cuántas horas se conecta cada vez que utiliza Internet? 
|____|____| Horas  99) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
 
T_8) Aproximadamente ¿Cuántos años lleva siendo usuario de internet? 
1) 6 meses o menos 4) 3 años   7) 6 años o más 
2) Un año  5) 4 años  
3) 2 a 3 años 6) 5 años   9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
T_9) ¿Usted cuenta o no con correo electrónico? 
1) Sí   2) No (Pase a T_11)    9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_11) |___| 
 
T_10) ¿Con qué servidor tiene su cuenta de correo electrónico principal? 
1) Hotmail  4) Outlook 
2) Gmail  5) Otro: ______________________ 
3) Yahoo  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)    |___| 
 
CELULARES 
T_11) ¿Tiene celular propio o no? 
1) Sí 2) No (Pase a T_23) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_23)   |___| 
 
T_12) ¿Paga su celular por medio de tarjetas pre-pagadas o de un plan? 
1) Tarjetas de prepago          2) Plan         9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |___| 
 
T_13) ¿Aproximadamente cuánto gasta al mes en su celular? 
1) De $100 -$300  4) De $1001- $1500 
2) De $301-$500  5) Más de $1500 
3) De $501-$1000  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |___| 
 
T_14) ¿Con qué compañía tiene contratado su servicio de celular? 
1) Telcel  4) Nextel  9) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
2) Movistar  5) Unefon  
3) Iusacell  6) Otro (Esp): _________________  |___|       
 
T_15) ¿El celular con el que usted cuenta es un teléfono inteligente o no? 
1) Si         2) No (Pase a T_18) 9) Ns/Nc (Pase a T_18) |___| 
   
T_16) ¿Qué sistema operativo tiene su teléfono inteligente? 
1) iOs (Mac)   4) Windows Phone  
2) Android   5) Otro (Esp): ________________ 
3) Blackberry OS  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)                      |___| 
 
T_17) ¿Accesó a Internet o no desde su teléfono inteligente ayer? 
1) Sí   2) No  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
T_18) ¿Su celular tiene o no acceso a internet? 
1) Sí  2) No (Pase a T_20) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_20)  |___| 
 
T_19) ¿Usted accede a internet en su celular a través de WiFi o Red 3G o similar? 
1) WIFI   2) 3G o similar 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
T_20) A continuación le voy a leer una lista, dígame si alguna vez ha utilizado o no su 
teléfono celular para realizar cualquiera de las siguientes cosas. ¿Utiliza su teléfono celular 
para (…)? 
Enc: Rotar Si No Ns/ Nc  
a) Enviar o recibir correos 1 2 9 |___| 
b) Acceder a internet 1 2 9 |___| 
c) Jugar 1 2 9 |___| 
d) Chatear 1 2 9 |___| 
e) Escuchar música 1 2 9 |___| 
f) Ver videos 1 2 9 |___| 
g) Buscar información 1 2 9 |___| 
h) Hacer compras 1 2 9 |___| 
i) Participar en una video llamada 1 2 9 |___| 
j) Realizar pagos     
 
Enc: Pregunte T_21 si utiliza internet (T_3=1) y cuenta con acceso a internet en su 
celular (T_18=1). En otro caso pase a T_23 
T_21) En general, cuando usted utiliza Internet ¿lo hace principalmente desde su teléfono 
inteligente o desde algún otro dispositivo como una computadora de escritorio, laptop o 
una tableta? 
1) Desde mi teléfono inteligente (Pase a T_22)  4) Desde una tableta  
2) Desde una computadora de escritorio 
3) Desde una laptop    9) Ns/Nc (Esp) |___| 
Enc: Pase a T_23 
 
T_22) ¿Cuál es la razón principal por la que usted usa Internet principalmente en su 
teléfono celular en lugar de utilizar algún otro dispositivo? (Enc: Esperar respuesta 
espontánea y codificar) 
1) El teléfono celular me es más conveniente 
2) Mi teléfono celular está siempre conmigo 
3) El teléfono celular es más fácil de utilizar que una computadora 
4) No tengo computadora en casa 
5) Sólo tengo acceso a Internet en el teléfono celular / No tengo acceso a Internet en casa 
6)!Velocidad / teléfono es más rápido que la computadora 
7)!Utilizo el teléfono para trabajar 
8) Otro: ________________________  9) Ns/Nc  |___| 
 
REDES SOCIALES 
T_23) ¿Usted es miembro de alguna red social? 
1) Sí        2) No (Pase a X_1B)     9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a X_1B) |___| 
 
T_24) ¿Tiene usted o no 
una cuenta de…?  T_25) ¿Y con qué frecuencia utiliza esta red social?  
Enc: Rotar Sí No → Diario 
Una 













a) Twitter 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
b) Facebook 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
c) Myspace 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
d) Linkedin 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
e) Tumblr 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
f ) Youtube 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
g) Vimeo 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
h) Instagram 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
i) Google Plus 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
j) Pinterest 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
k) Hi5 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
l) Metroflog 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
m) Taringa 1 2 → 1 2 3 4 5 9  
 
T_26) ¿Cuál es la cuenta que más utiliza? (Enc: Esperar respuesta espontánea) 
1) Twitter           4) Youtube 
2) Facebook 5) Otra: ____________________________ 
3) Myspace 9) Ns/Nc     |___| 
 
 
T_27) Principalmente, ¿Para qué utiliza usted las redes sociales?   
1) Platicar con los amigos 3) Hablar de política 
2) Informarse  4) Otro (Esp): _____ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) |___| 
 
T_28) Aproximadamente, ¿cuántos amigos o “contactos” tiene usted en la cuenta que más 
utiliza? 
|___|___|___|___| Amigos o “contactos” 9999) Ns/Nc (Esp) 
 
T_29) ¿Con qué frecuencia escribe usted mensajes para que todos sus contactos los 
vean? 
1) Menos de una vez por semana 
2) Una vez a la semana  6) Cinco veces a la semana 
3) Dos veces a la semana  7) Seis veces a la semana 
4) Tres veces a la semana  8) Diario 
5) Cuatro veces a la semana  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
X: ‘ITEM COUNT TECHNIQUE’ (B) 
X_1B) Le voy a mostrar una tarjeta donde se describen algunas actividades relacionadas 
con la última campaña electoral para presidente de la República en la cual resultó ganador 
Enrique Peña Nieto. Me gustaría que me indicara si algún candidato o representantes de 
partidos políticos (señalar sinónimos como operadores políticos, activistas o 
militantes para asegurar la comprensión) llevaron a cabo dichas actividades. Por favor 
NO ME DIGA CUÁLES, SOLAMENTE LA CANTIDAD (señalar 1, 2, 3, 4 o 5 para el 
grupo de tratamiento para asegurar la comprensión). (Entregar TARJETA 3) 
 
Por favor, dígame CUÁNTAS de estas cosas usted ha presenciado: cero, una, dos, tres, 
cuatro o cinco.       |____| 
 
X_2) En las elecciones para presidente de la República en la cual resultó ganador Enrique 
Peña Nieto, el día de las votaciones ¿algún candidato o alguien ligado a algún partido 
político lo contactó? 
1) Sí   2) No  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)  |___| 
 
X_3) Independientemente de por cuál partido político o candidato votó, podría decirme cuál 
de las siguientes frases aplica más a usted y su experiencia… 
1) Había decidido mi voto antes del día de las elecciones y SÍ voté por esa opción. 
2) Había decidido mi voto antes del día de las elecciones pero NO voté por esa opción. 
3) No estaba seguro de por quién votar antes del día de las elecciones. 
9) Ns/Nc (Esp)      |___| 
        
XIX. Socio-Demográficos 
 
E) ¿Hasta qué año estudió usted? 
1)  Nada     3)  Secundaria   5)  Universidad o más 
2)  Primaria   4) Preparatoria, bachillerato o carreras técnicas  
9) Ns/Nc (esp)      |______| 
 
F) ¿Sumando todo lo que ganan en su familia, como cuánto ganan todos los que trabajan 
en su familia al mes? 
1) Hasta $1,500 3) $3,001-$6,000 5) Más de $12,000 
2) $1,501-$3,000 4) $6,001-$12,000 9) Ns/Nc (esp)                          |______|             
 
G) ¿Cuál es su principal ocupación?  
1) Sector público (no maestro)    8) Maestro 
2) Trabajador por cuenta propia    9) Desempleado 
3) Sector privado (no maestro)   10) Jubilado          
4) Sector agropecuario    11) Otro (esp) __________________ (anotar) 
5) Obrero                       99) Ns/Nc (esp)                                                                                             
6) Ama de casa                                                                                                                             
7) Estudiante                                                                                           |____|____| 
 
H) ¿Podría decirme cuál es su estado civil actualmente? 
1) Soltero (a)                5) Separado(a)  
2) Casado(a)                6) Viudo(a) 
3) En unión libre  
4) Divorciado(a)            9)Ns/Nc                                                                    |____| 
 
I) ¿Tiene hijos que dependan económicamente de usted? 
1) Sí  2) No  9) Ns/Nc (esp)               |______| 
 
J) ¿Practica usted alguna religión? 
1)   Sí,    ¿Cuál?_________________                                                               |______| 
2)   No  
9)   Ns/Nc 
 
K) Si usted recibe una solicitud para hacer una encuesta como ésta, ¿preferiría participar 
en una entrevista cara a cara en su vivienda, en una entrevista telefónica, en una 
entrevista a través de su teléfono celular o a través de una encuesta por internet? 
1) Cara a cara en vivienda  
2) Por teléfono  5) Otro (Esp): ____________ 
3) Por teléfono celular  6) Ninguno en particular (Esp) 
4) A través de internet  9) Ns/Nc (Esp)   |___| 
 
 
ENCUESTADOR: Pida y escriba el nombre del entrevistado  
_______________________________________________________ 
ENCUESTADOR EXPLIQUE LO SIGUIENTE “Para efectos de medir la calidad de mi 
trabajo, una persona de esta empresa se comunicará con usted. Para este fin le 
agradecería  mucho que me diera su número telefónico o celular para que puedan realizar 
esta supervisión 
_______________________________________________________ 
Enc: Anote la hora en que terminó la entrevista:                                       
                                                                                     |___|___| : |___|___| 
Hora         Minutos 
Enc: Anote la duración aprox. de la entrevista (en minutos):_______   
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A.4.4 Survey Reports 
 
A) Frequencies Demographics 
 
GENDER 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
Male 1 426 53.25 53.25 53.25 
Female 2 374 46.75 46.75 100.00 
Total 800 100.0 100.0   
 
AGE 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
-24 1 124 15.50 16.29 16.29 
25-34 2 198 24.75 26.02 42.31 
35-44 3 193 24.13 25.36 67.67 
45-54 4 151 18.88 19.84 87.52 
55-64 5 69 8.63 9.07 96.58 
65+ 6 26 3.25 3.42 100.00 
 . 39 4.88 Missing  
Total 800 100.0 100.0   
 
AGE GROUPED 
N Valid 761 
 Missing 39 
Mean  2.90 
Std Dev  1.33 
Minimum  1.00 







DEGREE OR LEVEL OF SCHOOL 
 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 





2 131 16.38 16.38 19.88 
Secondary 


















5 58 7.25 7.25 99.63 
 DK/NO 9 3 .38 .38 100.00 






HOUSEHOLD INCOME (MONTLY) 
 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
 Less than 
MX$1,500 1 67 8.38 8.38 8.38 
 MX$1,501-
MX$3,000 2 149 18.63 18.63 27.00 
 MX$3,001-
MX$6,000 3 323 40.38 40.38 67.38 
 MX$6,001-
MX$12,000 4 159 19.88 19.88 87.25 
 MX$12,000 
or more 5 21 2.63 2.63 89.88 
 DK/NO 9 81 10.13 10.13 100.00 
Total 800 100.0 100.0   






B) Frequencies Experiment-Related 
 
ITEMS ASKED INDIVIDUALLY (CONTROL GROUP)  
 
They visited your home to talk to someone 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
Yes 1 103 12.88 25.75 25.75 
No 2 290 36.25 72.50 98.25 
DK/NO 9 7 .88 1.75 100.00 
 . 400 50.00 Missing  
Total 800 100.0 100.0   
 
 
They put up campaign posters or signs in your neighbourhood/city 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
Yes 1 219 27.38 54.75 54.75 
No 2 169 21.13 42.25 97.00 
DK/NO 9 12 1.50 3.00 100.00 
 . 400 50.00 Missing  
Total 800 100.0 100.0   
 
They broadcasted campaign advertisements on radio or television 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
Yes 1 229 28.63 57.25 57.25 
No 2 154 19.25 38.50 95.75 
DK/NO 9 17 2.13 4.25 100.00 
 . 400 50.00 Missing  
Total 800 100.0 100.0   
 
 
They communicated you in detail their candidates’ manifesto 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
Yes 1 75 9.38 18.75 18.75 
No 2 312 39.00 78.00 96.75 
DK/NO 9 13 1.63 3.25 100.00 
 . 400 50.00 Missing  








…During the Election Day, did any candidate or activist contact you? 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
Yes 1 118 14.75 14.75 14.75 
No 2 637 79.63 79.63 94.38 
DK/NO 9 45 5.63 5.63 100.00 
Total 800 100.0 100.0   
 
…which of the following statements you would say suits better your own 
experience? 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
I had already made 
my choice 
BEFORE the 
Election Day and I 
DID VOTE for that 
option 
1 377 47.13 47.13 47.13 
I had already made 
my choice 
BEFORE the 
Election Day but I 
DID NOT VOTE for 
that option 
2 164 20.50 20.50 67.63 
I had made NO 
choice BEFORE 
the Election Day 
3 136 17.00 17.00 84.63 
DK/NO 9 123 15.38 15.38 100.00 







…which party do you think yourself more lean to? 
 
Value Label Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cum 
Percent 
 PAN strong 1 82 10.25 10.25 10.25 
 PAN not 
strong 2 72 9.00 9.00 19.25 
 PRI strong 3 176 22.00 22.00 41.25 
 PRI not 
strong 4 100 12.50 12.50 53.75 
 PRD strong 5 54 6.75 6.75 60.50 
 PRD not 
strong 6 39 4.88 4.88 65.38 
 PT strong 7 13 1.63 1.63 67.00 
 PVEM strong 9 13 1.63 1.63 68.63 
 PVEM not 








12 7 .88 .88 72.88 
 Nueva 




14 4 .50 .50 74.00 
 MORENA 
strong 15 11 1.38 1.38 75.38 
 MORENA not 
strong 16 8 1.00 1.00 76.38 
 Encuentro 












20 3 .38 .38 77.63 
 None 22 160 20.00 20.00 97.63 
 DK/NO 99 19 2.38 2.38 100.00 








C) Cross Tabulation 
 













and I DID 
VOTE for 
that option 














Yes 51.00 38.00 22.00 7.00 118.00 
 43.22% 32.20% 18.64% 5.93% 100.00% 
 13.53% 23.17% 16.18% 5.69% 14.75% 
 6.38% 4.75% 2.75% .88% 14.75% 
No 315.00 119.00 107.00 96.00 637.00 
 49.45% 18.68% 16.80% 15.07% 100.00% 
 83.55% 72.56% 78.68% 78.05% 79.63% 
 39.38% 14.88% 13.38% 12.00% 79.63% 
DK/NO 11.00 7.00 7.00 20.00 45.00 
 24.44% 15.56% 15.56% 44.44% 100.00% 
 2.92% 4.27% 5.15% 16.26% 5.63% 
 1.38% .88% .88% 2.50% 5.63% 
Total 377.00 164.00 136.00 123.00 800.00 
 47.13% 20.50% 17.00% 15.38% 100.00% 
 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 




Statistic Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Pearson Chi-Square 47.35 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 40.98 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 35.21 1 .000 









Non–sensitive item from the ITC, They visited your home to talk to 
someone * People Contacted by Activists  
 Contacted by Activists   
They visited your 
home to talk to 
someone 
No Yes Total 
 Yes 64.00 37.00 101.00 
 63.37% 36.63% 100.00% 
 19.69% 72.55% 26.86% 
 17.02% 9.84% 26.86% 
 No 257.00 14.00 271.00 
 94.83% 5.17% 100.00% 
 79.08% 27.45% 72.07% 
 68.35% 3.72% 72.07% 
 DK/NO 4.00 .00 4.00 
 100.00% .00% 100.00% 
 1.23% .00% 1.06% 
 1.06% .00% 1.06% 
Total 325.00 51.00 376.00 
 86.44% 13.56% 100.00% 
 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 86.44% 13.56% 100.00% 
 
Chi-square tests. 
Statistic Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Pearson Chi-Square 62.78 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 55.58 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 22.09 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 376   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
